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UNIVERSITY  OF  ILLINOIS  STUDIES 

IN  THE 
SOCIAL  SCIENCES 

VOL.  IX  DECEMBER,  1920  No.  4 


THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU 


BOARD  OF  EDITORS  : 

ERNEST  L.  BOGART  JOHN  A.  FATRT.TB 

ALBERT  H.  LYBYER 


COPYRIGHT,  1922 
BY  THE  UNIVERSITY  OP  ILLINOIS 


The  Economic  Policies  of  Richelieu 

BY 
FRANKLIN  CHARLES  PALM,  PH.  D. 

Assistant  Professor  of  Modern  European  History 
in  the  University  of  California 


To  my  Father  and  Mother 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

PREFACE      .         .         .         .         .         .         .         .  9 

I.    INTRODUCTION          . 13 

Richelieu  is  known  chiefly  by  his  political  accomplish- 
ments. The  aim  of  this  study  is  to  point  out  that  he 
was  an  economic  as  well  as  a  political  statesman.  The 
economic  side  of  his  career  has  been  underestimated, 
and  a  study  of  this  is  important  in  order  to  attain  a 
fair  estimate  of  his  character  and  accomplishments. 

II.    THE  AGE  OF  MERCANTILISM      ......          17 

A.  The  17th  century  was  the  age  of  mercantilism.     Def- 
inition of  the  mercantilistic  view  of  which  Richelieu  was 
on  the  whole  a  true  exponent. 

B.  The  age  of  Henry  IV  and  Sully  was  the  first  in 
which  the  economic  side  of  French  development  was 
recognized  and  fostered.     Both  Sully  and  Henry  IV 
lacked  definite  conceptions  of  economic  doctrine,  and 
what  they  accomplished  along  such  lines  largely  disap- 
peared after  the  death  of  Henry  IV.     The  meeting  of 
the  Estates  General  in  1614. 

C.  Montchretien  'a  economic  treatise  was  published  about 
1614.  In  it  he  brings  out  the  need  of  a  great  man  at  the 
head  of  affairs  of  state  to  meet  the  various  economic 
problems.     The  economic  philosophy  of  Montchretien 
was  very  similar  to  Richelieu's.     It  is  probable  that 
the  Cardinal  read  and  was  influenced  by  Montchr4tien  's 
book. 

III.    THE  ECONOMIC  RELATIONS  EXISTING  BETWEEN  RICHELIEU, 

THE   KING   AND   THE   THREE   ESTATES  ....  29 

A.  The  King 

Richelieu  regarded  the  King  as  the  father  of  his  coun- 
try, responsible  to  God  alone.     He  and  the  Cardinal 
were  to  do  all  they  could  to  build  up  the  state  of  which 
the  King  was  the  sole  earthly  owner. 

B.  The  Nobility ••  -.   :      . 

Richelieu  wanted  to  diminish  the  political  power  of  the 
nobles  and  increase  their  economic  and  other  useful- 
ness.    He  recognized  the  justice  of  their  claims  to  a 
large    place   in    the    administrative   functions    of   the 
country,  and  frankly  opposed  them  only  in  so  far  as 
they  injured  the  development  of  the  state. 


CONTENTS  [550 

C.  The  Clergy 

Eiehelieu  favored  a  national  clergy  as  a  valuable  factor 
in  the  welfare  of  the  state.     He  recognized  their  eco- 
nomic as  well  as  their  religious  importance. 

D.  The  Third  Estate 

Eiehelieu,  according  to  some  writers,  considered  the 
Third  Estate  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  welfare 
of  the  nation,  even  though  such  consideration  might 
prove  detrimental  to  the  position  of  that  body.     Yet 
he  did  have  sympathy  for  thej  Third  Estate  from  the 
very   first   and   tried   to   better   its   position.     Other 
problems  prevented  the  completion  of  his  plans  in  its 
behalf,  which  one  can  find  expressed  in  his  Testament 
Politique. 

IV.    THE  ECONOMIC  ASPECTS  OF  EIOHELIEU'S  POLICY  OF  CEN-. 

TRALIZATION 46 

Centralization,  according  to  Eiehelieu,  was  a  means  of 
state  building.  In  becoming  ' '  grand  master,  chief  and 
general  superintendent  of  navigation  and  commerce," 
he  took  his  first  important  step  in  the  economic  central- 
ization of  power  in  the  hands  of  one  man.  Eiehelieu  *s 
treatment  of  all  individuals  was  based  on  their  contri- 
bution for  or  against  the  public  welfare.  The  economic 
importance  of  the  Intendants,  the  reduction  of  the 
powers  of  the  Parlements,  and  Eiehelieu 's  relations 
toward  the  Huguenots.  His  ideas  concerning  the  selec- 
tion of  royal  officials.  The  government  furthered  any 
schemes  beneficial  to  the  public  welfare :  i.e.,  Hospitals. 

V.      BlCHELIEU  AND  THE  FINANCIAL  ADMINISTRATION  OF  FRANCE  62 

The  financial  policy  of  Eiehelieu  is  difficult  to  treat. 
It  must  be  considered  as  a  whole,  even  though  it  was 
incomplete  at  the  time  of  the  death  of  the  Cardinal. 
This  phase  of  his  administration  is  not  so  bad  as  has 
been  depicted,  as  is  shown  by  a  study  of:  A.  French 
finances  during  the  administration  of  Eiehelieu,  and 
the  efforts  made  to  reform  them;  B.  the  theoretical 
financial  views  of  the  Cardinal  as  found  in  his  Testa- 
ment Politique. 

VI.    THE  ECONOMIC  EELATIONS  OF  EICHELIEU  TO  AGRICULTURE, 

INDUSTRY,  AND  INTERNAL  COMMERCE        ....          82 

What  little  Eiehelieu  accomplished  in  the  field  of  inter- 
nal affairs  was  hindered  by  the  requirements  of  his  ex- 
ternal policy.  Nevertheless,  his  internal  administra- 
tion was  based  on  the  same  unconscious  mercantilistie 


551]  CONTENTS  7 

principles  which  he  followed  in  his  external  affairs. 
Peace  was  needed  before  the  maximum  attention  could 
be  paid  to  internal  problems.  His  efforts  to  develop 
agriculture,  industry,  and  internal  commerce. 

VII.    THE  IDEAS  AND  ACCOMPLISHMENTS  OF  RICHELIEU  AS  RE- 
GARDS A  MARINE 92 

Richelieu,  appointed  to  the  position  of  ' '  grand  master, 
chief,  etc.,"  used  this  office  as  a  means  for  carrying 
out  his  ideas  in  regard  to  creating  a  great  marine. 
Causes  which  influenced  him  to  take  action  along  this 
line.  His  accomplishments,  in  the  way  of  building  up 
the  war  and  merchant  marine.  The  importance  of  his 
work. 

VIII.    THE  IDEAS  AND  ACCOMPLISHMENTS  OF  RICHELIEU  AS  RE- 
GARDS  COLONIZATION 108 

Little  done  before  Richelieu's  time,  but  unprecedented 
growth  in  French  colonization  under  his  direction. 
His  early  ideas  with  regard  to  colonization.  His  ac- 
complishments, and  the  results  of  this  phase  of  his 
administration. 

IX.  RICHELIEU  AND  THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  FOREIGN  COMMERCE  125 
The  rise  of  foreign  commerce  during  the  age  of  Riche- 
lieu made  it  naturally  an  important  part  of  his  admin- 
istration. As  Superintendent  of  the  marine  and 
commerce,  he  tried  to  develop  trade  to  the  utmost,  as 
illustrated  best  in  the  articles  of  the  ' '  Code  Michaud. ' ' 
Difficulties  encountered  in  his  efforts  to  develop  com- 
merce. Richelieu's  conception  of  the  value  of  commerce 
as  an  important  part  of  the  ' '  great  state ' '  idea,  as 
illustrated  in  his  commercial  relations  with  other  great 
Europeon  powers,  the  Levant,  and  minor  countries. 
General  ideas  of  the  Cardinal  concerning  trade  as 
expressed)  in  his  Testament  Politique. 

X.  THE  ECONOMIC  ELEMENTS  IN  THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  RICHELIEU  141 
Richelieu  advocated  a  combined  continental  and  colonial 
policy.  He  planned  that  the  internal  economic  devel- 
opment of  France  should  be  carried  out  extensively 
after  the  Thirty  Years'  War  was  over.  His  "welfare 
of  the  State"  doctrine  —  which  was  the  guiding  force 
of  his  administration  —  was  not  understood  or  compre- 
hended by  the  common  people.  The  economic  elements 
in  his  diplomatic  relations  with  Spain,  England,  Hol- 
land, Italy,  and  the  northern  States.  The  economic 


8  CONTENTS  [552 

phase  of  the  Thirty  Years'  War.  Eichelieu's  purpose 
in  entering  the  war  from  an  economic  point  of  view. 

XI.    CONCLUSION 172 

Mazarin  carried  out  only  the  external  political  phase  of 
Richelieu 's  policy.  Thus  France  lost  a  great  opportun- 
ity. Colbert  took  up  the  economic  program  again  but 
irreparable  damage  had  been  done.  In  conclusion,  mer- 
cantilism was  the  keynote  of  the  Cardinal's  economic 
policy.  He  looked  forward  to  a  period  of  universal 
peace,  and  an  opportunity  for  a  political  and  economic 
reconstruction  of  France.  His  two  general  contribu- 
tions to  economic  thought  and  practice. 

APPENDIX  A.    BIBLIOGRAPHY  ........      180 

APPENDIX  B.    THE  AUTHENTICITY  OF  RICHELIEU  's  Testament  Politiqite     189 
BIBLIOGRAPHY  TO  APPENDIX  B  195 


PREFACE 

This  study  attempts  to  bring  out  the  economic  phase  of  the 
administration  of  Cardinal  Richelieu.  At  present  he  is  rightly 
regarded  as  one  of  the  great  French  statesmen.  He  is  more 
than  that,  for  he  may  well  be  considered  one  of  the  first  economic 
leaders  in  French  history.  This  is  the  central  theme  of  the 
treatise  and  although  the  study  cannot  claim  to  be  regarded  as  a 
final  treatment  of  the  subject,  nevertheless,  if  it  should  aid  in  the 
development  of  similar  investigations  in  the  future,  the  writer 
would  feel  amply  repaid. 

The  attempt  has  been  made  here  to  use  as  fully  as  possible  the 
letters,  contemporary  memoirs,  the  interesting  Mercure  Francois 
and  other  sources  available  in  a  consideration  of  this  fascinating 
age. 

This  study  was  carried  on  mainly  in  graduate  work  at  the  Uni- 
versity of  Illinois.  It  is  impossible  therefore  to  thank  all  persons 
to  whom  the  writer  is  indebted  for  advice  and  criticism.  Es- 
pecial gratitude  is  due  to  Professor  A.  H.  Lybyer  of  the  Univer- 
sity of  Illinois,  whose  scholarly  direction  and  inspiring  criticism 
have  made  this  study  possible.  Acknowledgement  should  also  be 
made  of  the  many  valuable  suggestions  given  by  Professor  L.  M. 
Larson  of  the  University  of  Illinois,  and  Professors  H.  I.  Priest- 
ley and  C.  E.  Chapman  of  the  University  of  California.  Fin- 
ally, grateful  notice  should  be  taken  of  the  kind  and  efficient  way 
in  which  the  staff  of  the  library  of  the  University  of  Illinois 
has  assisted  in  the  search  for  materials. 

FRANKLIN  CHARLES  PALM 
UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 
MAY  26,  1922 


THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU 

Car  chacun  sait  que,  quoique  vous  fassiez, 
En  guerre,  en  paix,  en  voyage,  en  affairs, 
Vous  vous  trouvez  toujours  dessus  vos  pieds. 
—  Works  of  Voiture,  II,  426-7. 
Edition  Ubicini. 


CHAPTER  I 
INTRODUCTION 

If  one  were  to  ask  the  average  well  informed  individual  con- 
cerning the  career  of  the  Cardinal  de  Richelieu,  the  reply  would 
be  one  which  would  convey  little  more  than  an  intelligent  appre- 
ciation of  the  political  acts  of  this  great  and  interesting  man,  for 
these  have  been  regarded  as  constituting  the  dominant  phase  of 
his  life.  His  genius  along  this  line  was  clearly  brought  out  in  his 
conduct  of  the  French  participation  in  the  Thirty  Years'  War, 
his  settlement  of  the  religious  question  in  France,  and  his  relations 
with  foreign  powers,  the  nobility,  the  Pope,  the  Queen  Mother, 
and  other  eager  opponents  of  his  ideas.  ' '  One  is  accustomed  by 
habit  to  consider  Richelieu  in  his  struggle  against  Austria  on 
the  outside,  the  nobles  and  Protestants  on  the  inside,  as  only 
a  diplomat  of  keen  and  profound  conceptions,  a  statesman  ad- 
vancing to  his  designs  with  an  unflinching  energy,  tfee  founder 
of  the  absolute  monarchy. ' ' * 

There  is  another  side  to  his  career  which  had  no  inconsiderable 
importance  in  directing  and  influencing  his  entire  life  and 
achievements,  namely,  the  economic  phase.  History  has  placed 
such  an  emphasis  on  the  other  part  of  his  life  that  it  is  difficult 
even  to  ask  if  economic  interests  held  any  place  in  that  spirit 
which  was  agitated  by  such  great  designs.  For  example,  did 
Richelieu  have  an  economic  purpose  in  his  capture  of  La  Ro- 
chelle  ?  Was  his  aim  in  entering  the  Thirty  Years '  War  purely 
political?  Did  the  Cardinal  have  an  economic  philosophy?  It 
is  to  be  the  purpose  of  this  study  to  determine  the  economic 
elements  which  entered  into  the  life  and  deeds  of  Richelieu, 
and  thereby  to  establish  the  claim  that  this  man  was  not  only 
a  magnificent  statesman,  but  also  an  able  economist,  with  all  the 
crude  but  important  economic  conceptions  of  his  time.  To  build 
France  up  as  a  strong  unit,  both  political  and  economic,  was 

i  Pigeonneau,  H.,  Histoire  du  Commerce  de  la  France,  2  vols.,  Paris,  1889, 
II,  375. 

13 


14  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [556 

the  goal  of  his  ambition,  which  a  premature  death  prevented  him 
from  reaching. 

The  economic  aspect  of  Richelieu's  achievements  has  been 
generally  neglected,  although  it  has  been  noticed  by  a  few 
writers.  One  says  that  "most  historians  have  glided  rapidly 
over  the  economic  side  of  Richelieu's  career."2  Others  have 
claimed  that  there  is  a  gap  in  our  general  histories,  and  that,  if 
Richelieu  had  despised  or  neglected  economic  problems  it  would 
have  shown  a  weakness  in  his  spirit.  Yet,  far  from  putting 
them  back  to  second  place,  he  brought  them  to  the  front 
and  studied  them  with  passion.  He  certainly  did  not  im- 
part second-rate  ideas  in  his  treatment  of  commerce,  the 
marine,  and  colonization.3  Another  writer  who  has  treated 
Richelieu's  career  from  the  administrative  point  of  view,  claims 
that  the  Cardinal's  work  as  an  administrator  was  not  inferior 
to  his  political  ability.  He  created  in  all  directions  a  vigorous 
impulsion  to  national  energy,  which  if  continued  along  those 
lines  would  have  produced  wonderful  results.*  The  same  writer 
in  defending  the  case  of  Richelieu  as  far  as  concerns  his  entire 
administrative  career  has  succeeded  in  bringing  to  light  the 
economic  aspect  of  the  man.  In  fact,  most  of  his  administrative 
reforms  were  of  direct  or  indirect  ecbnomic  importance.  When 
he  proceeds  to  point  out  the  fact  that  Richelieu  centralized  the 
monarchy  and  laid  France  open  to  administrative  reforms, —  by 
ruining  the  political  positions  of  the  Protestants  and  the  nobles, 
by  giving  the  council  of  state  a  superior  place,  by  diminishing 
the  power  of  local  government  and  establishing  fixed  duties  in 
the  generalites  — 5  he  really  indicates  the  first  steps  taken  toward 
an  economic  reform  of  the  country  which  Richelieu  fully  in- 
tended to  carry  through.  Many  difficulties,  however,  prevented 
the  great  minister  from  accomplishing  all  he  desired.  Most 
people  have  neglected  to  take  these  into  consideration  and  thus 
he  has  been  denied  a  fair  judgment  of  his  career  upon  the  eco- 
nomic side. 

His    great    internal    and    external    achievements    seem    im- 

zPigeonneau,  II,  375-6. 
8/Md.,  376. 

<Caillet,  J.,  L' Administration  en  France  sous  \e  Ministere  du  Cardinal 
de  Richelieu,  Paris,  1857,  Introduction,  I-IV. 
e  Caillet,  Introduction,  I-IV. 


557]  INTRODUCTION  15 

possible  when  one  considers  his  poor  physical  health.6  Sick 
throughout  his  life,  one  wonders  how  he  was  able  to  carry  out 
or  even  to  conceive  the  things  he  did.  Then  there  were  the 
many  external  and  internal  difficulties  to  be  removed,  some  of 
which  were  of  a  sort  directly  opposed  to  the  material  develop- 
ment of  any  nation,  as  the  Huguenot  situation,  for  example. 
Indeed,  says  one  writer,  the  historian  who  studies  the  greatest 
statesman  France  ever  had  without  considering  the  gravity  of 
the  internal  situation  at  that  time  and  the  many  difficulties 
of  the  internal  organization ;  without  appreciating  the  diversity 
of  provinces,  and  the  multiplicity  of  their  franchises;  without 
seeing  the  clash  of  religious  beliefs,  the  variety  of  taxes, 
customs,  etc.,  in  permanent  conflict;  without  considering  the 
immense  interests  of  the  kingdom  and  the  conditions  of  its 
power  and  security,  will  never  comprehend  either  the  power 
or  the  ability  of  this  man,  or  the  genius  of  his  work.7  The 
pressing  need  to  attack  these  many  difficulties  is  best  illustrated 
in  the  opening  passages  of  Richelieu's  Testament  Politique, 
where  he.  maintained  that  his  first  problems  were  to  ruin  the 
political  power  of  the  Huguenots,  lower  the  pride  of  the  nobles, 
reduce  all  rebellious  subjects  to  their  duties,  and  raise  the  king 's 
name  again  in  foreign  affairs  to  the  place  where  it  ought  to  be.8 
A  good  example  of  the  difficulties  encountered  by  Richelieu 
is  shown  in  the  opposition  of  public  opinion  or  sections  of  it. 
In  fact  in  1626  he  was  accused  of  ruining  the  rights  and  interests 
of  France  by  remaining  at  peace.  This  accusation  was  voiced 
by  some  so-called  "libelles"  in  Germany,  who  saw  no  good  in  his 
actions.9  However,  it  is  interesting  to  notice  that  the  "theolog- 
ians" in  reply  maintain  that  the  reasons  which  guided  the  king 
and  the  Cardinal  with  regard  to  the  so-called  resolutions  of  peace 
are  unrecognized  by  his  opponents.  "Why  not  praise  what  has 
been  accomplished  rather  than  condemn  what  has  not  been 
carried  out?  Since  you  bear  the  names  of  Christians  would 
it  not  be  better  to  judge  those  things  which  are  beneath  the 

6/&id.,  VI-IX. 

7  Montcretien,  A.,  Traicte  de  I'Oeconomie  Politique,  Ed.,  Th.  Funck- 
Brentano,  Paris,  1889,  Introduction,  XCI. 

s  Richelieu,  A.  J.,  Cardinal,  due  de,  Testament  Politique,  Londres,  1770, 
pt.  I,  8-26. 

*>Mercure  Francois,  le  (1604-44),  a  Paris,  XII,  516-18. 


16  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [558 

surface  rather  than  to  condemn  the  surface  indications?"  In 
other  words  criticised  by  some  because  he  fostered  wars,  and 
by  others  because  he  made  peace,  his  problems  were  very  modern 
indeed,  and  it  is  no  wonder  that  many  sides  of  his  career  (the 
economic  for  example)  have  been  submerged  because  of  a  mis- 
taken perspective  of  the  difficulties  involved. 

It  seems  profitable,  therefore,  to  dwell  for  a  while  upon  the 
economic  activities  of  Eichelieu  and  to  show  that  most  phases  of 
his  administration  were  more  or  less  influenced  by  them.  To 
trace  the  economic  thread  is  the  problem  of  this  study.  This 
involves  an  examination  of  its  importance  in  the  confusing 
unsolved  period  of  the  first  half  of  the  seventeenth  century,  the 
age  of  Richelieu. 


CHAPTER  II 
THE  AGE  OF  MERCANTILISM 

The  seventeenth  century  was  distinctly  the  age  when  mercan- 
tilism reached  its  height.  Mercantilism  was  the  natural  out- 
come of  a  series  of  historical  events  which  caused  men  to  grasp 
and  understand  the  economic  theories  of  the  doctrine  without 
realizing  that  they  really  were  developing  a  distinct  school  of 
economic  thought.  It  did  not  take  long,  however,  to  discover 
and  to  formulate,  along  definite  lines,  the  philosophy  behind  it, 
once  it  had  become  the  cardinal  feature  of  the  nation's  develop- 
ment. It  is  desirable  to  distinguish  some  of  the  important 
factors  which  led  to  the  practical  application  of  mercantilistic 
ideas  and  the  consequent  theoretical  formulation,  because,  as 
will  be  shown,  Richelieu  based  his  entire  administration  on  the 
principles  of  the  mercantilistic  doctrine  and  in  doing  so  was  one 
of  the  most  enlightened  exponents  of  that  system. 

The  mercantilistic  age  seems  to  fall  in  the  period  of  transition 
from  medieval  to  modern  conditions,  and  really  grew  out  of 
those  changes.  "la  fact,"  says  one  writer,  "the  decomposition 
of  medieval  feudal  life  into  modern  existence  is  one  of  the  two 
chief  aspects  of  modern  life. ' ' *  He  goes  on  to  say  that  the  new 
system  based  on  individual  activity  and  scientific  conviction 
has  superseded  the  old  military  activity  and  supernatural  be- 
liefs of  the  middle  age.  Thus  he  maintains  that  industry  has 
been  substituted  for  warfare.  It  often  seems  better  to  con- 
sider industry  as  another  cause  for  warfare.  Moreover,  the 
beginnings  of  the  separation  of  church  and  state,  thd  growth  of 
commerce  and  industries,  and  the  discovery  of  the  new  world 
with  all  its  important  consequences  had  a  strong  influence  in 
developing  the  modern  era  to  the  detriment  of  the  medieval 
age  with  its  feudalistic  basis  of  existence.  They  resulted  in  the 
growth  of  the  state  as  the  vital  force  which  was  to  expel  all 

1  Bridges,  F.  H.,  France  under  Bichelieu  and  Colbert,  Edinburgh,  1866, 
5-10. 

17 


18  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [560 

the  needless  and  unhappy  phases  of  the  past  ages,  and  a  new 
kind  of  feudalism  came  into  existence  in  which  the  state,  or 
its  king,  was  the  actual  feudal  lord  and  his  subjects  were  his 
vassals.  As  a  result  when  one  reaches  the  stage  in  history  where 
the  state  takes  the  lead  in  controlling  the  destinies  of  man,  then 
appears  the  modern  age  and  with  it  the  so-called  period  of  mer- 
cantilism. 

As  to  a  definition  of  the  mercantilistic  age,  it  may  best  be 
defined  in  terms  of  the  state.  "It  is  not,"  says  Schmoller, 
"so  much  a  doctrine  of  money  or  tariff  barriers,  protective 
duties,  ior  navigation  laws  as  it  is  a  doctrine  which  involves 
something  far  greater,  namely,  the  total  transformation  of  soci- 
ety, and  its  organization  as  well  as  that  of  the  state  and  its  in- 
stitutions, in  the  replacing  of  a  local  and  territorial  policy  by 
that  of  the  state.  Now  followed  a  struggle  between  state  and 
district  against  the  great  nobility,  the  towns,  the  corporations, 
and  provinces,  the  economical  as  well  as  the  political  blending 
of  the  struggle  of  these  isolated  groups  into  large  wholes,  the 
struggle  for  uniform  measures  and  coinage  and  for  a  well 
ordered  currency  and  credit. ' ' 2  Thus  the  mercantilistic  doc- 
trine was  that  philosophy  which  centered  everything  economic 
and  political  in  the  hands  of  the  state. 

When  one  assumes  the  general  definition  of  Schmoller,  that 
mercantilism  implies  state-building,  it  is  also  necessary  to  realize 
that  this  general  idea  includes  a  series  of  theories  which  prevailed 
to  various  degrees  in  different  minds:  in  the  first  place,  a 
tendency  towards  overestimating  the  importance  of  possessing 
a  large  amount  of  precious  metals;  secondly,  towards  an  undue 
exaltation  (a)  of  industry  which  works  up  material  over  indus- 
try which  provides  it,  and  (b)  of  foreign  trade  over  domestic; 
thirdly,  towards  attaching  too  high  a  value  to  a  dense  population 
as  an  element  of  national  strength ;  and  fourthly,  towards  invok- 
ing the  action  of  the  state  in  furthering  artificially  the  attain- 
ments of  the  several  ends  thus  proposed  as  desirable.3  Thus 
the  three  earmarks  of  the  mercantile  system  are:  (1)  attention 
to  commerce  (the  importance  of  which  was  exaggerated),  (2) 
cultivation  of  a  favorable  balance  of  trade,  (3)  prohibition  in 

2  Schmoller,  G.,  The  Mercantile  System,  New  York,  1902,  51. 

s  Ingram,  J.  K.,  History  of  Political  Economy,  London,  1904,  36-37. 


561]  THE  AGE  OP   MERCANTILISM  19 

duties,  bounties,  and  development  of  monopolies,  etc.4  All  these 
things  led  to  the  struggle  of  nations  not  only  for  political  but  for 
economical  predominance.  States  became,  as  it  were,  artificial 
hothouses  for  the  rearing  of  urban  industries,  etc.5  Most  of  these 
characteristics  will  be  found  existing  during  the  administration 
of  the  great  Cardinal. 

In  following  out  the  policies  of  his  administration,  Richelieu 
conformed  approximately  to  the  common  mercantilistic  con- 
ception as  described  above.  In  doing  so  he  was  especially  for- 
tunate in  having  certain  predecessors  to  guide  him  in  his  actions. 
Henry  IV  and  his  minister,  Sully,  laid  the  foundation  or  at 
least  made  the  excavations  for  the  economic  system  of  that 
century.  The  economist  Montchretien  drew  up  in  1615  the 
first  French  work  on  the  subject  of  economics.  Its  crude  but 
timely  ideas  correspond  to  the  theoretical  basis  for  Richelieu's 
administration.  It  represented  the  thought  of  the  time  and  so 
Richelieu,  whether  he  read  it  or  not,  followed  its  precepts  with 
astonishing  accuracy.  This  work  together  with  the  contributions 
of  Henry  IV  and  Sully  requires  brief  consideration. 

The  age  of  Henry  IV  and  Sully  marked  the  rise  in  France 
of  a  consciousness  of  the  economic  side  of  life.  People  had  not 
been  really  aware  of  its  presence  in  the  fifteenth  century.  The 
progress  of  public  peace  and  well  being,  the  influence  of  the 
Italian  custom,  had  given  to  the  commerce  of  luxuries  an  impulse 
hitherto  unknown.  The  age  of  discoveries  had  awakened  the 
enterprise  of  the  Norman  mariners  who  began  following  in  the 
tracks  of  the  Portuguese  and  Spanish  navigators  about  the  same 
time  as  the  English.6  Thus  France  began  to  assume  a  place  of 
economic  as  well  as  political  importance  in  the  affairs  of  the 
world.  As  a  consequence  the  men  at  the  head  of  the  government, 
whether  they  were  kings  or  prime  ministers,  began  to  consider 
and  solve  matters  which  were  primarily  of  economic  importance, 
on  that  basis  alone,  and  were  influenced  in  their  political 
policies  by  the  economic  results  to  be  obtained  thereby. 

Louis  XI,  at  the  close  of  the  fifteenth  century,  initiated  the 
economic  growth  of  France  especially  by  his  centralization  and 

*  Ibid.,  50. 
s  Ibid.,  39. 
6  Pigeonneau,  II,  54-55. 


20  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [562 

unification  of  the  government.  But  it  was  left  to  Henry  IV  and 
Sully,  who  came  in  after  the  religious  wars,  at  the  end  of  the 
sixteenth  century,  to  make  the  first  direct  efforts  to  solve  the 
commercial  questions  confronting  the  French  nation. 

The  first  problem  encountered  was  the  proposition  of  securing 
internal  peace.  The  edict  of  Nantes  settled  the  matter  so  far 
as  the  religious  strife  was  concerned.  The  nobles  were  also 
subdued  by  a  combination  of  payments  and  force.  Thus  in  a 
short  time  both  Henry  and  Sully  were  ready  to  strengthen 
the  economic  position  of  France.  Now  at  this  time  existed  the 
peculiar  situation  where  a  king  and  his  helper  both  had  their 
own  ideas  on  the  subject  and  tried  to  carry  them  out  regardless 
of  the  opinion  of  the  other  party.  For  example,  Henry  IV  en- 
deavored to  make  France,  and  especially  Paris,  the  artistic  and 
industrial  center  of  the  world,  much  to  the  disgust  of  Sully,  who 
favored  the  encouragement  of  agriculture.7  As  a  consequence, 
France  at  this  time  underwent  a  temporary  expansion  in  agricul- 
ture, industry,  colonies,  the  marine,  and  internal  and  external 
commerce. 

By  their  accomplishments  Henry  IV  and  Sully  laid,  in  a  more 
or  less  haphazard  and  incomplete  way,  the  foundations  which 
Richelieu  and  Colbert  were  to  complete  or  ruin.  One  writer 
aptly  sums  up  the  work  of  Henry  IV  as  follows :  ' '  He  did  his 
best  to  facilitate  the  downfall  of  the  old  system  (feudal)  and 
to  encourage  the  new.  He  tried  to  remove  the  shackles  upon 
industry  and  commerce;  to  improve  the  finances  and  found 
trans-Atlantic  colonies,  etc.  He  looked  forward  to  a  common 
European  arbitration  agreement,  of  a  universal  peace,  and  to 
accomplish  this  which  might  be  by  others  defined  as  a  policy 
of  the  balance  of  power,  he  set  in  motion  the  movement  against 
the  forces  of  retardation,  namely  Austria  and  Spain. " 8  In 
other  words,  the  policy  of  Henry  IV  was  directed  in  one  way 
along  the  line  of  international  relations,  and  thus,  while  atten- 
tion was  given  to  the  building  up  of  the  state,  it  was  not  the 
central  theme  of  his  administration.  However,  all  of  these 
excellent  and  well  planned  policies  were  ended  when  Henry  IV 
was  killed  in  1610,  and  fourteen  years  of  economic,  as  well  as 
political  stagnation,  were  to  follow. 

7  Pigeonneau,  II,  289-290. 
s  Bridges,  25-26. 


563]  THE  AGE  OF    MERCANTILISM  21 

A  certain  writer  says  that  "the  death  of  Henry  IV  was  de- 
plorable in  that  the  brilliant  impulses  which  he  had  impressed 
on  the  economic  life  of  the  country  were  stopped  and  existed 
no  more. ' ' 9  This  is  not  wholly  true,  for  one  can  find  in  the 
treatise  of  Montchretien  a  clear  presentation  of  the  doctrine  of 
the  time,  and  this  work  had  a  definite  influence  on  the  economic 
future  of  France.  Yet,  in  a  practical  sense,  the  tasks  of  Henry 
IV  were  incomplete.  "The  peasants  existed  but  that  was  all; 
credit  and  commerce  reestablished  themselves  with  difficulty; 
the  systems  of  roads  and  canals  were  only  outlined;  colonial 
experiences  had  only  begun  and  habits  of  order,  of  economy, 
and  of  honesty,  which  Sully  had  introduced  into  the  financial 
administration,  had  not  yet  become  traditions,  etc. ' ' 10 

It  would  be  interesting  to  speculate  upon  what  might  have 
occurred  if  the  rule  of  Richelieu  had  succeeded  that  of  Henry 
IV  in  1610.  But  as  it  actually  happened,  the  government  de- 
clined rapidly  under  Marie  de  Medicis.  She  was  not  able  to 
understand  or  follow  the  good  policy  of  her  husband.  The 
money  saved  by  Sully  was  spent,  taxes  increased,  colonies  and 
the  marine  were  neglected,  and  the  new  colonial  policy  was  saved 
only  through  the  energy  and  ability  of  Champlain.11 

The  death  of  Henry  IV  then  meant  an  industrial  crisis  both  of 
a  commercial  and  monetary  nature.  Troubles  which  he  had  set- 
tled appeared  again.  Foreign  states  disregarded  treaties  with 
France,  excluded  French  commerce,  sank  French  vessels,  and 
imposed  unfair  duties  upon  French  vessels  entering  their  ports, 
in  spite  of  the  privileges  they  had  in  French  harbors.  Things 
went  from  bad  to  worse  until  finally  in  1614  a  meeting  of  the 
Estates  general  was  called  in  a  vain  effort  to  remedy  the 
situation. 

The  result  of  this  gathering  was  not  insignificant.  Riche- 
lieu, in  his  Memoirs,  says  that  the  assembly  ended  as  it  began, 
by  doing  nothing  to  advantage  for  either  the  king  or  the  public. 
"It  was  a  financial  burden  in  itself,"  he  claims,  "while  the 
corruption  it  opposed  still  continued."12  He  fails,  however, 

»  Gouraud,  C.  M.,  Histoire  de  la  Politique  Commercial  de  la  France  et  son 
Influence  sur  le  Progres  de  la  Bichesse  Publique,  Paris,  1854,  174-175. 
!°  Pigeonneau,  II,  350-352. 

11  Ibid. 

12  Richelieu,  A.  J.,  Cardinal,  due  de,  Memoires,  (Petitot    Edition),  vols. 
X-XXX,   Paris,   1821-1829,  X,  383. 


22  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [564 

to  mention  the  fact  that  the  king  promised  to  carry  out  the 
reforms  asked  by  the  assembly  and  neglected  to  do  so.  The  in- 
teresting features  of  the  gathering  are  that  it  indicates  a  reaction 
against  the  bad  conditions  of  the  time,  that  Richelieu  was 
present  at  the  meeting  and  thus  realized  what  was  wrong,  and 
finally,  that  Montchretien  was  led  to  publish  his  Traicte  de 
I'oeconomie  politique,  in  which  he  planned  a  solution  for  the 
troubles  of  France.  The  Cardinal  must  have  been  strongly 
affected  by  these  two  events,  and  his  later  actions  indicate 
that  he  was.13  Thus,  at  the  very  beginning  of  his  career  eco- 
nomic problems  were  placed  before  him  alongside  of  the  benefic- 
ial, practical  beginnings  of  Henry  IV  and  Sully,  so  that  he 
could  not  help  but  be  influenced  by  all  these  things.  It  is  im- 
portant, indeed,  that  the  ideas  were  furnished  by  an  assembly 
of  the  people,  and  by  the  first  French  economist.  Surely  the 
modern  world  in  a  commercial  sense,  both  practically  and  theo- 
retically, began  for  France  at  that  period. 

Montchretien  was  very  careful  in  his  work  to  develop  his  idea 
of  a  paternalistic  form  of  government.  "The  education  of  the 
nation,"  he  said,  "  is  the  same  as  in  the  family."14  However, 
there  are  some  liberal  conceptions  in  this  treatment,  as  he 
recognized  the  development  of  the  third  estate  and  a  certain 
amount  of  individualism.15  Furthermore,  he  maintained  that 
the  social  organization  extends  beyond  the  interest  of  individuals 
and  the  family,  of  the  locality  and  the  province,  or  even  the 
particular  interest  of  the  nation.16  This  idea  involves  a  multi- 
plicity of  relations  between  the  different  divisions  of  the  govern- 
ment and  territories  which  only  great  men  by  their  genius  can 
comprehend,  and  by  their  position  and  resources  can  justify 
so  as  to  increase  the  general  prosperity,  or,  aided  by  science 
and  guided  by  the  experience  of  individuals,  can  the  practice 
justify,  according  to  the  theories  of  political  economy.  In  other 
words,  he  said  that  the  situation  called  for  a  great  man,  and 
indeed  a  great  leader  in  the  person  of  Richelieu  presently  took 

is  Montchretien   based   his   work   upon    the    accomplishments   of    Henry 
IV.     Eichelieu  and  Colbert  carried  out  the  industrial  and  commercial  con- 
ceptions depicted  in  his  treatise.    See  Montchretien,  Introduction,  LXXXIX. 
i*  Montchr4tien,  Introduction,  LV. 
uJ.,  Introduction,  LVI. 
id.,  Introduction,  XXV. 


565]  THE  AGE  OF    MERCANTILISM  23 

advantage  of  the  opportunity,  and  carried  out  the  major  part 
of  the  program  outlined  by  Montchretien.  A  brief  summary  of 
the  leading  ideas  of  this  early  economist  may  be  given,  arranged 
in  relation  to  similar  ideas  or  practices  on  the  part  of  Richelieu. 

He  begins  in  his  treatise  by  describing  to  the  king  the  excellent 
resources  and  situation  of  France.  Richelieu  in  his  Testament 
Politique  repeated  Montchretien 's  ideas  almost  verbatim.17  He 
then  complains  that  France  lacks  men  to  invent  and  to  do.  Too 
many  of  her  men  go  to  Spain,  England,  Germany,  and  Flanders. 
Richelieu  had  this  same  idea,  as  will  be  shown  later.  He  then 
advocates  the  development  of  agriculture  and  manufactures, 
so  important  to  the  strength  of  a  nation.  The  whole  tone  of  the 
book  is  to  "build  up  the  power  of  the  French  nation  with  the 
rich  resources  available,"  —  a  true  mercantilistic  doctrine.  He 
advises  the  king  to  study  the  commercial  systems  of  England 
and  Holland  as  accounting  for  their  remarkable  growth.  Mont- 
chretien continuously  had  the  interests  of  France  at  heart  and 
does  not  consider  outside  interests  as  Henry  IV  did.  The  Cardi- 
nal conforms  with  his  view  in  this  respect.  Montchretien 
recognizes  both  free  trade  and  protection  as  combined  and  not 
separate.  "Send  your  surplus  abroad,"  he  says,  "but  keep 
what  you  need  and  protect  it."  To  carry  out  this  idea  both  ex- 
ternal and  internal  trade  have  important  roles.  However,  it 
is  with  foreign  commerce  that  he  is  chiefly  concerned,  as  was  also 
the  case  with  Richelieu. 

"All  society,  generally  speaking,"  he  says,  "seems  to  be  com- 
posed of  government  and  commerce. ' ' 18  Thus  the  merchants 
are  an  important  class  of  people.  The  stress  laid  upon  com- 
merce by  Richelieu  will  be  shown  later.  Both  believe  that  gold 
and  silver  are  important,  as  they  supply  the  necessities  for  all 
men;  and  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  both  men  in  their  ideas 
concerning  commerce,  industry,  etc.,  constantly  refer  to  the 
public  good,  whose  interests  they  claim  to  follow. 

Montchretien  devotes  especial  attention  to  commercial  rela- 
tions with  England.  That  country  he  claims  limits  the  use  of 
the  products  of  French  industries  in  England,  for  her  own* 
benefit,  while  obtaining  fair  treatment  for  her  own  goods  in 

IT  Testament  Politique  II,  133-135. 
is  Montchr6tien,  137-146. 


24  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [566 

France.19  Everything  possible  is  done  to  ruin  French  com- 
merce by  extra  taxes,  etc.  England  desires  to  get  control  of 
navigation.  One  thus  can  see  that  the  commercial  rivalry  be- 
tween France  and  England  was  coming  to  the  front  at  this 
time,  and  it  actually*  was  to  be  one  of  the  first  problems  con- 
fronting the  Cardinal. 

Montchretien,  on  the  other  hand,  admires  Holland  and  desires 
France  to  be  on  good  terms  with  her.20  The  fact  that  they  are 
so  near  and  have  mutual  interests  makes  it  best  to  be  on  friendly 
terms.  Kichelieu  also  had  a  great  admiration  for  what  the 
Hollanders  had  accomplished.  Both  of  them  wished  France 
to  study  her  and  imitate  what  she  had  done  rather  than  actually 
to  compete  with  her. 

As  to  Spain,  Montchretien  complains  about  the  failure  to 
treat  French  traders  in  Spain  as  Spanish  traders  are  treated 
in  France.  He  says,  "French  subjects  are  not  allowed  or  per- 
mitted in  Spain  except  if  they  wish  to  enrich  the  king  of  Spain. 
She  is  jealous  of  her  colonies  and  taxes  French  traders  un- 
fairly. " 21  As  a  result,  he  claims  that  it  is  the  duty  of  the 
French  to  see  that  they  are  treated  justly  by  the  Spanish,  as 
the  Dutch  have  done  for  their  own  citizens.  "For  if  Holland 
could  do  this,  cannot  we  ? "  A  policy  of  this  nature  will  lead  to 
the  augmentation,  the  welfare,  and  the  repose  of  France,  and  the 
employment  and  use  of  its  most  courageous  subjects,  who  would 
like  nothing  better  than  to  undertake  long  and  difficult  duties. 
By  authorizing  and  protecting  the  trade  of  France,  this  policy 
will  increase  commerce.  Spanish  ships  have  orders  to  destroy  all 
French  vessels  found  on  the  ocean,  whether  they  are  Huguenot  or 
Catholic.  Thus  it  is  the  task  of  the  king  to  restore  the  use  of 
the  sea,  which  is  common  and  free  to  all  the  world,  and  on  which 
the  French  have  a  natural  and  legitimate  right.  How  well  this 
part  of  his  work  was  carried  out  by  Richelieu,  who  believed  in 
these  ideas,  will  be  brought  out  later.  It  may  be  added  that  no 
better  proof  of  the  early  economic  rivalry  between  England, 

is  Montchretien,  196-197.  Montchretien  believed  that  the  severe  treatment 
of  foreigners  originated  by  England  had  resulted  in  a  commercial  and  mone- 
tary crisis.  He  opposed  any  concession  to  that  nation  except  on  the  basis 
of  reciprocity.  See  Montchretien,  129-130,  footnote;  134-135. 

20  Ibid.,  207-208. 

21  Ibid.,  208-209. 


567]  THE  AGE  OP    MERCANTILISM  25 

Spain,  and  France  can  be  obtained  than  in  this  treatise  by 
Montchretien,  an  enlightened  contemporary. 

Turning  to  the  Levant,  he  urges  the  development  of  silk  man- 
ufactures at  home,  instead  of  obtaining  these  articles  from  the 
Levant,  a  wasteful  method  because  of  the  heavy  duties  imposed 
by  the  Levantine  countries  and  Italy.  He  refers  to  the  at- 
tempts of  England  to  form  a  company  in  the  Levant,  and 
after  affirming  the  fact  that  Russia  constitutes  a  new  outlet  for 
trade,  he  turns  to -a  discussion  of  colonization.  He  was  a  strong 
advocate  of  efforts  along  this  line.  Thus  he  advises  the  formation 
of  companies  like  the  Dutch  East  Indian  company  (the  one 
formed  in  1595).  ''Such  companies,"  he  says,  "would  make 
France  strong  and  powerful. ' ' 22 

His  treatment  of  financial  conditions  in  France  was  based 
on  the  cardinal  principle  of  preserving  peace  and  quiet  in  the 
land  and  being  fair  with  the  people.  He  says  that  there  were 
great  riches  in  the  land  which  would  aid  the  true  finances  of  the 
country.  They  were  wheat,  salt,  wine,  cloth,  and  silk.  "This 
country  is  so  flourishing  and  abundant  in  all  that  one  can  desire 
that  it  is  not  necessary  to  borrow  from  one 's  neighbors. "  23  It  is 
not  at  all  the  abundance  of  gold  and  silver,  or  the  quantity  of 
pearls  and  diamonds  which  makes  the  state  wealthy,  but  it  is  the 
resources  of  things  necessary  to  maintain  life,  etc.  Montchretien 
had  absolute  faith  that  the  resources  of  France  were  such  as  to 
solve  all  financial  troubles  if  used  properly.  Both  Richelieu 
and  the  economist  had  a  sublime  trust  in  the  ability  of  the 
French  to  overcome  all  commercial  odds  by  this  means.  Both 
desired  to  conserve  the  people  and  make  them  happy.  Just 
as  the  owner  of  a  large  plantation  wants  to  build  it  up  to  its 
greatest  extent,  both  economically  and  physically,  so  these 
two  interesting  men  desired  to  build  up  France  commercially  and 
also  to  increase  the  happiness  of  the  people,  not  only  by  internal 
means  but  by  external  additions  of  colonies  to  be  obtained  by  the 
development  of  navigation.24 

Now  in  order  to  put  down  the  colonial  rivals  of  France  not 
only  a  strong  army  but  a  strong  navy  was  needed.  Like  Riche- 

22  Montchretien,   248-255. 

23  Ibid.,  237-244. 

24  Hid.,  283. 


26  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [568 

lieu,  Montchretien  discusses  the  geographical  position  of  France 
with  its  two  oceans,  etc.  He  urges  the  development  of  the  ad- 
mirality.  Again,  like  the  Cardinal,  he  cites  the  success  of  Holland 
on  the  sea,  "If  Henry  IV  had  used  his  money  to  build  up 
harbors  instead  of  the  useless  canal  de  Braire,  our  commerce 
would  be  much  greater  than  it  is  at  present. "  2t>  To  develop 
commerce  and  a  strong  marine,  and  thereby  make  a  strong  state, 
was  constantly  in  his  mind.  At  this  point  it  may  be  added  that 
both  Montchretien  and  Richelieu,  advised  the  king  to  encourage 
the  building  of  boats  by  financial  support  or  to  sell  some  vessels 
himself,  to  be  used  for  trade  outside  of  the  kingdom.  The  very 
fact  that  the  Cardinal  as  soon  as  he  came  into  office  turned  his 
attention  toward  colonization,  the  building  up  of  a  marine,  and 
commerce  in  general,  indicates  that  he  was  strongly  influenced 
by  similar  views,  perhaps  obtained  from  Montchretien 's  treatise.26 
Both  men  claimed  that  they  were  actuated  by  the  purpose 
of  "the  public  welfare,"  as  being  the  greatest  aim  of  the  king. 
They  appreciate  the  importance  of  each  of  the  three  estates. 
Richelieu  emphasized  that  of  the  nobles,  and  Montchretien  the 
third  estate.  They  both  desired  to  increase  the  riches  of  the 
people  by  means  of  the  development  of  the  arts  and  manufac- 
tures, the  increase  of  navigation,  and  the  reestablishment  of 
commerce,  which  was  perishing  day  by  day  in  the  kingdom.27 
One  cannot  help  but  notice  the  similarity  between  the  intro- 
duction of  Richelieu's  Testament  Politique  and  Montchretien's 
work.  Both  bring  out  the  disorders  of  the  time  and  the  reme- 
dies to  be  undertaken  in  order  to  enrich  the  crown  and  the 

asMontchre'tien,  306-308. 

26  For  further  views  of  Montchretien  concerning  the  duties  of  the  King, 
the  people,  the  Estates  General,  the  finances  and  the  laws,  all  of  which  are 
closely  related  to  Richelieu's  ideas,  see  Montchretien,  336-354. 

2?  Montchretien,  3,  note.  An  interesting  comparison  might  be  made  of 
this  quotation  of  Montchretien's  with  one  of  Richelieu's,  regarding  the  gov- 
ernment. "Si  la  nature  des  disordres  ou  vous  vivons  maintenant  portait 
que  vous  fissiez  deux  reformations  differentes,  1'une  a  1'appetit  du  commun, 
et  1'autre  par  les  vrayes  maximes  d'etat  et  de  police  que  1 'usage  des  affaires 
vous  apprend  je  ne  doute  point  que  le  semblable  n'arrivast." 

Richelieu:  "II  semble,  fait  dire  Richelieu  a  Louis  XIII  dans  le  pre- 
amble de  la  declarations  de  1641,  que  1 'establissement  des  monarches  estant 
fonde  par  le  government  d'un  seul,  cet  ordre  est  comme  I'ame  que  anime  et 
que  leur  inspire  autant  de  force  et  de  vigeur  qu  'a  et  de  perfection. ' ' 


569]  THE  AGE  OF   MERCANTILISM  27 

state.  There  seems  to  be  no  doubt  in  the  mind  of  Montchretien  's 
editor  that  Richelieu  did  read  the  work.  "Richelieu,"  he  said, 
"was  the  deputy  of  the  clergy  at  the  Estates  General  when 
Montchretien  published  his  treatise,  so  not  only  the  industrial 
and  commercial  measures  of  the  Cardinal,  but  also  the  maxims 
on  commerce,  the  marine,  and  manufactures  which  one  finds  in 
his  Testament  Politique,  reflect  the  spirit  of  Montchretien. ' ' 28 

Other  writers  have  similar  views  on  this  issue.  For  example, 
one  maintains  that  Richelieu's  theories  concerning  commerce 
and  navigation  were  not  original.  ' '  He  borrowed  or  derived  them 
from  documents  of  the  reign  of  Henry  IV,  of  which  the  cahiers 
of  the  assembly  of  notables  of  1617  and  1627,  and  the  Estates 
General  of  1614  were  one  source  and  MontcLretien 's  Traicte 
d'Oeconomie  Politique  was  another,  from  which  the  Cardinal 
obtained  many  of  his  views. ' ' 29  Another  writer  brings  out  the 
fact  that  Montchretien  provided  the  colonial  formula  for  Riche- 
lieu to  follow.  ' '  As  regards  colonial  companies, ' '  he  says, ' '  Mont- 
chretien recalls  the  methods  followed  by  Holland  and  England, 
forestalling  Richelieu  or  rather  giving  him  a  formula."80  (He 
refers  to  the  Cardinal's  speech  at  the  assembly  of  notables,  to 
be  taken  up  later.)  Montchretien  claimed  that  there  was  no 
better  way  to  carry  on  colonies  than  by  societies  such  as  Hol- 
land used,  or  a  council  of  many  individuals  instead  of  one  in- 
dividual effort.  So  colonial  exploitation  by  privileged  companies 
is  the  means  advised  by  the  economist.  He  is  thus  in  that  respect 
the  inspirer  of  the  political  economy  of  Richelieu.  He  has 
formulated  all  the  economic  principles  of  the  seventeenth  cen- 
tury and  is  the  first  and  the  most  penetrating  of  the  seventeenth 
century  economists.  This  study  will  attempt  to  show  how  Riche- 
lieu took  up  many  of  his  ideas  and  tried  to  put  them  into  execu- 
tion. 

That  the  Cardinal  ever  read  the  book  is  not  known  because 
he  has  never,  so  far  as  can  be  ascertained,  mentioned  the  name 
of  Montchretien  in  his  writings.  The  similarity,  however,  be- 
tween the  views  of  the  two  would  indicate  that  the  Cardinal 

28  Montchretien,  Introduction,  XX-XXI. 
2»  Pigeonneau,   II,   381-382. 

so  Desehamps,  L.,  Histoire  de  la  Question  Coloniale  en  France,  Paris, 
1891,  61-62. 


28  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [570 

did  so.  The  letters  and  memoirs  of  Richelieu  prove  that 
he  was  interested  in  these  problems,  and  the  fact  that  he  favored 
literary  efforts  of  all  kinds,  and  would  be  likely  to  read  a 
treatise  dedicated  to  the  Queen  Mother  and  her  son  Louis 
XIII,  strengthens  the  probability  of  his  having  read  it.  The 
important  deduction  to  be  made  is  the  existence  of  a  general 
economic  tendency  both  theoretical  and  practical  in  France 
when  Richelieu  came  to  power.  The  mercantilistic  doctrine  with 
the  state  as  a  center  was  the  natural  commercial  philosophy 
for  a  statesman  to  follow.  And  while  this  statement  might  seem 
to  detract  from  the  originality  of  Richelieu's  beliefs,  this  is 
not  so  when  one  looks  into  the  matter.  For,  although  a  man 
may  not  conceive  a  view,  it  takes  a  certain  amount  of  genius  and 
originality  to  make  the  practical  application.  The  ideas  of  Mont- 
chretien  required  economic  statesmanship  of  a  high  grade.  (An 
inquiry  may  now  be  made  whether  the  Cardinal  possessed  that 
quality  together  with  his  political  capacity.)  Was  Cardinal 
Richelieu  not  only  a  political  but  also  an  economic  statesman? 
To  what  extent  did  he  continue  the  practical  accomplishments 
of  Henry  IV  and  Sully,  and  carry  out  the  theories  of  Mont- 
chretien  ? 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  ECONOMIC  RELATIONS  EXISTING  BETWEEN 

RICHELIEU,  THE  KING,  AND  THE 

THREE    ESTATES 

Richelieu  from  the  first  took  the  tasks  confronting  the  King, 
the  people  and  himself  with  intense  seriousness.  Dominated 
by  his  paternalistic  conception  of  the  King  as  the  father  of  the 
people,  responsible  only  to  God,  he  desired  to  do  everything 
he  could  to  enable  the  King  to  build  up  a  strong  mercantilistic 
state  of  which  he  was  the  sole  owner.  In  his  general  scheme  of 
government  all  classes  had  their  particular  places  and  obliga- 
tions. This  idea  was  true  even  of  the  Cardinal  himself.  Loyal  to 
the  individual  who  could  alone  represent  the  French  nation, 
whom  he  loved  so  well,  the  Cardinal  at  the  beginning  pledged 
his  fidelity, saying,  "I  will  do  all  that  will  be  possible,  for,  by 
following  the  good  inclinations  of  the  king,  one  receives  an 
assured  repose,  the  fruit  of  the  service  which  I  render  his  maj- 
esty according  to  my  duty.-'1  In  his  Testament  Politique  he 
recalls  his  first  ambitions  when  called  to  office.  "As  soon  as 
your  majesty  was  pleased  to  admit  me  into  the  management  of 
your  affairs,  I  resolved  to  use  my  utmost  efforts  to  facilitate 
your  great  designs,  so  useful  to  the  state  and  glorious  to  your 
person. ' ' 2  One  sees  from  the  start  the  constant  strife  to  obtain 
all  advantages  possible  for  the  king  and  the  state,  and  no  better 
illustration  can  be  given  of  the  unselfish  interest  of  the  man  apart 
from  personal  gain  than  his  constant  fidelity  to  his  ruler  and  the 
latter 's  welfare. 

Richelieu  did,  to  be  sure,  look  after  his  own  personal  fortune. 
His  "Will  and  Testament"  proves  that  he  left  great  wealth,3 
most  of  which  he  bequeathed  to  his  relatives.  It  also  shows 

1  Richelieu,  A.  J.,  Cardinal,  due  de,  Lettres,  Instructions  Diplomatiques, 
etc.,  Ed.,  G.  Comte  d'Avenel.     Paris,  1853-1877,  III,  159. 

2  Eichelieu,  Testament  Politique,  1,  8-9. 
s  Eichelieu,  Memoires,  X,  122. 

29 


30  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [572 

his  own  personal  commercial  ability.  A  good  share  of  his  money, 
land,  etc.,  was  obtained  by  gifts  from  the  king.  He  refused,  how- 
ever, many  attempts  of  the  rulers  to  bestow  pensions  on  him,  and 
indeed  maintained  that  at  the  court  the  minister  must  not 
think  of  making  a  personal  fortune  but  must  plan  only  for  the 
development  of  the  welfare  of  the  state,4  which  he  must  have 
seen  would  in  the  end  benefit  him.  Yet  it  is  clear  that  the 
Cardinal  looked  upon  his  office  as  meaning  something  other  than 
a  mere  money  making  proposition  and  a  means  of  obtaining  high 
honor.6 

In  1624  Eichelieu  came  into  power  as  first  councillor.  At 
once  he  began  to  carry  out  the  duties  of  his  office  according 
to  his  mercantilistic  belief,  by  recognizing  the  two  elements  which 
he  must  consider  and  whose  welfare  he  must  constantly  promote 
by  advice  and  deeds,  namely,  the  king  and  the  people,  or  the 
king  and  the  state  (including  the  people).  "The  greatest  obli- 
gation of  a  man  is  the  saving  of  his  soul,"  he  says,  "the  most 
important  duty  of  the  king  is  the  repose  of  his  subjects,  the 
conservation  of  the  state  in  its  entirety,  and  the  welfare  of  his 
government;  for  which  reason,  it  is  necessary  to  put  down  so 
severely  the  injuries  done  to  the  state,  that  the  severity  of  the 
vengeance  will  prevent  a  recurrence.  The  repose  of  the  state 
is  the  dominant  thing. ' ' 6  The  welfare  of  the  nation,  politically 
and  economically,  is  the  main  theme  of  all  his  writings.  Indeed, 
he  says  that  the  king  has  the  right  to  do  anything,  even  though 
it  is  against  religion,  to  save  his  state.7  No  better  expression 
can  be  given  of  the  political  and  economic  ideas  of  Riche- 
lieu. One  even  finds  a  tinge  of  the  conception  of  a  larger  field 
than  the  mere  state,  when  he  says  that  the  king  must  be  liberal 
but  only  at  the  right  time.  He  must  reward  merit.  For  that 
not  only  does  the  public  but  the  entire  world  a  service  of  which 
the  reward  to  the  state  is  only  a  partial  return  of  the  huge 
interest.8 

The  works  of  Richelieu  revealed  a  suppressed  fear  of  the  inabil- 
ity of  the  king  to  look  out  for  the  country.  The  reason  for 

*  Richelieu,  Lettres,  III,  204-205. 

s  Eichelieu,  Testament  Politique,  1,  Introduction,  4-5. 

e  Eichelieu,  Memoires,  XXII,  15.    Lettres,  II,  168  et  seq.,  Ill,  159. 

Ul>id.,  XI,  285. 

s  Eichelieu,  Lettres,  III,  196. 


573]  THE  ECONOMIC  RELATIONS  31 

this  state  of  mind  is  clear  when  one  remembers  the  political 
weaknesses  which  existed  through  the  youth  and  ineffectiveness 
of  the  king,  as  well  as  the  unfortunate  economic  condition  of 
France  in  1624.  The  king's  power  was  in  a  bad  way.  "Indeed 
some  people  even  brought  up  the  idea  of  electing  a  ruler.  But 
the  majority  with  Kichelieu  believed  that  the  absolute  power 
of  the  ruler  was  best  for  the  welfare  of  the  country.  He  made 
the  king  the  incarnation  of  public  safety  and  interest."9  The 
Cardinal  in  his  Testament  Politique  has  clearly  stated  his  posi- 
tion as  related  to  the  king  when  he  says  that  the  ruler  must 
act  according  to.  reason  and  public  interest.  In  this  respect  he 
would  choose  men  to  carry  out  those  things  he  could  not  do.  By 
their  working  together,  he  had  no  doubt  that  the  greatest  good 
for  France  would  result.10  "For,"  he  says,  "nothing  ought  to 
divert  us  from  a  good  enterprise.  We  must  do  all  we  can  to 
carry  through  those  things  we  undertake  with  reason. ' '  " 

Thus  one  cannot  fail  to  see  the  common,  though  unconscious, 
economic  conceptions  of  that  time  which  dominated  Richelieu  in 
his  ideas  concerning  his  duties  as  minister,  and  those  of  the 
king  his  master.  It  is  a  mercantilistic  state  he  pictures,  with 
the  king  as  its  earthly  owner.  Therefore  it  is  the  chief  concern 
of  those  who  govern  this  piece  of  property  to  see  that  the  people 
who  work  on  it,  namely  the  subjects,  are  taken  care  of;  that 
their  welfare  is  aided,  and  also  that  the  state  in  a  national 
sense  is  to  be  developed  to  its  fullest  extent.  By  doing  so  a 
strong  state  would  be  created,  a  credit  to  its  king  and  its  min- 
isters, whose  constant  aim  must  be  the  welfare  of  France.  What 
was  his  attitude  with  regard  to  the  Three  Estates  ? 

Eichelieu,  following  the  traditional  French  scheme,  divided  the 
people  of  France  into  three  classes  and  considered  all  individuals 
as  related  to  one  of  these  orders.12  They  were  the  nobility,  the 
clergy,  and  the  third  estate,  which  included  the  rest  of  the  peo- 
ple. However  it  is  an  interesting  fact  that  the  Cardinal  looked 

»Caillet,  26. 

10  Eichelieu,  Testament  Politique,  I,  197-199. 

11  Ibid.,  I,  265.     Richelieu 's  efficiency  in  governing  is  best  illustrated 
in  that  part  of   the   Testament  Politique  in   which   he   advises  the   King 
to  consider  the  important  things  and  not  to  bother  with  the  details.     See 
Richelieu,   Testament  Politique,   I,  195. 

12  Ibid.,  I,  182. 


32  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [574 

upon  all  these  classes  as  constituting  one  people,  and  when  he 
attacked  any  class  or  sect  of  individuals,  such  as  the  Huguenots, 
he  did  so  for  the  public  good,  that  is,  the  benefit  of  all.  As  a 
consequence  it  was  said  that  while  the  general  public  praised 
him,  individuals  hated  him  and  tried  to  bring  about  his  fall.13 
His  efforts  to  reform  the  finances  and  to  build  up  commerce 
and  colonies  were,  in  general  terms,  the  lines  along  which  he  tried 
to  aid  the  people,  instead  of  particular  groups.  Centralization 
of  the  government  was  the  only  efficient  way  by  which  they 
could  be  benefited.  His  efforts  to  bring  this  about  illustrate  only 
too  well  the  economic  and  political  purposes  involved.  Yet  in 
treating  the  people  as  a  whole  he  had  to  consider  their  various 
classes  and  the  rights  due  to  each.14  He  recognized  the  system 
as  being  for  the  best,  but  in  doing  so  he  constantly  had  in  view 
the  welfare  of  the  state.  The  class  in  which  he  placed  the  high- 
est hopes  were  the  nobles,  who  he  believed  were  destined  to  play 
the  leading  part  in  the  destinies  of  France. 

In  his  treatment  of  this  section  of  the  population  of  his  native 
land,  the  Cardinal  had  constantly  in  mind  the  welfare  of  the 
nation.  This  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  he  confronted  and  at- 
tempted to  solve  two  problems  with  respect  to  them.  Namely, 
first  to  prevent  them  from  being  politically  independent  of  the 
central  government,  and  secondly,  to  make  them  useful  members 
of  society  and  the  state.  What  he  did  with  respect  to  depriving 
the  nobility  of  political  rights  will  be  taken  up  in  the  next 
chapter.  But  one  might  add,  that  when  Richelieu  ordered  in 
1626  the  razing  of  the  castles  and  chateaus  of  the  nobles,15  a 
measure  which  was  the  outcome  of  his  opposition  to  the  separate 
political  power  of  the  nobility  (which  began  as  far  back  as 
1617 ),16  he  changed  the  entire  economic  policy  of  France,  not 
only  in  the  increase  of  internal  freedom  of  trade  but  in  the 
altered  position  of  the  noble  class.17  They  were  no  longer  inde- 
pendent of  the  central  government  socially,  politically,  or  eco- 

is  Bichelieu,  Memoires,  XXIV,  191. 

!*  Richelieu,  Testament  Politique,  I,  81. 

15  Isambert,  A.  E.,  Eecueil  General  des  Anciennes  Lois  Francoises,  etc., 
29  vols.,  Paris,  1829,  XVI,  192-193. 

J«  Richelieu,  Memoires,  II,  6. 

"  Rambaud,  A.,  Histoire  de  la  Civilisation  Fran$ais,  2  vols.,  Paris,  1898, 
I,  574. 


575]  THE  ECONOMIC  RELATIONS  33 

nomically.  They  were  subject  to  the  will  of  the  state.  This  con- 
cept was  just  a  part  of  the  plan  of  Richelieu  "to  put  down  the 
turbulent  nobles  and  obtain  by  that  means  repose  for  the  common 
people,  prosperity  for  the  king,  and  increased  grandeur  for 
the  monarchy."18 

However,  when  Richelieu  had  deprived  this  class  of  people 
of  their  independent  powers,  he  did  not  oppress  them  and  try 
to  push  them  down  into  the  lower  estate.  On  the  contrary 
he  favored  them.  He  looked  at  them  not  only  from  a  political 
but  also  from  an  economic  point  of  view;  and  saw  in  them  "one 
of  the  principal  sinews  of  the  state,  capable  of  contributing  much 
to  its  conservation  and  establishment. " 19  In  fact  he  and  the 
king  shared  the  same  views,  for  the  latter  called  them  "the 
right  arms  of  the  state. ' ' 20 

Richelieu  tried  to  make  a  definite  use  of  the  nobles.  He  saw 
that  they  could  fit  into  certain  positions,  especially  those  which 
were  rewarded  with  many  honors.  "His  ability  to  converse 
with  the  world,  etc.  ...  all  adapt  him  to  certain  func- 
tions. ' ' 21  So  that  if  Richelieu  wanted  to  deprive  them  of  their 
political  right  to  oppose  the  government,  he  also  desired  to 
find  a  method  by  which  they  could  live  with  dignity  and  serve 
their  country  both  in  a  political  and  economical  sense. 

Not  only  Richelieu  but  many  of  the  nobles  themselves  de- 
sired a  part  in  the  upbuilding  of  France.  In  a  statement 
of  their  condition  presented  to  the  king  by  the  assembly  of 
notables  in  1627,  one  obtains  a  fair  idea  of  their  ambitions.  The 
exposition  begins  with  an  account  of  the  distressing  condition 
of  the  nobles,  who  are  without  any  power  or  purpose.  They 
then  ask  for  the  reestablishment  of  the  nobility  "as  the  greatest 
power  to  upbuild  France,  and  to  remedy  its  miserable  condi- 
tion. ' '  Mention  .is  made  of  their  former  splendor  and  service. 
They  are  now  in  poverty  and  without  power  and  are  oppressed. 
Unwarranted  abuses  by  some  of  their  number  (by  many  as  a 
matter  of  fact)  has  deprived  them  of  the  administration  of  jus- 
tice, finance,  and  all  the  councils  of  the  king.  "Aid  us,  and 
put  us  in  our  former  place,  and  the  kingdom  will  gain  thereby 

i*  Richelieu,  Memoires,  XI,  244-256. 

J»  Richelieu,  Testament  Politique,  I,  141. 

zoMercure  Francois,  XVII,  65. 

21  Richelieu,  Testament  Politique,  I,  141.  et  seq. 


34  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [576 

and  your  reign  will  be  more  glorious  and  have  a  greater  splen- 
dor. ' ' 22  However  they  showed  their  selfishness  when  they  asked 
for  control  of  governmental,  church,  and  army  offices  and  other 
unreasonable  favors.  The  fundamental  thing  was  that  they 
desired  a  more  active  part  in  the  government.  ' '  Herein  is  where 
Richelieu  erred,"  says  one  writer,  "in  not  giving  them  a  more 
important  place  in  the  administration  of  the  government,  as  a 
way  of  safe-guarding  the  right  and  well  being  of  the  nobility. ' ' 23 
Yet,  judging  from  their  demand  it  is  doubtful  whether  the 
nobles  ought  to  have  been  considered.  Nevertheless  the  Cardinal 
did  make  efforts  to  use  them  for  the  good  of  the  nation. 

He  devotes  a  section  of  the  Testament  Politique  to  the  differ- 
ent means  of  aiding  the  nobility  and  making  them  subsist  hon- 
orably. "They  must  be  respected,"  he  says,  "as  one  of  the 
principal  sinews  of  the  state,  capable  of  contributing  much 
towards  its  preservation  and  settlement.  Having  been  injured 
by  vast  numbers  of  business  men,  who  have  been  elevated  at 
their  expense,  it  is  my  duty  to  protect  them  against  any  at- 
tempts of  such  individuals.  Yet  the  people  under  the  nobility 
must  be  protected  from  certain  offices.  It  is  a  common  fault  in 
those  that  are  born  in  a  certain  order  to  exert  violence  against 
the  people  to  whom  God  seems  to  have  given  arms  with  which 
to  get  their  livelihood  rather  than  to  defend  themselves."  2*  In 
this  statement  one  sees  the  entire  attitude  of  Richelieu.  He  did 
not  oppose  the  nobility  because  he  had  any  prejudice  against 
them,  but  he  did  stand  against  them  in  so'  far  as  they  were  a 
detriment  to  the  whole  state  in  that  they  interfered  with  the 
economic  contribution  of  the  third  estate,  one  part  of  the  country. 

In  order  to  aid  them  he  carried  out  several  of  the  demands 
of  the  assembly  of  notables.  For  example,  he  established  a  mili- 
tary school  for  young  nobles,  who  were  to  be  trained  to  adminis- 
ter and  develop  the  nation  within  and  extend  and  protect  it 
abroad.25  They  were  to  have  a  part  in  the  government,  but 
were  to  be  trained  for  their  work  and  could  only  keep  their 
positions  by  great  services  and  superiority  of  ideas.26  The 

^Mercure  Francois,  XII,  40-46. 

23  Pigeonneau,  II,  376-377. 

2*Bichelieu,  Testament  Politique,  I,  141-146. 

zslsambert,  XVI,  466-470. 

26Caillet,  122. 


577]  THE  ECONOMIC   RELATIONS  35 

very  fact  that  the  nobility  realized  this  made  them  ask  for  the 
military  school.  This  request  was  an  effort  to  stay  the  decadence 
of  the  class. 

Efforts  were  made  to  aid  the  nobles  in  other  ways.  Many 
were  given  good  positions  and  favors  to  keep  them  in  line  with 
the  government.  For  example,  "Chateauneuf  was  granted  a  better 
governmental  position  in  spite  of  his  bad  intentions  toward  the 
government. " 27  ' '  Indeed, ' '  Richelieu  says,  ' '  common  people 
were  replaced  by  nobles  in  the  king's  household  because  it 
would  increase  the  number  of  those  who  are  to  help  the  people 
bear  the  burden  of  taxation,  which  they  are  overwhelmed  with 
at  present. ' ' 28  This  is  an  economic  way  of  looking  at  the  prob- 
lem. The  Cardinal  was  willing  to  do  all  he  could  to  help  the 
poor  people,  but  he  regarded  the  privileges  of  the  nobles  as 
something  necessary  and  a  part  of  the  natural  order  of  events. 

The  fact  that  the  Cardinal  desired  the  nobles  to  enter  all 
phases  of  French  life  and  thus,  through  their  abilities,  help  in  the 
development  of  France,  is  best  illustrated  by  his  provision  that 
they  were  to  be  allowed  to  engage  in  commerce  without  loss  of 
honor.29  Moreover,  individuals  were  ennobled  because  of  their 
successful  colonial  or  commercial  ventures.  He  thus  strove  to 
bring  the  exclusive  order  down  to  the  everyday  phases  of  life,  and 
while  he  recognized  their  privilege,  he  wanted  them  to  retain 
these  only  in  so  far  as  earned  by  economic  or  political  efforts. 
The  ultimate  goal  was  to  be  of  course  the  building  up  of  the  state. 
He  really  intended  to  make  this  class  the  brains  and  administra- 
tion of  the  country.  The  older  men  were  to  formulate  the  plans  of 
government  and  the  younger  men  were  to  carry  them  out.30 
He  desired  to  use  these  men  as  official  agents  in  the  development 
of  France  politically  and  economically  as  well.  The  inefficient 
corrupt  character  of  the  members  of  the  noble  class  prevented 
the  success  of  the  plan,  and  in  the  long  run  brought  on  the 
French  Revolution  and  their  ruin.  They  wanted  a  political 
pension  and  not  an  economic  position. 

But  after  all,  the  great  thing  that  Richelieu  accomplished 
with  respect  to  the  nobles  was  to  ruin  their  individual 

27  Richelieu,  Testament  Politique,  I,  40-45. 

as  Ibid.,  I,  215-217. 

^Mercure  Frangois,  XII,  3640. 

so  Richelieu,  Testament  Politique,  II,  2425. 


36  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [578 

political  power  and  open  to  them  opportunities  to  serve 
the  state  politically  or  commercially,  a  course  of  action  certainly 
worthy  of  a  statesman.  That  he  weakened  this  class  by  adding 
to  them  by  means  of  the  creation  of  titles  because  of  activities 
in  the  field  of  literature  or  in  the  field  of  commerce,  is  very 
true.  But  what  better  proof  is  there  of  his  economic  tendencies  ? 
He  realized  that  the  sale  of  offices  to  the  nobles  was  bad  and 
tried  to  stop  it,  but  he  could  not  bring  about  a  reform  in  one 
night,  as  he  admitted.31  In  opening  to  the  nobility  the  chance 
to  engage  in  political  or  commercial  opportunities  whereby  the 
state  was  to  be  strengthened,  he  acted  in  keeping  with  his  eco- 
nomic and  political  views,32  and  with  the  fundamental  theory  of 
mercantilism. 

The  same  viewpoint  was  true  with  regard  to  the  clergy,  "In 
conformity  with  his  doctrine  of  the  state,  Richelieu  opposed 
ultramontanism  and  proclaims,"  says  one  writer,  "the  absolute 
independence  of  civil  power  and  the  necessity  of  a  national 
clergy. " 33  To  be  plain  the  Cardinal  desired  the  clergy  to  join 
their  interests  with  those  of  the  nation.  In  fact  the  church 
had  something  more  than  a  religious  influence  in  France  at 
that  time.  "It  was  an  age  of  hospitals  and  schools  which  were 
conducted  by  the  clergy.  They  were  the  leaders  of  philanthropic 
work. ' ' 3*  Richelieu  as  Bishop  of  LuQon  was  well  aware  of  the 
importance  of  that  class,  and  indeed  tried  to  use  his  position  to 
diminish  the  oppression  of  the  common  people.  Thus  he  wanted 
them  to  use  their  powers  for  the  interest  of  the  state  and  its 
economic  and  social  betterment.  Indeed,  he  said  that  he  pre- 
ferred the  welfare  of  the  king  and  the  grandeur  of  the  state 
to  the  interest  of  Rome,  even  though  he  was  of  the  clerical 
order.  That  in  brief  explains  his  attitude.  He  desired  a  na- 
tional clergy. 

On  the  other  hand  some  of  the  clergy  recognized  this  position 
taken  by  the  Cardinal.  They  appreciated  the  fact  that  he  de- 
sired the  unity  of  all  the  people  in  France  for  their  common 
conservation.  "Your  majesty,"  said  one  of  their  representa 

31  Eichelieu,  Testament  Politique,  I,  165-167. 

32  Ibid.,  I,  141-147. 
83  Caillet,  55. 

60-62. 


579]  THE  ECONOMIC  RELATIONS  37 

tives,  "treats  offensively  and  defensively,  solely  for  the  protec- 
tion of  the  altar  of  France  from  the  enemy."  They  outwardly, 
at  least,  then  joined  the  king  and  his  administration  "whether 
it  would  be  to  keep  up  commerce  or  preserve  the  security  of  the 
state  in  common  defense,  knowing  that  the  sovereign  law  of 
political  government  is  the  safety  of  the  people. ' ' 35  Thus  they 
promised  to  do  all  they  could  to  keep  up  the  glory  of  the  state. 
This  action  indicates  that  at  least  a  part  of  the  clergy  appreciated 
the  attitude  Richelieu  took  towards  them,  and  wanted  to  "do 
their  bit"  towards  developing  the  nation,  even  in  keeping  up 
commerce. 

Richelieu  considered  the  clergy  as  being  capable  of  serving 
in  other  capacities  besides  the  religious  side  of  affairs.  (Doubt- 
less he  was  thinking  of  his  own  case.)  For  instance,  he  says 
that  the  churchmen  are  best  for  public  tasks  because  they  have 
less  self-interest  and  other  distracting  influences  such  as  fam- 
ilies.36 Economically  speaking  he  desired  to  get  out  of  them 
the  most  possible  for  the  aid  of  the  central  government.  How- 
ever he  believed  that  their  important  function  was  on  the 
religious  side.  Herein  he  admits  that  many  reforms  are  needed 
such  as  an  effort  to  get  good  bishops,  to  change  the  system 
of  appeals  and  courts,  unjust  exemptions,  etc.37  "In  fact,"  he 
writes  in  a  letter, ' '  the  King  must  be  obeyed,  by  great  and  small, 
and  he  must  fill  the  bishoprics  with  wisely  chosen  and  capable 
men. ' ' 38  While  admitting  the  importance  of  learning  and  of  its 
propagation,  he  desires  to  see  the  monasteries  limited  in  number, 
as  well  as  other  religious  houses,  because  of  the  fact  that  there 
is  a  loss,  probably  economic,  in  having  too  many  of  them.39  So 
he  forbade  the  establishment  of  any  more  without  the  consent 
of  the  king.40 

In  conformity  with  his  plan  to  get  all  he  could  out  of  the 

ssMercure  Frangois,  XVI,  527-528. 

««  Richelieu,  Testament  PoUtique,  I,  304. 

37  /bid.,  I,  62-63. 

38  Biehelieu,  Lettres,  III,  181. 

so  Ranke,  L.  von,  Samtliche  WerTce,  Leipzig,  1874,  IX,  212.  Ranke  says 
that  Richelieu  diminished  the  number  of  monasteries  as  they  were  a  hind- 
rance to  trade  or  business. 

loisambert,  XVI,  347. 


38  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [580 

clergy,  especially  the  upper  strata,41  he  tried  to  obtain  as  much 
financial  support  from  them  as  possible.  For  example,  in  1628, 
he  requested  money  for  the  upkeep  of  the  army  and  navy.  By 
giving  some,  the  clergy  would  relieve  the  common  people.  So  they 
granted  three  millions  of  livres.*2  He  would  have  liked  to 
exclude  them  from  exemptions  of  taxes.43  On  other  occasions 
he  demanded  certain  amounts  of  money  from  the  clergy  and 
they  objected.  Busy  with  his  European  wars  he  permitted  them 
to  hold  a  council  and  decide  what  they  would  pay  and 
he  accepted  it,  as  he  had  other  matters  which  kept  him  busy.44 

As  will  be  shown  later,  Richelieu  opposed  the  Huguenots  not 
on  religious  but  on  political  and  economic  grounds,  except  that 
he  encouraged  their  individual  economic  prosperity.  This  opposi- 
tion was  just  a  part  of  that  central  theory  of  state  building  which 
he  carried  out  so  well,  and  of  which  not  only  the  nobles  and 
clergy  but  the  Third  Estate  was  a  part. 

Richelieu  regarded  the  Third  Estate  from  the  same  point  of 
view  as  the  nation,  and  for  doing  so  he  has  been  condemned.  One 
writer  says  that  Richelieu  always  sacrificed  the  well  being  of 
the  population  to  the  grandeur  of  the  nation  without  thinking 
that  there  was  no  more  true  and  solid  grandeur  than  in  the 
union  of  these  two  factors,  public  prosperity,  and  national 
glory.  In  fact  he  accused  the  Cardinal  of  having  no  true  love 
of  the  people.  And  whereas  the  latter  followed  Henry  IV  in 
his  attempts  to  build  up  the  state  he  did  not  imitate  him  with 
respect  to  the  improvement  of  the  welfare  of  the  people,  which 
was  one  of  the  aims  of  his  predecessor.46 

Now  it  is  quite  correct  to  say  that  the  Cardinal  built  up 
everything  for  the  interest  of  the  state.  That  was  the  central 
part  of  his  political  and  economic  philosophy.  He  recognized 
the  people  as  constituting  a  part  of  the  great  nation  and  con- 
sequently they  must  be  aided  as  a  class.  He  looked  at  them 

4iBonnefon,  P.,  La  Societe  Frangaise  du  XVII  Siecle,  Paris,  1903,  85. 
Richelieu  neglected  the  lower  clergy,  probably  considering  them  a  part  of  the 
Third  Estate  so  far  as  social  standing  was  concerned.  In  this  he  made  a 
mistake. 

**Mercure  Francois,  XIV,  179. 

43  Caillet,  83  et  seq. 

44 Ibid.,  87. 

45  Richelieu,  Lettres,  I,  Introduction,  GUI,  CIV. 


581]  THE  ECONOMIC  RELATIONS  39 

from  the  cold,  calculating  point  of  view  of  the  statesman  and 
economist,  who  believes  that  you  must  build  up  all  the  parts  in 
order  to  increase  the  grandeur  of  the  whole,  but  care  must 
be  taken  to  have  in  view  constantly  the  whole  rather  than  to 
weaken  common  advancement  by  an  undue  emphasis  placed 
upon  some  part.  This  was  his  theory  with  respect  to  the  rela- 
tions of  the  people  to  the  state  and  even  with  regard  to  the 
relation  of  individuals  to  the  people  as  a  whole.  For  example, 
he  says  in  his  Testament  toward  the  end  of  his  life  that  the 
public  interest  ought  to  be  the  goal  of  those  who  govern  the 
state,  or  at  least  the  mass  should  be  preferred  instead  of  indi- 
vidual people.  He  cites  Spain  as  an  example,  as  having  been 
made  great  through  emphasis  on  the  people  as  a  whole.  "By 
means  of  reason  and  justice  this  should  be  the  method  of 
councillors  and  kings  of  the  future. ' ' 46  He  asks  the  future 
government  to  consider  the  welfare  of  its  peoples  but  in  doing 
so  he  says,  "all  classes  should  stay  in  their  proper  boundaries, 
and  thus  trouble  would  not  arise. ' ' 47 

In  spite  of  the  fact  that  Richelieu  is  considered  to  have  had 
no  personal  sympathy  with  the  people,  but  instead  appeared  to 
base  all  his  ideas  upon  problems  concerning  the  welfare  of  the 
state;  nevertheless,  he  did  have  human  sympathy  for  them. 
He  realized  their  difficulties  and  would  have  liked  to  solve 
them.  He  tried  to  do  so  but  he  knew  that  the  strongest  means 
to  obtain  aid  for  the  people  was  through  a  strong  nation. 
That  is  why  he  put  the  latter  doctrine  to  the  front,  even  though 
the  citizens  had  to  suffer  temporary  oppressions.  It  was  done 
with  the  hope  of  better  conditions  for  the  common  people  in 
the  future. 

Richelieu  was  a  farsighted  man.  He  admitted  the  sufferings  of 
the  people  due  to  the  wars,  but  he  saw  the  benefits  to  be  derived 
in  the  future  because  of  them,  not  only  by  the  king  but  by  the 
people  as  a  body.  "War,"  he  says,  "is  for  the  best  interests 
of  the  people  as  a  whole  in  that  it  keeps  the  state  from  ruin. ' ' 48 
In  another  place  he  says  that  the  interest  of  France  is  the  interest 
of  its  citizens,  and  the  most  important  obligation  of  a  king  is  the 

46  Eichelieu,  Testament  Politique,  I,    267-270. 

4i  Ibid.,  181-182. 

*8  Eichelieu,  Memoires,  XXVI,  87. 


40  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [582 

repose  of  his  subjects  and  the  conservation  of  the  Kingdom.*9 
He  admitted  that  war  made  the  people  suffer,  and  he  tried 
to  prevent  it  when  possible.  However,  he  also  recognized  the 
fact  that  the  average  individual  could  not  understand  the 
ultimate  benefits  to  be  derived  by  war  and  thus  was  apt  to 
oppose  it  at  inopportune  times.  ' '  The  miseries  and  afflictions  of 
the  people  of  France,"  he  says  about  1630,  "who  have  suffered 
under  very  great  and  almost  incredible  poverty,  made  peace 
a  desirable  thing,  and  the  king  as  their  king  and  father  was 
obliged  to  urge  it.  The  frequent  disorders  taking  place  in  many 
towns  brought  up  the  fear  of  a  continuation  of  the  war,  because 
of  the  need  of  more  money  to  wage  it.  The  people  in  general, 
especially  merchants,  blamed  the  government  for  heavy  taxes, 
etc."  In  conclusion  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  he  says  the 
king  as  their  father  was  obliged  to  seek  peace  for  them.50 

It  is  quite  evident  that  there  was  a  strong  peace  party  in 
France,  led  by  the  merchants,  who  did  not  like  to  pay  the  bills 
of  war.  Yet  the  problem  resulting  seems  to  explain  why  Eichelieu 
did  not  take  active  steps  to  aid  the  people  at  this  time.  In  fact 
he  could  not.  The  political  and  economic  status  of  France 
as  related  to  other  nations  had  to  be  settled  first  before  he 
could  attend  to  the  internal  economic  problems  confronting 
him.  He  had  to  develop  his  foreign  commercial  policy  first  and 
then  his  internal  commercial  program.  He  could  only  accomplish 
the  latter  when  the  general  status  of  France  in  the  world  at  large 
was  established.  This  task  occupied  the  last  ten  years  of  his  life. 
Only  a  beginning  could  be  made  with  respect  to  internal  af- 
fairs, although  throughout  his  administration  he  was  at  least 
sympathetic  toward  the  common  man. 

One  of  the  most  important  phases  of  Richelieu's  career  is 
his  bishopric  of  Lucon.  The  very  fact  that  he  was  a  church- 
man, and  a  conscientious  one  at  that,  tends  to  indicate  that  he 
must  have  known  about  the  unhappy  conditions  of  the  people. 
That  he  did  was  also  shown  by  letters  written  during  his  ad- 
ministration as  bishop.  In  1608,  when  he  first  became  bishop, 
he  wrote  to  the  people  that  "time  will  show  the  affection  which 
I  bear  toward  you,  more  than  words  can  do.  It  is  for  that 

*»  Eichelieu,  Memoires,  XXII,  15. 
BO  Ibid.,  XXVI,  86-87. 


583]  THE  ECONOMIC   RELATIONS  41 

reason  that  I  wait  for  deeds  to  let  you  know  that  all  my  attentions 
are  for  your  welfare."51  He  follows  this  up  a  few  days  later 
with  a  letter  to  the  local  tax  collector,  protesting  against  the 
unfair  assessment  of  taxes,  bringing  out  the  misery  and  poverty 
of  the  inhabitants  from  the  excessive  tattles,  etc.,  and  he  closes 
with  a  plea  for  moderation  of  the  taxes  and  equalization  among 
the  different  sections  of  France.52  This  letter  is  followed  by 
another  the  next  year  (1609)  to  a  high  official  (probably  Sully) 
asking  him  to  aid  the  poor  by  a  reduction  of  their  taxes. 

When  he  became  secretary  of  war  in  1617,  he  desired  to  aid 
the  poor  people.  Also  in  1627,  at  the  assembly  of  notables 
he  again  advocated  attention  to  the  welfare  of  the  common 
people.54  He  said  that  the  greatest  thing  that  a  king  can  do 
is  to  protect  public  faith,  as  it  is  an  inalienable  friend  which  is 
always  to  be  found  present.  He  made  the  assertion  that  the  people 
who  now  contribute  more  of  their  blood  than  their  sweat  to  the 
expenses  of  the  state  should  be  aided.  ' '  In  proportion  as  you  help 
the  people  and  better  their  condition,  the  more  you  can  obtain 
from  them. ' ' 55  This  certainly  is  a  sound  economic  doctrine  and 
shows  that  the  Cardinal  appreciated  the  fact  that  improved 
labor  conditions  would  bring  better  results. 

In  1627  Richelieu  was  advocating  the  uplifting  of  the  common 
people  to  a  surprising  extent.  One  writer  states  "that  he  even 
said,  that  he  was  to  do  it  all  in  six  years. ' ' 56  Unfortunately 
he  was  not  able  to  carry  it  out  before  his  death.  That 
he  believed  in  it  in  theory  to  the  very  last  was  shown  in  his 
Testament.  "This  does  not  excuse  him,"  says  d'Avenel,  "why 
did  he  not  aid  them  during  the  period  1627  to  1642 ?"57  He 
did  to  a  certain  extent,  as  will  be  shown  in  the  chapter  on 
finances.  But  one  must  remember  that  during  that  time  France 
was  involved  in  a  great  European  war,  to  preserve  her  economic 
and  political  status  as  a  nation ;  that  she  was  trying  to  overcome 

•r>i  Richelieu,  Lettres,  I,  15. 

52  Ibid.,  1,  18. 

53 /bid.,  I,  20. 

s*  Ibid.,  I,  Introduction,  CII-CIII. 

ss  Mercure  Francois,  XII,  790. 

se  Richelieu,  Lettres,  Introduction,  XCII-XCIII. 

57  Ibid.,  Introduction,  CII-CIII. 


42  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OP  RICHELIEU  [584 

internal  political  troubles ;  that  a  certain  amount  of  territory  and 
centralization  of  government  was  necessary  before  the  finances 
could  be  improved;  and  lastly,  that  the  great  Cardinal  was 
hindered  by  numerous  petty  plots  of  individuals  which  disturbed 
the  nation  during  the  entire  period.  What  chance  did  he  have 
to  fund  a  debt  or  attempt  any  important  internal  reform? 

The  center  of  difficulty  in  regard  to  the  third  estate  was  of 
course  the  heavy  taxes.  Between  1627  and  1632  he  intended  to 
discharge  the  people  from  the  burden  of  three  millions  of  livres 
and  asked  them,  in  recognition  of  this  desire  on  the  part  of  the 
government  to  aid  them,  to  keep  the  peace.58 

The  same  idea  is  brought  out  in  his  Testament.  He  says  that 
the  public  welfare  should  be  the  only  end  of  those  who  govern 
the  state.  "If  private  interest  is  preferred  to  public  good 
then  harm  is  done.  But  if  the  public  interest  is  the  first  con- 
cern, then  the  state  will  be  happy  and  escape  miseries.  The 
particular  interest  of  the  king  and  the  people  go  hand  in  hand. 
We  must  therefore  aid  the  public  and  prepare  for  their  pres- 
ervation. ' ' 59  The  means  to  do  this  was  to  be  the  reform 
of  the  finances,  for  he  says,  "If  the  finances  are  properly  ar- 
ranged, the  people  will  love  him  out  of  pure  personal  interest. 
This  affection  is  very  important  to  a  king.  It  is  worth  more  than 
gold  or  silver. " 60  In  other  words  a  king  cannot  do  much  with 
his  money  without  the  love  of  his  people,  —  a  rather  business- 
like way  of  beginning  the  problem.  And  he  not  only  states 
it  but  tries  to  solve  it  by  proposing  to  reduce  the  revenues  de- 
manded of  the  people  by  three-fourths.  This  will  be  taken  up 
in  a  later  chapter.61 

Richelieu  has  been  criticised  for  his  economic  conception  of 
the  common  people.  He  has  brought  out  this  idea  in  his  treatment 
of  the  question  of  the  relation  between  the  amount  of  labor 
a  man  should  do  and  his  physical  strength.  "In  regard  to  this 
problem,"  he  says,  "all  authorities  agree  that  when  the  people 
are  too  comfortable,  or  have  too  easy  a  time,  it  is  impossible  to 
keep  them  within  the  bounds  of  duty,  because  they  are  more 

ssMercure  Francois,  XII,  36-40. 
5»Eichelieu,  Testament  Politique,  I,  267-271. 
BO  Ibid.,  II,  115-117. 
ei  See  Chapter  V,  73-81. 


585]  THE  ECONOMIC  RELATIONS  43 

ignorant  than  the  other  classes,  and  to  keep  them  within  the 
limits  of  reason  and  within  the  law,  they  must  be  kept  occupied. 
If  discharged  from  their  duties  or  obligations,  they  would  think 
themselves  released  from  obedience,  like  mules  used  to  burdens. 
But  like  these  animals,  their  burdens  must  be  moderate.  The 
common  people  need  protection.  Common  sense  must  determine 
the  proportion  between  the  burden  and  the  strength  of  those  who 
bear  it.  The  relation  of  the  loads  and  the  ability  of  the  people 
must  be  religiously  observed.  A  prince  cannot  be  esteemed  good 
if  he  exacts  from  his  subjects  more  than  is  necessary.  Yet  those 
people  are  not  the  best  who  never  raise  more  than  is  absolutely 
necessary. ' ' 62  This  passage  seems  to  indicate  the  economic  turn 
of  the  Cardinal's  mind  as  no  other  part  of  his  work  does.  He 
desired  efficiency  in  France.  He  wanted  her  to  produce  a  sur- 
plus. His  idea  was  a  strong  nation  built  up  of  healthy,  busy 
people  who  would  work  and  produce  so  that  France  could  become 
a  great  political  and  economic  power.  To  bring  this  about 
he  even  went  so  far  as  to  advocate  extra  taxation  of  the 
rich.  For  he  says,  "Sovereigns  must,  if  possible,  make  use 
of  the  abundance  of  the  rich  before  they  bleed  the  poor. ' ' 63 
This  remark  has  a  socialistic  tinge  which  is  rather  out  of 
place  in  the  seventeenth  century.  No,  it  does  not  seem  fair  to 
say  that  Richelieu  was  unsympathetic  with  the  common  people. 
He  really  tried  to  aid  them  not  only  financially  and  politically, 
but  commercially  as  well.  Richelieu  was  a  business  man  and 
the  welfare  of  France  was  his  business. 

The  development  of  the  economic  side  of  France  was  one  of 
the  most  important  phases  of  his  administration,  and,  indeed, 
affected  the  common  people  by  bringing  on  what  might  be  called 
a  social  revolution.  "Richelieu,"  says  a  writer,  "has  been, 
without  wishing  it,  one  of  the  most  powerful  agents  of  that 
economic  evolution  and  social  change,  which  tends  little  by  little 
to  level  the  ranks  and  which  left  to  the  nobles  no  other  super- 
iority except  that  of  privilege.  The  commercial  man  no  long- 
er resembled  the  trader  of  the  past  with  his  simple  and  rude 
manners,  who  busied  himself  with  his  cloth,  etc.  and  passed  his 
life  in  going  from  town  to  town  with  goods  on  the  backs  of 

*2  Richelieu,  Testament  Politique,  I,  179-182. 
es  Ibid.,  I,  181-182. 


44  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [586 

his  mules.  Now,  often  raised  in  his  calling  to  the  side  of  some 
magistrate's  son,  he  was  no  longer  a  merchant  but  the  head  of 
a  firm  of  speculators,  who  had  his  departments  and  his  corres- 
pondents at  Cadiz,  London,  Frankfort,  etc."64  "Big  business" 
was  beginning  at  that  time.  Richelieu  did  all  he  could  to  en- 
courage it  by  allowing  the  nobles  to  engage  in  it  without  losing 
their  rank  and  also  by  creating  nobles  from  those  of  the  third 
estate  who  made  a  success  of  commerce  and  permitting  them  to 
join  the  royal  court.65  Efforts  were  made  to  reestablish  com- 
merce, to  renew  and  amplify  its  privileges,  and  to  bring  it 
about  that  the  profession  of  trade  should  be  honored  by  the 
people.66 

As  a  result  of  the  increase  in  commerce,  class  feeling  was  en- 
gendered. It  caused  trouble  between  the  nobility  and  the  common 
people,  in  that  the  nobles  claimed  that  they  were  better  than 
the  common  man  even  though  they  engaged  in  trade.  Also,  the 
third  estate  did  not  want  the  privileged  class  to  engage  in  com- 
merce and  protested  about  it.  Lastly,  the  rise  of  many  middle 
class  people  to  the  ranks  of  nobility  can  be  noticed  as  a  result 
of  this  economic  and  social  change.67  The  middle  class  began 
to  assume  a  place  of  importance  so  that  even  Richelieu  was 
forced  to  try  to  influence  them  in  his  Mercure  Franqois,  the 
first  so-called  French  newspaper.68 

In  conclusion,  Richelieu's  attitude  toward  the  King  and  the 
Three  Estates  was  that  of  a  mercantilist.  The  latter  were  a 
part  of  the  state  of  which  the  King  was  the  father  or  owner. 
As  his  overseer  the  Cardinal's  chief  duty  was  to  build  up  the 
state,  although  he  was  keen  enough  to  see  that  this  really  in- 
volved the  welfare  of  the  people  of  France.  As  a  result,  he  had 
a  sincere  interest  in  their  betterment,69  and  by  his  many  accom- 
plishments he  helped  to  prepare  the  way  for  the  social  and  eco- 
nomic, as  well  as  the  political,  changes  which  came  later.  No 
better  phrase  can  illustrate  the  Cardinal's  deep  and  heartfelt 

6*  Pigeonneau,  II,  456-458. 
eslsambert,  XVI,  527. 
<*Meroure  Francois,  XII,  36-40. 

"  Levasseur,  E.,  Histoire  du  Commerce  de  la  France,  2  vols.,  Paris,  1911, 
I,  259. 

«»  Deschamps,  129. 

6»  Eichelieu,  Testament  Politique,  I,  180  et  seq. 


587]  THE  ECONOMIC  RELATIONS  45 

interest  in  them,  than  the  close  of  that  section  of  his  Testament 
dealing  with  the  third  estate,  in  which  he  pleads  with  the  king 
to  consider  always  their  interest,  and  affirms  that  nothing  would 
give  him  greater  pleasure  than  to  have  the  king  try  to  carry  out, 
after  his  death,  what  he  has  tried  to  do  when  he  was  on  earth ; 
namely,  to  build  up  a  strong  state  and  a  happy  people  therein.70 


70  Eichelieu,  Testament  Politique,  I,  180  et  seq. 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE  ECONOMIC  ASPECTS  OF  RICHELIEU'S  POLICY 
OF  CENTRALIZATION 

Richelieu,  when  he  came  into  power  in  1624,  realized  that  if 
he  was  to  make  the  King  supreme  and  build  around  him  a  great 
state,  he  had  to  take  steps  that  would  lead  to  the  centralization 
of  all  internal  political,  social,  or  economic  forces,  under  direct 
or  indirect  control  of  the  royal  government.  "The  Huguenots 
shared  the  Kingdom  with  us,"  he  said,  "and  the  nobles  con- 
ducted themselves  as  if  they  were  not  subjects  of  the  King, 
and  the  most  powerful  governors  of  the  provinces  as  if  they  had 
been  sovereigns  of  the  Kingdom. ' ' x  All  this,  he  claimed,  dimin- 
ished the  authority  of  the  King.2  People  looked  after  their  own 
interests  rather  than  the  state,  and  this  neglect  on  the  part  of  the 
king's  advisers  caused  great  injury  to  the  development  of  France. 
To  strengthen  the  power  of  the  Royal  House  in  internal  affairs 
was  his  first  problem.  It  was  the  only  way  to  develop  the  nation. 
That  Richelieu  devoted  his  personal  attention  to  this  side  of  the 
development,  and  left  Father  Joseph  to  carry  on  the  major  part 
of  the  political  questions  of  the  Thirty  Years'  "War,  indicates  the 
importance  he  placed  upon  this  phase  of  his  administration. 

Now  to  bring  about  a  thorough  internal  change,  he  had  to 
remove  all  troublesome  obstacles,  which  involved  naturally  the 
accumulation  of  power  in  the  hands  of  the  King  and  his  Prime 
Minister,  the  destruction  of  the  political  independence  of  the 
nobles  and  Huguenots,  and  the  centralization  of  all  local  forces 
under  the  direct  or  indirect  control  of  the  King  and  his  govern- 
ment, especially  the  chief  Councillor,  who  was  to  be  a  very  im- 
portant officer. 

Richelieu  has  left  ample  evidence  as  to  the  qualifications  of  a 
chief  minister  of  the  King.  He  must  have  in  mind  constantly 
his  duty  to  the  King  and  to  the  state.  There  should  be  more 

i  Richelieu,  Testament  Politique,  I,  6. 
id.,  I,  7. 

46 


589]  POLICY  OF    CENTRALIZATION  47 

than  one  councillor  to  advise  the  ruler,  but  one  should  be 
above  the  others.3  "However,"  he  says,  "this  man  should  have 
public  approbation,  for  if  everybody  likes  him,  he  will  be  most 
able  to  do  good. ' ' 4  This  minister  should  be  able  to  advise  the 
King  in  all  the  phases  of  government.  Louis  XIII  understood 
the  vast  importance  of  the  Cardinal.5  Indeed,  he  even  permit- 
ted him  to  have  a  deliberative  voice  in  the  Parlement  of  Paris, 
just  as  he  had  in  the  council  of  state.6  As  the  king's  chief  ad- 
viser he  had  access  to  all  the  parts  of  the  French  government. 
He  was  supreme.  All  was  centralized  in  his  hands,  subject  of 
course  in  theory  to  the  final  word  of  his  master. 

However,  it  is  interesting,  and  important  to  notice,  that  the 
office  upon  which  Richelieu  laid  the  most  emphasis  was  that  of 
"grand  master,  chief,  and  general  superintendent  of  the  naviga- 
tion and  commerce  of  France. ' '  The  fact  that  he  obtained  it  dur- 
ing the  early  part  of  his  administration  brings  two  important 
points  to  light,  namely,  the  economic  interest  of  the  Cardinal,  and 
the  means  by  which  independent  nobles,  governors,  and  other 
powers  were  removed  in  the  interest  of  centralization.  It  was 
the  first  great  step  by  which  Richelieu  could  carry  out  personally 
his  political  and  economic  program. 

Bad  internal  conditions  made  this  necessary.  "There  existed 
in  France,"  says  one  writer,  "two  institutions  incompatible  with 
the  unity  of  ministerial  power,  as  with  the  order  and  finance 
and  administration.  They  were,  first,  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
high  conn&table  of  France  and  secondly,  the  office  of  the  admir- 
alty. ' ' 7  Both  were  suppressed.  Richelieu  in  his  Memoirs, 
mentions  the  abuses  brought  about  by  Montmorency,  the  last  of 
the  connetables.  The  office  and  its  mate  the  admiralty,  which 
had  as  much  power  on  the  sea  as  the  former  on  the  land,  were 
suppressed,  "because,"  he  said,  "they  weakened  the  control  of  the 
King  and  were  harmful  to  the  finances,  which  were  the  ordinary 
expense  of  war,  together  with  that  of  the  local  officials  of  that 
department. ' ' 8  The  admiral  had,  likewise,  large  sums  of  money 

3  Richelieu,  Testament  Politique,  I,  232-240. 

«  Ibid.,  I,  244. 

5  Bonnefon,  Introduction,  II. 

*Mercure  Francois,  XIII,  365. 

i  Martin,  H.,  Histoire  de  France,  6  vols.,  Paris,  1861,  II,  244. 

s  Richelieu,  Memoires,  XXIII,  212-213. 


48  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [590 

to  spend  on  the  navy.  The  question  raised  was  as  to  whether  or 
not  they  expended  the  money  as  it  should  be  spent.  It  was  quite 
evident  from  the  complaints  of  the  soldiers  and  others  that  much 
of  it  was  wasted,  and  that,  as  a  result,  their  finances  were  in  bad 
shape.  Naturally,  this  led  to  the  suppression  of  those  offices 
in  the  interest  of  the  state.  It  happened  that  in  1627  they 
were  both  made  vacant  by  death,  so  that  by  abolishing  them 
the  people  were  to  be  aided  by  decreased  expenditures.9  This 
was  the  view  Kichelieu  desired  the  people  to  take.  It  is  inter- 
esting to  notice  how,  in  carrying  out  all  his  great  acts,  he  con- 
stantly appealed  to  the  effect  upon  their  purses.  He  desired  to 
get  control  of  the  armies  on  land  and  sea,  but  wanted  the  people 
to  look  upon  it  as  an  economical  change  for  their  benefit.  His 
aim  was  not  only  along  financial  lines,  however.  He  desired 
to  build  up  the  commerce  of  France,  and  this  office  enabled  him 
to  do  so  without  local  hindrances. 

But  just  what  were  its  duties?  The  answer  to  this  question 
gives  a  clue  to  the  economic  policy  of  Richelieu.  "In  the  first 
place,"  says  the  edict,  "he  must  treat  with  all  kinds  of  persons. 
He  must  look  over  propositions  of  our  subjects  relating  to 
commerce,  decide  concerning  the  merit,  utility,  etc.,  of  all  agree- 
ments, articles,  contracts,  etc.,  concerning  the  sea  and  its  enter- 
prises. .  .  .  He  is  to  look  after  commerce,  which  is  so  useful 
to  France.  Our  navigation  rights  and  sea  enterprises  are  under 
his  charge.  All  those  embarking  on  sea  trips,  can  now  go  to  him 
for  permission.  Before  this  no  one  knew  to  whom  to  go.  All 
the  evils  of  the  marine  are  to  be  removed,  etc. ' ' 10  The  Cardinal 
was  to  have  full  charge  of  navigation,  the  advancement  of  com- 
merce, and  the  security  of  Frenchmen  on  the  seas,  in  times  of 
peace.  In  times  of  war,  other  offices  might  be  created.11  The 
importance  of  this  office  can  only  be  appreciated  when  one  real- 
izes that  it  put  the  control  of  commerce  fully  in  the  hands  of 
Richelieu,  and  indicated  that  this  part  of  his  administration 
was  to  be  one  of  the  dominating  factors  of  his  career.  Trade 
was  to  be  fostered  by  it  for  the  honor  and  grandeur  of  the 
state  and  the  profit  and  increase  of  public  wealth.12  It  was 

9  M ercure  Francois,  XIII,  354-358. 
loj&uf.,  XIII,  361-362. 
11  Ibid.,  XIII,  362-364. 

XIII,  359-360;   XIV,  4-46. 


591]  POLICY  OP   CENTRALIZATION  49 

clearly  a  part  of  his  centralization  policy.  Indeed,  says  one 
writer,  "Richelieu  took  the  control  of  the  maritime  provinces 
away  from  local  governors,  and  concentrated  it  in  his  hands,  in 
order  that  it  should  grow  at  an  astonishing  rate."  13  He  realized 
that  centralization  in  time  of  need  meant  efficiency  and  quick 
results.  This  is  what  he  wanted  on  the  economic  side  of  his  ad- 
ministration. The  office,  really  that  of  secretary  of  commerce, 
marks  the  first  great  step  taken  in  the  economic  development 
of  France,  and  it  is  an  evidence  of  Eichelieu's  unselfish  motives 
that  the  first  abuses  which  he  remedied  were  those  by  which)  he 
might  have  profited.  He  would  take  no  pay  for  his  duties  in 
this  office,  nor  would  he  take  a  share  in  the  salvage.14  Yet  he 
had  enough  economic  shrewdness  to  know  that  he  would  benefit 
financially  by  other  means,  of  a  more  quiet  nature. 

However,  this  mercantilist^  policy  of  centralization,  which  the 
Cardinal  used  as  the  dominant  keynote  of  his  administration, 
is  to  be  found  also  elsewhere  than  in  the  changes  in  the  royal 
government.  The  unity  of  the  King  and  the  common  people 
against  the  nobles  is  a  feature  which  plays  a  part  in  this  pro- 
gram. The  idea  was  not  original  with  him,  for  one  can  see 
its  beginnings  in  the  early  Capetian  days,  and  again  in  the 
reign  of  Louis  XI,  "whose  sole  aim  was  to  constitute  the  French 
nation  by  removing  the  incubus,  without  whose  removal  its  ex- 
istence was  impossible,  namely,  feudal  aristocracy.  Thoroughly 
devoted  to  looking  on  the  frivolous  etiquette  of  the  nobles  with 
undisguised  scorn,  assuming  the  dress  and  society  of  commoners, 
Louis  XI  was  the  true  precursor  of  Richelieu. ' ' 15  Nevertheless, 
little  was  accomplished  in  the  way  of  reducing  the  power  of  the 
nobles  until  Richelieu's  time. 

When  he  undertook  the  administration  of  France,  he  saw 
the  nobles  still  at  their  attempts  to  strengthen  feudalism  by 
means  of  various  internal  and  external  conspiracies.  He  feared 
a  combination  of  troubles.  "What  would  happen  if  the  nobles 
or  Huguenots  united  with  Spain  ? "  he  asked.  It  is  quite  evident 
that  he  saw  the  economic  as  well  as  the  political  and  religious 
consequences.  For  a  Spanish  victory  might  and  probably  would 

isGouraud,  C.,  193-244. 
i*  Martin,  II,  244. 
is  Bridges,  16-25. 


50  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [592 

have  meant  not  only  the  supremacy  of  the  nobles,  but  it  would 
have  permitted  the  Spanish  Catholic  nation  to  overrun  France, 
thus  preventing  the  political  and  religious  equilibrium  which 
the  Cardinal  hoped  to  establish  in  Europe  as  a  necessory  prere- 
quisite for  his  future  plans  of  making  France  a  great  economic 
as  well  as  a  political  state.1* 

Consequently  Richelieu  decided  that  he  had  to  weaken  or 
destroy  the  political  power  of  the  nobles.  The  destruction  of 
most  of  their  fortresses  and  castles  unnecessary  to  the  defense 
of  the  kingdom  was  the  most  important  step  taken  to  attain 
this  desire.17  It  was  brought  about  with  the  express  purpose 
of  eliminating  needless  expense,  of  preventing  trouble,  and  of 
delivering  the  people  from  the  inconvenience,  both  economic 
and  political,  which  they  had  suffered  from  the  existence  of  the 
local  quasi-independent  powers.18  As  a  result,  it  made  the 
nobles,  the  courtiers,  and  the  common  people  more  independent 
citizens.  They  .could  trade  with  more  freedom,  and  France  re- 
ceived a  direct  economic  stimulus  through  this  act.  It  cut  down 
the  expenses  of  government  and  made  for  peace  and  tranquillity 
in  the  land.  Therefore,  it  was  a  very  important  economic  meas- 
ure. With  the  same  purpose  in  mind  the  Cardinal  prohibited 
the  carrying  of  weapons  except  by  permission.19  Also,  he  brought 
about  the  edict  against  duels,  on  the  ground  that  it  was  best 
for  the  conservation  and  growth  of  the  state.  He  said  that  the 
general  welfare  of  the  people  was  ahead  of  the  interests  of  par- 
ticular individuals.20  In  other  words,  he  did  all  that  he  could 
to  better  social  and  economic  conditions  in  France  for  all  the 
people,  by  depriving  certain  classes  of  rights  unjustly  claimed. 
This  was  done  with  the  express  purpose  of  making  France  grow. 

Richelieu  did  not  succeed  in  his  attempts  to  reform  social  con- 
ditions. The  blight  of  war  prevented  the  fulfillment  of  this 
phase  of  the  development  of  France.  Nevertheless,  he  had  in- 
itiated a  social  reform,  and  was,  therefore,  in  so  far,  a  forerunner 
of  the  French  Revolution.  He  left  the  nobles  mere  courtiers, 
and  the  French  Revolution  deprived  them  of  all  their  privileges. 

is  Richelieu,  Lettres,  II,  82-84. 
17  Ibid.,  II,  320.  Caillet,  124. 
islsambert,  XVI,  192-194. 

19  Ibid.,  XVI,  175;  Mercure  Francois,  XIII,  399-400. 

20  Richelieu,  Memoires,  XXIII,  294-297. 


593]  POLICY   OF    CENTRALIZATION  51 

Richelieu  desired  the  nobles  to  earn  their  exemptions.  They 
failed  to  respond,  and  this  caused  their  fall. 

The  Cardinal  was  not  radical  in  his  changes.  His  was  a  con- 
servative type  of  mind.  In  his  reform  of  the  government,  in  his 
replacement  of  officials  and  removals  of  nobles  in  office,  he  was 
very  slow  and  exact  in  the  steps  he  took.  "The  disorders,"  he 
says,  "which  have  been  established  by  public  necessities  and 
strengthened  by  reasons  of  state,  cannot  be  reformed  without 
time.  Changes  must  be  accomplished  by  degrees  without  passing 
from  one  extreme  into  another. ' '  He  then  admits  that  care  must 
be  taken  in  the  removal  of  officials.  Efforts  must  be  made  to 
keep  them  within  the  bounds  of  their  duty,  for  the  public  wel- 
fare.21 Richelieu  was  willing  to  give  in  to  some  nobles  or  prov- 
inces in  various  proportions,  if  he  saw  that  it  was  for  the  in- 
terest of  the  state  to  do  so.  Numerous  examples  can  be  given,  as 
where  he  refused  to  abolish  certain  taxes  because  all  the  prov- 
inces would  not  agree  to  it,22  and  where  he  exiled  the  ruler  or 
governor  of  Rouen  and  later  allowed  him  to  return.23  "Les 
messieurs  de  Saint-Halo"  refused  to  permit  the  King  to  con- 
struct some  vessels  in  their  port.  The  Cardinal  showed  them 
that  it  was  for  their  interest  in  the  protection  of  their  commerce 
to  do  so,  and  promised  in  return  to  increase  their  franchises.24 
Richelieu  added  to  or  took  away  the  privileges  of  individuals, 
with  the  sole  purpose  of  public  welfare  as  he  saw  it.25 

No  better  indication  that  Richelieu  wanted  to  be  consid- 
ered the  benefactor  of  the  people  can  be  found  than  in  the 
dispute  over  the  Cardinal's  administration  between  Richelieu 
and  Gaston,  brother  of  the  King.  The  latter  accused  the  Car- 
dinal of  working  for  his  own  ends  and  causing  the  great  misery 
of  the  people.  In  reply  Richelieu  said  that  the  unfortunate  state 
of  the  people  hurt  him.  However,  he  pointed  out  the  fact,  that 
it  was  largely  due  to  the  uprisings  caused  by  Gaston  and  others, 
which  had  retarded  him  in  his  efforts  to  aid  them.26  Richelieu 

21  Richelieu,  Testament  Politique,  I,  159. 

22  Montehre"tien,  Introduction,  XC. 

23  nid.,  Introduction,  XC. 
24/&id.,  Introduction,  XC. 

as  Richelieu,    Memoires,    II,    217-218;    Lettres,    IV,    200-201;    Mereure 
Francois,  XII,  325-326;  XIV,  70-139;.  156-160;  Isambert,  XVI,  339. 
26  Mereure  Francois,  XVII,  264. 


52  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [594 

constantly  asserted  that  as  soon  as  the  political  disturbance  inside 
France  should  be  put  down  and  Spain  be  defeated  on  the  outside, 
he  would  turn  his  attention  toward  the  aid  of  the  people,  "which 
I  so  much  desire."  27  "The  King,"  he  says,  "has  no  other  aim 
than  the  grandeur  and  welfare  of  the  Kingdom. ' ' 

Another  way  by  which  Richelieu  weakened  the  nobles  and 
aided  the  people  was  in  the  appointment  of  intendants.  These 
newly  created  government  officials  were  charged  with  the  man- 
agement of  financial  and  judicial  affairs  in  the  local  provinces, 
but  were  responsible  to  the  central  government.  This  power  had 
been  in  the  hands  of  various  nobles,  who  had  used  their  authority 
for  their  own  personal  financial  benefit,  so  that  the  appointment 
of  these  new  officials  had  a  distinct  economic  aspect.28 

The  reduction  of  the  power  of  the  Parlements,  especially 
that  of  Paris,  has  an  economic  interest  besides  its  part  in  the 
general  centralization  idea  of  Richelieu.  He  desired  them  to 
attend  to  their  judicial  affairs,  and  leave  the  government  alone.29 
He  did  not  ask  either  the  Estates  General  or  the  Parlements  to 
aid  him  in  getting  control  of  the  nobility,  because  both  of  these 
bodies  supported  the  party  he  struggled  against,  namely,  the 
great  landowners.30  Therefore,  the  destruction  of  the  political 
power  of  the  Parlements  as  well  as  that  of  the  nobles  was  neces- 
sary for  the  centralization  of  the  government,  and  the  aid  of  the 
people.  According  to  Richelieu's  scheme  France  was  not 
to  have  a  government  of  the  poor  by  the  rich.  It  was  to  be  a 
government  by  a  central  hereditary  monarchy  over  both  classes. 
"In  other  words,"  says  one  writer,  "feudalism  in  the  hands  of 
Richelieu  was  concentrated  into  a  single  institution,  hereditary 
monarchy." 31  By  this  he  hoped  to  do  away  with  most  internal 
and  external  evils  and  build  up  a  strong  state.  No  wonder  he 
put  down  all  conspiracies  so  severely.  Indeed,  his  effort  to 
end  the  disorders  of  the  court  of  justice,  by  having  the  King 
appoint  men  of  merit  and  integrity,32  only  serves  to  illustrate 

27  Mercure    Frangois,    XVII,    130-133,    192-194;     Richelieu,    Testament 
Politique,  I,  8 ;  Eichelieu,  Memoires,  XI,  349-350. 

28  For  further  information   concerning  the   Intendants,  see  Chapter  V, 
84  et  seq. 

29  Mole,  Memoires,  4  voaols.    Paris,  1855,  I,  478-482;  II,  3. 
so  Bridges,  30-31. 

31/ftwZ.,  31. 

32  Eichelieu,  Testament  Politique,  I,  168. 


595]  POLICY  OP   CENTRALIZATION  53 

the  fact  that  he  tried,  in  theory  at  least,  to  reform  all  the  parts 
of  the  royal  and  local  governments,  in  order  to  build  up  a  strong- 
ly centralized  kingdom  in  which  the  people  should  enjoy  a  hap- 
pier social  and  economic  life.  Practically,  Richelieu  was  apt 
to  favor  certain  classes  in  his  appointments,  as  when  for  example 
he  made  the  Archbishop  of  Bordeux  admiral  of  one  of  his 
fleets.  The  latter  was  not  especially  efficient  in  this  new  calling. 
In  1641  the  fleet  was  defeated  by  a  Spanish  squadron  near  Tarra- 
gona, and  Richelieu  admitted  that  he  had  made  a  mistake  by 
removing  the  Archbishop  from  command.33 

There  was  one  political  element  in  France  which  attracted 
the  attention  of  Richelieu  more  than  any  other  single  factor,  on 
account  of  its  independence  and  opposition  to  the  interests  of 
the  state.  It  was  the  organization  of  the  Huguenots.  In  his 
Political  Testament  he  says  that  at  the  beginning  of  his  admin- 
istration, he  promised  the  King  to  employ  all  his  industry  and 
all  the  authority  given  him,  to  rule  the  Huguenots,  etc.84  Their 
control  constituted  one  of  his  first  problems  in  carrying  out  his 
great  scheme  of  centralization.  ''It  is  certain,"  he  said,  "that 
the  downfall  of  La  Rochelle,  (politically  speaking),  is  the  end  of 
the  miseries  of  France  and  the  beginning  of  its  repose  and  good 
fortune."  35  It  was  the  idea  of  attaining  a  future  peace  and  the 
development  of  France  thereby,  which  caused  Richelieu  to  take 
a  severe  attitude  toward  these  people  from  the  start.  ' '  As  long 
as  the  Huguenots  have  a  foothold  in  France,"  he  writes,  "the 
King  will  never  rule  within  and  can  take  no  glorious  action  with- 
in or  without."36  The  destruction  of  their  political  power  was 
a  necessary  preliminary  to  the  welfare  of  the  ideal  centralized 
state.87 

Nevertheless,  in  bringing  about  this  change  the  Cardinal  did 
not  desire  to  injure  the  Huguenots  personally.  "If  they  stay 
quiet,"  he  said,  "they  will  be  treated  as  citizens,  with  the  due 
protection  of  laws,  etc."38  They  had  a  place  and  value  as 

33  Perkins,  J.  B.,  EicJielieu  and  the  Growth  of  French  Power,  New  York, 
1904,  179. 

s*  Richelieu,  Testament  Politique,  I,  8-9. 

ss  Richelieu,  Lettres,  III,  161. 

»«  Richelieu,  Memoires,  XXII,  430. 

37  Aa  Bishop  of  Lucon,  Richelieu  lived  near  the  Huguenots  and  thus  waa 
well  aware  of  their  religious,  political,  and  economic  power. 

salsambert,  XVI,  143. 


54  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [596 

Frenchmen,  and  he  recognized  that  fact.  One  writer  sug- 
gests that  he  rather  favored  those  Huguenots  who  devoted  them- 
selves to  agriculture,  industry,  and  commerce.  "He  opened  to 
their  enterprise  all  the  French  colonies  except  Canada. ' ' 39  The 
Cardinal  appreciated  their  economic  importance  as  individuals, 
but  depreciated  their  political  strength  as  a  body.  To  preserve 
the  former  and  ruin  the  latter  was  necessary  in  order  to  develop 
France  along  either  political  or  economic  lines.  "There  is  no 
King,  Prince,  sovereign,  nor  any  state  so  well  governed  that  it 
approves  a  rebellion  of  its  subjects;  for  an  uprising  would  be 
fatal  to  the  existence  of  the  state. ' ' 40  And  Richelieu  means  not 
only  the  political  but  the  economic  state  as  well.  The  Hugue- 
nots could  not  remain  either  politically  or  economically  inde- 
pendent. 

In  1615  Montchretien  's  treatise  on  economics  placed  great  em- 
phasis on  the  value  of  the  salt  industry  in  France.  "I  would 
remark  to  your  majesty,"  he  says,  "that  all  the  trade,  not  only  of 
Frenchmen  but  of  foreigners,  depends  upon  the  salt  of  the 
Kingdom."  Salt  can  be  a  great  source  of  revenue  for  France, 
he  points  out,  as  it  is  a  public  necessity  for  all.  In  fact  the 
English,  Dutch,  Italians,  etc.,  should  pay  the  same  revenues 
as  the  French  (which  evidently  had  not  been  the  case  pre- 
viously).41 In  another  place,  he  advocates  the  transfer  of  salt 
to  other  parts  of  France  by  Frenchmen,  instead  of  foreigners, 
as  had  been  the  case.42  It  would  seem  that  Montchretien  was 
well  aware  of  the  economic  importance  of  the  French  salt  re- 
sources. Also,  one  can  see  in  the  above  citations  another 
indication  of  Richelieu's  fostering  care  for  the  development  of 
French  labor  and  transportation. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  that  at  the  time  when  Montchretien 
was  advocating  retaliation  against  foreign  countries  which  in- 
jured French  commerce,  England  resented  this  attitude  (as  will 
be  shown  later) ,  and  thus  was  brought  about  an  industrial  mone- 
tary crisis  in  France.43  Hard  times  helped  to  bring  on  the  re- 
volt of  the  Huguenots,  who  were  becoming  more  and  more  ad- 
dicted to  the  pursuits  of  trade  and  industry,  and  also  led  to  the 

39Rambaud,  I,  572. 
toMercure  Francois,  XIV,  104. 
4i  Montchretien,  235-236. 
42/fctd.,  185-186. 
**  Ibid.,  129-130,  Editor's  note. 


597]  POLICY  OP   CENTRALIZATION  55 

uprisings  of  the  nobles  who  sought  to  profit  by  popular  dis- 
content, and  recover  their  lost  prestige.44  Thus  a  commercial 
rivalry  between  England  and  France,  and  a  political  and  econ- 
omic struggle  between  France  and  the  Huguenots  developed  into 
a  three-cornered  fight,  with  the  English  in  alliance  with  the 
Huguenots,  who  in  turn  were  aided  by  many  ambitious  nobles. 

The  struggle  centered  around  the  capture  of  the  islands  of 
Oleron  and  Re,  which  of  course  would  result  in  the  fall  of  La 
Rochelle.  Richelieu  said,  that  the  island  of  Oleron  was  of  great 
importance  in  that  it  controlled  the  outlet  of  the  Clarente  and 
the  Sendre  rivers,  and  could  be  of  inconvenience  to  the  traffic 
of  the  Garonne  river,  and  thus  injure  the  King's  taxes  and 
commerce.45  It  thus  becomes  clear  that  Richelieu  had  a  com- 
mercial motive  for  the  conquest  of  those  islands.  He  desired 
the  advantages  obtained  from  their  wines,  wheat,  and  salt. 

Of  course  Richelieu's  views  were  bitterly  opposed  by  the  peo- 
ple of  La  Rochelle.  The  Huguenots  claimed  that  the  French 
had  constantly  tried  to  hinder  the  commerce  of  that  place, 
by  which  it  existed.  In  reply,  the  King  and  Richelieu 
accused  the  people  of  La  Rochelle  of  doing  injury  to  the  com- 
merce of  other  towns,  as  Orleans  for  example.  "They  do  not 
keep  their  promises,"  the  King  said.46  He  told  them  on  another 
occasion  that  the  commercial  growth  of  La  Rochelle  made  them 
try  to  imitate  the  Parlememt  of  Paris  and  oppose  the  govern- 
ment. "Now  the  word  is  given  by  their  master  and  it  is  to 
be  enacted  according  to  his  pleasure.  Otherwise,  it  is  contrary 
to  the  laws  of  his  subjects,  the  divine  law  and  other  rights 
of  the  people.47  In  other  words,  the  commercial  as  well  as  the 
political  laws  of  the  central  government  were  to  dominate  over 
any  province  or  town.  Any  special  commercial  privileges  of  La 
Rochelle  were  subject  to  the  will  of  this  central  body. 

It  is  certainly  interesting  to  note  that  the  Huguenots  claimed 
that  they  revolted  to  get  commercial  rights.  They  bemoaned  the 
unfairness  of  France  in  attacking  La  Rochelle,  confiscating  its 
goods,  and  forcing  it  to  seek  English  aid.  In  reply,  the  royal 
government  has  the  following  to  say:  "O  unfortunate  fort  so 

4*  Montchretien,  129-130. 

43  Richelieu,  Memoires,  XXIII,  343-344. 

46  Mercure  Francois,  XIV,  94. 

47  Ibid.,  XIV,  90-94. 


56  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [598 

fatal  to  France,  0  infidelity,  so  dearly  purchased.  Since  in  your 
substance  is  found  the  force  of  our  misfortune,  your  ruin  will 
be  the  true  remedy.  Who  will  believe  the  fact,  that  they  were 
capable  of  hazarding  the  honor  of  France  and  the  loss  of  the 
islands  and  the  fort  of  Re,  and  our  liberty  thereby. " 48  It  is 
clear  that  the  French  feared  above  all  the  conquest  of  this 
territory  by  the  English. 

At  this  point  it  may  be  observed  that  the  economic  basis 
of  Eichelieu's  desire  to  put  down  internal  rebellion  was  prob- 
ably partly  due  to  this  loss  of  revenue,  which  must  have  been 
largely  responsible  for  the  unfortunate  financial  condition  of 
France.49  Furthermore,  "the  activity  of  commerce,  which  rend- 
ers the  Kindom  flourishing,  would  be  interrupted,  as  a  result 
of  the  Huguenot  trouble,"  says  the  Mercure  Francois.50  It  is 
evident  that  commercial  gain  and  financial  loss  were  the  factors 
behind  the  oposition  to  the  Huguenot  and  English  control  in 
France. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Huguenots  pointed  out  the  fact  that  a 
treaty  of  peace  had  been  made  between  England  and  France 
with  their  aid.  But  they  had  found  little  to  warrant  their 
carrying  out  the  articles  of  that  treaty.  They  had  been  prom- 
ised free  disposition  of  salt,  which  they  possessed  on  the  islands, 
and  of  their  other  products,  yet  all  the  salt  on  the  island  of  Re 
had  been  taken  away  from  them  since  the  treaty.  By  the  same 
agreement  liberty  of  commerce  was  promised,  the  retention  of 
privileges,  and  the  reestablishment  of  the  island  of  Re  as  a  re- 
treat for  the  naval  forces,  but  none  of  these  had  been  carried 
out.51  In  fact  the  Huguenots  were  emphatic  in  their  claims  that 
economic  injustice  caused  them  to  revolt.  Later  on,  in  1627,  they 
asked  why  commerce  was  hindered.  They  hinted  that  something 
must  be  behind  it  all.  A  plain  exposition  of  the  importance 
of  trade  and  the  production  and  distribution  of  salt  was  given 
and  they  declared  that  England  wanted  the  islands.52  The  gov- 
ernment in  reply  claimed  that  the  Huguenots  had  fostered  the 

48  Mercure  Francois,  XIV,  102. 

"d'Avenel,  G.  de,  Richelieu,  Monarchic  Absolue,  4  vols.,  Paris,   1859, 
II,  275;  Mercure  Frangois,  XIV,  102. 
so  Mercure  Francois,  XIV,  102. 
si  Ibid.,  XIV,  89-90. 
tU,  XIV,  100-103. 


599]  POLICY  OP   CENTRALIZATION  57 

English  alliance  and  that  the  commercial  complaint  was  a  mere 
false  mask,  and  accused  the  Huguenots  of  starting  the  whole 
trouble.  The  central  authorities  failed  to  explain,  however,  why 
the  Huguenots  should  have  so  acted. 

The  personal  element  was  brought  into  the  controversy  be- 
cause there  was  at  least  one  individual  who  believed  that  Riche- 
lieu had  personal  motives  in  his  capture  of  La  Rochelle.  "For," 
says  Gaston  d 'Orleans,  the  bitter  royal  opponent  of  the  Car- 
dinal, ' '  by  his  control  of  that  place  he  could  monopolise  the  salt 
sent  to  England  and  France  as  a  whole."53  (Evidently  the 
importance  of  the  salt  trade  as  applied  to  La  Rochelle  justified 
the  ardent  efforts  of  all  parties  to  retain  control  of  it.)  Indeed, 
Gaston  claims  that  if  Richelieu  should  fortify  properly  the  is- 
lands around  La  Rochelle,  he  could  render  France  tributary  for 
the  salt  trade,  and  possess  the  principal  revenue  of  the  kingdom. 

Viewed  in  retrospect  the  Huguenot  affair  was  one  of  the  steps 
in  Richelieu's  efforts  to  centralize  all  the  trade  of  France.  His 
assuming  the  office  of  superintendent  and  grand  master  of  com- 
merce and  navigation  was  another.  However,  the  important  de- 
duction from  it  all  is  that  the  British,  the  French,  and  the  Hu- 
guenots all  desired  the  control  of  the  salt  supply,  which,  being 
near  La  Rochelle,  became  the  logical  economic  bone  of  contention 
for  all  parties.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  one  finds  that  in  1629, 
Richelieu  was  appointed  Lieutenant  General  of  the  islands  of 
Re  and  Oleron  and  several  other  places.5*  He  actually 
controlled  Oleron,  and  perhaps  Gaston  was  not  wholly  in  the 
wrong.  At  least  one  can  be  assured  that  the  Cardinal  realized 
the  importance  of  that  region,  though  to  what  extent  he  was 
influenced  by  patriotic  or  personal  reasons  is  a  question  which 
is  difficult  to  settle.  It  seems  quite  clear,  however,  that  the  Hug- 
uenot affair  was  not  simply  a  political,  but  also  an  economic 
problem.  In  the  second  place,  it  is  evident  that  Richelieu  brought 
about  not  only  political,  but  economic  centralization  in  his  hand- 
ling of  the  Huguenot  situation.  In  keeping  with  his  mercantil- 
istic  policy  he  did  not  desire  either  political  or  economic 
decentralization  within  France. 

In  his  efforts  to  create  an  efficient  and  centralized  economic 

ss  Mereure  Francois,  XVII,  216-218. 
5*  Mote,  II,  2. 


58  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [600 

state  Richelieu  had  certain  ideas  as  to  the  kind  of  man  he  desired 
for  the  King's  household  and  other  official  positions.  He 
desired  the  positions  to  be  filled  from  the  nobility,  yet  every 
individual  appointed  to  office  in  the  King's  household  should  be 
qualified  for  his  place.55  While  he  believed  the  class  system  was 
best  for  France,  yet  even  here  he  considered  the  interests  of 
the  common  people.  For  by  limiting  these  positions  to  the  nobility 
he  would  leave  more  people  liable  to  taxes  and  in  that  respect 
would  aid  the  people.  He  then  openly  advised  the  King  to 
appoint  men  on  the  merit  system,  and  not  sell  the  offices.  ' '  Thus 
virtue  will  be  the  reward  for  office,  not  money. ' ' 56  He  even 
outlined  the  requirements  as  to  what  constitutes  a  good  council- 
lor.57 Above  all  he  must  be  faithful  to  God  and  the  state.  He 
can  attend  to  his  own  business  and  the  state's  also,  but  in  a 
conflict  of  interests,  the  welfare  of  the  nation  comes  first.68  In- 
deed, when  Richelieu  says  that  a  minister  must  be  chosen  accord- 
ing to  his  capacity,  and  his  reward  as  a  faithful  public  servant 
is  that  of  fame  which  is  the  greatest,  he  seems  like  some  of 
our  modern  idealists  with  socialistic  impulses.  In  fact  ''state 
socialism"  seems  to  be  an  underlying  premise.  A  happy  state, 
a  happy  people  would  make  a  great  King  and  a  magnificent 
France ;  this  sums  up  his  philosophy. 

Fame  should  not  be  the  only  reward  of  a  minister  of  the 
King's  household.  "He  should  be  given  enough  to  live  on  in 
comfort  and  be  able  to  labor  for  the  grandeur  and  benefit  of 
the  kingdom. " 59  If  a  man  has  the  honesty,  ability,  and  fore- 
sight to  merit  a  governmental  position  of  this  sort  and  to  work 
for  the  welfare  of  the  state,  the  government  should  provide  for 
his  economic  existence.  Richelieu  has  a  practical  way  of  exam- 
ining political  matters,  which  indicates  that  he  saw  their  eco- 
nomic importance  as  well  as  their  political  or  social  value. 

SB  Richelieu,  Testament  Politique,  I,  207. 
sejfttd.,  I,  208-216. 
37  Ibid.,  1,  217-218. 

58  Ibid.,  I,  225-226. 

59  Ibid.,  195-196.     D  'Avenel  has  pointed  out  that  the  officers  of  the  King 's 
household,  as  chambellan,  grand  ecuyer,  and  grand  maitre  of  the  King,  were 
charged  with  various  domestic  duties  of  the  royal  house,  but  had  no  political 
functions.     Richelieu  evidently  wanted  to  make  these  officials  of  more  po- 
litical and  economic  value  to  the  state.     See  d 'Avenel,  Monarchic  Absolut, 
I,  55. 


601]  POLICY  OP   CENTRALIZATION  59 

Good  officials  were  necessary  to  build  up  a  strong  state  not  only 
politically,  but  economically  as  well.  "A  person's  interest  is 
not  to  be  compared  with  that  of  the  public  welfare. ' ' 60 

It  seems  that  this  idea  of  obtaining  men  for  office  by  the  merit 
system  is  entirely  in  harmony  with  the  mercantilistic  conception 
of  the  strong  state.  Richlieu  admits  this,  when  he  claims  that 
one  of  the  greatest  advantages  that  can  be  procured  for  a 
state,  is  to  give  everyone  a  position  suitable  to  his  genius  and 
capacity.01  A  man  who  is  capable  of  serving  the  public  in  cer- 
tain functions  may  ruin  it  in  others.  What  would  have  been 
the  history  of  France,  if  Richelieu  had  been  able  to  carry  out 
these  views?  They  were  conclusions  reached  as  a  result  of  his 
years  of  work  for  the  nation,  and  which  he  desired  to  be  carried 
out  by  those  who  followed  him.  Failure  to  do  so,  was  one 
of  the  contributing  factors  in  the  events  which  followed  in 
French  history.  What  a  difference  it  would  have  made  if 
this  advice  had  been  followed,  — ' '  Princes  must  be  careful  of 
their  given  promises.  A  Prince  does  harm  to  appoint  a  friend 
to  a  position  for  which  he  is  incompetent.  A  personal  friendship 
should  not  come  before  the  interests  of  the  state. ' ' 62 

However,  when  one  examines  his  administration  as  a  whole, 
it  will  be  seen  that  the  Cardinal  did  not  carry  out  his  ideas 
to  the  letter.  He  knew  that  to  change  a  custom  takes  time.  There- 
fore, in  such  matters  as  the  sale  of  offices  versus  the  merit  sys- 
tem, he  admits  at  the  last  that  a  man  must  submit  to  certain 
weak  conditions,  and  prefer  a  moderate  regulation  to  a  more 
austere  settlement,  which  would  probably  not  be  so  successful. 
"He  who  brings  justice  in  by  the  lump,  may  sell  it  at  retail, 
but  on  the  other  hand,  a  man  who  buys  an  office  may  conduct 
it  aright,  so  as  not  to  lose  what  he  put  into  it. " 63  He  believed 
in  not  rushing  into  radical  changes.  He  admits  that  he  would 
be  more  popular  with  the  common  people  if  he  advocated  the 
suppression  of  the  sale  of  offices.  However,  he  believed  that  the 
welfare  of  the  state  is  best  maintained  as  it  is  now.64  The  nation 
was  not  strong  enough  as  yet  to  bring  about  the  required  change, 

eo  Richelieu,  Testament  Politique,  I,  282. 
si  Ibid.,  I,  296. 
62/&wZ.,  I,  299-301. 
63/&id.,  I,  156-158. 
e*  Ibid.,  I,  163-165. 


60  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OP  RICHELIEU  [602 

which  could  better  take  place  at  a  later  time,  while  bad  effects 
might  result  if  he  abolished  it  at  this  time.  Evidently  he  judged 
all  changes  on  the  basis  of  the  present  and  future  welfare  of  the 
state.  Again  he  said  repeatedly  that  merit  should  rule  the 
Prince  and  his  appointments,  but  admitted  that  he  had  not  fol- 
lowed out  this  idea.  "The  reason  for  it,"  he  says,  "is  due  to 
the  fact  that  while  disorders  were  in  vogue,  without  any  possi- 
bility of  a  remedy,  reason  required  that  order  should  be  extracted 
out  of  the  troubles.  This  was  my  intention  in  preserving  or  keep- 
ing in  offices  in  my  care  people  whom  I  could  oblige  to  follow 
strictly  my  intentions  and  plans.  If  it  had  been  possible  during 
the  troubles  of  a  reign  agitated  by  different  storms  to  settle  the 
regulation  I  propose,  I  would  have  been  a  very  religious  observer 
of  it. ' ' 65  Richelieu  believed  that  an  idea  in  theory  and  in 
practice  becomes  two  different  things,  which  can  both  exist 
only  if  the  welfare  of  the  state  permits.  In  the  case  of  the 
merit  system,  however,  he  did  hope  to  see  it  succeed  in  the  end. 

Before  he  could  carry  out  many  of  his  plans  along  these  lines, 
he  had  to  restore  peace  in  France.  He  hoped  to  do  so  by  means 
of  a  large  army  centralized  in  the  hands  of  the  royal  govern- 
ment. "For,"  he  says,  "a  Prince  must  be  powerful  by  the 
strength  of  his  frontiers  and  the  strength  of  his  army.  The 
welfare  and  the  repose  of  the  state  depend  on  the  fidelity  and 
repose  of  its  defenders. ' ' 66  The  army  was  another  means  by 
which  France  was  to  be  made  ready  for  the  great  economic 
change  which  would  take  place  when  peace  arrived.  Alas, 
the  great  Cardinal  had  departed  before  that  eventful  day  oc- 
curred. 

It  is  interesting  to  notice,  however,  that  in  spite  of  the  many 
distractions  of  war,  Eichelieu  tried  to  use  the  centralistic  poli- 
cies of  the  government  to  bring  about  great  social  improvements. 
For  example,  "lettres  patent"  were  granted  a  certain  individual 
who  offered  to  aid  in  the  foundation  of  an  institution  for  the 
incurable.  "There  are,"  said  the  edict,  "many  hospitals  and 
monasteries  for  curable  troubles."  Therefore,  the  government 
considered  such  an  institution  needed  for  the  welfare  of  its 
people  and  allowed  its  establishment  according  to  fixed  rules. 

es  Eichelieu,  Testament  Politique,  I,  188-191. 
ee  Ibid.,  II,  1-3 ;  Isambert,  XVI,  386. 


603]  POLICY  OF    CENTRALIZATION  61 

It  was  to  be  exempt  from  taxes,  and  to  be  favored  in  all  ways 
by  Jthe  government.67  The  letter,  published  in  1637,  shows 
that  the  government  was  interested  in  and  fostered  all  schemes 
which  could  be  of  benefit  to  the  general  public  welfare.  It  even 
went  so  far  as  to  investigate  the  hospitals  and  their  bad  admin- 
istration, which  prevented  the  poor  from  being  received.  This 
evil  was  to  be  remedied;  the  Mayors  and  Bishops  were  to  look 
after  their  interests.  The  poor  were  to  be  aided  by  new  laws; 
public  employment  was  to  be  provided.  "By  not  working," 
Richelieu  said,  ' '  they  deprive  the  public  of  the  services  which  it 
could  receive  by  their  labor. ' ' 68  This  statement  indicates  solici- 
tude for  the  interests  of  the  poor  and  the  state  as  well,  rather 
surprising  but  entirely  in  harmony  with  the  general  plan  of 
government.  He  seemed  to  be  interested  also  in  the  physical  wel- 
fare of  the  people.  The  establishment  of  a  Royal  Garden  at 
Paris  for  the  culture  of  medicinal  plants,  would  indicate  a  gen- 
eral governmental  plan  to  preserve  and  conserve  the  health  of 
the  people  and  thus  make  France  strong.  For  the  government 
knew  that  the  health  of  man  is  the  most  desired  and  precious  of 
things.  "To  aid  the  universities  in  their  research  along  this 
line  and  to  help  the  people  in  their  collection  of  medical  plants, 
we  desire  to  establish  this  garden,  etc. ' ' 69 

All  this  formed  part  of  the  one  political,  economic,  and  social 
conception  of  Richelieu,  namely,  to  build  up  a  great  state  along 
these  lines.  To  reduce  the  nobles,  to  put  down  the  political 
and  economic  power  of  the  Huguenots,  and  to  unify  and  make 
efficient  the  governmental  organization  as  a  whole  were  elements 
of  one  scheme  which  was  essentially  centralistic  not  only  on  the 
political,  but  also  on  the  economic  side.  He  was  successful  in  his 
efforts  to  attain  this  program.  Yet  his  financial  policy  is  gener- 
ally considered  his  one  great  failure.  Thus  it  merits  considera- 
tion. 


67  Isambert,  XVI,  474-477. 
es  Richelieu,  Lettres,  II,  180. 
69  Isambert,  XVI,  161-162. 


CHAPTER  V 


The  financial  phase  of  Richelieu 's  administration  is  a  very  dif- 
ficult subject  to  treat.  It  has  been,  in  itself,  fairly  well  devel- 
oped in  financial  works  dealing  with  the  time.  But  as  a  part  of 
a  general  economic  scheme,  the  weak  phases  of  his  activities 
in  this  line  take  on  a  new  meaning,  and  thus  require  considera- 
tion from  a  new  point  of  view. 

In  the  light  of  a  broader  interpretation  of  the  elements  enter- 
ing into  the  financial  administration,  it  does  not  seem  possible 
to  accept  the  common  conception  of  this  part  of  the  great  Car- 
dinal's work.  That  the  weakest  phase  of  Richelieu's  ministry 
was  his  administration  of  the  finances,  is  probably  true;  but 
considering  all  conditions  involved,  one  cannot  say  it  was  a  fail- 
ure. The  accusation  that  he  made  no  effort  to  relieve  the  burdens 
of  the  people,  or  that  he  failed  completely  in  his  efforts  to  reform 
the  abuses  of  the  financial  administration  is  false.1  It  is  an 
unjust  interpretation  of  the  man's  career,  and  necessitates 
a  vindication,  although,  in  one  sense,  other  writers  have  attended 
to  this  more  or  less  successfully.2 

Richelieu  in  developing  the  financial  side  of  his  administration 
was  guided  by  his  one  general  purpose,  namely,  to  build  the 
great  state,  of  which  the  financial  system  was  a  necessary  part. 
But  it  could  be  improved  only  in  times  of  peace  and  thus  appears 
the  real  explanation  for  what  failures  there  were  in  the  Car- 
dinal's policy,  —  namely,  a  long  period  of  war  which  was  like- 
wise a  necessity  in  the  preliminary  development  of  the  great 
state.  Richelieu  realized  that  he  could  carry  out  a  general  finan- 
cial reform  only  in  times  of  peace.  He  points  out  in  his  Testa- 
ment Politique  that  he  ruined  the  Huguenots,  put  down  the 

1  Lodge,  R,  Eichelieu,  London,  1896,  174. 

2  Caillet,  254,  etc. 

62 


605]  THE  FINANCIAL,  ADMINISTRATION  OP  FRANCE  63 

nobles,  and  undertook  a  great  war  against  powerful  external 
enemies,  in  order  to  assure  a  good  peace  and  repose  for  the 
future.3  Why?  He  goes  on  to  say  that  the  tolerance  of  these 
abuses  has  prevented  any  attempts  to  attain  his  aims,  of 
which  the  reform  of  the  finances  is  one.  The  Cardinal's  main 
interest  during  his  administration  was  in  carrying  out  the 
duties  of  ''superintendent  of  navigation  and  commerce,  etc." 
As  a  result  he  intrusted  the  principal  care  of  the  finances  to  the 
superintendent  of  finances.  Yet  he  gave  attention  to  financial 
matters  throughout  his  life,  and  left,  in  his  Testament  Politique, 
a  clear  and  concise  solution  of  the  whole  problem,  to  be  applied 
later. 

This  subject  will  be  treated  in  two  parts,  first  the  achieve- 
ments and  problems  of  Richelieu  and  his  financial  superintend- 
ents during  his  administration,  and  secondly,  the  general 
theoretical  solution  of  the  problems  as  expounded  by  the  Cardinal 
in  his  last  great  work.  In  considering  his  achievements  or 
intentions,  one  must  bear  constantly  in  mind  the  main  purpose 
behind  all  his  ideas,  namely  the  grandeur  of  the  state  and  the 
elements  entering  into  the  attainment  of  that  ideal. 

It  was  in  1615  that  Richelieu  first  took  an  active  public  in- 
terest in  the  finances  of  the  country.  He  spoke  then  as  a  repre- 
sentative of  the  clergy  against  the  sale  of  offices,  which  increased 
the  burden  on  the  poor  people,  who  were  not  able  to  bear  much 
more.  "Finances,"  he  said,  "  are  the  true  nerves  of  the  state 
and  should  be  administered  with  economy  and  with  the  reduction 
of  expenses,  such  as  pensions,  etc. ' '  *  Also  he  maintained  that 
the  number  of  people  who  were  exempt  from  paying  taxes  should 
be  decreased,,  all  in  the  interest  of  justice  and  the  welfare  of 
the  poor.  However,  internal  dissention  prevented  any  actual 
accomplishment  except  the  temporary  establishment  of  a  cham- 
ber of  justice  to  study  the  question  of  finances.5 

Nevertheless,  this  meeting  of  the  Estates  General  marks  the 
beginning  of  the  reaction  against  the  heavy  taxes  and  the  unfair 
exemptions  of  certain  classes.  The  assembly  had  heard  the 
demands  of  the  third  estate  for  the  establishment  of  a  real 

3  Richelieu,  Testament  Politique,  II,  85. 
*  Richelieu,  Mtmoires,   X,   203,   321-322,   340,   358. 

s  ' '  This  chamber  was  created  in  1624  and  revoked  in  1625.  So  little  was 
done. "  —  Isambert,  XVI,  147. 


64  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [606 

tattle  borne  by  all  owners  of  ' '  immovable  property. ' '  6  From 
now  on  this  tax  was  one  of  the  goals  of  their  ambition. 

None  appreciated  better  than  Richelieu  the  immense  waste 
of  funds  which  had  been  going  on  since  the  death  of  Henry  IV. 
Huge  amounts  had  been  spent  on  pensions  for  various  nobles. 
Indeed  he  said,  that ' '  the  economy  of  Henry  IV  and  what  he  has 
left  alone  has  preserved  France.  But  it  will  not  last,  and  the 
very  fact  that  the  nobles  who  have  obtained  most  of  the  money 
claim  that  it  was  given  to  foreign  statesmen,  makes  an  under- 
standing necessary  at  once. ' ' 7 

Richelieu  took  two  steps  in  1625  to  remedy  the  situation. 
He  advocated  publicity  in  the  disposition  of  money  obtained 
in  taxes,  and  a  reduction  of  the  expenses  of  the  government.8 
To  carry  out  the  above  purposes  he  brought  about  a  temporary 
establishment  of  the  chamber  of  justice,9  and  the  replacement  of 
corrupt  officials  by  honest  ones.10  "A  change  of  officials,"  he 
said,  "is  not  a  good  thing,  but  there  are  times  when  a  nation  is 
saved  by  means  of  such  changes."  "  Richelieu  carried  out  this 
idea  by  replacing  several  financial  officials  who  were  connected 
with  various  instances  of  corruption.12  However,  nothing  was 
really  accomplished  except  the  stirring  up  of  a  little  excitement 
among  the  nobles,  until  1626,  when  the  two  inefficient  individuals 
by  the  names  of  Champigny  and  Marillac  were  replaced  by  the 
Marquis  d'Effiat,  in  the  office  of  superintendent  of  finances. 
' '  His  administration, ' '  said  one  writer, ' '  can  be  placed  beside  that 
of  Sully  and  Colbert  in  merit  and  importance. ' ' 13 

The  position  of  superintendent  of  the  finances  was,  next  to 
that  of  chancellor,  the*  most  important.  He  had  charge  not  only 
of  the  finances  but  also  of  all  of  the  internal  administration. 
In  fact,  next  to  Richelieu,  he  took  precedence.  D'Effiat  took 
full  advantage  of  his  powers  and  showed  his  ability  from  the 
very  beginning.  The  first  thing  he  did  was  to  have  the  assembly 

eEichelieu,  Memoirs,  XI,  240-243. 

Tlbid.,  XI,   240-243. 

s  Richelieu,  Lettres,   II,   177-179. 

9  See  p.  93,  note  2. 

10  Mole",  I,  337. 

11  Richelieu,  Lettres,  II,  25-26. 

12  Ibid.,   II,   26,   209-211,   330;    Memoires,   XXII,    354-356. 
is  Caillet,  268. 


607]  THE  FINANCIAL  ADMINISTRATION  OF  FRANCE  65 

of  notables  called.  At  this  meeting,  he  presented  to  the  depu- 
ties a  valuable  statement  of  the  financial  condition  of  France. 
He  indicated  the  lack  of  funds  for  everyday  expenses.  Money 
had  been  collected  ahead  of  time14  and  bad  management  of  the 
finances  had  been  endured  ever  since  the  age  of  Henry  IV.15 
Just  as  Spain  had  suffered  because  of  heavy  war  expenditures 
and  no  peace,  so  France  was  on  the  verge  of  ruin  because  of 
the  state  of  her  treasury.  Efforts  had  been  made  to  aid  the 
finances  by  selling  the  domain  of  the  King;  by  the  creation  of 
offices  and  increase  of  tattle,  but  to  no  avail.  "However,  when 
peace  is  declared,"  he  said,  "the  King  wants  to  aid  his  people, 
put  down  the  internal  disorders,  and  increase  the  rights  and 
wages  of  sovereign  companies,  etc.  This  meeting  is  to  offer  solu- 
tions of  the  present  problem.  The  King  especially  desires  a 
decrease  of  the  tattles  for  the  benefit  of  the  people,  because  of 
their  terrible  condition.  Also,  supremacy  for  France  abroad 
needs  good  home  finances.  Expenses  and  receipts  must  be  made 
at  least  to  balance."  16  "One  of  the  means,"  he  said,  "of  bring- 
ing this  about  is  to  supervise  more  strictly  the  amount  of  money 
collected  and  spent. ' ' 17  That  there  was  too  much  chance  for 
"graft"  was  the  keynote  of  his  discourse.  He  intended  to  put 
the  finances  of  France  back  where  they  had  been  in  the  times 
of  Sully,  and  the  methods  used  were  fundamentally  those  of  the 
latter. 

His  remarks  indicate  the  unfortunate  financial  condition  and 
the  problems  confronting  d'Effiat  if  he  was  to  improve  them. 
However,  the  great  expenditures  brought  about  by  unforeseen 
external  and  internal  troubles  prevented  him  from  accomplish- 
ing much,  except  to  keep  down  the  public  debt,  which  was  a 
great  work  in  itself.  For  example,  one  way  by  which  he  dimin- 
ished the  expenses  of  the  government  was  by  reducing  the  inter- 
est rate  on  money  advanced  to  the  government  from  16  or  20 
per  cent  to  10  per  cent.18  Strict  economy  and  increased  credit 
would  have  worked  wonders  in  spite  of  the  ever-existing  dis- 
turbances. 

i*Mercure  Francois,  XII,  804. 
is  Ibid.,  XII,  790-794. 
i6/&td.,  XII,  802-809. 
"  Ibid.,  XII,  794. 

XIV,    589-590. 


66  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [608 

Richelieu  also  delivered  a  speech  to  the  assembly  of  notables, 
in  which  he  tried  to  justify  the  heavy  expenditures  made  so  far 
in  his  administration.  '  '  Everyone  knows  that  in  matters  of  state 
real  results  are  not  often  achieved  at  little  expense.  The 
great  numbers  of  soldiers  necessary  inside  and  outside  of  France 
explain  it  clearly  and  so  we  cannot  doubt  the  necessity.  The  in- 
tegrity of  the  administration  guarantees  the  honesty  of  the  ex- 
penditures ;  and  the  oppression  of  the  outside  powers  and  internal 
rebellions  threatening  the  ruin  of  the  Kingdom,  explain  their 
need.19  He  tried  to  point  out  that  the  great  expenditures  were 
for  the  welfare  and  future  grandeur  of  France,  and  so  far  as 
he  went  he  was  right.  In  advocating  a  state  of  preparedness 
in  the  future  for  the  preservation  of  France,20  he  strikes  a  chord 
which  is  more  or  less  modern.  In  fact  Eichelieu  here  justified 
his  administration,  and  of  course  it  was  for  the  superintendent 
of  finance  to  obtain  the  money  in  the  best  way  available,  even 
though  the  people  had  to  suffer  as  a  consequence. 

The  Cardinal  became  so  infatuated  with  his  external  plans 
of  building  up  a  great  commerce,  a  large  navy,  and  making 
France  strong  by  means  of  a  great  army,  to  be  used  against 
her  ever-present  enemies,  that  he  seemed  to  have  forgotten  all 
his  financial  schemes  for  improvements.  Of  course  the  death  of 
d'Effiat  in  1632,  followed  by  the  appointment  of  two  weak 
superintendents,  both  theoretically  working  at  the  same  task, 
accounts  for  the  weakness  of  the  financial  policy  to  a  certain 
extent.  Richelieu  realized  that  in  the  death  of  his  great  financial 
minister  d'Effiat  he  had  suffered  an  immense  loss,  and  both  he 
and  the  King  were  greatly  affected  by  his  death.21  Yet  he  should 
have  done  better  in  replacing  him.  The  two  men,  Bouthilier  and 
Bullion,  who  divided  the  duties  of  this  office,  were  not  strong 
men.  This  contributed  largely  to  the  unfortunate  financial  con- 
dition of  France  in  1642,  which  will  be  taken  up  later.  Further- 
more, from  1632  to  1642  was  the  period  in  which  Richelieu 
was  engaged  in  the  important  diplomatic,  economic,  and 
military  activities  of  the  Thirty  Years'  War.  Expenses,  on  this 
account,  together  with  part  of  the  former  costs  of  the  large 


Francois,   XII,   756-760. 
td.,  XII,  760-761. 
21  Eichelieu,  Lettres,  IV,  337. 


609]  THE  FINANCIAL  ADMINISTRATION  OF   FRANCE  67 

marine,  were  contributing  factors  toward  the  unfortunate  finan- 
cial condition  of  France  at  his  death. 

Richelieu  constantly  harped  on  the  need  of  great  armies  which 
in  turn  explained  why  the  expenditures  were  so  heavy.  At  one 
time  he  cited  the  success  of  the  armies  in  France  as  an  explana- 
tion of  the  bad  finances,  and  promised  a  future  reform.  Quoting 
from  the  philosophers  the  saying,  "that  which  is  first  in  inten- 
tion is  the  last  in  execution,"  he  promised  reforms  in  the  name 
of  the  King,  for  the  people,  (1)  by  the  decrease  of  the  tallies, 
(2)  by  revoking  undue  exemption  privileges,  (3)  by  abolishing 
luxury  and  waste,  and  (4)  by  the  increase  of  commerce.22  This 
promise  is  an  excellent  example  of  the  clear  economic  viewpoint 
of  the  man.  He  had  a  definite  economic  policy  even  if  conditions 
were  such  as  to  prevent  him  from  carrying  it  to  completion. 

He  even  claimed  that  he  had  the  interests  of  the  people  in 
mind,  while  confronted  with  financial  problems  involved  in 
raising  great  armies  and  navies.  From  the  first,  he  had  tried 
to  raise  troops  in  various  provinces  in  order  to  protect  their 
commerce  and  ships,  and  to  secure  freedom  of  the  sea  for  them.23 
One  must  not  be  too  hasty  in  condemning  the  man  when  one 
considers  the  independent  ideas  of  the  various  classes  and  indi- 
viduals in  France.  How  to  raise  money  and  also  respect  indi- 
vidual privileges  was  certainly  a  problem.  For  he  knew  the 
time  was  not  ripe  to  do  away  with  all  special  exemptions. 

In  1630  Richelieu  used  his  own  personal  funds  to  pay  the  army 
in  Italy,  the  government  having  failed  to  send  him  the  required 
amount.  He  even  went  so  far  as  to  borrow  money  for  the 
army  from  individuals.24  In  1634,  he  again  admitted  that  war 
had  cost  a  great  deal  and  was  a  burden  upon  the  poor,  but  he 
affirmed  it  was  a  necessity  in  order  to  save  those  men  and  to  build 
up  the  nation.25  He  tried  to  aid  the  people  by  decreasing  the 
wages  of  the  troops,  who  were  then  the  best  paid  in  the  world.26 
Towards  the  last  he  was  so  deeply  affected  by  the  financial 
side  of  affairs  that,  in  a  letter  to  Bouthilier,  he  said  that  the 

22  Beaurepaire,  Ch.  de,  Cdhlers  des  Etats  de  Normandie,  3  vols.,  Eouen, 
1877.  Ill,  205. 

zs  Bichelieu,  Mtmovres,  XXIII,   125. 

2*  Eiehelieu,  Lettres,  III,  694. 

^MSmoires,  XXVIII,  4.     Lettres,  II,  297-298. 

se  Eiehelieu,  Lettres,  IV,   523-525. 


68  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [610 

latter  should  decide  financial  matters,  but  if  they  were  brought 
before  the  King  Richelieu  would  give  his  opinion.27 

By  1638,  the  finances  were  in  a  very  bad  shape,  as  is  shown 
by  the  fact  that  Richelieu,  in  a  letter  to  M.  de  Bullion,  com- 
plained of  the  non-payment  of  the  troops.  Money  was  asked 
for  the  marine,  the  army,  fortifications,  etc.28  In  fact,  Rich- 
lieu  had  finally  realized  that  he  was  involved  in  a  death 
struggle,  and  had  concluded  that  victory  was  the  only  sal- 
vation for  France  regardless  of  monetary  consequences.  As 
late  as  1641  he  wrote  in  a  letter  that  the  King  must  provide 
for  a  great  navy  even  if  he  has  to  borrow  the  money,  for  power 
on  the  sea  is  necessary.29  If  the  Cardinal  could  have  had  per- 
sonal charge  of  the  financial  end  of  things,  it  might  have  been 
different.  However,  it  was  a  physical  impossibility  to  handle  all 
the  affairs  at  the  same  time,  as  an  intensive  study  of  the  prob- 
lems involved  will  prove.30  Yet  he  did  from  the  very  first  try 
to  bring  about  some  constructive  financial  legislation. 

Richelieu  displayed  a  certain  amount  of  economic  caution  and 
ability  when  at  the  beginning  of  his  administration  he  urged 
the  need  of  making  the  best  of  conditions.  "Since  God  is  the 
only  being  who  will  do  something  for  nothing,  in  order  to 
arrive  at  his  good  ends,  it  is  necessary  either  to  diminish  the 
ordinary  expenses  or  increase  our  receipts  or  do  both.  However, 
it  is  impossible  to  retrench  in  the  necessary  costs  of  the 
state.31  To  think  of  such  a  thing  would  be  a  crime.  This  is 
why  the  King  prefers  the  public  to  his  own  individual  interest, 
and  retrenches  on  his  own  household  expenses  in  preference. 
You  can  judge  the  necessity  of  every  other  man  doing  the  same 
thing  even  when  he  cuts  down  on  some  things  involving  his  own 
person.  Each  should  aid  according  to  his  means,  and  the 
small  efforts  of  the  poor  should  have  a  place  with  the  larger 
aids  of  the  rich.  The  most  austere  rules  are  and  may  seem  mild, 
when  they  have  no  other  end  than  the  public  safety  and  well- 
being.  ' ' 3Z  Could  anything  be  more  modern  than  this  statement  ? 

27  Richelieu,   Lettres,   IV,  647. 

28/ftid.,  VI,  245-247. 

29  Ibid.,  VI,  806-807. 

so  Beaurepaire,  III,  1-3. 

si  Mercure  Francois,  XII,  759-761. 

32  The  assembly  of  notables  at  the  beginning  of  Richelieu's  administra- 


611]  THE  FINANCIAL  ADMINISTRATION  OP   FRANCE  69 

Richelieu  admits  that  war  is  necessary  for  the  good  of  the  state. 
Therefore  it  is  necessary  for  all  to  do  their  "bit"  toward  meet- 
ing the  inevitable  heavy  expenditures.  But  many  for  various 
reasons  failed  to  respond  to  similar  exhortations ;  and  therein  lies 
the  failure  of  his  policy.  The  nobles  and  the  clergy  did  not 
fulfil  their  part  of  the  bargain,  though  he  had  a  sublime  faith 
in  the  patriotic  feeling  of  the  upper  classes  of  the  people.  His 
belief  that  educated  individuals  would  all  work  for  the  public 
welfare  was  a  great  mistake.33 

The  Cardinal  did  all  he  could  to  carry  out  this  idea  by  pun- 
ishing corrupt  officials.  "No  official  who  looks  after  only  his 
individual  interests  should  retain  office. ' ' 3*  Yet  he  was  lenient 
because  of  the  King,  who  desired  his  favorites  kept  in  office.35 
Again  one  sees  that  the  faith  of  the  Cardinal  in  every  man's 
interest  in  the  state,  and  his  conservative  attitude  toward  vio- 
lent changes  in  offices  caused  him  to  leave  inefficient  men  in 
various  positions,  and  resulted  unsatisfactorily  for  the  nation. 

The  most  interesting  phase  of  Richelieu's  efforts  to  meet  the 
financial  situation  in  1626,  was  his  attitude  toward  the  common 
people.  He  admitted  that  in  wartime  the  people  contributed 
not  only  labor  but  their  blood.  Therefore,  he  advocated  making 
the  people  contribute  only  enough  to  keep  them  from  losing  the 
habit  of  paying  taxes,  and  they  were  to  be  heavily  taxed  only 
when  foreign  enterprises  or  internal  rebellion  necessitated  extra- 
ordinary means,  for  the  welfare  of  the  state.36  Thus,  Richelieu 
was  entirely  consistent  in  obtaining  the  money  of  the  people  as 
far  as  possible  in  times  of  emergency.  He  only  carried  out  what 
he  had  said  in  1626.  His  great  mistake  is  to  be  found  of  course 
in  his  attitude  toward  the  exemption  of  the  privileged  classes, 
which  he  permitted. 

tion  had  succeeded  in  bringing  into  the  foreground  the  need  of  retrenchment 
in  government  expenses,  of  decreasing  the  taille,  and  making  other  financial 
reforms,  and  lastly  of  doing  away  with  corrupt  officials.  People  in  France 
realized  that  these  problems  had  brought  about  the  ruin  of  Spain, 
and  they  wished  to  avoid  similar  disasters,  in  order  to  save  the  state.  See 
Mercure  Francois,  XII,  774-783. 

33  Mercure  Francois,  XII,  760,  et  seq. 

34  Eichelieu,  Memoires,  XXII,  256. 
SB  Ibid.,  XXII,  345-348,  357. 

36  Eichelieu,  Lettres,  II,  302-303. 


70  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [612 

In  1630,  a  special  council  for  the  consideration  of  the  finances 
was  formed.  The  superintendent  of  course  was  the  head  of  it, 
and  its  reports  were  usually  accepted  by  the  council  of  state. 
This  change  was  accomplished  through  the  Cardinal 's  efforts  and 
indicates  his  interest  in  that  department.  The  council,  however, 
not  only  had  charge  of  the  finances  but  also  of  matters  dealing 
with  the  roads,  bridges,  and  other  public  works.  It  is  interesting 
to  note  that  Richelieu  tried  to  appoint  nobles  to  positions  in  the 
various  councils  and  thus  interest  them  in  affairs  of  state.37 

But  the  most  interesting  and  important  improvement  in  the 
matter  of  finances,  was  the  development  between  1633  and  1637 
of  the  system  of  Intendants  of  justice,  police,  and  finances, 
which  was  one  of  the  most  important  accomplishments  of  Riche- 
lieu, because  it  took  away  from  Parlement,  the  nobles,  local  gov- 
ernments, etc.,  all  rights  to  a  monopoly  of  the  collection  of 
governmental  taxes.38  The  Intendants  carried  out  the  decrees 
and  reported  to  the  central  governmental  councils,  and  had  sup- 
ervision of  all  affairs  which  concerned  the  taxes  and  adminis- 
tration of  public  funds.  The  main  purpose  in  appointing  them 
was  to  centralize  the  administration  of  finances,  in  accordance 
with  Richelieu's  general  plan  of  centralization.  Their  appoint- 
ment aided  the  people,  who  in  many  cases  suffered  from  corrupt 
local  governors  and  nobles  charged  with  the  collection  of  taxes.39 
It  was  the  special  duty  of  the  Intendant  to  look  after  the  inter- 
ests of  the  common  people.  Generally  speaking,  they  were 
established  in  order  to  bring  about  local  unity  in  all  parts  of  the 
administration,  namely,  the  police,  justice,  and  finances,  and  to 
see  that  these  were  controlled  by  the  central  government.  Yet 
Richelieu  permitted  the  Intendants  in  the  performance  of  their 
duties,  to  make  certain  allowances  for  the  franchises  and  local 
liberties  of  provinces  or  cities.  He  did  this  in  order  that  they 
should  build  up  commercial  industry.40  The  Cardinal  desired 
the  supremacy  in  a  political  sense  of  France,  but  he  was  willing 
to  grant  political  or  economic  privileges  to  those  who  would  use 
them  for  the  interest  of  France,  by  developing  their  commercial 

sfCaillet,  23. 

ss  Isambert,  XVI,  442-450;   Caillet,  45-54. 

so  In  1626,  careful  instructions  were  laid  on  the  ' '  tax  commissioners  to 
avoid  corruption."  —  Isambert,  XVI,  165-174. 
*o  Montchr6tien,  XCI. 


613]  THE  FINANCIAL  ADMINISTRATION  OF  FRANCE  71 

or  industrial  resources.  Exceptions  were  valid  only  when  they 
resulted  in  increased  grandeur  for  the  entire  state.  In  many 
cases  the  Intendant  really  usurped  the  despotic  position  of  the 
noble  and  thus  the  people  did  not  gain  by  the  change. 

Richelieu  was  conservative  in  his  plans  for  specific  financial 
reform  in  that  he  advocated  no  general  retrenchments  on  the 
ground  that  they  would  not  pay  for  the  reason  that  the  expense 
of  bringing  them  about  would  make  them  failures.  For  example, 
he  did  not  put  much  faith  in  the  selling  of  so-called  "bonds," 
because  the  King  never  received  more  than  a  third  of  their 
amount,  while  much  time  was  consumed  in  examining  the  se- 
curities upon  which  they  were  based.41 

He  did  favor  greater  returns  by  means  of  increased  commerce 
and  a  strong  marine.  "By  means  of  both,"  he  said,  "France 
could  make  herself  more  powerful  in  money  than  any  King  of 
the  Christian  world. ' '  One  of  the  most  important  ways  by  which 
the  taxes  were  to  be  increased  was  by  means  of  the  gabelle  on 
salt,  which  both  the  French  and  foreigners  obtained  near  La 
Eochelle.  No  wonder  he  was  so  interested  in  obtaining 
control  of  that  city.42  All  the  provinces  of  France  were 
to  pay  this  gabelle,  and  any  parts  exempt  before  should  have 
their  privileges  transferred  to  the  collection  of  the  tailles.  This 
was  not  a  good  tax  because  it  worked  a  hardship  on  the  common 
people. 

Richelieu  also  showed  a  lack  of  insight  in  the  collection  of 
revenue,  namely,  in  the  matter  of  commerce.  Trade  was  to  be 
stimulated  in  order  to  obtain  more  money  for  France.43  The 
French  were  to  pay  slight  duties  on  the  export  of  goods,  but 
a  limited  number  of  imports  paid  duties,  light  at  first  but  heavy 
later  on.  Thus,  ' '  while  Richelieu  obtained  more  money  for  taxes, 
he  did  not  see  as  Colbert  did,  that  by  decreasing  the  duties 
instead  of  increasing  them,  he  would  increase  the  receipts  because 
of  the  growth  of  commerce. ' ' 44 

«  Kichelieu,  Memoires,  XXIII,  264.  Bonds  were  sold  during  the  age  of 
Richelieu,  with  the  tailles,  the  aides,  gdbelles,  and  other  taxes  as  security. 
Very  often  it  was  difficult  to  find  out  whether  a  certain  tax  could  be 
accounted  good  security,  since  it  might  have  been  spent  in  advance. 

« /&{<?.,  XXIII,  262. 

«Isambert,  XVI,  514-515. 

«  Deschamps,  138. 


72  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [614 

Many  examples  can  be  found  wherein  the  Cardinal  tried  to 
settle  conflicts  between  local  provinces  and  the  central  govern- 
ment over  questions  of  finance  in  the  interest  of  both  and  for  the 
state  as  a  whole.45  One  can  obtain  a  general  idea  of  his 
fundamental  desire  in  his  statement  of  the  financial  side  of 
the  case  to  the  Province  of  Brittany.  In  1628,  he  admitted  that 
the  wars  against  the  Huguenots,  etc.,  had  been  costly,  but  they 
conserved  the  state  and  prevented  the  English  from 
invading  Brittany.  To  protect  them  a  strong  army  and  nayy  was 
necessary  and  strong  forts  along  the  coasts.  Thus  for  their 
own  interest  as  a  part  of  the  state,  he  asked  them  for  money.*6 
But  the  misery  and  poverty  of  the  people  even  at  that  time 
was  a  strong  obstacle  to  extensive  gifts  of  money  to  the  govern- 
ment. The  fact  that  Richelieu  had  to  go  many  times  to  the  local 
Parleme-nts  of  the  various  provinces  for  money  indicates  where- 
fore the  terrible  financial  condition  of  the  poor  was  bound  to 
come,  and  it  is  surprising  that  it  was  not  worse. 

Of  course  Richelieu  came  in  for  his  share  of  personal  criti- 
cism. Gaston,  brother  of  the  king,  glad  of  a  chance  to  injure 
the  Cardinal,  accused  him  of  causing  this  poverty  through  his 
personal  ambitions  and  lavish  expenditures.47  In  reply,  Riche- 
lieu frankly  admitted  that  he  desired  to  aggrandize  France,  but 
as  a  good  servant  he  regretted  to  see  the  Kingdom  afflicted  with 
these  passing  misfortunes,  which  would  continue  if  men  like 
Gaston  were  to  have  their  way.48 

There  was  one  way  in  which  the  central  government  as  a 
whole  took  a  definite  stand.  It  was  in  suppressing  the  corrup- 
tion of  the  tax  collectors.  In  1631,  one  year  before  d'Effiat 
died,  it  was  decided  that  ' '  no  impositions  should  be  raised  except 
in  virtue  of  letters  patent  sent  and  sealed  in  regular  form,  which 
should  be  registered  by  the  controller-general  of  finances.  Fur- 
thermore, the  royal  judges  were  ordered  to  consult  the  people 
on  Sundays  or  Festival  days  to  make  clear  the  causes  of  the 
impositions  which  were  proposed,  naming  the  amount  of  taxes, 
and  obtaining  the  consent  of  the  majority  of  the  people,  etc. ' ' 49 

**Mercure  Francois,  XIII,  533-534;  XIV,  113-119. 
**nid.,  XIV,  139-140. 
<"  Ibid.,  XVII,  255-256. 
*&Ibid.,  XVII,  301. 

XVII,  337-345. 


615]  THE  FINANCIAL  ADMINISTRATION  OP   FRANCE  73 

The  finances  were  to  be  administered  according  to  the  amount 
called  for.  Officials  were  to  obey  the  laws,  there  was  to  be  an 
absence  of  "graft"  in  that  they  had  to  report  the  amount  to 
be  collected  to  the  people  and  get  their  consent,  and  also,  send 
in  a  report  concerning  the  sums  obtained  to  the  central  gov- 
ernment. Local  and  external  conditions  prevented  this  plan 
from  being  actually  carried  out,  but  it  is  significant  in  that  it 
aimed  to  place  the  collection  of  the  finances  on  a  more  democratic 
basis  than  ever  before.  The  fact  that  the  people  were  to  be 
consulted  gives  to  them  an  economic  and  political  importance 
strangely  out  of  place  in  a  true  conception  of  an  absolute  cen- 
tralized monarchy,  unless  one  considers  the  mercantilistic  point 
of  view,  that  they  were  a  part  of  the  state,  and  thus  their 
interests  would  tend  to  influence  the  strength  or  weakness  of  the 
nation. 

In  1634,  in  an  effort  to  aid  the  people,  the  tattle  was  cut  down 
by  one  fourth  and  they  were  exempted  from  the  ordinary  in- 
crease of  the  burdens  for  the  year  1634.  Also,  the  increased 
payment  made  by  the  people  in  the  past  was  largely  due  to  the 
"graft"  of  the  tax  collectors.  To  avoid  this,  officials  were  to  go 
into  parishes  and  districts,  examine  the  rolls  of  the  tattles  of 
those  exempted,  and  see  that  each  one  should  bear  his  just  por- 
tion, according  to  his  ability  or  means,  etc.50  This  practice 
would  indicate  a  continued  effort  to  improve  the  financial  condi- 
tion of  France,  even  at  that  critical  time. 

The  same  edict  went  on  not  only  to  deprive  the  rich  of  their 
"increasing  rights"  and  exemptions,  but  also,  only  the  heredi- 
tary nobles  were  to  retain  their  privileges.  All  those  ennobled 
in  the  last  twenty  years  except  twelve  associates  of  the  company 
of  New  France  (notice  the  indirect  importance  placed  upon  col- 
onization by  this  act)  were  to  lose  their  privileges.  In  the  future 
nobles  were  to  be  created  only  for  important  considerations,  etc. 
Also,  no  one  could  be  exempt  from  the  tattle  by  the  simple  con- 
sent of  the  inhabitants  of  the  parish,  but  all  were  to  pay  their 
regular  share.51  None  but  exemptions  of  long  standing  were 
to  be  recognized.52  This  would  seem  to  be  a  very  important 

so  Isambert,  XVI,  389-391 ;  Mercure  Francois,  XX,  661-662,  697. 
5i/6td.,   XVI,   391-406;    Beaurepaire,   III,   207-212. 

sz  Omer  Talon,  Memoires,  Petitot  2«  Serie  vols.,  LX-LXIII,  Paris,  1819- 
1829,  LX,  60-63;  84,  123. 


74  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OP  RICHELIEU  [616 

edict,  even  though  as  one  writer  says,  "It  was  not  well  ob- 
served. " 53  It  illustrates  the  efforts  of  the  government  to  aid 
France  and  its  people  in  obtaining  a  more  just  and  fair  basis  for 
taxation.  Even  though  the  edict  failed,  it  is  evidence  of  the 
efforts  of  Richelieu  to  reform  the  finances  in  a  constructive  way, 
at  that  critical  epoch  of  French  history. 

In  1635,  another  edict  was  issued  to  supplement  that  of  1634. 
It  appears  that  many  rich  people  had  fled  to  other  towns  to 
avoid  paying  taxes,  thus  making  the  burden  heavier  for  the 
poor.  Similar  action  was  to  be  prevented  in  the  future,  by  mak- 
ing them  liable  to  taxation  in  their  old  home,  until  they  had  been 
three  months  in  the  new  one.54  There  was  indeed  a  strong  ten- 
dency on  the  part  of  the  government  to  aid  the  poor,  in  fact  it 
even  went  so  far  in  an  edict  abolishing  the  sou  for  the  registra- 
tion of  deaths,  marriages,  or  births,  as  to  say  that  "the  strong 
should  bear  the  burdens  of  the  weak. ' ' 55 

By  1637,  the  financial  condition  of  France  had  become  critical. 
Richelieu,  in  a  letter  to  the  King,  warned  him  against  overtaxing 
the  border  cities,  since  their  security  was  necessary  for  that 
of  the  state.56  In  1639,  Richelieu  on  account  of  the  increasing 
expenses  had  to  cut  down  the  financial  aid  given  Holland.57 
Finally  the  Cardinal  in  a  letter  of  1639  came  out  directly 
against  the  increase  of  the  gabelle,  against  unfair  taxation  in 
general,  and  corruption,  as  having  caused  the  financial  troubles 
of  France.  "I  know,"  he  says,  "that  the  superintendents  will 
say  that  they  can  do  nothing,  and  are  obliged  to  undertake  many 
things  which  they  would  condemn  another  time.  I  will  say  that 
all  have  given  their  hearts  and  lands  to  the  enemy  and  are  con- 
demned at  all  times. ' ' 58  Richelieu,  by  this  letter  and  others, 
opposed  the  policy  of  the  superintendent  and  the  financial  coun- 
cil, which  caused  so  much  suffering.59  Yet  he  added  insult  to 
injury  by  asking  for  additional  money.  In  fact,  the  last  letters 
of  Richelieu  to  the  superintendent  of  finances  not  only  requested 

ssCaaiet,  265. 

6*Isambert,  XVI,  455-457. 

BOjftMf.,  XVI,  460-461. 

seBichelieu,  Lettres,  VI,  98;   Memoires  XXX,  317-318. 

57  Ibid.,  VI,  613-614. 

ss  Hid.,  VI,  496-497;  500-501.     Isambert,  XVI,  497-499. 

69  Ibid.,  VI,  858-859. 


617]  THE  FINANCIAL,  ADMINISTRATION  OP  FRANCE  75 

more  money,  which  was  needed,  but  also  recommended  the  pas- 
sage of  a  general  aid  of  a  "sou  per  livre,"  which  he  said  the 
people  were  willing  to  endure.60  He  had  come  to  the  point  where 
he  realized  that  the  people  had  something  to  say.  He  admitted 
that  they  were,  after  all,  the  deciding  factor  in  the  solution  of 
this  problem.  "The  consent  of  the  people  in  a  time  like  this," 
he  says,  "is  better  than  all  the  force  which  one  can  use  in  any 
other  way. ' ' 61  Finances  must  have  been  in  a  critical  state. 

It  was  not  an  entire  lack  of  ability  which  caused  Richelieu  to 
permit  the  state  of  the  finances  which  existed  at  his  death. 
The  whole  truth  of  the  matter  is  that  he  left  the  financial  side  of 
his  administration  to  his  capable  minister  d'Effiat,  who  died 
while  in  the  midst  of  carrying  France  through  very  successfully. 
Then  two  incapable  men  took  charge  of  affairs,  and  Richelieu  was 
just  beginning  to  take  an  active  hand  in  financial  matters,  when 
his  own  early  death  prevented  the  completion  of  his  plan. 

A  few  things  may  be  noticed  in  his  favor.  The  debt  which 
in  1595  was  300  millions  of  livres  had  been  reduced  to  250 
millions  by  Sully,  and  was  only  300  millions  at  Richelieu's 
death.  Thus,  although  the  Cardinal  increased  the  burdens  for 
his  generation  by  his  wars,  the  coming  generation  would  have  had 
an  excellent  chance  to  develop  France  on  the  financial  side  ac- 
cording to  the  ideas  left  in  his  last  great  work.62 

Finally,  when  one  considers  the  new  and  powerful  impulse 
he  gave  to  maritime  and  commercial  enterprises,  and  his  efforts 
to  favor  general  prosperity  and  future  welfare,  it  cannot  be 
said  that  his  own  personal  financial  policy  was  a  failure.  In 
the  larger  sense  of  the  term  it  was  not.  That  it  was  in- 
complete cannot  be  denied.  Constant  references  by  him- 
self and  others,  leave  no  doubt  as  to  his  future  plans.63  These 
as  appearing  in  his  Testament  Politique  will  be  considered  next, 
and  will  be  seen  largely  to  justify  his  financial  administration. 

so  Richelieu,  Lettres,  VI,  900-901. 

fli  Ibid.,  VI,  901-902. 

62  Another  evidence  of  the  Cardinal 's  interest  in  the  finances  is  found  in 
the  budget  system  which  he  attempted  to  introduce.  This  innovation  re- 
quired a  yearly  statement  of  the  finances,  and  would  have  been  very  valuable 
if  it  had  been  carried  out. 

os  Beaurepaire,  II,  175,  176,  177;  188-189,  etc.;  Ill,  1-3,  69.  Goulas, 
N.,  Memoires,  2  vols.,  Paris,  1879,  I,  19-20. 


76  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [618 

Richelieu  has  left  in  his  Testament  Politique,  a  complete 
statement  of  his  final  ideas  with  reference  to  the  solution  of  the 
financial  problems  confronting  France.64  That  he  expected  the 
future  generation  to  carry  them  out  cannot  be  doubted.  Indeed, 
it  is  to  his  credit  that  in  his  financial  schemes  as  well  as  his 
entire  policy,  he  looked  into  the  future  as  well  as  the  present. 
Admitting  that  the  expenses  for  war  were  great,  he  maintained 
that  the  conflicts  would  benefit  posterity  forever  and  repay  them 
for  the  pain  and  labor  undergone. 

The  graft  and  corruption  connected  with  the  collection  of 
taxes  in  the  past,  had  filled  him  with  disgust.  He  had  been  in 
favor  of  sending  officials  to  oversee  these  collectors  and  also 
the  nobility,  and  prevent  any  oppression  of  the  weak  and  poor 
by  the  strong  and  rich.  However,  he  shows  his  caution  and 
farsightedness  by  indicating  the  necessity  of  "going  slow"  and 
not  overturning  the  entire  system  of  collection.  "The  state 
should  see, ' '  he  said,  ' '  that  those  who  serve  the  nation  to  the  best 
of  their  ability  should  be  properly  rewarded."  To  punish  the 
really  bad,  and  reward  the  faithful,  was  the  true  method  of  his 
reform.  In  fact  his  entire  plan  for  the  reform  of  the  financial 
officials  was  placed  on  the  solid  principles  of  allowing  fewer 
men  to  do  the  work  and  rewarding  them  adequately  for  their 
efforts.  Centralization  in  the  hands  of  a  few  men  of  merit  ex- 
pressed the  idea  of  one  who  was  always  looking  for  the  greatest 
economic,  political,  and  social  returns,  for  every  measure  along 
these  lines. 

One  must  turn  to  the  second  part  of  Richelieu's  Testament 
Politique  to  appreciate  his  final  ideas  concerning  the  finances 
of  France,  and  his  plans  for  the  future  solution  of  the  diffi- 
culties arising  there.  "It  shows  that  he  was  not  a  stranger 
to  this  important  part  of  his  administration,"  says  one  writer.65 

In  the  first  place  Richelieu  makes  clear  the  power  of  money 
in  developing  the  power  of  the  state.  ' '  Finances, ' '  he  says,  ' '  are 
the  nerves  of  the  state. ' '  In  order  that  a  nation  may  be  able  to 
compete  with  other  countries,  she  must  have  the  financial  foun- 
dation upon  which  to  build  her  power.  He  points  out  that  the 

«*  The  basis  of  this  discussion  is  Richelieu's  treatment  of  the  finances 
in  his  Testament  Politique,  French  Edition,  II,  80-105.  English  Edition, 
II,  105-132.  Both  II,  Ch.  IX,  Section  VII. 

ecCaillet,  260. 


619]  THE  FINANCIAL  ADMINISTRATION  OP   FRANCE  77 

foundation  must  be  solid.  There  is  a  danger  of  asking  too 
much  of  the  people,  and  also  of  asking  too  little.  A  happy  medi- 
um must  be  struck.  All  necessary  expenses  must  be  met.  How- 
ever, the  less  one  gets  from  the  people  the  better.  Now  to  obtain 
the  happy  result  of  the  best  welfare  of  the  people,  strict  economy 
in  the  use  of  money  must  be  the  motto  of  the  government,  which, 
of  course,  means  a  reform  in  the  means  of  collection  of  the  finan- 
ces and  also  in  the  payment  of  expenses.  He  maintains  that 
the  financial  accounts  of  France,  both  receipts  and  expenses, 
must  be  open  and  above  board.  ' '  Secrecy  is  conducive  to  corrup- 
tion, ' '  he  says. 

He  defends  his  policy  of  the  suppression  of  the  Huguenots  and 
his  attitude  toward  wars  in  general  on  the  ground  of  their  neces- 
sity in  order  to  obtain  a  peace  which  would  do  away  with  all 
other  abuses.  The  finances  could  not  be  reformed  very  much  un- 
til an  internal  and  external  peace  should  be  secured. 

He  then  takes  up  the  matter  of  internal  revenue  taxes,  as  a 
means  of  raising  revenue.  He  admits  that  they  bring  money,  but 
also  realizes  that  they  raise  prices,  which  in  turn  makes  the 
expense  of  maintaining  soldiers  higher,  as  well  as  causes  worse 
conditions  for  workmen.  They  result  in  a  great  loss  to  indi- 
viduals, with  only  a  slight  gain  for  the  Prince.  "The  poor 
landowner  will  not  gain  by  the  levy  of  such  a  tax.  His  land  will 
remain  the  same  in  value  and  its  products  likewise,  and  even 
if  they  increase  in  price,  the  excess  of  price  will  cause  the  market 
for  the  products  to  be  limited."  Richelieu  seems  to  have  a 
faint  conception  of  a  law  of  supply  and  demand  as  affected  by 
price.  He  goes  on  to  state  that  there  will  be  not  only  an  increase 
of  revenue  tax  for  the  producer,  but  he  will  also  have  to  pay  more 
for  other  goods.  Thus  he  will  tend  to  become  self-sufficing  as 
far  as  possible.  Increasing  internal  revenue  taxes  raises  the 
price  of  commodities  and  decreases  their  sale.  Certainly  this  is 
a  remarkable  economic  idea  to  come  from  a  "Political  States- 
man" of  the  17th  century.  He  even  goes  so  far  as  to  say  defi- 
nitely, that  if  the  taxes  are  increased,  the  loss  in  foreign  trade 
will  more  than  offset  the  gain..  Also,  if  the  internal  revenue 
taxes  are  increased  it  will  reduce  a  number  of  subjects  to  idle- 
ness, and  the  amount  realized  will  decrease,  due  to  diminished 
production. 

The  discourse  of  the  Cardinal  is  interesting  in  that  it  shows 


78  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [620 

that  he  was  judging  his  actions  on  an  economic  basis.  He 
admits  that  he  deviates  from  the  subject  when  he  undertakes 
to  point  out  the  bad  features  of  the  above  tax.  Yet  this  deviation  is 
sure  evidence  that  he  was  of  an  economic  turn  of  mind,  and  that 
most  of  his  activities,  whether  political,  religious,  or  social,  had 
an  element  of  the  economic  in  them. 

Going  back  to  the  matter  of  taxes,  he  makes  the  point  that 
there  should  be  an  arithmetical  proportion  between  taxes  and 
the  necessities  of  the  state.  He  goes  on  to  explain  by  saying 
that  no  more  must  be  imposed  on  the  people  in  taxes  than  is 
necessary  for  the  subsistence  of  the  Kingdom  in  its  grandeur  and 
glory.  Nevertheless,  he  points  out  that  the  King  is  responsible 
only  to  God  in  his  judgment  as  to  the  amount  of  taxes.  Yet  he 
must  consider  the  interests  of  his  people  in  that  their  love  and 
fidelity  are  necessary  for  the  subsistence  of  the  state  and  the 
preservation  of  his  person.  Even  though  the  King  was  theo- 
retically responsible  only  to  God,  yet  practically,  Richelieu 
admits  here  and  in  many  other  places  that  the  interests  of  the 
people  must  be  considered.  "Taxes,"  he  says,  "must  be  in  pro- 
portion to  the  wealth  of  the  country,  for  if  this  rule  is  not  fol- 
lowed, his  subjects  will  have  no  funds  with  which  to  pay  the 
regular  duties  which  they  owe  their  ruler,  or  to  build  up  com- 
merce. ' '  A  reasonable  decrease  of  taxes,  especially  the  t aille,  and 
a  careful  use  of  the  money  obtained  so  as  to  attain  the  greatest 
results  is  advice  worthy  of  a  first-class  financier.  He  says  also 
that  the  interests  which  look  to  the  future  must  be  even  more 
considered  than  those  of  the  present,  in  spite  of  the  arguments 
of  numerous  men  to  the  contrary.  These  statesmanlike  words 
justify  to  a  large  extent  the  administration  of  Eichelieu. 

The  views  of  the  Cardinal  were  not  so  wise  with  regard  to 
foreign  commerce-,  on  the  side  of  imports.  He  still  believed  that 
the  principal  riches  of  the  country  depended  upon  the  ability 
to  sell  much  and  buy  little.  He  forgot  that  a  balance  of  trade 
as  a  whole  was  the  most  sure  way  of  stopping  all  the  attempts 
at  home  in  the  direction  of  production  and  industry.66  How- 
ever, that  he  did  see  the  value  of  buying  commodities  in  return 
to  a  certain  extent,  will  be  shown  later.67 

as  Caillet,  261. 

67  See  Chapter  IX,  134. 


621]  THE  FINANCIAL  ADMINISTRATION  OP  FRANCE  79 

The  Cardinal  emphasized  the  ecomomical  use  of  the  money 
obtained  by  taxation.  He  compared  the  waste  of  French  money 
with  the  use  of  the  taxes  in  Venice.  As  a  promoter  of  state 
economy,  he  advised  the  removal  of  the  corrupt  "campions,"  to 
whom  the  taxes  were  farmed.  This  would  mean  a  money  saving 
of  a  million  livres.  He  concludes  this  particular  topic  by  point- 
ing out  that  it  was  an  art  to  be  able  to  know  how  to  collect 
only  the  necessary  amount  and  also  how  to  spend  just  the  amount 
needed.  "The  inability  to  do  either,  is  a  detriment  and  injury 
to  the  state."  It  is  clear  that  Eichelieu  comprehended  the  im- 
portance of  these  two  sides  of  the  financial  problem,  and  that  he 
proceeded  to  treat  it  in  a  practical  as  well  as  theoretical  way 
is  shown  by  what  follows. 

In  taking  up  the  method  of  reforming  the  finances,  he  con- 
siders first  the  amount  of  revenue,  then  the  expense  of  the  gov- 
ernment, and  lastly,  to  what  degree  the  people  may  be  eased 
by  changes  in  the  above  two  phases.  No  part  of  the  work  better 
illustrates  the  clear,  methodical,  logical  working  of  this  great 
statesman's  mind. 

In  the  first  place,  in  his  detailed  analysis  of  the  revenues 
and  expenses  of  the  Kingdom,  he  points  out  that  the  amounts 
and  methods  of  taxation  and  expenses  in  times  of  war  and 
peace  were  different.  Also  he  says  that  the  revenues  could 
be  79  millions  and  the  expenses  44  millions  of  livres.  Thus 
over  30  millions  could  be  saved.  In  this  79  millions!  the 
tailles  amounted  to  44  millions,  the  aids  4  millions,  the 
gabelles  19  millions,  and  other  taxes  12  millions.  The  ex- 
penses are  interest  on  bonds,  wages,  taxes  and  rights  of 
offices,  etc.  To  increase  the  taxes,  Richelieu  wished  to  raise 
the  salt  tax  and  make  everyone  pay  it.  He  also  wanted 
the  sou  per  livre  tax  on  commodities  in  France.  Likewise,  he 
desired  to  diminish  the  taille  by  one  fourth.  But  he  strongly 
recommended  the  sou  per  livre  tax  as  an  aid  to  the  support  of  the 
war  for  the  grandeur  of  the  state,  although  at  heart  he  did  not 
think  much  of  the  tax.  He  goes  on  to  list  the  expenses  that  are 
absolutely  necessary,  i.  e.,  buildings  and  fortifications  must  be 
built,  and  as  for  pensions,  while  they  cannot  be  abolished,  a 
happy  medium  ought  to  be  struck,  in  that  they  should  be  reduced 
about  one  half.  "Pensions,"  he  claimed,  "were  for  those  who 


80  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [622 

were  doing  something  for  the  state,  like  serving  in  the  war  for 
example. ' '  Now  by  cutting  down  the  expenses,  the  taille  could  be 
decreased,  and  thus  the  people  would  be  aided.  ' '  This  reduction 
should  be  the  chief  end.  For  the  true  way  to  enrich  the  state  is 
to  aid  the  people  and  discharge  them  of  their  burdens.  How- 
ever, in  doing  so,  we  should  constantly  have  in  mind  the  future 
as  well  as  the  present. ' ' 

Eichelieu  had  resolved  also  to  put  an  end  to  the  great  amount 
of  interest  which  was  paid  on  bonds,  and  at  the  same  time  to 
diminish  the  taxes  on  the  people.68  He  planned  to  do  this  by  a 
reduction  of  the  tallies  to  about  22  millions;  by  a  considerable 
increase  of  the  revenue  from  salt.  (This  scheme  is  especially  in- 
teresting considering  the  value  he  put  on  this  product  in  1627 
when  attacking  the  Huguenots. )  Also,  by  a  suppression  of  the  30 
millions  above  44  millions.  He  furthermore  intended  to  make 
the  salt  gabelle  the  important  tax  and  one  of  the  valuable 
resources  of  the  state,  by  making  the  trade  in  that  commodity  free 
to  everybody.  Thus  they  would  get  rid  of  the  numerous  officials 
whose  wages  absorbed  a  large  share  of  the  money  received. 

The  30  millions  of  interest  charges,  which  he  desired  to  elimi- 
nate, he  planned  to  reimburse  within  7  years.  He  was  well 
aware  of  the  decrease  in  the  value  of  the  capital  which  the 
interest  represented  and  saw  the  advantage  to  the  government 
of  repurchasing  the  debt  while  its  value  was  low.  "Then,"  he 
says,  "the  revenues  ought  to  be  57  millions  of  which  the  tallies 
furnish  22  millions,  aids  4  millions,  gabelles  19  millions,  and  all 
the  other  forms  12  millions.  Laying  aside  the  17  millions  to  be 
put  in  the  exchequer,  the  balance  must  be  looked  upon  as  consid- 
erable. No  nation  lays  up  half  so  much  after  paying  expenses. ' ' 

He  notes  that  many  more  individuals  are  to  be  made  liable  to 
the  tallies,  which  will  aid  the  people.  The  reduction  of  the 
number  of  officials  will  ease  them,  in  that  they  will  become  sol- 
diers, merchants,  or  laborers.  Decrease  of  the  exemptions  will 
discharge  the  people  of  more  than  one  half  of  their  tallies,  it  be- 
ing certain  that  the  richest,  who  are  liable  to  the  greatest  taxes. 
are  those  who  get  exempted  by  means  of  money.  In  other  words, 
a  general  reform  of  the  exemptions  and  the  number  of  corrupt 
officials  would  result  in  more  paying  the  tallies  and  the  burden 
of  the  lower  classes  would  be  lightened. 

esCaillet,  262. 


623]  THE  FINANCIAL  ADMINISTRATION  OF   FRANCE  81 

Upon  what  foundation  was  this  entire  financial  scheme  laid? 
The  benefit  of  the  state,  and  of  the  people  as  the  strongest  factor 
in  the  state.  "I  am  sensible,"  he  says,  "that  it  will  be  urged 
that  it  is  easy  to  make  such  projects,  like  unto  those  of  Plato's 
Commonwealth,  which  though  fine  in  its  ideas,  is  a  real  chimera. 
But  I  dare  to  affirm  that  the  design  is  not  only  so  reasonable, 
but  so  easy  to  execute,  that  if  God  pleases  to  grant  your  majesty 
a  speedy  peace  and  preserve  you  for  the  Kingdom,  together  with 
your  servants,  of  which  I  esteem  myself  one  of  the  meanest, 
instead  of  leaving  this  advice  by  my  Testament,  I  hope  to  ac- 
complish it  myself ."  « 

He  had  indeed  an  excellent  scheme  for  the  financial  reform 
of  France.  It  certainly  was  a  misfortune  for  the  French  nation, 
that  he  did  not  live  long  enough  to  carry  the  project  to  a  suc- 
cessful completion.  Even  though  his  actual  financial  administra- 
tion was  somewhat  weak,  nevertheless  this  final  plan  when  viewed 
in  connection  with  his  general  economic  and  political  policy, 
justifies,  in  great  measure,  his  financial  policy.  The  same  state- 
ment might  well  be  made  of  his  internal  administration  as  a 
whole. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE  ECONOMIC  RELATION  OF  RICHELIEU  TO  AGRI- 
CULTURE, INDUSTRY,  AND  INTERNAL  COMMERCE 

When  Richelieu  received  the  office  of  "grand  master  and 
chief  of  commerce  and  navigation,"  it  was  natural  that  he 
should  be  more  interested  in  the  external  side  of  the  national 
development.  He  placed  internal  affairs  in  the  hands  of  others. 
For  example,  he  left  the  guidance  of  industry  to  the  secretary 
of  state,  Sublet  des  Noyers,  ordonnateur  generate  of  the  buildings 
and  manufactures  of  the  King.1  So  we  see  that,  although  the 
Cardinal  entirely  neglected  no  phase  of  the  administration,  yet 
he  did  not  emphasize  this  particular  aspect  of  it. 

From  another  point  of  view,  it  is  clear  that  this  part  of  the 
French  development  would  have  to  wait  while  Richelieu  accom- 
plished great  things  on  the  exterior.  Only  matters  of  direct 
importance,  in  that  for  example  they  were  concerned  with 
the  wars,  engaged  his  attention.  To  illustrate,  the  Cardinal 
constantly  tried  to  curb  waste  and  extravagance  in  the  kingdom. 
He  realized  that  industry  and  production  in  general  should  be 
made  to  aid  the  nation  in  carrying  its  wars  to  a  successful  com- 
pletion. Therefore  he  asked  the  Grand  Marechal,  de  Bassom- 
pierre,  to  form  a  committee  to  investigate  and  seek  ways  to  do 
away  with  the  needless  waste  and  luxuries  of  the  people  of 
France.2  Furthermore,  abundance  was  to  be  produced  in  the 
Kingdom  by  increased  commerce,  and  the  vagabonds,  disbanded 
soldiers,  etc.,  were  to  be  made  to  work.3  Thus  the  Cardinal 
seems  to  have  attempted  a  rather  efficient  conservation  scheme,4 
which  he  carried  almost  to  economic  extremes  when  he  advo- 
cated trade  schools  as  being  far  more  important  to  France 

iPigeonneau,  II,  389-390. 

2  Richelieu,  Lettres,  I,  LXXXV-LXXXVI. 

3  Bassompierre,  Marechal  de,  Memoires,  4  vols.     Paris,  1875 ;  III,  435. 
'Mercure  Francois,  XX,  704-711;  XXIV,  1-2. 

82 


625]         AGRICULTURE,  INDUSTRY,  AND  INTERNAL  COMMERCE  83 

than  the  schools  of  Liberal  Arts.5     The  economic  efficiency  of 
the  man  would  be  of  great  benefit  to  France  at  the  present  time. 

In  the  larger  sense  of  the  term  Richelieu  did  not  fail  entirely 
with  regard  to  internal  affairs.  "He  had  too  great  a  desire 
for  the  welfare  of  the  public  to  fail  utterly  in  attempting  to 
continue  the  internal  administration  of  Henry  IV. ' ' 6  He  fol- 
lowed the  same  unconscious  economic  policy  with  reference  to 
the  internal  as  to  the  external  affairs;  namely,  the  mercantil- 
istic  or  the  great  state  idea.  He  desired  to  centralize  industry 
and  commerce,  and  take  away  the  powers  of  local  nobles  over 
agriculture.  Whatever  he  did  was  done  for  the  good  of  France. 
However,  the  many  local  franchises,  the  heavy  wars,  etc.,  all 
prevented  him  from  accomplishing  very  much  in  such  matters 
as  agriculture  and  industry.  These  phases  of  his  administration 
were  postponed  until  the  future  peace,  when  they  were  to  be 
settled  in  the  interest  of  the  public  welfare.  Nevertheless,  he 
did  manage  to  accomplish  a  little. 

With  regard  to  agriculture,  the  administration  of  the  Cardinal 
shows  a  weakness  which  was,  however,  but  natural  when  one 
considers  the  torn-up  condition  of  the  country  at  this  time.  Yet 
efforts  were  made  to  drain  marshes,  and  various  companies  were 
granted  the  privilege  of  doing  this  work  with  suitable  exemp- 
tions.7 Weakening  the  power  of  the  nobles  and  centralizing  con- 
trol in  the  hands  of  the  government  was  bound  to  aid  the  farmers 
and  give  them  a  better  chance  to  pursue  their  life's  work. 
"Also,"  says  one  writer,  "the  numerous  ordinances  which  were 
made  relating  to  the  problem  of  raising  and  alloting  the  taille, 
and  the  matter  of  the  discipline  of  the  soldiers,  not  only  resulted 
in  decreasing  the  bad  finances  and  developing  the  army,  but  also 
relieved  many  of  the  country  estates  by  repressing  the  selfishness 
of  collectors  and  the  ravages  of  men  of  war. ' ' 8  All  this  would 
have  had  an  important  effect  on  France  under  different  circum- 
stances. 

M.  Henri  Doniol  in  his  Histoire  des  classes  rurales  en  France, 
has  brought  up  the  point  that  Richelieu's  administration,  con- 
trary to  general  belief,  did  consider  the  interests  of  individ- 

5  Richelieu,  Testament  Politique,  I,  125-134. 

«Gouraud,  I,  189. 

i  Isambert,  XVI,  500-503,  537. 

sCaillet,  281. 


84  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [626 

uals  and  their  freedom  and  rights.  He  has  cited  several  extracts 
from  the  famous  code  Michaud  of  1629  in  support  of  this  point.9 
In  the  first  place,  the  farmer  was  relieved  from  the  entail'  Also, 
by  the  destruction  of  the  fortresses  of  the  lords,  an  additional 
security  was  obtained  which  did  much  to  relieve  the  hard  life 
of  the  population.10  The  prospect  of  peace  produced  an  in- 
centive to  work,  because  of  sure  profits.  Furthermore,  laws 
relating  to  exportation  and  importation,  involving  the  decrease 
of  the  taille,  and  efforts  to  make  imports  more  nearly  equal  to 
exports,  together  with  the  reduction  of  the  rate  of  interest,  all 
tended  to  better  the  condition  of  the  farmers.11 

There  are  several  other  measures  in  the  "grand  vrdonnance" 
of  January,  1629,  which  indicate  the  solicitude  of  the  government 
for  the  people.  Article  206  forbids  lords  to  subject  their  tenants 
and  inhabitants  to  corvees  in  their  own  interest,  or  to  impose  on 
the  villages  in  any  way.  Article  207  forbids  lords  to  make  their 
tenants  patronize  their  mills  or  presses  on  penalty  of  losing  their 
mills  and  all  other  rights.  Article  209  forbids  the  lords  to  inter- 
fere with  the  collection  of  taxes  and  the  appointment  of  collect- 
ors.12 A  direct  effort  was  made  to'  deprive  the  lords  of  any 
unlawful  control  over  the  peasants,  and  to  permit  the  latter  to 
make  the  most  of  their  own  few  privileges.  Of  course  conditions 
in  France  were  such  that  this  code  was  never  actually  carried 
out. 

But  one  can  see  that  although  very  little  was  done  to  aid  agri- 
culture, yet  in  an  indirect  way  a  path  was  prepared  whereby  this 
part  of  the  economic  development  of  France  was  to  be  controlled 
and  influenced  by  the  central  power.  The  farmers  at  the  start 
were  given  more  individual  rights,  and  what  Richelieu  would 
have  accomplished  if  he  had  lived  is  of  course  a  matter  of 
conjecture.13 

Turning  to  the  subject  of  industry,  one  can  find  more  evidence 

»  Caillet,  281-282. 

10  Code  Michaud,  see  Isambert,  XVI,  225. 

11  Caillet,  282 ;  Mercure  Francois,  XX,  697. 

12  Isambert,  XVI,  225  et  seq. ;  Caillet,  282. 

is  Richelieu  diminished  the  power  of  the  Huguenots  and  nobles  as  well 
and  after  he  had  put  them  in  their  proper  position  of  subordination  to  the 
central  authority,  he  did  all  he  could  to  encourage  commerce.  See  Rambautl, 
A.,  Histoire  de  la  Civilisation  Frangaise,  2  vols.,  Paris,  1903,  I,  572. 


627]         AGRICULTURE,  INDUSTRY,  AND  INTERNAL  COMMERCE  85 

of  activity  along  that  line  of  French  development,  so  far  as  the 
government  was  concerned.  Starting  with  the  Estates-General 
of  1615,  efforts  were  made  to  open  industry  to  all.  "At  that 
time,  the  cahiers  of  the  third  estate  had  demanded  that  the 
free  exercise  of  the  trades  be  open  to  all  the  poor  subjects  of 
the  King. ' ' 14  Richelieu,  however,  did  not  respond  to  the  desire 
to  deprive  the  so-called  corporations  of  their  monopolies.  The 
only  exception  he  made  was  in  the  case  of  colonists  who  had  been 
in  the  colonies  six  years.  They  could  become  "masters"  when 
they  returned  to  France.  This  part  of  his  economic  policy  was 
weak. 

Many  industries  were  at  that  time  the  object  of  regula- 
tions. For  instance,  the  beer  industry  was  under  governmental 
control,  and  the  wine;  growers  and  distillers  were  recognized  as 
engaged  in  two  separate  industries.  Certain  regulations  were 
passed  also  with  respect  to  the  iron  industry.  The  soft  and  hard 
varieties  of  iron  were  designated  to  be  used  for  different  purposes, 
and  steps  were  to  be  taken  to  develop  the  mines  of  France.15 
Such  an  industry  as  the  manufacture  of  glass  in  Picardy  received 
its  first  impetus  under  Richelieu.16 

The  manufacture  of  rugs  and  tapestry  attracted  more  of 
the  attention  of  the'  government.  During  the  administration  of 
Richelieu  a  man  by  the  name  of  Pierre  du  Pont  and  a  partner 
were  given  the  right  to  weave  and  manufacture  rugs  in  gold, 
silver,  silk,  etc.,  for  18  years.  They  were  to  accept  apprentices, 
train  them,  and  as  a  reward  for  their  services  were  to  be  en- 
nobled.17 In  other  words,  the  government  made  special  efforts 
to  develop  this  industry  and  thus  cut  down  the  imports  from  the 
East. 

The  manufacture  of  silk,  an  eastern  product,  was  also  fostered 
by  Richelieu  as  well  as  Henry  IV.  It  increased  to  a  remarkable 
extent  under  the  former,  who  realized  its  importance.  Indeed,  he 
believed  in  making  France  able  to  manufacture  such  things  for 
herself  and  advocated  the  development  of  the  cloth  industry 
in  pursuit  of  this  policy.18  The  obtaining  of  luxuries  from 

"  CaUlet,  275-276. 

is  Isambert,  XVI,  183,  191. 

lei&td.,  XVI,  198. 

"Caillet,  278. 

is  Richelieu,  Testament  Politique,  II,  67-68. 


86  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [628 

abroad  was  not  to  be  encouraged ;  they  should  be  made  at  home.19 
This  belief  was  a  part  of  the  mercantilistic  doctrine.  "If  in- 
dustry was  developed  and  foreign  importations  hindered  by 
intelligent  laws,  France  could  live  on  its  own  manufactures  as 
well  as  agriculture,"  said  Richelieu.20 

One  means  by  which  the  Cardinal  hoped  to  aid  industry  was 
the  development  of  technical  schools  along  industrial  lines.21 
This  was  a  plan  which  he  was  not  able  to  carry  out  before  he 
died. 

It  is  clear  that  the  interest  taken  by  the  government  in  the 
development  of  industry  was  from  the  point  of  view  of  the 
welfare  of  the  state  as  a  whole.  The  state  fostered  those  indus- 
tries which  would  compete  with  foreign  manufactures,  especially 
in  the  East.  What  little  attention  industry  did  receive  was  on  the 
basis  of  making  France  a  strong  mercantilistic  state.  The  de- 
struction of  internal  political  obstacles  had  an  indirect  influence 
on  industry  in  France.  Doubtless  this  field  of  Richelieu 's  admin- 
istration would  have  received  marked  attention  after  the  Cardi- 
nal had  finished  the  external  part  of  his  program  and  peace  had 
enabled  him  to  turn  his  attention  to  other  things.  This  state- 
ment might  be  applied  to  the  matter  of  internal  commerce  as 
well  as  industry  or  agriculture.22 

"At  the  beginning  of  the  17th  Century,"  says  one  writer, 
two  obstacles  opposed  the  development  of  interior  commerce:  (1) 
the  lack  of  good  roads  and  navigable  rivers,  (2)  legislation  which 
laid  heavy  duties  upon  the  products  of  the  soil. ' ' 23  The  first 
problem  was  mentioned  by  the  Cardinal  in  a  letter  to  his  super- 
intendent of  finances  in  1638,  in  which  he  brought  out  the  incon- 
venience suffered  by  the  public,  because  of  the  corruption  and 
waste  of  money  on  the  part  of  those  who  were  supposed  to  attend 
to  the  paving  of  the  streets  of  cities  like  Paris,  which  were 
neglected  as  a  consequence.24  At  another  time  he  mentions  the 
plan  of  joining  the  ocean  and  the  Mediterranean  Sea  by  means 

i»  Beaurepaire,  III,  270-277.  Indicates  the  rivalry  between  France  and 
England  in  the  cloth  trade  in  1639. 

20  Richelieu,  Testament  Politique,  I,  64-80. 

21  Hid.,  I,  126-127. 

22  Gouraud,  1, 190. 
23Caillet,  284. 

2*  Richelieu,  Lettres,  VI,  247. 


629]         AGRICULTURE,  INDUSTRY,  AND  INTERNAL.  COMMERCE  87 

of  the  rivers  d'Ouche  and  d'Armacon.  "But,"  he  says,  "this 
enterprise  was  too  costly  for  the  times.  ,No  person  would  fur- 
nish the  money,  so  it  was  neglected. ' ' 25  He  admitted  that  such 
schemes  must  rely  on  individual  efforts  as  the  government  was 
not  financially  able  to  carry  them  out.  However,  in  1632  a  law 
was  passed  with  the  purpose  of  making  the  rivers  of  Vettes, 
Chartres,  Dreux  and  d'Etampes,  etc.,  navigable.26  So  that  evi- 
dently Richelieu's  interest  in  this  part  of  his  administration 
obtained  some  results. 

Richelieu  tried  to  carry  on  the  work  of  Henry  IV  in  developing 
navigation  by  means  of  canals.  The  famous  canal  of  Braire, 
begun  in  1604,  was  finished  in  1640.  The  government  had  tried 
to  pay  all  the  expenses  involved  in  its  construction  but  finally  had 
had  to  call  in  the  aid  of  certain  individuals  to  complete  the  task 
in  return  for  certain  concessions.  They  were  to  unite  the  ocean 
and  the  sea  by  this  canal  in  4  years  or  lose  the  rights  connected 
with  it.27  The  owners  were  to  be  ennobled  and  might  induce 
other  persons  of  quality,  such  as  churchmen,  nobles,  and  judges, 
to  contribute  toward  the  undertaking.  In  return,  "considering 
the  services  which  said  Guyon  and  partner  render  to  the  public, 
if  they  succeed  in  an  enterprise  so  useful  to  Paris  and  many 
provinces  of  the  Kingdom  we  will  give  to  them  the  title  of  no- 
bility, etc. ' ' 28  In  this  case  the  government  wished  to  centralize 
everything  in  its  hands,  but  lacking  money,  permitted  private 
parties  to  undertake  some  portions  of  the  work.  However,  this 
concession  was  made  with  the  welfare  of  the  entire  state  con- 
stantly in  mind.  The  economic  benefits  of  canals  were  evident 
to  all  at  that  time. 

Many  other  attempts  were  made  to  develop  other  canals,  but 
the  unfortunate  state  of  the  treasury  and  general  political  con- 
ditions prevented  their  execution.  "However,"  says  one  writer, 
"the  system  adopted  by  Richelieu  had  at  least  the  advantage  of 
not  engaging  the  financial  responsibilities  of  the  state,  and 
leaving  to  the  companies  who  undertook  the  task,  the  costs  as 

25  Richelieu,  Mcmoires,  II,  321. 

2«Isambert,  XVI,  369. 

27  Richelieu  took  a  personal  interest  in  the  plan  for  the  uniting  of  the 
two  seas  by  a  canal.  See  Caillet,  285;  also  Mercure  Francois,  XXIII,  338, 
etc. 

zsisambert,   XVI,   488-496. 


88  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [630 

well  as  the  benefits. "  Z9  In  this  one  respect,  Richelieu  seems  a 
little  in  advance  of  the  mercantilistic  belief. 

With  regard  to  the  condition  of  the  roads  and  bridges  during 
the  period  of  Richelieu's  rule,  one  writer  has  taken  great  pains 
to  prove  that  the  Cardinal  centralized  their  control  in  the  hands 
of  the  Intendants.  Richelieu  made  out  the  budget  of  bridges 
and  roads,  looked  over  the  changes  ordered,  regulated  the 
corvees  instead  of  leaving  their  control  to  officials,  and  was 
responsible  only  to  the  King  and  his  council.30  This  unity  of 
oversight  was  not  long  in  bearing  fruit.  Although  the  roads 
were  far  from  being  as  well  kept  as  they  were  in  the  18th  cen- 
tury, they  passed  in  the  second  part  of  the  17th  century  for  the 
best  and  the  safest  highways  in  Europe.31 

The  service  of  transportation  tended  more  and  more,  like  the 
control  of  bridges  and  roads,  to  be  monopolized  in  the  hands  of 
the  state.  Before  Richelieu's  time,  the  convents,  the  universi- 
ties, the  Kings,  etc.,  all  had  their  separate  postal  and  parcel  post 
systems.  No  royal  relays  or  messengers  took  private  business, 
unless  permitted  to  do  so  by  the  chiefs  in  charge.  The  transport 
of  goods  in  wagons  was  the  exception,  merchandise  being  car- 
ried as  far  as  possible  on  the  backs  of  animals  and  by  boat. 

Richelieu  wanted  the  government  to  take  charge  of  this  part 
of  French  affairs,  and  to  centralize  the  postal  service  in  its  own 
hands.  He  continued  this  development  (which  had  been  started 
by  Charles  IX)  by  creating  in  1624,  the  office  of  director  and 
"Intendant  Generate"  of  the  posts,  and  gave  it  to  one  of  his  de- 
voted servants.32  Also,  at  this  time  the  royal  relays  were  given 
the  monopoly  over  the  roads  they  covered.  The  messengers  of 
the  universities  were  limited  to  university  letters,  parcels,  etc. 
In  1625  an  edict  was  issued  which  established  relays  on  various 
roads,  that  is,  the  government  was  to  rent  horses  to  individuals 
who  were  to  convoy  goods  to  various  places.  An  effort  was 
made  to  render  the  distribution  of  goods  even  and  fair  by  pre- 
venting the  holding  back  of  food,  through  storing  it  in  boats 
which  were  kept  in  secret  places,  etc.  Warning  was  given  that 
merchants  in  the  future  could  not  hold  up  laden  boats  or  keep 

2»  Pigeonneau,  II,  391-392. 
so  Ibid.,  II,  392-393. 
si/Znd.,  II,  394. 
32  Levasseur,  I,  249. 


631]         AGRICULTURE,  INDUSTRY,  AND  INTERNAL  COMMERCE  89 

merchandise  in  warehouses  along  the  rivers  for  future  use.  Such 
action  was  fraudulent  and  to  the  prejudice  of  the  public.33  Thus 
efforts  were  made  to  prevent  speculation  in  food  and  merchandise, 
in  a  manner  very  similar  to  the  present.  One  sees  that  the 
government  of  that  time  did  not  fail  to  regulate  any  indus- 
try or  organization  if  it  saw  fit,  when  the  latter  tried  to 
interfere  with  the  public  welfare.  Finally,  all  goods  except 
grains,  wines,  etc.,  were  to  be  transported  by  royal  carriers,  so 
that  the  form  of  a  monopoly  was  at  last  reached.34  However, 
this  privilege  of  government  monopoly  of  the  post  and  express 
was  never  enforced,  and  the  traders  remained  free  to  choose  their 
carriers  for  packages  weighing  more  than  50  pounds.35 

Richelieu  finally  was  able  to  establish  regular  routes  from 
various  cities  on  certain  days,  and  in  1630,  France  was  divided 
into  20  postal  districts,  and  7  foreign  offices  were  added,  in 
Spain,  Flanders,  England,  Holland,  Germany,  Switzerland,  and 
Italy.36  Carriers  left  the  "central  bureaus"  of  Paris,  twice  a 
week,  and  traveled  at  the  rate  of  4  leagues  per  hour  in  summer 
and  11/2  per  hour  in  winter.37  The  government  did  not  make 
any  profit  from  the  postal  system.  It  was  farmed  out  to  indi- 
viduals and  they  received  the  profits.38  Yet  there  was  a  gain 
in  that  the  letters  went  from  one  part  of  the  country  to  another 
with  regularity,  quickness,  and  security  unknown  in  preceding 
centuries.  The  creation  of  relays  at  this  time  was  a  great  aid 
to  increasing  the  speed  of  the  trips.  ' '  Indeed, ' '  says  one  writer, 
"travel  by  coaches  became  more  regular,  and  transportation  as 
a  whole  became  cheaper  both  on  land  and  water. ' ' 39  Evidently 
during  the  administration  of  Richelieu  transportation  received 
an  important  impetus,  with  increased  security,  faster  time,  and 
decreased  costs.  All  this  was  accomplished  by  the  state  and 
depended  on  it,  in  spite  of  the  desires  of  individuals  to  the  con- 
trary. Created  in  the  interest  of  the  public,  transportation,  in 
this  instance,  was  successful  in  attaining  its  object. 

as  Isambert,  XVI,  158-161. 
34/&U?.,  XVI,  353-355. 
ss  Pigeonneau,  II,  399. 
36  Isambert,  XVI,  351. 
ST  Pigeonneau,  II,  399-402. 
38  Isambert,  XVI,  450-455. 
so  Pigeonneau,  II,  402. 


90  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [632 

Among  the  important  means  of  aiding  commerce  was  the  news- 
paper, which  traces  its  origin  to  the  days  of  Bichelieu.  "It 
was,"  said  one  writer,  "together  with  the  opening  of  the 
canals,  the  creation  of  letter  posts,  of  relays,  messengers  and 
carriages,  the  crowning  event  which  inaugurated  modern 
times. ' ' 40  Bichelieu  not  only  used  the  newspaper  for  govern- 
mental purposes  but  the  so-called  journal  was  a  powerful  aid 
to  commerce,  by  giving  knowledge  and  publicity.  When  one 
considers  that  through  it  the  King  notified  the  nobles)  that  they 
would  not  lose  their  rank  if  they  engaged  in  commerce  and 
announced  that  certain  merchants  or  traders  had  become  nobles, 
one  can  see  the  effect  it  would  have  on  trade.  Richelieu's 
constant  concern  for  the  welfare  of  commerce  is  displayed  also 
in  the  reduction  of  the  interest  rate  from  the  usual  rate  of  24  per 
cent  plus  to  18  per  cent.  There  was  a  danger  to  commerce  in 
that  men  neglected  it  for  speculation.  Therefore  this  more 
moderate  rate  was  established  to  aid  trade  and  industry 
and  also  to  assure  a  sufficient  profit  to  investors.41 

Everything  possible  at  that  time  was  done  to  develop  commerce. 
The  government  tried  to  make  the  frontier  the  only  tariff  bound- 
ary, but  the  local  provinces  refused  to  consent  on  account  of  local 
privileges,  rivalries,  etc.42  No  matter  how  heavy  the  taxes 
were  upon  goods  in  France,  similar  goods  imported  from  abroad 
paid  at  least  as  much.  For  example,  a  tax  was  laid  on  iron  in 
1632,  but  foreign  iron  paid  more  than  French  iron.  This  privi- 
lege accorded  to  national  industry,43  was  a  part  of  the  protective 
aspect  of  the  mercantilist^  theories. 

The  question  of  money  was  a  problem  confronting  the  govern- 
ment in  its  efforts  to  aid  commerce.  The  Mercure  Francois 
brought  up,  in  1631,  the  necessity  of  trade  and  the  injury  done  to 
it  by  counterfeit  money.  A  chamber  of  moneys  was  established 
to  deal  with  the  matter,  on  the  ground  that  otherwise  the  ruin 
of  France  would  result.44 

Also  the  increase  of  money  as  a  result  of  the  discovery  of  the 

40  Pigeonneau,  II,  461-463. 

4ilsambert,  XVI,  406.     Memoires,  XXIII,  259-260. 

42  Caillet,  267. 

43  Pigeonneau,  II,  414. 

"Mercure  Frangois,  XVII,  713-720;  Isambert,  XVI,  365;  Mote,  II,  62- 
63,  195-196. 


633]         AGRICULTURE,  INDUSTRY,  AND  INTERNAL  COMMERCE  91 

New  World  had  caused  trouble  for  French  commerce.  In  1636, 
the  relations  of  38  different  foreign  coins  were  established  in  an 
arbitrary  way.  Of  course  this  plan  did  not  work  and  in  1639 
the  relation  of  coins  by  weight  was  tried.  Finally  in  1640  all 
the  lighter  French  gold  coins  were  retired  and  refunded  into  the 
Louis  d'or  and  smaller  coins,  with  definite  relative  weights. 
In  addition  to  the  simplification  of  the  monetary  system  the 
cost  of  mining  was  decreased,  which  was  a  gain  for  both  the 
government  and  commerce,  even  though  not  all  the  monetary 
questions  were  solved.45 

In  conclusion,  it  would  seem  that  the  efforts  made  by  the  gov- 
ernment to  improve  the  agricultural,  industrial,  and  internal 
commercial  conditions,  though  rather  meager  in  results,  were 
nevertheless  important,  when  one  considers  the  situation  at  that 
period.  The  general  purpose  to  build  up  the  state  and  center 
control  in  its  hands  was  the  common  policy  behind  the  govern- 
ment in  whatever  it  accomplished  in  these  particular  phases  of 
its  administration.46  The  coming  peace  would  doubtless  have 
seen  the  attempt  to  complete  this  policy  as  applied  to  internal 
affairs.  It  was  not  Richelieu's  lack  of  ability  or  of  knowledge 
of  conditions,  but  his  lack  of  time,  which  accounts  for  his  inac- 
tivity in  regard  to  these  particular  phases  of  his  administration. 
Furthermore,  Richelieu,  during  his  administration,  was  more 
interested  in  his  external  than  his  internal  problems.  His 
accomplishments  with  regard  to  marine,  colonization,  and  foreign 
commerce,  really  constitute  the  positive  side  of  his  administra- 
tion. 


45  Pigeonneau,  II,  415-422;  Levasseur,  I,  255-258. 

*6 ' '  Richelieu 's  razing  of  the  fortieses  of  the  nobility  was  one  of  the 
most  important  steps  ever  taken  towards  internal  freedom  of  intercourse 
within  France."  Schmoller,  G.,  The  Mercantile  System,  New  York,  1902, 
I,  54. 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE  IDEAS  AND  ACCOMPLISHMENTS  OF  RICHELIEU 
AS  REGARDS  A  MARINE 

The  keynote  of  Richelieu 's  position  in  regard  to  a  war  marine 
for  France  is  found  in  the  following  quotation  taken  from  his 
Testament  Politique:  "The  sea  is  an  object  of  dispute  among 
all  sovereigns,  for  they  all  claim  that  they  inherit  a  right  to 
control  it.  Therefore,  the  factor  which  does  so  is  force  and  not 
reason.  It  is  necessary  to  be  powerful  in  order  to  have  a  recog- 
nized claim  in  the  heritage. ' ' x  The  Cardinal  then  considers  the 
maritime  organization  of  England,  Spain,  and  the  Barbary 
states,  compares  the  naval  forces  of  these,  and  shows  briefly  how 
he  wishes  to  make  the  French  strong  and  active*  enough  to  be 
able,  in  times  of  war,  to  contend  with  advantage  against  the 
fleets  of  their  enemies,  and  in  times  of  peace,  to  defend  their 
commerce,  ships,  and  shores,  from  the  aggression  of  pirates. 
Richelieu  saw  the  need  of  a  strong  marine  as  a  means  of  attain- 
ing a  powerful  state,  and  so  was  anxious  to  exert  his  efforts  to- 
ward that  phase  of  his  administration. 

In  order  to  gain  the  opportunity  to  carry  out  his  ideas  along 
this  line,  in  1626,  he  saw  to  it  that  he  was  offered  the  position 
of  "grand  master,  chief,  and  general  superintendent  of  the 
navigation  and  commerce  of  France."  The  duties  of  this  office 
had  been  carried  on  by  several  officials  in  the  past,  and  were  now 
put  under  the  control  of  the  Cardinal,  as  a  further  move  toward 
the  centralization  of  power  which  he  was  bringing  about  at  that 
time.  "God  be  praised,"  says  the  Mercure  Francois,  "that  lack- 
ing in  power  because  of  the  weakness  of  France  on  the  sea,  the 
King  has  committed  to  the  care  and  administration  of  the  great- 
est person  of  the  century  and  most  worthy  pilot  of  the  state, 
who  has  appeased  the  storms  of  civil  war  and  the  foreign  tem- 
pests near  and  far  .  .  .  ,  the  police  and  administration  of 

i  Eichelieu,  Testament  Politique,  II,  48-50. 

92 


635]        IDEAS  AND  ACCOMPLISHMENTS  AS  REGARDS  A  MARINE  93 

the  sea,  and  as  a  result  will  build  up  commerce  by  means  of 
power  upon  the  ocean  and  immunity  from  the  attacks  of  other 
nations  thereby. ' ' 2 

Up  until  Richelieu's  time  each  of  the  former  admirals  and 
connetables  had  unlimited  personal  power,  and  they  were  bound 
to  come  into  conflict  with  other  officials.3  But  when  Richelieu 
took  charge,  all  the  duties  were  centralized  in  his  hands.  Some 
of  them  were  as  follows :  "to  give  and  furnish  all  orders  which 
will  be  useful  and  necessary  for  navigation,  in  conservation  of 
the  rights  of  France,  the  advancement  and  establishment  of 
the  commerce  and  security  of  her  subjects,  at  sea,  in  the  ports, 
harbors  and  nearby  islands. ' ' 4  Thus  one  perceives  that  the 
powers  which  Richelieu  was  to  possess  were  very  extended;  in- 
deed the  appointment  placed  under  his  control  the  merchant  as 
well  as  the  war  marine.  The  duties  of  the  Cardinal  were  defined 
in  more  detail  than  were  those  of  his  predecessors,  and  further- 
more, they  were  broader  in  so  far  as  they  concerned  the  necessary 
field,  so  that  he  was  able  to  decide  as  a  sovereign  ruler,  all  ques- 
tions relating  to  the  sea,  even  to  disputes  arising  over  the  capture 
and  disposal  of  the  contents  of  wrecked  vessels.  That  he  took 
his  office  seriously,  and  tried  to  realize  vast  plans  for  the  mari- 
time and  commercial  development  of  France,  is  the  final  con- 
clusion of  most  students  of  his  life. 

The  way  in  which  Richelieu  carried  on  the  duties  of  his 
office  will  illustrate  both  his  impartiality  and  his  honesty. 
Numerous  passages  in  his  letters  show  that  he  looked  upon  the 
position  as  a  sort  of  sacred  trust.  Indeed,  the  Cardinal  consid- 
ered the  appointment  as  being  one  which  was  not  conferred 
upon  him  as  a  regular  part  of  his  official  position,  but  was 
given  to  him  with  the  idea  that  its  great  importance  to 
the  welfare  of  the  nation  and  the  King,  required  every 
loyal  Frenchman  not  only  to  obey  its  precepts,  but  aid  in 
carrying  out  its  functions,  if  he  was  ordered  to  do  so.5 
This  explains  why  the  Cardinal  refused  to  accept  money 
for  his  work  in  this  particular  office.6  One  of  his  letters  illus- 

2  Mervure  Francois,  XIII,  257-258. 

3  Isambert,  XVI,  198. 
*  Ibid.,  XVI,  194. 

sEichelieu,  Memoires,  XXIII,  257-258. 

eBichelieu,  Lettres,   II,  346;   Memoires,   XXIV,  275-276. 


94  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [636 

trates  very  well  the  spirit'  in  which  he  took  up  his  duties  and 
some  of  the  problems  he  had  to  face  at  the  outset.  He  says, 
"that  the  King,  knowing  for  some  time  how  his  vessels  were 
preyed  upon,  was  determined  to  put  a  stop  to  it.  So  he  sent 
out  escorts  with  the  various  merchant  vessels  and  fortified  all 
ports.  Also,  his  majesty  ordered  me  to  take  charge  of  commerce 
and  navigation,  and  has  sent  forward  a  general  order  that  clear- 
ance was  to  be  taken  from  me  rather  than  from  Montmorency 
(his  predecessor)  .  .  ."7  He  then  goes  on  to  cite  cases  in 
which  his  authority  was  not  recognized.  There  existed  at  that 
time  provinces,  where  local  governments  exerted  almost  unre- 
stricted rights  in  maritime  matters,  and  thus  conflicted  with  the 
central  authority,  which  was  at  that  time  the  "superintendent 
of  navigation  and  commerce."  In  regard  to  Brittany,  one  of 
the  more  or  less  independent  provinces,  he  says  that  he  does 
not  seek  to  make  innovations  there,  but  only  tries  to  give  aid 
and  means  to  all  those  who  wish  to  trade,  and  to  do  so  in  pleasing 
and  favorable  ways.  Many  other  letters  indicate  his  great  inter- 
est in  the  office.  8  And  so  one  finds  that  after  this,  he  begins  to 
introduce  important  plans  in  regard  to  forming  a  naval  force, 
which  was  to  be  of  great  importance  to  France  in  the  future. 
But  first  of  all  a  few  words  in  respect  to  the  past  history  of 
this  new  war  marine. 

Francis  I  and  Henry  II  had  attempted  to  build  up  the  navy 
but  since  then  it  had  dwindled  to  nothing.  In  1603,  Sully  was 
obliged  to  journey  to  England  in  an  English  vessel.  On  the 
way  over  he  was  escorted  by  some  small  French  ships,  which 
were  forced  to  salute  the  English  flag  when  they  passed  one  of 
the  vessels  of  that  country.9  This  was  an  insult  which  affected 
Richelieu  deeply,  as  it  indicated  the  fact  that  England  was 
master  over  France,  in  so  far  as  the  sea  was  concerned. 

Henry  IV  recognized  the  necessity  of  a  strong  marine,  but 
his  sudden  death  prevented  any  efforts  in  that  direction,  so 
that  when  the  Cardinal  went  into  office,  France  had  practically 
no  power  on  the  sea.  "Trade,"  he  says,  "was  almost  totally 
ruined  and  the  King  did  not  have  one  ship."  10 


,  Lettres,  II,  350-352. 
8  Ibid.,  II,  346,  349-350,  409-412,  416. 
»Caillet,  287-288. 
10  Eichelieu,  Testament  Politique,  I,  190. 


637]        IDEAS  AND  ACCOMPLISHMENTS  AS  REGARDS  A  MARINE  95 

Richelieu  as  far  back  as  1616  realized  the  weakness  of 
the  marine,  and  in  his  brief  entrance  into  the  "consett" 
urged  all  villages  to  encourage  the  development  of  a  marine  as 
far  as  they  were  able.11  Now,  as  has  been  pointed  out,  Riche- 
lieu's theories  with  regard  to  the  marine  have  been  borrowed 
from  the  ideas  of  men  like  Henry  IV,  Issac  de  Laffemas,  from  the 
cahiers  of  1614,  1617,  and  1626  as  well  as  the  writings  of  Mont- 
chretien.12  But  yet  one  must  give  him  credit  for  having  the 
ability  to  weld  all  these  ideas  together  in  spite  of  almost  super- 
human difficuties,  and  to  develop  an  exceedingly  capable  marine 
policy,  which  was  largely  put  into  execution  before  his  death. 

One  of  the  most  interesting  phases  of  this  policy  was  the  fact 
that  he  consulted  and  informed  the  people  of  France  concerning 
it.  He  seems  to  have  especially  desired  their  approval.  For 
instance,  the  assembly  of  notables  was  made  aware  of  his  eco- 
nomic and  political  reforms  through  the  speech  of  one  of  his 
representatives.  They  were  unanimously  approved  by  that 
body.13  The  nobles  felt  that  a  strong  marine  was  the  sure 
means  whereby  France  could  develop  and  regain  her  former 
splendor.14  Richelieu  also  used  the  Mercure  Francois,  in  reality 
a  government  controlled  newspaper,  to  inform  the  public 
concerning  the  state  of  the  marine.  In  it  the  former 
glory  of  France  is  brought  out,  especially  under  Charlemagne, 
Charles  VI,  and  Francis  I,  particularly  with  regard  to  relations 
in  the  Levant.  Then  it  shows  how  the  religious  wars  had  led 
to  the  fall  of  the  fleet,  which  Henry  IV  had  not  been  able  to 
renew.  ' '  He  who  is  master  of  the  sea  is  master  of  the  land. ' ' 15 
France  had  existed  without  sea  control,  while  England,  Spain, 
Denmark,  and  Sweden  had  increased  in  power  by  that  means. 
Control  of  the  sea  meant  power  for  the  nations,  and  was  neces- 
sary for  France. 

However,  the  Cardinal  did  not  have  to  use  many  arguments 
to  convince  the  people  as  to  the  need  of  a  marine.  France  had 
many  direct  and  indirect  enemies  at  this  time,  and  the  critical 
state  in  which  the  nation  was  placed  because  of  lack  of  sea  con- 

11  Gouraud,  I,  176. 

12  Pigeonneau,  II,  381-382. 
« Ibid.,  II,  384. 

i*  Bichelieu,  Memoires,  XXIII,  256-257. 
is  Mercure  Frangois,  XIII,  214-229. 


96  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [638 

trol  caused  him  to  take  immediate  efforts  to  reform  the  marine, 
with  the  full  consent  of  the  people.  Of  course,  there  was  a 
certain  amount  of  opposition  from  local  governors  and  other 
officials  affected  by  a  centralization  of  its  control.16  Further- 
more, the  Huguenots  were  not  enthusiastic  for  a  national)  navy. 
But  it  was  just  this  local  opposition  which  caused  the  Cardinal 
to  go  ahead.  Eichelieu  knew  that  the  marine  exerted  a  direct 
influence  on  foreign  relations,  and  this  was  the  primary  cause 
for  his  determined  and  farsighted  stand  with  regard  to  this 
problem. 

In  the  first  place,  one  discovers  that  relations  between  France 
and  the  Barbary  pirates  were  not  very  pleasant.  The  inhabitants 
of  northern  Africa  had  for  many  generations  followed  piracy 
as  a  profession,  and  at  that  time  dominated  the  Mediterranean 
Sea.  They  had  been  so  strong  that  it  was  impossible  for  a  French 
vessel  to  venture  out  of  a  Mediterranean  port  without  running 
the  risk  of  being  captured  and  having  its  crew  taken  to  Africa 
as  slaves.17  Indeed,  no  part  of  the  French  coast  was  immune 
from  attacks  of  pirates  of  various  nationalities.  The  "Barbar- 
esques"  penetrated  from  ten  to  twenty  leagues  into  the  interior 
of  Provence  and  were  a  source  of  constant  terror  to  the  people 
there,  who  constantly  petitioned  for  aid,  calling  Richelieu's 
attention  to  the  fine  harbors  upon  which  to  base  his  sea  control, 
where  he  could  also  build  up  an  immense  trade.18  Furthermore, 
the  Spaniards  and  English  committed  piracies  near  French 
soil.19  Add  to  all  this  the  fact  that  the  nobles  in  France  had 
no  scruples  about  taking  part  in  these  depredations,  and  one  can 
readily  understand  why  the  people  of  France  demanded  as  a 
unit  the  creation  of  a  strong  marine. 

On  account  of  these  raids  and  the  unanimous  demand  of  the 
people,  Richelieu,  in  the  second  year  of  his  ministry,  made  a 

is  Richelieu  was  hindered  in  his  work  by  many  opponents,  even  with 
regard  to  the  marine,  which  had  more  national  support  perhaps  than  any 
other  measure.  Some  even  said  that  he  hid  behind  the  claims  of  benefiting 
commerce,  to  obtain  control  of  the  sea  and  thus  to  make  himself  supreme. 
This  helps  to  indicate  the  problems  before  him.  See  Richelieu,  Memoires, 
XXIII,  224-225. 

nMercure  Francois,  XII,  56-65;   75-79. 

is  Ibid.,  XII,  65-73. 


639]         IDEAS  AND  ACCOMPLISHMENTS  AS  REGARDS  A  MARINE  97 

"Reglement  pour  la  mer,"  in  which  he  brought  out  the  necessity 
of  a  strong  war  marine  for  France.  "In  order  to  guarantee  to 
our  subjects  who  trade  in  the  East,  safety  from  the  losses 
which  they  have  received  from  the  pirates,  and  to  maintain 
the  regulation  and  dignity  of  our  crown  among  foreigners,  we 
wish  that  in  the  future  there  will  always  be  in  our  ports  forty 
galleys  prepared  to  go  out  and  quietly  scour  our  coasts. ' ' 20 
A.S  a  result,  Richelieu  did  all  he  could  by  means  of  treaties  with 
the  pirates,  as  well  as  the  force  of  a  great  navy,  to  make  the 
pirates  respect  the  flag  of  France  on  the  high  seas.21  He  succeed- 
ed in  accomplishing  these  aims  to  a  remarkable  extent,  but  his 
successor  Mazarin,  through  neglect,  permitted  the  pirates  to 
become  strong  again  and  continue  their  depredations.  However, 
there  were  other  influences  besides  that  arising  from  the  acts  of 
the  pirates,  which  caused  Richelieu  to  take  such  an  active  stand 
with  regard  to  the  navy. 

Diplomatic  relations  with  such  countries  as  England  and 
Spain,  which  affected  both  the  political  and  economic  growth 
of  his  country,  caused  the  Cardinal  to  consider  a  strong  marine 
as  the  most  important  weapon  with  which  to  meet  these  nations. 
"On  the  power  of  the  sea,"  he  says,  "depends  the  lowering  of 
the  pride  of  England,  Holland,  Spain,  .  .  .  against  us,  and 
the  ruin  of  the  Huguenots. ' ' 22 

The  best  source  of  his  ideas  on  this  particular  subject  is  found 
in  his  Testament  Politique,  where,  after  discussing  the  advantage 
of  certain  types  of  ships  on  the  ocean  and  the  Mediterranean 
Sea,  he  goes  on  to  say  that  a  great  state  would  never  be  in  such 
a  position  that  it  had  to  receive  an  injury  without  taking  a  just 
revenge.  He  points  out  the  supremacy  of  the  English  over  the 
French.  "This,"  he  says,  "works  as  an  injury  to  the  commerce 
of  France,  especially  to  her  fisheries."  He  then  comments  on 
the  fact  that  England  and  not  France  can  fix  the  duties  on  com- 
modities because  of  her  strength  at  sea.  The  latter  in  her  state 
of  weakness  could  do  nothing.  He  goes  on  to  relate  an  incident 

zoEiehelieu,  Lettres,  II,  163-166. 

21  Masson,   P.   Histoire  du   commerce  Franc.ais  dans   le  Levant,  XVII" 
Si6cle,  Paris,  1896,  28. 

22  Sourdis,  H.   de,  Correspondence,  Ed.,  E.   Sue  Collection  des  Docum., 
ined.  de  I 'hist,  de  France),  3  vols.,  Paris,  1839,  I,  Introduction,  II-III. 


98  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [640 

in  which  the  British  flag  had  to  be  saluted  in  preference  to  the 
French  standard,  because  of  the  naval  inferiority  of  the  latter. 
In  conclusion,  he  says  that  only  force  will  make  England  recog- 
nize France. 

He  then  takes  up  the  naval  strength  of  France,  pointing  out 
the  fact  that  the  utility  of  the  Indies  to  Spain  compels  her  to 
have  a  large  sea  force.  "We  should  be  able,"  he  says,  "to  op- 
pose and  put  a  stop  to  any  of  these  enterprises  against  us.  If 
your  majesty  is  powerful  at  sea,  you  will  be  able  to  attack  Spain 
on  her  lengthy  coast,  and  they  will  conserve  most  of  their  rev- 
enues in  an  effort  to  guard  their  territory.  This  danger  will  keep 
them  from  troubling  their  neighbors,  as  they  have  done  up  to  the 
present.  For  they  will  need  all  the  power  they  have  to  protect 
themselves  .  .  ."2S  He  closes  this  section  by  describing  the 
excellent  location  of  France  in  respect  to  harbors,  emphasizing 
the  fact  that  she  has  ports  on  the  ocean  and  the  Mediterranean 
Sea  as  well.  This  is  an  immense  advantage.  Then  he  comments 
in  more  detail  on  her  excellent  ports.  "Brittany  alone,"  he  says, 
"contains  the  best  harbors  on  the  ocean,  and  Provence  has  better 
ones  than  England  and  Italy  together.  Spain  has  to  have  a  large 
navy  in  order  to  keep  her  many  seaports  under  control.  Just 
as  the  sea  divides  Spain  from  Italy,  so  France  separates  her 
from  the  rest  of  her  territories. ' ' 24  Richelieu  realized  very 
clearly  the  importance  of  a  war  marine  to  France,  because  of  her 
weakness  on  the  political  and  commercial  side  in  her  relations 
with  foreign  nations.  One  must  admit  that  his  desire  for  a 
fleet  almost  implies  aggression  against  Spain  for  commercial 
and  territorial  rights.  These  quotations  taken  from  his  last 
work,  written  as  a  result  of  twenty  odd  years  of  service  in  the 
employ  of  his  country,  certainly  indicate  his  final  ideas  on 
this  subject,  and  throw  very  valuable  light  on  his  aims  at  that 
time. 

There  was  yet  another  cause  which  influenced  Richelieu  to 
build  up  a  war  marine.  This  was  the  rising  colonial  trade  of 
France  and  her  growing  commerce  as  a  consequence  of  it.  Riche- 
lieu realized  that  in  order  to  develop  and  protect  colonies  and 

23  Richelieu,  Testament  Politique,  II,  49-52 ;  Memoires,  XXIII,  257-258 ; 
Mercure  Francois,  XIII,  208-213. 

2*  The  Spanish  Netherlands,  Luxemberg,  and  the  Franche  Comte  were 
the  important  territories  separated  from  Spain  by  the  French  nation. 


641]         IDEAS  AND  ACCOMPLISHMENTS  AS  REGARDS  A  MARINE  99 

commerce,  a  strong  navy  was  a  necessity.  Now,  as  he  wanted 
France  to  be  a  powerful  colonizing  nation,  it  is  natural  that  he 
should  turn  toward  the  development  of  a  navy  as  one  of  the 
first  steps  in  the  promotion  of  this  idea.  "A  force  on  the  sea 
is  necessary  to  keep  it  clear  of  pirates,  to  protect  commerce  and 
increase  the  grandeur  of  the  state.  The  King  takes  to  heart  all 
the  affairs  of  commerce  and  trade  inasmuch  as  he  cannot  sep- 
arate individual  interests  and  his  own.  All  are  involved  in  the 
question  of  power  on  the  sea  and  against  those  who  would  ex- 
clude them,  thus  to  the  detriment  of  their  trade  .  .  .  etc. '  '25 
The  question  of  commerce  was  a  national  affair,  and  affected  all. 
And  the  very  fact  that  Gaston,  the  hated  enemy  of  Richelieu, 
supported  him  in  his  efforts  to  secure  a  marine,  indicates  the 
importance  placed  on  this  part  of  his  administration.26 

"Power  in  trade  and  commerce  depends  on  sea  power,"  says 
the  Mercure  Francois.  "For  example,  the  naval  force  of 
England  and  also  of  Holland  all  have  increased  trade  by  that 
means,  as  well  as  the  Portuguese  and  Venetians.  The  Hanseatic 
cities  of  Germany  also  having  failed  to  protect  themselves  have 
sought  the  protection  of  some  powerful  Princes  on  the  sea. 
French  commerce  shows  a  decrease  and  thus  the  absolute  necessity 
of  a  fleet.  France  needs  to  be  protected  in  war  on  the  sea,  and 
to  be  strong  in  commerce  in  times  of  peace  through  protection. 
Thus  not  only  for  political,  but  for  commercial  reasons,  it  is 
desirable  that  the  French  nation  be  a  strong  sea  power. '  '-2T  This 
quotation  from  Eichelieu's  paper  sums  up  his  entire  attitude 
toward  that  problem.  He  appreciated  the  natural  advantages 
which  France  had  in  regard  to  commerce,  and  the  development 
of  a  strong  marine,  and  was  farsighted  enough  to  desire  to  build 
up  for  the  future.  At  no  other  place  is  his  economic  states- 
manship better  illustrated  than  in  his  efforts  to  create  a  war  and 
commercial  marine,  in  spite  of  the  numerous  obstacles  in  the 
way.  "There  is  no  Kingdom  so  well  situated  as  France  and 
so  rich  in  all  that  is  needed  for  it  to  become  a  power  on  the  sea. 
To  do  this  we  must  see  how  our  neighbors  govern  themselves  in 
that  work,  we  must  make  great  companies,  and  oblige  the  mer- 
chants to  enter  them.  Small  merchants  cannot  meet  the  diffi- 

25  Mercure  Francois,  XIII,  229-233.     Eichelieu,  Lettres,  II,  331-332. 

26  Eichelieu,  Memoires,  XXIII,  261-262. 

27  Mercure  Francois,  XIII,  233-237. 


100  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [642 

culties  of  the  sea  .  .  .  etc. " 28  A  combination  between  the 
merchants  and  the  government  to  furnish  mutual  aid  on  the 
seas,  was  the  plan  of  Richelieu,  which  would  have  doubtless  pro- 
duced great  results  if  he  had  lived  long  enough  to  carry  it 
to  its  logical  conclusion,  namely,  a  great  merchant  and  war 
marine. 

Turning  to  the  actual  accomplishments  of  Richelieu  with  re- 
gard to  the  marine,  one  finds  that  it  was  during  the  years  1629 
to  1635  that  he  began  seriously  to  consider  this  phase  of  his 
administration,29  although  there  is  evidence  that  he  contemplated 
action  along  this  line  from  the  very  start.30  Financial  troubles,31 
and  disturbances,  such  as  those  with  the  Huguenots,  prevented 
his  doing  much  until  later.  But  he  admitted  the  weakness  of  the 
French  on  the  sea,  and  the  injury  done  to  their  commerce  by 
other  powers.  "Our  neighbors,"  he  said,  "buy  our  goods  and 
sell  theirs  at  their  price.  Now  this  state  of  affairs  should  cease. 
Therefore,  his  majesty  is  resolved  to  have  30  good  vessels  of 
war  to  protect  our  coasts  and  inspire  respect  for  us  on  the  part 
of  our  neighbors. ' ' 32  From  the  very  start  the  Cardinal  had 
a  definite  policy  outlined  and  stood  ready  to  carry  it  out  even 
to  the  smallest  detail. 

The  first  thing  he  did  with  reference  to  the  marine  was  to  place 
the  situation  before  the  assembly  of  notables  in  1626.  As  a  re- 
sult of  this  meeting  the  grand  edict  of  reformation  of  1629,  or 
the  Code  Michaud,  was  passed.  This  edict,  written  by  officials 
of  the  Cardinal,  but  expressing  his  views,33  advocated  the  free 
exportation  of  wheat  and  wine  except  in  times  of  famine,  author- 
ization for  gentlemen  to  exercise  the  duties  of  merchants  and 
colonists ;  forbade  French  sailors  to  serve  under  foreign  banners ; 
and  established  the  convoy  of  merchant  ships  by  war  vessels; 
action  against  the  pirates  was  contemplated;  exportation  of 
merchandise  in  foreign  boats  was  forbidden  if  French  vessels 
were  available;  there  was  prohibition  of  the  importation  of 
foreign  cloth;  jurisdiction  in  maritime  matters  was  reserved  to 

28  Richelieu,  Memoires,  XXIII,  258-259. 
29Caillet,  292. 

so  Richelieu,  Lettres,  II,  163-166;   290-292;   295-296. 
si  Richelieu,  Memoires,  XXIII,  126. 

32  Richelieu,  Lettres,  II,  386,  see  note. 

33  Isambert,  XVI,  329,  etc. ;  Levasseur,  243. 


643]        IDEAS  AND  ACCOMPLISHMENTS  AS  REGAEDS  A  MARINE          101 

tribunals  of  the  admiralty,  etc.  If  these  provisions  had  been 
carried  out  France  would  have  developed  a  great  commercial 
and  war  marine  based  on  rather  remarkable  modern  protective 
ideas,  part  of  which  endure  at  the  present  time.  This  code  is 
a  striking  example  of  the  emphasis  that  was  being  placed  on  the 
economic  side  of  foreign  relations  at  that  time.  It  is  a  pity  that 
internal  opposition  and  external  problems  prevented  its  entire 
execution. 

Finally,  in  1629,  the  Cardinal  was  free  enough  from  other 
administrative  troubles  to  take  up  the  question.  He  decided 
that  conditions  in  the  land  in  so  far  as  they  affected  the  creation 
of  a  war  marine,  should  be  investigated.  Accordingly  in  1629 
and  1633,  he  ordered  two  of  the  best  trained  men  in  the  King- 
dom, Messrs.  Leroux  D 'Inf reviile,  commissioner  of  the  marine, 
and  Henri  De  Seguioran,  Seigneur  de  Bone,  Knight  and  Council- 
lor of  the  King,  to  carry  out  this  project.  The  former  was  to 
inspect,  the  coast  bordering  on  the  Mediterranean  Sea.  They 
were  to  report  on  everything  which  concerned  the  marine  and 
were  also  to  reestablish  the  right  of  anchorage,  which  Henry  IV 
had  yielded  to  foreign  vessels."'4  "These  duties,  executed  with 
rare  intelligence,  cast  a  rather  depressing  light  upon  the  de- 
plorable situation  in  which  they  found  all  forms  of  sea.  activities, 
a  situation  rendered  still  worse  by  the  conflicts  of  jurisdiction 
which  were  being  constantly  brought  up  by  the  governors  of 
provinces  or  the  admirals  or  the  nobles  whose  feudal  estates 
bordered  on  the  oceans  and  rivers. '  '35  These  men  reported  that 
the  ports  were  without  garrisons,  that  the  coast  of  the  ocean 
was  harried  by  the  pirates  of  Africa  and  Spain,  and  that  the 
harbors  and  the  castles  built  around  them,  both  on  the  Atlantic 
Ocean  and  the  Mediterranean  Sea,  were  in  a  very  unfortunate 
state  of  neglect.  In  addition  to  all  this,  there  were  "river  rul- 
ers, ' '  who  exacted  tolls  from  travelers  who  went  up  and  down  the 
rivers  which  passed  through  their  territories.  They  reported  in 
detailed  fashion  as  to  the  condition  of  the  coasts  of  France,  the 
duties  collected,  armaments,  boats,  the  means  of  defense  in  the 
ports,  the  spirit  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  coast  towns,  the  number 

3*  Richelieu  reestablished  the  old  anchorage  charge  of  "3  sous  per  ton- 
neau,"  on  foreign  vessels  unloading  their  freight  in  France.  See  Sourdis, 
III,  173-175. 

35  Sourdis,  III,  173-225,  etc. 


102  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [644 

of  ships  engaged  in  navigation,  and  the  number  of  their  sailors, 
carpenters,  pilots  and,  captains.  Finally  they  gave  an  exact 
analysis  of  the  different  claims  of  the  dukedoms,  syndicates, 
and  corporations  in  France,  and  recommended  as  a  result,  that 
his  majesty  provide  war  vessels  to  protect  the  commercial  ships 
as  well  as  the  ports.36 

Thus  Eichelieu  became  aware  of  the  fact  that  trade  was  at  a 
low  ebb ;  that  other  nations  because  of  the  weak  marine  of  France 
could  do  what  they  wanted  so  far  as  concerned  their  relations 
with  France;  and  that  the  position  of  France  both  in  the  East 
and  the  West  was  becoming  worse.  He  came  to  the  conclusion 
that  something  must  be  done  to  build  up  her  weak  and  almost 
rotten  fortifications,  and  her  small  and  almost  useless  navy,  if 
France  was  to  command  the  respect  of  foreign  nations  and  even 
of  the  pirates. 

The  program  of  Kichelieu  in  regard  to  a  war  marine  might 
be  broadly  classified  in  the  following  manner:  (1)  laws  relating 
to  maritime  authority  and  accountability  (the  bureau  of  ac- 
counts) ;  (2)  the  formation  of  a  "personal  marine;"  (3)  the 
restoration  of  dilapidated  coast  fortifications  and  the  creation  of 
new  ones ;  (4)  the  creation  of  a  war  marine  and  of  naval  equip- 
ment.37 A  brief  consideration  of  the  above  seems  justifiable. 

The  Cardinal  in  taking  up  that  part  of  his  work  which  was 
concerned  with  the  passing  of  laws  governing  affairs  on  the 
sea,  displayed  not  only  his  fairness  to  all  other  sea  powers,  but 
his  knowledge  of  matters  pertaining  to  the  marine.  He  soon 
placed  the  control  and  conduct  of  all  acts  relating  to  it  in  the 
hands  of  definitely  assigned  officials.  The  latter  formed  what 
is  called  his  "personal  marine,"  and  they  conducted  and 
managed  affairs  relating  to  the  sea  according  to  fixed  rules  and 
regulations  imposed  by  him.  He  tried  to  put  an  end  to  the 
conflict  of  authority  existing  in  France,  in  respect  to  the  control 
of  military  affairs.  Seven  Bureaus  of  Admiralty  were  establish- 
ed, to  be  composed  of  officials  already  appointed  by  certain 
individuals,  and  in  the  future  to  be  nominated  by  the  Cardinal 
himself  and  his  successors,  who  were  "grand  masters  of  France." 
They  were  to  have  under  their  control  all  criminal  and  civil 

seSourdis,  I,  Introduction,  XXXI-XXXII. 

t,  301-302. 


645]         IDEAS  AND  ACCOMPLISHMENTS  AS  REGARDS  A  MARINE  103 

affairs,  and  all  acts  connected  with  the  state  government  and 
navigation  on  the  high  seas.  Also,  they  were  to  have  charge 
of  the  proper  disposal  of  wreckage.38 

In  carrying  out  his  scheme  relating  to  the  formation  of  a  mar- 
ine, Richelieu  even  went  so  far  into  details,  as  to  change  the 
method  of  getting  sailors,  which  had  hitherto  been  one  of  the  great 
causes  of  the  weakness  of  the  French  on  the  sea.  He  had  a 
census  taken  of  the  number  and  addresses  of  sailors  and  carpen- 
ters in  every  harbor  in  France.  He  ascertained  the  number  of 
vessels  and  their  equipment,  and  the  number  and  size  of  the 
harbors,  and  from  that  information  as  a  basis,  he  determined 
the  quota  of  sailors  to  be  furnished  by  each  province,  and 
the  amount  of  money  that  might  be  levied  for  ships  and  their 
equipment.39  In  addition  to  all  this,  he  established  schools  for 
pilots,  put  the  coast  in  a  state  of  defense,  created  new  ports, 
enlarged  others,  and  finally  established  three  arsenals.  He 
spent  over  359,000  livres  in  1635  for  the  fortifications  of  Brouage 
d 'Orleans  and  the  island  of  Re.  He  wanted  to  make  the  former 
the  center  of  maritime  power  upon  the  ocean.  He  strengthened 
the  ports  on  the  Mediterranean  in  a  similar  fashion,  especially 
Toulon,  which  he  desired  to  make  the  war  center  of  the  nation 
on  the  southern  coast.40  However,  the  crux  of  his  efforts  in 
building  up  the  power  of  France  lay  in  the  increase  of  the  num- 
ber of  war  vessels  and  the  enlarged  equipment. 

Henry  IV  had  realized  the  necessity  of  a  fleet,  but  it  was 
left  to  Richelieu  to  carry  this  idea  into  execution.  "He  resolv- 
ed," says  Caillet,  "to  endow  France  with  a  military  marine, 
that  is  to  say,  a  military  force  truly  belonging  to  the  state,  and 
not  furnished  by  cities,  as  had  previously  been  the  case. ' ' 41 
Up  to  this  time,  there  had  existed  the  custom  of  allowing  par- 
ticular individuals  and  certain  interests  to  build  vessels  and 
rent  them  to  merchants  for  their  protection.  But  Richelieu 
saw  that  this  was  not  a  good  thing,  and,  after  he  had  triumph- 
ed over  the  Huguenots,  he  was  very  careful  to  hold  all  ports 

ss  M ercwe  Francois,  XX,  924-925. 

39  Richelieu  also  issued  orders  in  1635,  that  all  vagabonds,  beggars,  etc., 
should  be  inducted  into  marine  service  to  fill  up  the  huge  gap  in  the  number 
of  men  available  for  service.     See  Meroure  Francois,  XX,  923. 

40  Sourdis,  III,  359,  et  seq. 
«  Caillet,  310. 


104  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OP  RICHELIEU  [646 

accountable  to  himself,  to  make  himself  master  of  all  the 
magazines,  all  the  cannons,  and  other  war  materials.  Lastly,  he 
forbade  all  vessels  to  bear  arms,  unless  they  had  royal  permis- 
sion. 

Under  the  orders  of  the  council  of  notables  in  1626,  which 
had  really  been  called  and  conducted  under  the  direction  of 
Richelieu,  the  fleets  of  war  vessels  were  greatly  increased.  But 
it  took  time  before  the  maritime  service  was  really  well  organ- 
ized.42 As  late  as  1626,  when  France  wished  to  put  an  end  to 
the  ravages  which  were  being  made  by  the  Barbary  pirates  on 
the  ocean,  they  could  not  find  enough  vessels  to  carry  out  the 
task  and  had  to  get  twenty  from  Holland.  It  was  particularly 
during  the  siege  of  La  Rochelle,  as  has  been  said  before,  that 
Eichelieu  felt  the  inferiority  of  the  French  war  marine.  After 
that  he  set  aside  a  certain  sum  each  year  for  the  creation  of  a 
navy. 

From  1630  to  1634,  the  naval  power  of  France  gradually 
increased,  and  finally  consisted  of  three  large  squadrons.  As 
a  result,  the  pirates  were  suppressed  for  the  time  being,  and 
Spain  was  thrust  aside,  so  far  as  her  claims  on  the  sea  were 
concerned.  ' '  It  was  to  be  for  France  and  for  the  great  minister, 
who  had  increased  his  country's  reputation  so  much,  a  just 
subject  of  pride  when  their  fleet  of  eighty-five  vessels  passed 
triumphantly  across  the  sea,  where  some  years  before  she  had 
possessed  a  fleet  less  powerful  than  that  of  the  smallest  city  of 
Italy."43  He  must  have  realized  that  he  had  now  in  his  pos- 
session the  implement  by  which  he  could  carry  out  many  of  his 
political  and  economic  plans  to  the  glorious  ends  which  his 
fertile  brain  had  assigned  to  them.  Up  to  the  very  last,  he 
was  occupied  with  this  problem,  although  hindered  by  financial 
difficulties.44 

Thus  the  Cardinal  saw  his  plans  reach  what  seemed  to  be  a 
successful  conclusion.  But  death  took  him  away  just  at  the 
time  when  he  was  most  needed.  The  splendid  fleet,  like  a 
flower  nipped  by  an  unexpected  frost,  dwindled  away  almost 
to  nothing  after  his  departure.  The  good  fruits  of  his  work 
along  this  line  were  mostly  temporary.  No  one  continued  this 

"Caillet,  314. 

« /bid.,  311. 

**  Richelieu,  Lettres,  VII,   292,   303. 


647]         IDEAS  AND  ACCOMPLISHMENTS  AS  REGARDS  A  MARINE  105 

task,  which  he  had  so  well  begun,  until  the  age  of  Colbert,  and 
then  it  was  too  late  to  prevent  irreparable  injury. 

But  before  reaching  a  conclusion,  it  seems  best  to  consider 
briefly  the  importance  of  his  work  so  far  as  it  concerns  the 
navy  of  France.  L.  P.  Fournier  in  the  preface  of  his  valuable 
work  entitled  Richelieu,  writes  with  much  enthusiam  con- 
cerning the  progress  of  sea  power  under  Louis  XIII.  "Fav- 
ored with  the  admiration  of  the  world,"  he  says  to  Louis 
XIII,  to  whom  he  dedicated  the  book,  "France  now  finds  her- 
self famous  through  your  victories.  She  now  sees  the  great 
navy  and  the  harbors  open  to  receive  and  fortified  to  protect 
them.  Well  supplied  magazines  are  established  on  both  coasts. 
All  of  which  is  equally  useful  in  the  promotion  of  commerce,  as 
well  as  warfare.  Your  majesty's  fleets  have  controlled  things  on 
the  Mediterranean.  Indeed,  Spain  has  been  forced  to  acknow- 
ledge the  power  of  the  French  fleet,  and  thus  future  glory  must 
be  approaching. ' ' 45 

M.  Masson  in  his  Histoire  du  Commerce  Franqais  dans  le 
Levant,  continually  emphasizes  the  point  that  it  was  the 
development  of  a  navy  under  the  Cardinal  that  prolonged  the 
Eastern  trade  of  France  with  the  Levant,  which  was  on  the 
decrease  at  that  time,  because  of  the  lack  of  protection.46  M. 
Sue  also  sums  up  the  work  of  Richelieu  very  appropriately 
when  he  points  out  the  fact,  that  when  the  Cardinal  built  up 
the  navy,  he  laid  the  foundations  of  a  great  and  splendid 
system  of  military  marine,  which  would  serve  as  an  offensive 
arm  to  combat  the  enemies  of  France,  and  as  a  shield  or  protect- 
ion to  aid  her  commerce,  and  thus  by  making  transportation 
of  goods  safer  he  made  them  cheaper,  which  in  turn  aided  in 
the  support  of  the  war  marine.*7  The  Cardinal's  econ- 
omic turn  of  mind  is  very  well  illustrated  by  the  above 
passage.  He  evidently  intended  to  pay  for  the  marine  by  an 
increase  of  taxes  on  the  subjects  whose  prices  were  lowered 
because  of  cheaper  transportation.  These  taxes  were,  as  a  rule, 
borne  by  the  merchants  themselves.  "His  system,"  says  Sue, 
"was  a  marvelous  exposition  of  thought,  force,  and  solidarity." 48 

«5CaiIlet,  314-315. 
46  Masson,   117. 

*7  Sourdis,  I,  Introduction,  VII-VIII.  M.  Sue  is  considered  an  authority 
upon  the  activities  of  Richelieu  with  regard  to  the  marine. 

43  Richelieu 's  ability  with  regard  to  the  marine  is  nowhere  better  illus- 


106  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [648 

It  was  carried  to  extremes  by  those  who  came  after  him,  so 
that,  not  being  sufficiently  supported  by  maritime  commerce, 
the  sea  power  of  France  died  from  lack  of  sailors,  finances, 
defenses,  and  good  harbors.  Indeed,  France  just  before  the 
world  war  adopted  an  active  policy  developing  her  war 
marine,  and  in  doing  so  was  influenced  by  the  same  motive 
which  compelled  Richelieu  centuries  ago  to  do  likewise.49 

After  all,  this  phase  of  his  administration  is  fundamentally 
economic.  "He,"  as  Sue  says,  "wished  to  give  also  a  large 
development  to  commerce,  merchant  navigation,  and  colonial 
enterprises,  interests  upon  which  he  intended  to  base  the  de- 
velopment of  a  military  marine,  preparing  himself  thus  for 
the  eventualities  of  a  war  during  the  intervals  of  peace.50  The 
Cardinal  knew  that  if  he  was  to  obtain  the  great  state  he 
desired,  France  must  be  strong  in  trade,  colonies,  and  in 
political  influence.  A  war  and  merchant  marine  was  the  means 
by  which  this  was  to  be  obtained.  It  is  certainly  a  pity  that 
Colbert  was  not  able  to  carry  to  a  successful  completion  the 
plans  for  the  marine  as  set  down  in  Richelieu's  marine 
code.51  If  the  Cardinal's  naval  ideas  had  been  carried  out,  the 
chances  are  that  the  subsequent  colonial  and  commercial  history 
of  France  would  have  been  entirly  different.  Richelieu  was 
constantly  favoring  those  engaged  in  commerce.52  He  realized 
that  trade  would  benefit  every  individual  in  France.  "France," 
he  says,  "will  add  in  a  short  time  to  her  natural  abundance  what 

trated  than  in  the  complete  statement  which  he  has  left  of  all  receipts  and 
expenses  connected  with  that  phase  of  his  administration,  during  the  years 
1631  to  1639.  It  is  a  striking  commentary  upon  the  efficient  financial  ad- 
ministrative abilities  of  the  man.  See  Sourdis,  III,  359,  etc. 

« See  Braeq,  C.,  France  under  the  Republic,  N.  Y.,  1910,  34.  M. 
Bracq  points  out  the  efforts  of  France  to  strengthen  her  fleet  before  the  war, 
so  as  to  be  able  to  meet  her  rivals  on  equal  terms,  and  also  be  strong 
economically,  and  thus  protect  her  commerce  and  colonies  from  the  possible 
insults  of  rival  powers. 

so  Sourdis,  I,  Introduction,  XXIX. 

si  Pigeonneau,  II,  411-412.  In  1642,  de  la  Porte,  Intendant  of  com- 
merce and  navigation,  was  ordered  to  write  a  general  statistical  account  of 
the  marine.  Richelieu  was  fond  of  statistics.  He  gave  therein  the  laws  and 
ordinances  concerning  the  marine.  It  was  really  the  sketch  of  a  maritime 
code  of  which  Eiehelieu 's  death  prevented  the  completion.  See  Sourdis, 
III,  321,  etc. 

52Gouraud,  II,  195. 


649]         IDEAS  AND  ACCOMPLISHMENTS  AS  REGARDS  A  MARINE  107 

commerce  brings  to  the  most  sterile  nation. ' ' 53  He  even  went 
so  far  as  to  point  out  the  fact  that  cheapness  of  food  for  work- 
men would  be  brought  about  through  increased  transportation 
facilities  on  rivers,  etc.5*  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  he  was 
preparing  the  marine,  not  only  to  oppose  his  great  political 
rivals  on  the  sea  and  protect  for  the  time  being  French  traffic 
on  the  water,  but  also  that  he  was  looking  forward  to  the  time 
of  peace,  when  he  would  be  able  to  found  the  great  mercantile 
nation  of  which  the  marine  would  be  the  strong  arm  for  defense, 
and  possibly,  for  economic  if  not  political  aggression. 


•"Eichelieu,  Testament  Politique,  II,  78-79. 
s*  Ibid.,  II,  78. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE  IDEAS  AND  ACCOMPLISHMENTS  OF  RICHELIEU 
AS  REGARDS  COLONIZATION 

Before  the  age  of  Richelieu,  France  had  accomplished  very 
little  along  the  lines  of  colonial  development.  Indeed  the 
period  in  which  he  came  into  power  was  really  the  time  when 
the  settlement  of  North  America,  for  example,  was  in  its  in- 
fancy, so  that  France  had  really  not  considered  very  seriously, 
up  to  that  time,  the  opportunity  of  carrying  on  colonial  projects 
in  the  new  continents,  although  a  beginning  had  been  made  by 
Champlain  in  1608.  Furthermore,  internal  troubles,  religious 
wars,  and  unfriendly  foreign  relations  all  tended  to  prevent 
the  predecessors  of  Henry  IV  from  sending  any  expeditions 
of  importance  outside  of  the  vicinity  of  France  and  Italy.  On 
the  other  hand,  other  nations  grew  stronger  on  the  seas  and 
in  colonial  enterprises.  Spain  and  Portugal  rose  for  nearly  a 
century,  but  declined  about  the  time  of  the  Armada  in  1588. 
And  then  came  the  age  when  England  and  Holland  gained  rap- 
idly on  the  sea.1  England  took  from  France  the  cloth  industry  in 
the  Hundred  Years'  War,  and  built  up  her  state  on  a  strong 
protective  basis.  The  Hanseatic  league  decayed  and  in  its 
place  rose  Holland.  Colonies  in  America,  Africa,  and  Asia 
resulted  from  the  growth  in  sea  power  of  these  nations,  and 
the  latter  acquired  wealth  in  consequence. 

In  the  seventeenth  century  came  for  France  the  age  of 
Henry  IV,  Richelieu,  and  Colbert,  and  as  a  result  colonial 
commerce  underwent  unprecedented  growth.  What  little  col- 
onial activity  had  occurred  before  the  age  of  Henry  IV  was 
based  on  the  motive  of  discovery  and  exploration,  rather  than 
of  industry  and  settlement.  But  when  Henry  IV  came  to 
power,  mercantilistic  ideas  were  just  beginning  to  take  a  definite 
form,  and  the  value  of  colonies  as  a  means  of  monetary  gain 

i  Levasseur,  E.,  Histoire  du  Commerce  de  la  France,  2  vols.,  Paris,  1911,  I, 
275-277. 

108 


651]          COLONIZATION:  IDEAS  AND  ACCOMPLISHMENTS  109 

began  to  be  recognized  by  French  statesmen.  In  other  words, 
Henry  IV  and  Richelieu  simply  applied  in  France  the  system 
inaugurated  by  England  and  Holland,  namely,  a  plan  of  col- 
onization founded  upon  the  general  interests  and  permanent 
needs  of  the  country,  and  not  upon  such  dreams  as  a  search 
for  the  northwest  passage,  or  some  other  particular  interest, 
such  as  the  religious  basis  of  the  colonization  of  Coligny.2 

Inspired  by  the  colonial  activities  of  England  and  Holland, 
both  Henry  IV  and  Richelieu  tried  to  foster  ideas  in  regard  to 
the  foundation  of  great  colonization  companies,  which  were 
more  or  less  new  to  the  French  people.  This  was  done  "in 
order  to  make  ourselves  masters  of  the  sea,  and  to  form  great 
companies,  to  encourage  merchants  to  enter,  and  give  great 
privileges  to  these  companies  as  they  came  into  existence,  just 
or  foreigners  have  done. ' ' 3  However,  lacking  money,  as  was  the 
case  with  the  governments  of  England  and  Holland,  the  French 
government  could  not  back  the  companies,  but  simply  encourag- 
ed, guided  and  protected  them,  leaving  in  the  hands  of  individ- 
uals the  financial  risks  and  the  details  of  administration. 

Not  much  in  a  colonial  way  was  accomplished  by  Henry  IV. 
' '  Colonial  enterprises  lacked  experience  and  national  character, ' ' 
says  one  writer;"  "they  were  too  local,  weak  in  capital,  and 
narrow  in  viewpoint  to  use  their  privileges  to  the  utmost.4  In 
fact  Henry  IV  did  not  live  long  enough  to  form  any  definite 
colonial  policy,  so  that  it  fell  to  Richelieu  to  initiate  the  colonial 
expeditions  of  France. 

When  the  Cardinal  came  into  power,  he  began  immediately 
to  build  up  the  strength  of  the  French  nation  as  a  colonizing 
state.  Aided  by  the  accomplishments  of  Henry  IV,  and  such 
ideas  as  are  found  in  the  work  of  Montchretien,6  he  made 
colonization  a  political  and  economic  question,  involving  the 
growth  of  France.6  This  problem  was  treated  with  diplomatic 
reserve,  and  as  a  consequence  little  was  written  concerning  it 
by  contemporary  writers.  However,  it  is  known  that  Champlain 
and  other  well  known  advocates  of  colonization  projects  recog- 
nized in  the  Cardinal  the  true  leader  of  this  movement. 

2  Pigeonneau,  II,  329. 

aD'Avenel,  Monarchic  Absolve,   III,  209-210. 

*  Pigeonneau,  II,  346. 

sibid.,    II,    360-363. 

oDeschamps,  82-83. 


110  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [652 

Richelieu  saw  the  advantages  and  difficulties  in  the  way  of 
colonial  expansion  on  the  part  of  France.  He  knew  that  he 
would  have  to  face  the  opposition  of  England,  Spain,  and 
Holland  on  the  sea.  But  that  did  not  stop  him,  for  as  soon  as  he 
assumed  the  office  of  the  head  of  navigation  and  commerce,  he 
began  to  plan  a  war  and  merchant  marine  and  commercial 
companies,  which  were  to  settle  and  build  up  economically  and 
politically  new  territorial  possessions  for  France  in  America, 
Africa,  and  Asia. 

His  principal  aims  in  forming  colonies  were:  (1)  to  establish 
and  multiply  colonies,  to  people  them  with  French  colonists, 
and  maintain  there  the  Catholic  religion  to  the  exclusion  of 
all  others;  (2)  to  enliven  commerce  and  promote  a  war  marine 
for  protection.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  Colbert  borrowed 
this  policy  from  him  and  completed  it.  " Indeed,"  says  one 
writer,  "  people  have  not  realized  the  important  part  played 
by  Eichelieu  in  colonial  development,  or  have  mixed  his  achieve- 
ments and  initiative  with,  those  of  Colbert.  In  the  thoughts  of 
Eichelieu,  the  maritime  and  colonial  supremacy  of  France  holds 
a  place  equal  to  the  idea  that  the  Hapsburgs  must  be  ruined. ' ' T 
These  were  the  two  threads,  which  were  really  connected  and 
were  to  unite  to  form  the  grandeur  of  France.  In  1625  the 
Cardinal  addressed  to  Louis  XIII  a  proposed  law  for  the  sea, 
and  a  memoir  which  contained  his  new  ideas,  namely,  to  build  up 
the  marine  as  a  preparatory  measure  of  which  colonization  was 
to  be  the  end.8  "In  1626,"  says  one  writer,  "Richelieu  re- 
ceived five  memoirs  or  letters  on  the  state  of  commerce  and 
the  marine.  He  was  himself  the  author  or  the  source  of  inspir- 
ation of  a  great  number  of  contracts,  letters,  reports,  and 
statistics  having  the  same  object. ' ' 9  Among  the  memoirs,  two 
are  of  special  interest,  one  by  the  Chevalier  Isaac  de  Razilly, 
and  an  anonymous  memoir  of  November  26,  1626.  De  Razilly 
pointed  out  the  need  of  navigation  in  spite  of  opinions  to  the 
contrary.  He  advocated  clearly  the  advantages  of  the  exchange 

7  Deschamps,  74-76 ;  Bonassieux,  L.  E.,  Les  Grandes  Compagnies  de 
Commerce,  Paris,  1892,  5. 

s  Richelieu,  Lettres,  II,  163-167. 

»  Deschamps,  87-88.  The  many  memoirs,  projects  and  plans  addressed  to 
Eichelieu  concerning  the  marine,  indicate  the  interest  shown  by  the  people 
in  this  phase  of  his  administration,  and  the  recognition  of  his  leadership  in 
the  undertakings  to  be  carried  out. 


653]  COLONIZATION:    IDEAS    AND    ACCOMPLISHMENTS  111 

of  goods,  and  the  adaptability  of  the  French  for  carrying  on 
long  voyages.  (Evidently  there  was  opposition  to  any  commer- 
cial policy  France  might  engage  in  at  this  time.)  Then  he 
outlined  a  plan  of  reform  concerning  navigation  and  colonies, 
exactly  similar  to  that  which  Richelieu  and  Colbert  followed. 

In  the  first  place,  France  was  to  regain  her  sea  power  and 
make  conquests  and  establish  trade  all  over  the  world.  Also, 
men  were '  to  be  encouraged  to  undertake  navigation,  nobles 
who  participated  were  to  retain  their  rank,  and  merchants 
were  to  be  ennobled  because  of  their  accomplishments  in  this 
particular  field.  Companies  were  to  be  founded  in  which  the 
King,  the  ministers,  the  princes  of  the  blood,  and  great  seign- 
eurs should  be  interested,  as  well  as  individual  cities  and  the 
clergy  as  a  class.  Colonies  were  to  be  established  in  the  Amer- 
icas, and  according  to  the  anonymous  memoir,  in  the  East  Indies 
as  well.10  These  two  memoirs,  which  were  in  harmony  with  the 
policy  of  Richelieu  and  Colbert,  looked  forward  to  the  fall 
of  Spain  and  Portugal,  and  the  rise  of  France  in  commerce 
and  navigation  in  the  Orient,  the  Mediterranean,  and  Asia. 
The  downfall  of  the  Hapsburgs  was  to  be  a  necessary  prelude 
to  the  rise  of  France  as  a  commercial  and  colonial  power.  This 
likely  was  one  of  the  guiding  forces  behind  the  rivalry  of  the 
Bourbon  and  Hapsburg  houses  at  this  time.  Colonization  was 
an  important  part  of  governmental  administration,  and  the 
fact  that  the  King  in  1626  gave  a  great  masquerade  ball  to 
which  the  fur-trading  companies  sent  representatives  dressed 
in  the  native  costumes  of  the  people  of  the  various  colonies  and 
and  trading  stations  of  France,  indicates  the  interest  displayed  by 
French  society  in  the  economic  affairs  of  their  country.11  There 
was  a  little  opposition  to  Richelieu's  commercial  policy,  but  it 
was  spoken,  not  written.12 

The  Cardinal  outlined  his  program  from  the  very  start. 
"Indeed,"  says  Mathieu  Mole,  a  contemporary,  in  one  of  his 
memoirs,  "the  Cardinal  wished  to  present  to  the  assembly  of 
notables  in  1627  some  new  edicts  concerning  the  state  of  the 
marine,  trade,  and  navigation,  in  order  to  justify  his  position 
as  head  of  the  kingdom.  He  established  by  means  of  an  edict, 

lODeschamps,  90-03. 

11  Mercure  Francois,  XII,  187-190. 

isDeschamps,  131. 


112  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [654 

a  perpetual  navy  of  forty-five  vessels,  which  he  said  would  re- 
turn the  French  war  marine  to  its  former  state  of  splendor. 
He  also  wished  to  create  some  important  companies  to  which  he 
would  grant  privileges.  He  then  appointed  me  to  examine  the 
first  proposition  which  was  made  by  Nicholas  Witte,  Jean  du 
Meurier,  esquire,  and  other  French  and  Flemish  merchants,  who 
have  formed  a  company  called,  'La  Nacelle  de  Saint  Pierre 
Fleurdelisee,'  with  the  purpose  of  establishing  in  France  an 
immense  trade  in  all  merchandise  which  enters  into  commerce, 
of  introducing  fisheries,  of  building  vessels,  and  other  uncommon 
duties,  and  finally  of  increasing  in  value  lands  and  colonies 
which  have  not  returned  much  profit  hitherto. "  13  This  company 
was  to  build  up  not  only  French  colonies,  but  France  itself. 

The  text  of  the  agreement  adopted  by  the  Cardinal  with  re- 
spect to  this  company  is  to  be  found  in  the  notes  or  memoirs  of 
Mathieu  Mole.  Since  it  gives  a  correct  idea  of  all  that  relates 
to  external  commerce  and  to  the  great  industries,  it  seems 
best  to  give  the  principal  articles  of  the  contract,  especially 
in  as  much  as  all  the  companies  formed  by  Richelieu  conformed 
more  or  less  rigidly  to  this  type.41 

I.  The  heads  of  the  company  were  to  take  over  400  families 
within  a  month  of  the  day  of  negotiating  the  agreement.    These 
families  were  to  be  composed  of  persons  suitable  for  commerce, 
fishing,  manufacturing,   and  agriculture.     Besides  these,  there 
were  to  be  sent  no  less  than  twelve  vessels  completely  equipped 
for  the  expedition.    By  so  doing,  the  aforesaid  company  would 
be  allowed  to  trade  both  by  seas,  rivers,  and  land,  to  establish 
fisheries  upon  the  sea,  and  manufacturing  concerns  of  all  sorts, 
to  plant  sugar  cane  and  refine  sugar,  to  work  mines,  to  make 
porcelain  vessels  and  crockery  by  the  methods  of  the  Indies 
and  of  Italy,  and  finally,  to  use  all  other  resources  and  manu- 
factures which  they  recognize. 

II.  All  Flemings,  Hollanders,  and  others  who  should  go  over 
to  the  colonies  were  to  be  regarded  as  Frenchmen  and  enjoy 
all  their  rights. 

III.  Rewards  were  offered  to  those  who  invested  money  in 
the  company  or  worked  on  behalf  of  it.     The  crown  intended 

is  Mol6,  Mathieu,  MSmoires,  4  vols.,  Paris,  1855,  I,  422-448. 
.,  I,  422-448. 


655]  COLONIZATION:    IDEAS    AND    ACCOMPLISHMENTS  113 

to  honor  those  who  took  up  the  work  more  than  ever  before, 
in  order  to  attract  persons  who  were  capable  of  aiding  the 
proposition  in  any  way.  People  of  every  condition,  clergy, 
nobles,  and  officials  could  enter  and  put  their  money  into  the 
company  without  injuring  their  position  or  endangering  their 
privileges.  Indeed,  in  order  to  aid  industry  and  colonization, 
His  Majesty  was  to  ennoble  thirty-two  persons,  whether  they 
were  Frenchmen  or  foreigners,  who  would  enter  the  company 
during  the  first  year  of  its  establishment,  and  put  at  least  5000 
pounds  into  its  funds  without  having  the  power  to  withdraw 
the  money  for  six  years,  and  also  some  who  did  not  invest  any 
capital  in  the  enterprise,  but  who  devoted  all  their  ability  and 
energy  to  the  advancement  of  the  aforesaid  company. 

IV.  His  Majesty  was  to  give  the  company  two  sites  not 
occupied  as  yet,  one  on  the  ocean,  the  other  on  the  Mediterranean. 
They  were  to  have  the  power  to  build  houses  of  business  in  those 
places.  In  each  of  these  a  market  place  was  to  be  established 
with  fairs  (two  yearly  fairs  of  eight  days  each),  etc.  All  inhabi- 
tants should  be  exempt  from  the  payment  of  the  aides,  tailles, 
etc.,  which  fell  upon  other  ports. 

Articles  V  and  VI  provided  for  the  government  and  the 
working  of  the  mines  in  those  territories,  in  which  the  colonies 
were  to  have  supreme  rights,  subject  only  to  the  final  decision 
of  the  "grand  master  of  commerce,"  who  was  Richelieu. 

VII.  All  vagabonds,  beggars,  petty  criminals,  etc.,  were  to 
be   taken   by   His   Majesty's   orders   into  the    employ   of   the 
company. 

VIII.  His  Majesty  was  to  allow  the  company  to  undertake 
voyages  abroad,  to  establish  colonies  at  advisable  places,  even 
in   Canada  and  New  France,  to  conquer  lands  beyond  those 
which  were  under  the  control  of  His  Majesty,  to  use  them  for 
profits   of   the   aforesaid   company,    to  which   full   and   entire 
possession  was  given,  on  condition  that  they  should  be  faithful 
and  swear  homage  to  His  Majesty.     The  latter  permitted  them 
to  trade  with  all  companies  which  were  not  declared  enemies 
of  the    Kingdom,    and    even    countries    like    Russia,    Norway, 
Sweden,  and  Hamburg. . .    The  articles  of  agreement  which  were 
made   with   the   latter  nations,   were  to  be   communicated   to 
Richelieu  as  superintendent  of  commerce  and  navigation.    Fin- 


114  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [656 

ally,  "if  the  directors  of  the  company  should  discover  new 
lands,  they  could  enjoy  the  fruits  of  them,  separate  from  the 
other  colonies." 

The  principal  articles  of  this  agreement  have  been  given, 
because  they  indicate  the  main  ideas  of  the  Cardinal's  policy 
toward  colonization.  It  shows  first  that  he  desired  to  develop  the 
colonies.  It  illustrates  the  fact  that  he  wanted  to  found  posses- 
sions, which  were  to  be  almost  self-governing,  with  this  one 
exception,  —  they  were  to  be  responsible  to  the  chief  of  commerce 
and  navigation  in  France.  In  fact,  Richelieu  put  himself  at 
the  head  of  almost  all  commercial  companies  founded  at  that 
time.  Masson  criticizes  Richelieu  because  he  made  the  colonial 
companies  too  centralized,  and  forced  them  all  to  depend  on 
the  government  of  France  as  a  final  authority.  Yet  the  agree- 
ment cited  above  seems  to  give  the  colonies  plenty  of  leeway 
in  which  to  develop  without  interference  of  the  home  power.15 

But,  before  generalizing  concerning  Richelieu's  colonial  pol- 
icies, it  is  well  to  look  further  into  the  actual  accomplishments 
of  the  Cardinal  in  that  particular  field. 

The  company  whose  charter  has  just  been  quoted  failed 
because  of  the  lack  of  credit  and  funds  to  maintain  it.  Further- 
more, the  directors  did  not  carry  out  their  promises  and  sought 
only  to  profit  by  the  monopoly  which  they  possessed  and  from 
which  they  derived  temporary  gains.  They  kept  up  the  project 
with  one  purpose  in  view,  namely,  to  sell  to  the  colonists  who 
had  been  sent  over,  goods  at  a  high  price,  and  to  buy  furs  from 
them  as  cheaply  as  possible.  Champlain  never  ceased  to  protest 
against  the  attitude  of  the  directors  toward  the  colonists.16  He 
himself  desired  to  found  a  colony  which  would  take  up  the 
threefold  purpose  of  colonization,  namely,  agriculture,  conver- 
sion of  the  natives,  and  commerce.  The  only  result  of  his  plan 
was  the  establishment  of  new  fur-trading  stations  in  North 
America.  But  there  is  another  explanation  for  the  failure  of 
the  company.  It  was  too  far-reaching  in  its  scope  and  plans  in 
that  it  proposed  a  thousand  things  to  do  and  a  thousand  ends  to 
achieve.  It  wished  to  establish  fisheries,  exploit  mines,  drain 
marshes,  develop  both  foreign  and  domestic  commerce,  colonize 
the  "West  Indies,  etc.  It  was  a  universal  company,  but  fell 
before  it  got  really  started.  It  was  a  society  which  wished  to 

15  Masson,  Histoire  du  Commerce  Franc.ais  dans  le  Levant,  174. 
leCaillet,  337;  Zeller,  B.,  Eiclielieu,  London,  1884,  184. 


657]  COLONIZATION:    IDEAS    AND    ACCOMPLISHMENTS  115 

embrace  all,  but  it  could  not  organize  itself.17    In  the  last  place 
it  was,  perhaps,  too  modern  in  its  purpose. 

The  company  of  Morbihan.  was  the  next  to  be  formed,  in 
1626.  It  obtained  its  name  from  a  port  in  Brittany,  where 
its  counting  offices  were  established.  A  group  of  men  called 
"the  Hundred  Associates"  signed  the  agreement,  so  that  it  was 
often  called  "The  Hundred  Associates"  company.  Its  articles 
provided  for  a  fort  at  Morbihan,  100  vessels,  a  capital  of 
1,600,000  livres  and  the  monopoly  of  the  commerce  of  the 
East  and  the  Levant  by  land  and  by  sea.18  Indeed,  such  was 
the  magnitude  of  its  designs  that  Richelieu  says  the  English 
and  Dutch  were  alarmed,  fearing  that  the  King  by  that  means 
would  soon  make  himself  master  of  the  sea.19  Spain  had  no 
less  fear  for  her  Indies  and  well  might  have,  when  one  reads 
in  Richelieu's  Testament  Politique  the  statement,  that  the  only 
way  to  obtain  footing  in  the  West  Indies,  is  by  driving  the 
Spanish  out  by  means  of  a  war.20  However,  this  company 
came  to  naught,  because  of  the  failure  of  the  local  Parlement 
to  register  the  edict  creating  it,  arising  from  a  conflict  between 
it  and  the  local  estates  general  of  the  province  in  which  Morbihan 
was  located.21  Yet  the  formation  of  this  company  had  impor- 
tant results  in  that  herein  one  finds  de  Razilly's  idea  realized; 
namely,  that  colonial  enterprises  should  be  participated  in  by 
all.22  In  it  is  apparent  the  disinterested  stand  taken  by  the 
Cardinal  with  respect  to  colonization.  In  return  for  all  the 
advantages  given  the  company,  Richelieu  demanded  only  one 
thing,  namely,  that  it  would  make  the  greatest  and  most  rapid 
fortune  that  was  possible,  and  in  whatever  manner  it  wished, 
either  by  fisheries,  by  boat  building,  or  by  cultivating  the  soil 
of  the  colonies  or  by  establishing  some  manufactures,  etc.  "It 
was  an  admirable  example  of  broad  and  decisive  views  which 
indicate  the  correct  judgment  of  the  great  man  in  all  affairs 
of  state,"  says  one  writer.23  This  company  likewise  did  not 

IT  Bonassieux,  363. 
isLevasseur,  281-282. 
is  Eichelieu,  Memoires,  XXIII,  127. 
2oEichelieu,  Testament  Politique,  II,  71. 
21  Eichelieu,  Memoires,  XXIII,  128. 
22Desehamps,  88-91. 

23  Gouraud,  I,  197.  Concerning  this  Company  see  Eiehelieu,  Lettres,  II, 
346-349;  Mercure  Francois,  XII,  44,  etc.;  Eichelieu,  Memoires,  XXIII,  127. 


116  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [658 

succeed  apparently  because  of  the  fact  that  the  people  of  France 
were  not  capable  of  so  great  commercial  enterprises  at  that  time. 
However,  Eichelieu  went  on  and  formed  other  colonies,  not  at 
all  discouraged  by  past  failures.  In  this  connection  it  is 
important  to  remember  that  his  company  was  the  prototype  of 
the  East  India  company  of  a  later  date. 

Richelieu  now  turned  his  attention  to  America.  Various  at- 
tempts had  been  made  to  settle  that  country  before  his  time, 
and  there  was  no  little  interest  to  be  found  in  France  concerning 
this  far-away  land  of  promise.  The  first  voyage  by  Frenchmen 
were  those  of  Jacques  Cartier,  Robeval,  and  others  from  1524 
to  1599.  In  1541  the  first  attempt  at  a  permanent  establishment 
was  made  by  Robeval.  It  was  abandoned  the  next  year.  Various 
companies  began  to  be  formed  to  settle  in  Canada.  Finally 
one  was  established  in  1602  by  the  leading  traders  of  Dieppe, 
Rouen,  and  La  Rochelle,  with  fur  trade  privileges,  etc.  Explor- 
ations were  made  under  the  leadership  of  one  especially  notable 
man,  Champlain.  In  1603  Sieur  De  Monts  became  chief  of 
the  colony  of  Canada,  undertaking  to  give  the  King  one 
sixteenth  of  the  product  of  the  mines.  In  1606,  in  addition  to 
the  fur  trade,  the  farming  and  exploration  of  the  new  territory 
began  to  be  considered  seriously.  Some  new  explorations  had 
made  known  the  fertility  of  the  soil.  In  1608,  Champlain 
was  again  sent  out  by  a  company  with  three  vessels,  which 
repeopled  Port  Royal  and  founded  Quebec.  But  failure  to  take 
up  agriculture  in  the  colonies  and  constant  opposition  on  the 
part  of  Holland  prevented  any  of  the  French  colonial  plans 
from  achieving  a  substantial  measure  of  success  before  1627. 

At  this  time  a  new  company  was  formed  called  the  company 
of  the  "Hundred  Associates"  of  New  France  or  Canada.  This 
organization,  which  lasted  longer  than  any  other  of  Richelieu's 
creation,  was  granted  its  charter  in  an  edict  issued  by  him 
when  before  La  Rochelle.24  Many  merchant  traders  and  other 
rich  persons  had  proposed  to  form  companies  to  support  the 
colonies  already  there,  and  to  establish  new  ones  in  the  vast 
and  little  known  country.  It  was  to  these  first  associates  that 
the  King  by  his  edict  conceded  the  following  privileges  and  con- 
ditions :  the  company  must  send  two  or  three  hundred  men  of  all 

24  Bonassieux,  350-351. 


659]  COLONIZATION:    IDEAS    AND    ACCOMPLISHMENTS  117 

trades,  and  during  the  following  fifteen  years  four  thousand  per- 
sons of  both  sexes.  The  company  should  support  the  inhabitants 
for  three  years.  No  foreigners  or  Protestants  should  be  among 
them.  Furthermore,  three  churchmen  should  be  in  each  habi- 
tation, etc.  Homage  was  to  be  paid  to  the  King,  and  a  crown 
of  gold  to  the  weight  of  eight  marks,  should  be  given  him 
on  his  accession  to  the  throne. 

In  return  for  these  requirements,  the  company  was  to  have 
the  following  privileges:  full  proprietorship  of  Quebec  with 
all  the  land  reaching  from  Florida  to  the  Arctic  region,  including 
the  land  of  the  Saint  Lawrence  river;  the  cession  of  all  mines 
and  minerals  discovered;  the  right  to  build  fortresses;  mon- 
opoly of  the  fur  trade  and  other  commerce,  etc.  Fishing  rights 
were  to  be  open  to  all  the  King's  subjects.  The  King  was  to 
give  two  war  vessels,  and  grant  exemption  from  customs. 
Finally,  the  principal  personages  were  to  receive  letters  of 
nobility.25 

However,  in  spite  of  the  encouragement  given  the  colonists 
by  the  government,  they  failed  in  the  end  because  of  the  fact 
that  they  tried  to  buy  from  their  colonists  goods  at  a  low  price, 
and  sell  to  them  at  a  high  price.  This  was  also  the  case  with 
the  natives,  who  preferred  to  trade  with  the  English  and  Dutch 
who  gave  them  better  prices.  Then  there  was  a  lack  of  support 
in  the  mother  country  easily  to  be  explained  by  the  difficulties 
confronting  France  during  this  period.  As  a  result,  the  Dutch 
soon  obtained  most  of  the  commerce  with  the  natives,  and  in 
1629  the  English  captured  Quebec  and  the  surrounding  terri- 
tory.26 

In  1632,  Champlain  pointed  out  to  Richelieu  the  necessity 
for  the  restitution  of  New  France  to  the  mother  country.27  As 
a  result  the  Cardinal  sent  six  armed  vessels  across  the  Atlantic 
and  compelled  the  English  to  cede  it  back.  Thus  in  1633,  the 
company  of  New  France  reentered  upon  all  its  former  rights. 
Champlain  as  head  of  the  French  colony  built  up  the  settle- 

25  Isambert,  XVI,  221-222. 

26  Mercure  Francois,  XIV,  61,  232-240.     Gives  a  complete  account  of  the 
colony  including  a  discussion  of  its  control  by  means  of  a  board  of  directors, 
etc. 

27  Caillet,  342-345,  Dumont  J.     Corps  Universel  Diplomatique  <?ui  Droit 
des  Gens,  8  vols.,  Supplement,  5  vols.    Amst.,  et  La  Haye,  (1726-1739),  VI, 
pt.  I,  31-32 


118  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [660 

ment  and  companies  to  a  degree  never  before  attained.  In 
1640,  Montreal  was  founded  and  a  fort  called  Fort  Richelieu 
was  established  just  above  where  Quebec  is  at  present,  so  that, 
by  the  time  of  Richelieu's  death,  the  French  possessions  hi 
North  America  had  a  good  start,  and  it  was  not  due  to  any 
direct  fault  of  his  that  they  failed  in  the  end. 

One  writer,  in  accounting  for  the  decline  of  the  colonies, 
places  the  blame  on  the  cupidity  of  the  merchants,  who  neglected 
agriculture  for  a  selfishly  conducted  fur  trade.  Furthermore, 
religious  influences  had  a  tendency  to  injure  the  economic  de- 
velopment of  the  colonies.  Too  much  emphasis  was  placed  on 
religion  to  the  neglect  of  agriculture.28  The  competition  of 
the  English  and  Dutch  for  the  Indian  trade,  and  of  the  govern- 
ors and  the  colonists,  coupled  with  increasing  neglect  of  the 
colonies  by  the  home  government,  after  Richelieu's  time,  all 
tended  to  ruin  the  bright  future  of  the  French  possessions  in 
America.  Indeed,  one  cannot  explain  the  failure  of  French 
colonial  policy  at  this  time  as  being  due  to  Richelieu's  central- 
ized system  of  settlements.  There  are  too  many  other  incidents 
which  go  to  make  up  a  logical  account  of  its  non-success. 

No  better  example  of  the  difficulties  confronting  the  Cardinal 
with  relation  to  foreign  opposition  is  to  be  found  than  in  his 
efforts  to  secure  a  foothold  in  the  West  Indies  and  South 
America.  A  company  of  the  Antilles  was  formed  in  spite  of 
the  opposition  of  Spain  and  Portugal,  who  claimed  sole  command 
of  the  seas  surrounding  that  particular  part  of  the  world. 
The  question  of  the  freedom  of  the  sea  then  came  up  for  the  first 
time  in  French  history  when  France  in  company  with  Holland 
(the  famous  work  of  Grotius,  Mare  Liberum,  appeared  in  1608) 
affirmed  with  energy  that  doctrine.  Thus  began  the  conflict 
between  interests  and  doctrines  which  continues  up  to  the 
present  time.  In  this  particular  case,  the  conflict  prevented 
France  from  doing  anything  in  a  colonial  way,  either  in  South 
America  or  the  West  Indies.  In  1625,  the  French  and  English 
established  a  colony  on  the  island  of  "  Saint-Kitts "  which  was 
destroyed  by  the  Spanish,  and  revived  by  the  French  later  on.29 

28  Pigeonneau,  II,  430-431     He  defends  Kichelieu's  policy  in  excluding 
the  Protestants  from  colonies  because   of  their  constant   efforts   to  form 
alliances  with  the  enemies  of  France. 

29  Pigeonneau,  II,  434-435;  Isambert,  XVI,  421,  540-551. 


661]  COLONIZATION:    IDEAS    AND    ACCOMPLISHMENTS  119 

Other  islands  as  Guadeloupe,  Martinique,  Dominique,  etc.,  were 
occupied  by  the  French.  A  settlement  was  made  even  in  Guiana. 
"Indeed,"  says  one  writer,  "the  French  in  their  settlements 
in  the  West  Indies,  gave  proof  of  brilliant  qualities,  persever- 
ance, and  initiative  never  exhibited  before. ' ' 30  But  the  im- 
portant thing  to  notice  is  the  fact  that  French  and  Spanish 
colonial  interests  were  conflicting  very  sharply  during  the 
Thirty  Years'  War,  and  this  economic  rivalry  must  certainly 
have  had  more  or  less  influence  on  the  diplomatic  relations  be- 
tween the  two  countries.  France  was  striving  for  a  world 
colonial  empire  during  Richelieu's  administration. 

About  the  time  the  French  were  colonizing  America,  they 
were  also  undertaking  the  task  of  assuming  close  relations  with 
the  Orient.  Missionaries  were  the  means  by  which  their  efforts 
were  to  be  made  successful.  The  famous  Father  Joseph  was 
named  by  the  Pope  in  1625,  director  of  missions  in  the  Levant ; 
and  that  nomination,  together  with  the  office  of  "grand  master 
of  navigation,  etc.,"  acquired  by  Richelieu  about  the  same  time, 
is  direct  evidence  as  to  their  aims  in  regard  to  colonial  and 
commercial  expansion.  Of  course  religion  was  the  prime  motive 
of  this  movement  in  Asia,  but  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  the 
French  Jesuits  sent  into  China,  Japan,  Persia,  etc.,  were  also 
diplomatic  agents  of  the  government.31 

The  first  society  to  trade  in  the  East  Indies  was  formed  by 
Henry  IV  in  1604,  with  exclusive  rights  for  fifteen  years.  It 
had  the  port  of  Brest  and  was  otherwise  favored  by  the  govern- 
ment. The  jealousy  of  other  nations  prevented  this  company 
from  buying  the  necessary  equipment  from  them.  Thus  it  did 
not  really  start  at  all.  Letters  patent,  however,  in  1615,  gave 
the  company  a  new  lease  of  life,  and  brave  adventurers  from 
Dieppe  visited  the  East  Indies  and  Madagascar.32  Finally  in 
1642,  Richelieu  granted  several  individuals  exclusive  privileges 
in  the  East  Indies  for  ten  years.  So  it  is  quite  evident  that 
France  definitely  began  her  East  India  policy  at  this  time. 

Settlements  were  established  even  in  Africa.  Senegal  espe- 
cially attracted  the  attention  of  the  French.  In  1621-1626  a  col- 
ony was  formed,  which  was  under  the  protection  of  the  Cardinal 

so  Pigeonneau,  II,  439-440. 
siDeschamps,  102-105. 
32  Isambert,  XVI,  78-82. 


120  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [662 

and  which  had  as  its  purpose  the  colonization  of  the  land  in 
that  territory.33  To  carry  this  out,  Richelieu  even  sent  Admiral 
de  Razilly  with  a  squadron  to  aid  in  the  work,  but  it  was  of 
no  avail,  for  the  company  had  to  be  replaced  in  1633  by  a  new 
one  composed  of  the  merchants  of  Rouen  and  Dieppe,  who 
obtained  permission  to  trade  for  ten  years  at  Cape  Verde  and 
upon  the  rivers  in  Senegal.  Various  other  similar  organiza- 
tions were  formed,  but  nothing  of  especial  importance  can  be 
obtained  from  a  study  of  French  colonization  in  Africa  at 
this  time,  except  that  a  foundation  for  French  influence  in 
that  continent  was  laid,  which  might  have  amounted  to  more 
than  it  did,  and  only  recently  has  been  utilized. 

One  colony,  established  on  the  island  of  Madagascar,  seems  to 
have  been  more  or  less  permanent.  Many  attempts  had  been 
made  during  the  reign  of  Henry  IV  and  during  the  first  year 
of  the  rule  of  Louis  XIII,  to  found  settlements  on  this  and  neigh- 
boring islands.  There  was  another  purpose  in  the  establishment 
of  a  colony  here  besides  mere  colonization,  namely,  that  the 
French  intended  to  use  this  possession  as  a  base  or  half- 
way house,  for  their  trade  with  the  East  Indies.  On  March 
2,  1611,  Louis  XIII  granted  permits  to  several  men  which 
gave  to  them  the  exclusive  right  to  settle  these  lands  and 
begin  trade.  They  had  besides  a  monopoly  in  all  commerce 
carried  on  with  the  East  Indies  for  the  next  twelve  years.  But 
as  they  made  no  use  of  that  privilege,  the  merchants  of  Rouen 
resolved  to  take  it  away  from  them.  They  offered  to  carry  on 
that  trade  and  develop  it  to  the  fullest  extent,  as  they  had  the 
facilities  to  do  if  they  had  the  chance.34  The  first  company, 
however,  opposed  any  interference  with  their  rights,  and  claim- 
ed that  they  were  doing  the  best  they  could,  considering  the 
obstacles  which  were  erected  by  the  foreign  neighbors  of  France. 
As  a  result  of  all  this,  the  various  companies  and  claimants  of 
their  rights  were  united  by  the  government  into  one  concern. 

The  grant  establishing  this  united  organization  stated  that 
its  members  should  undertake  the  navigation  of  the  West  Indies, 
maintain  its  protection  and  enjoy  its  privileges.  The  fleet  of 
Montmorency  was  to  defend  all  the  subjects  of  the  King,  as 
well  as  the  interests  of  the  company,  and  to  undertake  any 

saCaillet,  352-358. 
3*  Ibid.,   353-355. 


663]  COLONIZATION:    IDEAS    AND    ACCOMPLISHMENTS  121 

necessary  trips  from  the  coast  to  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope  during 
this  space  of  twelve  years,  in  order  to  aid  commerce.  In  spite 
of  this  liberal  charter  and  the  various  attempts  made  to  settle 
the  East  Indies,  the  plan  failed  in  1620,  because  of  the  pressure 
of  the  Dutch  in  that  part  of  the  world. 

Finally,  the  company  decided  to  place  a  colony  on  the  island 
of  Madagascar,  in  the  hope  that  if  they  could  found  a  powerful 
settlement  there,  it  would  serve  to  aid  in  further  expeditions 
to  the  Indies.  So  they  went  back  to  the  original  plan  which 
had  been  changed  when  the  different  colonizing  organizations 
had  been  united.  However,  internal  disturbances  in  France, 
which  took  place  in  1631,  prevented  them  from  carrying  out 
this  plan. 

In  1638,  another  attempt  was  made  by  a  man  from  Rouen  to 
found  a  colony  in  Madagascar,  and  he  left  a  very  interesting 
account  of  a  voyage  to  that  island.35  Finally,  a  new  company 
was  formed  January  24,  1642,  which  obtained  from  the  Cardinal 
the  exclusive  privilege  of  sending  into  the  island  of  Madagascar 
and  other  adjacent  islands  the  members  of  the  organization,  to 
establish  colonies  and  take  possession  in  the  name  of  the  King.36 
As  a  result,  in  the  month  of  May  a  ship  was  sent  to  the  islands, 
and  they  took  formal  possession.  Thus  Madagascar  was  at  last 
a  real  possession  of  France  and  a  way  was  prepared  for  further 
settlement.  This  was  the  final  colonizing  project  started  by 
Richelieu. 

What  were  the  general  results  of  all  the  efforts  of  the  Cardinal 
and  his  co-workers  along  this  line?  ' ' Geographical  knowledge 
was  extended  if  nothing  else,"  says  one  writer  in  relating  the 
results  of  the  colonial  efforts  of  France  during  this  period. 
"Richelieu  himself,"  he  says  "aided  a  man  named  Sanson  to 
found  a  geographical  school  at  that  time. ' ' 37  But  there  were 
other  gains  more  important  than  these,  especially  on  the  eco- 
nomic side,  for  which  the  Cardinal  merits  considerable  praise. 

When  one  looks  over  the  field  of  the  colonial  activities  under- 
taken during  Richelieu's  time,  he  must  conclude  that  very  little 
had  been  accomplished  on  the  material  side.  It  seems  that 
all  the  efforts  of  the  Cardinal  were  in  vain,  and  while  Holland, 

ssCaillet,  355-357. 
36  Ibid.,  357-358. 
3T  Ibid.,  358. 


122  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [664 

England,  and  Spain  were  forging  ahead  in  their  colonial  de- 
velopment and  commercial  activities,  France  was  doing  scarcely 
anything  along  these  lines.  But  the  Cardinal  deserves  great 
credit  for  the  part  he  played  in  the  colonial  development  of 
France.  In  spite  of  many  internal  troubles,  such  as  the  relations 
of  the  government  and  nobles,  and  his  complicated  foreign  poli- 
cies, he  was  always  interested  in  planting  new  French  settlements 
on  great  unoccupied  continents,  and  he  aided  in  the  different 
colonization  enterprises  not  only  during  the  first  part  of  his 
rule,  but  up  to  the  very  last.  He  at  least  laid  the  foundation  of 
the  French  colonial  policy. 

Finally,  one  must  not  forget  that  this  great  man  died  before 
he  could  carry  out  his  ideas  as  regards  this  part  of  his  adminis- 
tration. His  Testament  Politique  clearly  indicates  that  he  real- 
ized the  advantage  of  colonial  development  as  keenly  as  French 
statesmen  did  just  before  the  recent  great  war.38  Furthermore, 
he  looked  ahead  and  foresaw  the  future  rivalry  with  England 
upon  the  sea.  It  is  indeed  unfortunate  for  France  that  he 
could  not  have  lived  to  see  the  dawn  of  peace  in  Europe,  so 
that  he  could  have  carried  out  his  entire  economic  program, 
of  which  the  formation  of  colonies  was  one  important  part. 

A  number  of  writers  criticize  Richelieu's  colonial  policy,  not 
without  justice.  But  they  do  not  look  at  it  with  reference  to 
the  other  difficulties  confronting  the  Cardinal  at  that  time.  Mas- 
son  thought  that  it  was  entirely  too  centralized,  and  d'Avenel, 
referring  to  one  of  his  edicts  concerning  the  formation  of  a 
colonial  company,  says,  ' '  that  it  is  a  source  of  profound  astonish- 
ment to  me  to  see  a  mind  as  clear  and  practical  as  Richelieu's 
in  diplomatic  and  military  organization,  attempt  to  carry  out 
his  dreams  of  that  most  peculiar  economic  despotism  which  mod- 
ern people  call  state  socialism."  But  to  Richelieu,  colonization 
was  a  state  affair.  "The  edict  of  Morbihan  is  one  which  all 
France  seeks,"  says  the  Cardinal,  "whose  execution  is  alone  cap- 
able of  putting  the  Kingdom  in  a  state  of  splendor.  The  pro- 
clamation," he  continues,  "alarms  already  the  English  and  the 
Dutch,  who  fear  that  he  will  make  himself  master  of  the  sea. 
Spain  is  afraid  of  us  also,  for  she  fears  the  loss  of  her  Indian 
possessions."39  This  would  indicate  that  Richelieu  saw  the 

ss  Richelieu,  Testament  Politique,  II,  64-80. 
39  D'Avenel,  Monarchic  Absolue,  III,  208-217. 


665]  COLONIZATION:    IDEAS    AND    ACCOMPLISHMENTS  123 

colonial  struggles  that  lay  ahead;  and  wished  to  prepare  for 
them  in  the  best  possible  way.  Since  individual  capital  to 
found  colonies  was  lacking,  support  by  the  government  seemed 
to  him  to  be  the  only  logical  way,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that 
colonization  is  essentially  due  to  individual  effort  rather  than 
royal  plans. 

It  was  not  the  general  economic  policy  of  the  Cardinal  re- 
lating to  this  branch  of  his  administration  which  was  at  fault, 
"but",  says  one  writer,  "it  was  marred  by  the  practice,  com- 
mon to  all  statesmen  of  the  day,  of  intrusting  colonial  enter- 
prises entirely  to  exclusive  companies.  These  corporations, 
by  which  privileged  individuals  were  protected  at  the  general 
expense  of  the  body  of  consumers,  were  extremely  unsuccessful 
in  French  hands,  partly  through  their  excessive  dependence 
upon  the  state  parentage  and  control,  and  partly  through  their 
total  neglect  of  agriculture,  and  the  consequent  failure  to 
form  permanent  and  prosperous  French  settlements. " 40  In 
short,  the  failure  of  the  French  colonies  can  be  laid  to,  (1) 
artificial  imitation,  (2)  religious  narrowness,  (3)  too  much 
aid  from  the  state,  and  not  enough  emphasis  upon  commerce 
and  colonization.  Furthermore,  the  companies  themselves  are 
to  blame  to  a  certain  extent  for  the  weak  colonial  policy  of 
France,  because  of  (1)  bad  administrative  direction,  (2)  pre- 
mature distribution  of  dividends,  (3)  lack  of  capital  and  credit, 
(4)  bad  economic  organizations. 

In  view  of  the  numerous  difficulties  confronting  Richelieu 
in  this  phase  of  his  administration  one  wonders  that  he  ac- 
complished what  he  did.41  The  very  fact  that  the  French 
people  were  unprepared  for  colonial  efforts,  the  numer- 
ous internal  troubles,  financial  and  industrial  for  instance,  as 
well  as  Richelieu's  involved  foreign  policies,  indicate  the  mag- 
nitude of  the  task  which  the  Cardinal  confronted.  Yet 
Richelieu's  thoughts  were  constantly  turned  toward  this  field 
of  activity.  Whenever  there  was  a  lull  in  political  and  internal 
affairs,  or  when  he  was  offered  any  favorable  opportunity,  he 
did  his  best  to  found  successful  colonies  in  the  new  lands. 

40  Lodge,  R.,  Eichelieu,  London.  1896,  173 

41  Seeley  explains  the  loss  of  French  colonies  as  due  to   (1)   strict  reg- 
ulations, (2)   loss  of  population  in  war,    (3)   expulsion  of  Huguenots,   (4) 
too  many  wars.     See  Seeley,  J.  E.,   The  Expansion  of  England,  London, 
1891,  79,  110. 


124  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [666 

He  even  tried  to  work  up  an  interest  in  colonies  by 'means 
of  inspiring  accounts  concerning  them,  published  in  his  Mercure 
Francois.42  Public  opinion  was  aroused,  as  is  illustrated  by  the 
numerous  publications  made  at  this  time  concerning  the  col- 
onies.43 A  few  years  of  peace  might  have  brought  about  a 
great  change  in  the  colonial  position  of  France.  But  it  is  only 
within  the  last  century  that  France  has  been  able  to  do  any- 
thing in  regard  to  colonization.  And  thus  the  general  policies 
of  Richelieu  have  been  revived  at  the  present  day,  and  so  are 
doubly  important  as  constituting  a  force  which  is  now  continu- 
ing. That  Richelieu  deserves  more  credit  than  he  has  obtained 
for  his  work  in  behalf  of  French  colonization,  that  whatever 
weaknesses  existed  in  his  charters  granted  to  colonists  were  of 
minor  importance,  and  finally,  that  the  foundation  laid  by  this 
man  which  would  have  resulted  in  the  erection  of  a  strong 
and  powerful  imperial  edifice  was  ruined  by  the  ineptitude 
of  the  French  people  and  the  faults  of  those  who  came  after 
him,  are  the  main  conclusions  to  be  drawn  from  a  study  of  this 
phase  of  his  career. 


«Deschamps,  129-130. 
id.,  103-115. 


CHAPTER  IX 

RICHELIEU   AND   THE   DEVELOPMENT   OF   FOREIGN 

COMMERCE 

Richelieu  came  to  power  at  a  time  when  foreign  commerce 
was  in  its  infancy  and  the  world  was  just  beginning  to  awake 
to  it8  importance.  "To  Richelieu  as  well  as  Cromwell  and 
other  great  people  of  his  time,"  says  Bridges,  "war  and  foreign 
conquest  were  no  longer  the  primary  occupations  of  rulers. 
When  they  engaged  in  it  they  saw,  dimly  indeed,  and  in- 
consequently,  but  still  they  saw,  the  two  grand  tendencies  of 
the  modern  world;  peaceful  industry  in  the  temporal  sphere 
and  morality  based  upon  unfettered  thoughts  in  the  spiritual."1 

The  Cardinal's  appointment  as  "grand  master  and  general 
superintendent  of  navigation  and  commerce,"  in  1626,  placed 
him  at  the  head  of  not  only  the  marine  but  also  of  internal 
and  external  commerce.2  He,  at  this  time,  made  the  assembly 
of  notables  understand  not  only  that  he  was  in  control  of 
commerce  but  that  he  was  going  to  develop  it  and  enrich  his 
people  and  state  thereby.3  Thus,  at  the  beginning  of  his  ad- 
ministration, he  decided  to  do  all  he  could  in  his  official  capacity 
to  develop  a  great  trade  for  France.  This  intention  is  remarkable 
when  one  considers  the  other  problems  which  then  confronted  him. 

In  1626,  as  mentioned  before,4  the  Code  Michaud  was 
introduced.  Richelieu,  although  an  enemy  of  Michaud,  accepted 
most  of  these  ordinances,  one  fifth  of  which  dealt  with  commerce. 
In  this  code  the  manufacturers  of  silk  were  to  be  encouraged 
by  forbidding  the  importation  of  foreign  goods.  Exportations 
should  be  aided  and  companies  of  commerce  should  be  established 

i  France  under  Richelieu  and  Colbert,  63. 
zlsambert,   XVI,   194-197. 
zMercure  Francois,  XII,  759-761. 
*  See  Chapter  VII,  100. 

125 


126  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [668 

and  encouraged.  Nobles  were  to  retain  their  rank  if  they  engaged 
in  commerce,  and,  as  mentioned  before,  the  privilege  of  nobility 
could  be  conferred  on  traders  under  certain  conditions.5  Indeed, 
Richelieu  in  trying  to  carry  out  these  ordinances,  really  pre- 
pared the  way  for  a  great  expansion  of  French  commerce, 
which  would  no  doubt  have  taken  place  except  for  internal 
and  external  wars. 

He  encountered  many  difficulties  in  his  attempts  to  develop 
commerce.  In  the  first  place,  such  nations  as  England,  Holland, 
and  Spain  were  far  ahead  of  France  in  this  phase  of  a  nation's 
strength.6  The  English  even  required  all  French  goods  to  be 
sent  to  England  in  English  vessels.  On  the  other  hand  the 
Dutch  seemed  to  carry  all  the  French  trade  with  the  northern 
countries.7  In  the  Levant  alone  the  French  flag  dominated 
the  carriage  of  commerce.  But  this  supremacy  also  was  en- 
dangered by  England  and  Holland. 

Therefore  in  order  to  aid  French  development  of  foreign 
commerce  certain  laws  such  as  that  which  laid  a  duty  on  foreign 
vessels,  or  such  as  that  which  prohibited  the  exportation  of  wool 
and  the  importation  of  cloths,  were  passed.8  These  mercantilis- 
tic  changes  had  a  tendency  to  aid  not  only  in  the  development 
of  manufactures  in  France  but  also  in  the  growth  of  French 
commerce.9  The  creation  of  a  large  marine  of  course  was  an- 
other important  factor  in  the  solution  of  the  problem  of  commer- 
cial growth. 

In  his  efforts  to  build  up  commerce,  however,  the  Cardinal 
had  internal  as  well  as  external  troubles.  For  example,  numer- 
ous towns  and  provinces  with  ancient  privileges  objected  to 
his  efforts  to  build  vessels  in  their  ports.  "Les  Messieurs  de 
Saint-Malo"  refused  to  allow  the  King  to  construct  some  vessels 
in  their  harbors,  as  it  was  contrary  to  the  franchises,  they  said.10 
The  Cardinal  showed  them  that  it  was  to  the  interest  of  their 
trade  to  do  so  and  promised,  further  to  enlarge  their 
franchises.  He  concluded  by  saying  that  he  was  working  for 
the  interests  of  French  commerce,  which  was  necessary  to  make 

«See  chapters  VII  and  VIII;  Isambert,  XVI,  273-278. 

«Gouraud,  I,  157-188. 

TPigeonneau,  II,  406-407. 

sSourdis,  III,  171-174. 

»  Beaurepaire,  III,  270-277. 

10  Montchr4tien,  Introduction,  XC-XCVL 


669]  THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  FOREIGN  COMMERCE  127 

France  strong  and  flourishing.11  Richelieu  was  perfectly  wil- 
ling to  aid  local  cities  by  subjecting  foreign  traders  and  goods 
to  high  import  duties,  etc.,  but  he  would  not  permit  them  to 
establish  independent  marines.12  Thus  developed  an  inter- 
esting economic  struggle  between  local  privileges  and  the  grow- 
ing spirit  of  centralization. 

The  problems  of  Richelieu  were  indeed  intricate.  Contrary 
to  the  demands  of  Rouen,  the  city  of  Marseilles  complained  to 
Richelieu  not  only  of  heavy  impositions  laid  upon  them,  and 
slight  protection  afforded  them,  but  also  of  the  lack  of  protection 
and  aid  to  foreigners  whose  trade  they  desired.  In  other  words, 
while  both  Rouen  and  Marseilles  wanted  instant  efforts  to  be 
made  to  repress  piracy,  the  former  desired  the  foreigners  in 
France  to  be  repressed  while  the  latter  wanted  encouragement 
to  be  offered  to  foreign  commerce.13  The  only  thing  he  could 
do  was  to  consider  the  interest  of  the  nation  as  a  whole  and 
adjust  his  policy  toward  individual  cities  accordingly. 

Now  the  Cardinal  did  not  neglect  the  commercial  problems 
in  France.  He  sent,  for  example,  M.  de  Lauson,  who  was 
employed  by  him  in  a  high  position  in  affairs  of  commerce 
and  of  the  colonies,  to  investigate  commercial  conditions,  and 
had  him  return  to  consult  concerning  remedies  which  would 
aid  both  the  King  and  his  subjects.14  As  a  result  he  attempted 
to  bring  about  better  conditions  with  respect  to  both  consuls  and 
other  officials  connected  with  commerce,  and  to  foreign  relations.15 
He  even  went  so  far  as  to  send  instructions  with  regard  to  the 
destinations  of  cargoes,  etc.,  of  French  convoys.18  At  another 
time,  in  1627,  he  wrote  a  letter  asking  M.  A.  M.  de  Baugy 
for  a  report  on  the  condition  of  commerce.  He  assures  him  that 
merchants  shall  be  given  all  reasonable  privileges  and  aid.17  In 
compliance  with  these  promises  he  tried  in  1627  to  establish  a 
company  of  merchants  in  the  capital  city  of  each  province,  for 
the  purpose  of  promoting  navigation,  and  to  give  them  special 
privileges.  This  was  done  with  the  main  purpose  of  building  up 

11  Richelieu,  Letters,  II,  381. 

12  Deschamps,  135. 
is  Ibid.,  136-137. 

i*  Richelieu,  Lettres,  II,  345. 
^Mercure  Francois,  XII,  782-784. 
"Richelieu,  Lettres,  II,  504-506. 
"  Ibid.,  II,  380. 


128  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [670 

trade.     One  can  find  many  other  letters  which  illustrate  his 
solicitude  for  the  state  of  commerce.18 

Dominated  by  this  view,  Richelieu  had  a  more  or  less  definite 
commercial  foreign  policy  which  affected  all  the  important  na- 
tions of  the  world.  This  was  especially  true  with  respect  to 
Spain.  Richelieu  hoped  that  he  might  be  able  to  develop  the 
army,  make  France  strong  upon  the  sea,  and  thus  be  able 
to  dominate  Spain  in  commercial  relations.19  During  the  first 
part  of  his  administration,  Spain  imposed  various  restrictions 
upon  French  trade,  but  would  not  permit  France  to  act 
similarly  towards  Spanish  commerce.  It  is  significant  that 
Spain  not  only  dominated  commercial  relations  between  the 
two  countries,  but  also  between  her  colonies,  and  between 
Portugal  and  France.20  Richelieu  then  decided  in  retaliation,  to 
prevent  all  trade  with  Spain,  and  in  1625  issued  a  declaration 
to  that  effect.21  However,  the  fact  that  Holland  and  England 
were  competing  for  French  trade  in  Spain  accounts  for  the 
Cardinal's  never  absolutely  cutting  off  commerce  between  the 
two  nations.  He  knew  that  if  Spain  could  be  defeated  in  the 
Thirty  Years'  War,  commercial  relations  with  her  could  be 
easily  settled  to  the  advantage  of  France.  Therefore,  rather  than 
lose  out  during  the  period  of  war,  he  permitted  trade  between 
the  nations,  which  of  course  was  of  mutual  benefit.  He  was 
sure  that  Spain,  "whose  sole  wealth  depended  on  the  gold  from 
her  colonies,"  was  on  the  decline,  and  that  time  would  make 
France  her  superior  and  dictator  in  commercial  as  well  as  in 
colonial  relations.22 

Turning  to  England,  one  finds  that  Richelieu  appreciated 
the  importance  of  that  country  as  a  commercial  nation.23  Her 
resources,  manufactures,  and  trade  were  all  elements  contribut- 
ting  to  her  grandeur  and  made  her  a  direct  competitor  of  France. 
Just  like  Spain,  England  restricted  French  commerce  in  her 
direction  and  opposed  similar  treatment  in  France.  As  will 

isEiehelieu,  Lettres,  III,   171-173;    178-179. 
is  Eichelieu,  Memoires,  XXIII,  261-262. 
2<>Levasseur,  I,  265. 

21  Isambert,  XVI,  148. 

22  Richelieu,  Memoires,  XXII,  39;  XXIII,  257-258;  Sourdis,  I,  Introduc- 
tion, III- VII. 

23  Eichelieu,  Testament  Politique,  II,  49-52. 


671]  THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  FOREIGN  COMMERCE  129 

be  shown  later,  Richelieu's  diplomacy,  to  a  large  extent,  was 
centered  around  his  attempt  to  obtain  a  just  recognition  of  the 
commercial  rights  of  France  by  England,  and  also  a  claim  for 
equality  on  the  seas.2*  Of  course  he  had  to  temper  these  demands, 
because  of  his  desire  to  retain  the  British  as  an  ally  against  the 
Hapsburgs.  Nevertheless,  he  recognized  the  fact  that  French 
commerce  needed  protection  on  the  seas  and  should  have  it. 

During  the  Huguenot  affair,  commerce  with  England  was 
prohibited.25  Richelieu  at  that  time  was  really  afraid  of  an 
alliance  of  England,  Spain,  Holland,  and  Savoy  against  France.28 
It  was  not  long,  however,  before  efforts  were  made  to  bring  about 
an  alliance  between  the  two  countries,  which  resulted 
in  the  treaties  of  1629  and  1632,  whereby  friendly  commercial 
relations  with  England  were  restored,  much  to  the  credit  of 
Richelieu,  who  even  wanted  to  establish  certain  rules  of  the 
seas  which  would  govern  commercial  relations  in  the  future.27 

After  1632  Richelieu  relaxed  his  efforts  to  settle  critical  com- 
mercial questions,  as  he  knew  that  the  Thirty  Years'  "War  pre- 
vented any  such  action  on  his  part.  On  the  whole,  therefore, 
commerce  between  the  two  nations  went  on  as  usual.  Most  of 
the  trade  was  in  English  boats,  and  the  English  continued  to 
annoy  the  French  merchant  who  came  to  trade  at  London,  by 
taxes,  formalities,  etc.28  France  had  to  become  stronger  on  the 
seas  before  she  could  settle  commercial  relations  with  her  rival. 

Richelieu  was  well  aware  of  the  power  of  Holland,  and  was 
a  strong  admirer  of  her  commercial  success.  It  was  between 
the  years  1610  and  1625,  that  Holland  assumed  a  strong  position 
on  the  seas,  in  the  colonies,  etc.  She  became  at  that  time  the 
great  economic  rival  of  England.  In  a  commercial  way,  trade 
with  Holland  was  kept  up  and  fostered  during  the  administration 
of  Richelieu.  That  country  was  the  diplomatic  ally  of  France 
against  the  Hapsburgs,  so  that  he  was  unable  to  undertake  any 
economic  action  against  her  except  to  injure  her  trade  with 
Spain  through  France,  by  means  of  ordinances.  Political  and 

24  See  Chapter  XIII;  Beaurepaire,  II,  84-85,  166-7;  Richelieu,  Lettres, 
II,  490. 

as  Richelieu,  Lettres,  II,  774 ;  Dumont,  V,  pt.  2,  506-507. 

26  Richelieu,  Memoires,  XXIII,  335. 

27  See  Chapter  XIII,  Lettres,  VII,  676;  Dumont,  V,  pt.  2,  581. 

28  Levasseur,  I,  264. 


130  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [672 

economic  necessity  elsewhere  prevented  a  direct  economic  con- 
nection between  these  two  lands,  although  two  treaties  in  1624 
and  1627,  arranged  a  more  or  less  clear  basis  of  friendly  economic 
relationship  with  regard  to  the  seas  and  colonies.29 

It  is  in  a  study  of  French  commerce  in  the  Levant  that  one 
can  obtain  the  best  illustration  of  the  real  economic  rivalries  of 
Holland,  England,  and  Spain  with  France.  Since  the  death  of 
Henry  IV,  the  former  important  commercial  relations  between 
France  and  Turkey  had  diminished,  while  the  influence  of 
Holland  and  England  in  Turkey  had  increased.  Centralization 
of  the  government  of  France  took  away  th<e  extensive 
commercial  powers  of  individual  cities.  But  even  this  change, 
up  to  Richelieu's  time,  had  not  aided  commerce  with  the  Levant. 
When  he  came  into  office  he  encountered  a  chaotic  condition  in 
this  trade.  The  conflicting  efforts  of  the  central  government 
and  the  cities  seemed  to  be  making  matters  worse.  "It  needed 
a  man,"  says  one  writer,  "with  a  definite  policy,  as  Richelieu 
had  to  make  an  effort  to  create  a  positive  reform. ' ' 30  Trade 
with  the  East  had  been  neglected,  and  it  was  his  task  to  restore 
it. 

In  the  first  place,  he  had  to  overcome  the  influence  of  the 
English,  Dutch,  and  others  in  Turkey.  They  were  paying  3% 
import  duty  while  France  paid  5%.  The  Porte  favored  the 
former  powers.  Inferior  business  methods  and  goods  had  lost  for 
France  the  cloth  trade  with  the  East  in  return  for  spices,  and  was 
ruining  the  general  commercial  chances  of  the  French  in  that 
quarter  of  the  globe.31  Nevertheless,  in  spite  of  this  competition, 
France  until  1635  had  an  important  trade  with  the  Levant.  Ac- 
tive entrance  into  the  Thirty  Years'  War  at  that  time  injured  this 
commerce  in  that  the  Spanish  ships  and  the  pirates  hindered 
navigation,  while  cessation  of  trade  with  Spain  cut  off  the  supply 
of  gold,  which  France  had  been  accustomed  to  send  into  the 
East.  The  lack  of  money  in  turn  accounts  for  the  resumption  of 
commercial  relations  with  Spain  in  1639.32  One  step  towards  a 
revival  of  eastern  commerce  would  be  attained,  however,  if  Spain 
could  be  defeated,  and  Richelieu  realized  that  fact.33  Spain's  de- 

2»  See  Chapter  X,  Levasseur,  I,  266.     Dumont,  V,  pt.  2,  461-462,  523. 

so  Masson,  Histoire  du  Commerce  Frangaise  dans  le  Levant,  105-109. 

si  Hid.,  118-119. 

32  Ibid.,  119-135. 

ss  Eichelieu,  Testament  Politiquc,  II,  55-56;   71. 


673]  THEJ  DEVELOPMENT  OP  FOREIGN  COMMERCE  131 

feat  would  have  removed  the  greatest  naval  and  colonial  rival  of 
France  in  the  Mediterranean. 

"Richelieu  has  been  accused  of  neglecting  the  Levant  in  the 
interest  of  more  distant  colonies,"  says  one  writer.  "This  is 
not  true.  The  Cardinal  understood  better  than  his  councillors 
the  value  of  commerce  in  the  East,  and  was  not  the  man  to  let 
himself  be  carried  away  with  the  dreams  of  another  crusade 
there,  which  seduced  the  imagination  of  Father  Joseph."34  He 
goes  on  to  indicate  that  the  elements  which  caused  the  deplorable 
weakness  of  France  in  the  East,  were  the  presence  of  pirates, 
poor  conduct  of  diplomatic  relations,  inferior  quality  of  mer- 
chandise, and  bad  organization  of  the  consulates  and  their  un- 
fortunate conduct.  All  of  these  defects  Eichelieu  tried  to 
remedy.  He  furthermore  encountered  the  war  between  Persia 
and  Turkey  which  made  matters  even  more  difficult.  But  he  at- 
tempted to  trade  with  the  former  country  by  arranging  a  treaty 
with  the  northern  countries  whereby  goods  could  be  sent  through 
Russia  and  the  Baltic.35  This  plan  did  not  succeed  because 
Russia  would  not  permit  French  caravans  to  go  through  her 
lands.96 

Father  Joseph,  at  last  rid  of  his  crusading  dream,  was  sent 
to  the  East.  He  founded  religious  establishments  in  Jerusalem, 
Alexandria,  Bagdad,  etc.  As  a  result,  commerce  was  permitted 
to  grow  up  under  the  wing  of  the  church.  Richelieu  had  other 
men  study  the  routes  and  conditions  of  commerce  in  central 
Asia  and  the  Orient,  and  they  succeeded  in  writing  and  bring- 
ing back  vivid  accounts.37 

The  Cardinal  knew  that  the  influence  of  France  depended  on 
the  capitulations  made  with  the  Sultan.  In  1631  he  sent  an 
ambassador  to  Constantinople  to  renew  the  capitulations,  "with 
the  very  high,  very  excellent,  very  powerful,  very  invincible 
Prince,  the  grand  Emperor  of  the  Musselmans,  in  order  to  con- 
serve and  extend  the  friendship  and  union  of  the  crown  of 
France  and  the  Ottoman  Empire  for  trade,  traffic,  and  com- 

8*  Pigeonneau,  II,  443-444. 

as  See  166. 

3«  Pigeonneau,  II,  445-446. 

87  Ibid.,  448-449.  The  best  known  of  these  men  sent  by  Richelieu  was 
Jean  Baptiste  Tavernier,  who  was  not  only  a  traveler  but  a  merchant  as 
well,  who  founded  French  commerce  in  Persia,  in  India,  etc.  Besides  visit- 
ing Turkey  in  Asia,  Persia,  and  India,  he  went  as  far  as  Sumatra  and  Java. 


132  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [674 

merce  with  our  subjects.38    But  he  was  at  no  time  very  successful 
in  his  commercial  efforts  in  the  East. 

In  1633,  a  committee  of  dignitaries,  nominated  by  the  coun- 
cil of  Marseilles  (a  city  very  much  interested  in  eastern  com- 
merce) on  the  basis  of  their  commercial  knowledge,  reported 
and  complained  concerning  the  decay  of  eastern  trade,  which  they 
said  was  due  to  many  causes.  They  cited  the  long  and  important 
European  wars,  piracy,  the  oppression  of  ministers  of  the 
"Grand  Seigneur,"  corruption  of  officials  in  the  Levant,  and 
of  traders,  etc.  In  fact,  they  complained  that  the  entire  com- 
mercial system  of  France  in  the  East  was  debased.39  To  re- 
build the  trade  of  the  Levant  was  a  difficult  proposition,  but 
Richelieu  did  the  best  he  could  under  the  circumstances. 

In  1639  he  sent  a  new  ambassador  to  Constantinople  with 
instructions  not  only  to  protect  Christians  there,  but  to  aid 
the  French  in  developing  commerce  by  seeing  that  the  capit- 
ulations were  obeyed.  He  was  to  see  that  all  nations  which 
had  no  ambassadors  in  the  East  should  sail  their  ships  under 
the  French  flag  and  recognize  the  French  consuls.  He  was 
also  to  investigate  the  heavy  impositions  levied  on  the  French 
merchants  at  Aleppo  and  Alexandria  by  the  natives.  If  there 
was  no  remedy  the  trade  would  be  ruined,  or  henceforth  be 
carried  by  the  Venetians  and  English.40  The  Cardinal  thus 
made  direct  efforts  to  strengthen  and  rectify  matters  in  the 
East.  He  even  went  so  far  as  to  give  advice  with  regard  to 
the  injury  caused  by  debts  contracted  by  past  ambassadors. 
They  should  be  settled  at  once  in  the  interest  of  French  trade 
as  a  whole. 

In  spite  of  his  difficulties,  the  Cardinal  up  to  the  very  last 
recognized  the  value  of  eastern  commerce.41  ' '  I  will  not  enter, ' ' 
he  says,  "into  detail  at  all  as  to  the  commerce  which  can  be 
carried  on  with  the  East  and  Persia,  because  the  humor  or 
caprice  of  the  Frenchman  is  so  quick,  that  he  wishes  the  end 
of  his  desires  almost  as  soon  as  he  has  conceived  of  them,  and 

3*  Richelieu,  Lettres,  II,  23-24;  IV,  106;  Mercure  Francois,  XVII, 
815-817. 

saDeschamps,  135-136. 

40  Richelieu,  Lettres,  VI,  320-322. 

« Richelieu  in  his  efforts  to  develop  commerce  gladly  accepted  helpful 
advice  from  others.  See  Pigeonneau,  II,  383. 


675]  THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  FOREIGN  COMMERCE  133 

the  voyages  that  are  distant  are  not  agreeable  to  their  na- 
tures. " 42  It  is  interesting  to  notice  that  Richelieu  was  keen 
enough  to  see  and  admit  the  colonial  weakness  of  the  French. 
History  was  to  bear  out  the  truth  of  his  remarks.  "However, 
as  there  comes,"  he  says,  "a  great  quanity  of  silk  and  tapestry 
from  Persia,  many  curiosities  from  China,  as  well  as  spices  from 
there  and  other  parts  of  that  section  of  the  world,  which  are 
useful  to  us,  therefore  this  trade  must  not  be  neglected.  In 
order  to  make  a  good  establishment  there,  it  is  necessary  to 
send  two  or  three  vessels  commanded  by  some  persons  of  qual- 
ity, prudence,  and  wisdom,  with  patents  and  necessary  powers, 
to  treat  with  the  Princes  and  make  alliances  with  the  people 
on  all  the  coasts,  just  as  the  Portuguese,  English,  and  Flemish 
have  done.  This  policy  works  better  than  forcing  one 's  way  into 
a  country,  and  holding  it  down  by  force,  and  thus  stirring 
up  hate  by  deceiving  them,  as  others  have  done."  It  is  quite 
evident  that  Richelieu  desired  close  commercial  relations  with 
the  East,  and  the  fact  that  he  did  not  aim  to  accomplish  that 
by  military  force  seems  to  indicate  his  keen  power  of  observa- 
tion. He  knew  that  he  could  attain  the  best  results  by  peace- 
ful treaties  in  the  East  and  acted  on  the  basis  of  that  knowledge. 
He  even  went  so  far  as  to  list  the  merchandise  involved  in 
trade  with  Naples,  Rome,  Smyrna,  Constantinople,  etc.  Money 
and  merchandise  were  exported  from  France  in  return  for  the 
silks,  wax,  leather,  spices,  drugs,  etc.,  of  the  East.  "Before 
the  English  and  Dutch  settled  in  the  Indies,"  he  says,  "all 
silks,  drugs,  and  other  merchandises  of  Persia  came  to  Aleppo, 
from  whence  they  were  sent  throughout  France,  Holland,  Eng- 
land, and  Germany. "  43  It  is  the  loss  of  the  monopoly  of  eastern 
trade  which  Richelieu  bemoaned  and  desired  to  regain. 
"Now  the  very  same  English  and  Dutch,"  he  says,  "have 
taken  away  our  commerce,  and  deprived  France  not  only  of  the 
merchandise  of  Persia,  but  also  are  encroaching  on  the  land  of 
the  'Grand  Seigneur,'  which  they  have  to  go  through.  The 
merchandise  is  then  sold  in  Sicily,  Naples,  Genoa,  Germany, 
etc. ' '  **  Furthermore,  he  points  out  the  fact,  that  the  English 
and  Dutch  were  getting  spices  and  drugs  directly  from  the 

42  Richelieu,  Testament  Politique,  II,  70-71. 
"Ibid.,  II,   72-73. 
44 Ibid.,  II,  73-74. 


134  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [676 

Indies,  and  thus  were  gradually  obtaining  control  of  the  sale 
of  these  goods. 

Richelieu  regretted  this  state  of  affairs.  He  feared  that  for- 
eigners would  even  control  the  trade  of  the  East  with  France, 
and  thus  his  nation  would  lose  the  profit  to  be  obtained  thereby. 
He  points  out  in  his  Testament,  that  the  French  took  more 
hemp,  cloth,  wood,  etc.,  to  the  East  than  they  did  money.  Fur- 
thermore, what  money  they  did  send  was  obtained  from  Spain 
in  exchange  for  merchandise  sold  to  them.  That  France  would 
profit  by  a  renewed  trade  he  had  no  doubt,  and  pointed  out 
Marseilles  as  a  city  which  had  made  considerable  money  in  the 
past  by  means  of  the  eastern  commerce. 

One  would  think  the  attention  given  the  advisibility  of  the 
retention  of  money  in  France,  would  classify  him  as  an  ex- 
treme mercantilist.  Such  was  not  the  case.  "I  admit,"  he 
says,  "that  I  have  for  a  long  time  been  deceived  as  to  the 
commerce  which  the  people  of  Provence  founded  in  the  East. 
I  believed  with  many  others  that  it  was  prejudicial  to  the  state, 
founded  upon  the  common  opinion  that  it  exhausted  the  money 
of  the  Kingdom,  in  order  to  bring  back  merchandise,  not  nec- 
cessary  at  all,  but  only  useful  for  the  ease  of  our  nation.  But 
after  having  taken  an  exact  view  of  this  trade,  condemned  by  the 
public  voice,  I  have  changed  my  mind,  and  if  any  one  will  ex- 
amine the  question,  he  will  see  certainly,  that  I  have  done  so 
with  thought  and  reasoning.  It  is  certain  that  we  could  not 
do  without  most  of  the  merchandise  which  is  obtained  from  the 
East,  as  silks,  cottons,  wax,  rhubarb,  and  many  other  drugs 
which  are  necessary  to  us. ' '  *5 

This  is  one  of  the  wisest  economic  utterances  of  the  Cardinal. 
It  might  well  mark  a  gradual  change  from  the  strict  mercantil- 
istic  view,  to  a  very  liberal,  if  not  modern  one.  Believing  in 
the  great  value  of  a  retention  of  money  in  France,  he  changed 
about,  and  toward  the  last  recognized  the  fact  that  after  all  it 
was  the  export  of  goods  which  other  countries  desired  and  the 
import  of  goods  needed  by  France,  which  counted.  He  could 
see  that  by  this  means  France  could  develop  better  than  under 
the  narrow  policy  of  the  past.  It  is  unfortunate  that  he  did 
not  live  long  enough  to  carry  into  execution  these  new  economic 
ideas  which  he  conceived  toward  the  end  of  his  administration. 

45  Richelieu,  Testament  Politique,  II,  75;  Mercure  Francois,  XXIII, 
390-393. 


677]  THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  FOREIGN  COMMERCE  135 

Richelieu  was  not  concerned  with  the  commerce  alone  be- 
tween France  and  the  East.  He  desired  France  to  be  a  dis- 
tributing point  and  a  manufacturing  center  for  the  products 
of  the  East,  by  which  it  could  make  100%  profit.  In  this 
way  France  could  be  assured  of  a  great  number  of  artisans 
and  sailors,  both  useful  in  peace  and  war,  and  of  revenues  from 
export  and  import  duties.  In  order  that  the  French  merchant 
could  appreciate  and  be  stimulated  to  develop  commerce  in  the 
East,  the  Cardinal  even  advocated  the  sale  of  government  ves- 
sels to  be  used  by  the  French  in  commerce.46 

Furthermore,  he  desired  to  make  the  Mediterranean  a  French 
lake.  This  is  best  illustrated  by  his  efforts  to  settle  not  only 
the  question  of  piracy  but  also  his  attempts  to  arrange  com- 
mercial relations  with  Algiers,  Tunis,  Morocco,  etc.,  in  North 
Africa.  A  representative  named  Sanson  Napolon  was  sent 
to  Algiers  and  obtained  in  1628  a  treaty  which  stipulated  ob- 
servation of  all  the  articles  of  the  capitulation  between  them. 
Trade  and  fishing  rights  were  adjusted  and  things  looked  bright 
again  in  that  part  of  the  world.47 

In  1630,  Isaac  de  Razilly  was  sent  to  settle  the  difficulties, 
and  he  succeeded  in  obtaining  the  right  of  the  French  to  trade 
freely,  and  have  consuls  in  that  country.48  Furthermore,  the 
English  were  forbidden  by  this  treaty  to  send  arms  to  Morocco.49 
By  these  agreements  the  privileges  of  the  French  in  North  Africa 
and  on  the  sea,  and  the  rights  of  the  natives  of  these  countries 
to  trade  with  France  were  confirmed.  On  the  whole  the  re- 
lations with  the  Barbary  States  were  improved.  There  was, 
however,  a  little  trouble  in  1633,  and  another  treaty  was  neces- 
sary in  1639.  In  fact  one  might  say,  that  in  Africa  as  well 
as  in  France  and  America,  Richelieu's  work  was  incomplete. 
He  had  ambitious  plans  for  the  development  of  the  entire 
Mediterranean,  but  did  not  live  long  enough  for  any  part  of  them 
to  materialize.*0 

Richelieu  did  not  confine  his  attentions  only  to  the  East  in 
his  effort  to  develop  foreign  commerce.  One  finds  for  in- 
stance, that  he  desired  to  sell  to  the  Swiss,  French  salt,  which 

46  Eichelieu,  Testament  Politique,  II,  76-77. 

47  Lavasseur,   I,   266-267;    Dumont,  V,  pt.   2,  559-560. 

48  Isambert,  XVI,  357-359. 

**Mercure  Francois,  XVII,  pt.,  II,  181;  Dumont,  V,  pt.  2,  613-614. 
so  Pigeonneau,  II,  453-455;  Dumont,  VI,  pt.  I,  18. 


136  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [678 

was  better  than  German  salt,  and  at  a  more  reasonable  price. 
He  hoped  by  this  means  to  pay  the  pensions  due  the  Swiss 
soldiers.51  Indeed  it  would  seem  as  if  the  Cardinal  was  plan- 
ning on  using  the  salt  resources  of  France  as  one  of  its  financial 
foundations.  No  wonder  he  did  not  want  to  lose  La  Eochelle. 

With  regard  to  Poland,  Eichelieu  made  an  interesting  remark. 
He  said  in  1629,  that  France  had  little  trade  with  Poland 
because  the  former  had  no  need  of  wheat  or  wood,  which 
could  be  obtained  in  nearer  markets,  in  Norway  and  Denmark. 
Furthermore,  she  could  get  tar  from  Norway  and  leather  from 
Sweden,  so  that  trade  with  that  country  was  not  really  im- 
portant.52 However,  Kichelieu  admitted  that  the  Austrians 
dominated  Poland  at  that  time,  which  may  account  to  a  certain 
degree  for  his  attitude  toward  the  latter.  He  declared  that 
France  furnished  Poland  some  salt  and  wine,  which  the  Dutch 
really  controlled.  "Our  more  important  trade  is  in  Spain,  Italy, 
and  the  Levant.  England  might  better  desire  peace  in  Poland 
because  of  her  great  trade  with  that  nation."53  Here  one  sees 
a  clever  effort  on  Richelieu's  part  to  push  England  into  the 
conflict  in  1630  because  of  commercial  interests  in  the  north. 
The  Cardinal  evidently  recognized  the  powerful  influence  of 
trade  in  diplomatic  relations.54 

Richelieu  did  not  get  all  that  he  wanted  in  Russia.  Full 
commercial  rights  were  obtained,  but  the  French  were  not  to 
be  allowed  to  go  through  there  on  their  way  to  Persia.  Russia 
was  to  furnish  such  a  good  market  for  France  that  they  could 
get  the  goods  from  the  East  as  cheaply  as  if  they  went  after 
the  merchandise  themselves.  It  certainly  is  interesting  to  notice 
that  the  orginal  plan  of  founding  a  commercial  company  in 
France,  which  was  to  trade  with  Russia,  and  which  included 
a  plan  to  bring  Persian  goods  by  means  of  the  Caspian  Sea,  the 
Volga  river,  and  the  Baltic  Sea  to  France,  culminated  in  the 
first  real  commercial  treaty  made  by  the  French  nation  with 
Russia.55  Richelieu  was  looking  out  for  French  commerce  and 
in  1630  he  believed  that  the  Baltic  Sea  was  to  be  the  way  by 

si  Eichelieu,  MSmoires,  XXIII,  289-290. 

52  Ibid.,  XXV,  129. 

53  Ibid.,  XXV,  129. 

5*  For  further  information,  see  Chapter  X. 

65  Eichelieu,  Memoires,  XXV,  131 ;  Dumont,  V,  pt.  2,  594-598. 


679]  THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  FOREIGN  COMMERCE  137 

which  he  could  trade  not  only  with  the  north  but  with  the  East.56 
One  can  see  why  he  was  so  anxious  to  arrange  treaties  with 
the  Scandinavian  countries.  Also,  the  effect  upon  France  if 
Austria  had  controlled  the  Baltic  must  have  been  obvious  to 
Richelieu.  It  is  no  wonder  that  he  founded  the  alliance  against 
the  Hapsburgs  and  fought  his  fellow  Catholics  at  a  time  when 
the  religious  controversy  still  had  its  place  in  affairs  of  the 
world.57 

Richelieu  desired  not  only  to  open  up  trade  with  the  East 
through  the  Baltic,  but  he  also  wished  to  increase  the  commerce 
of  France  with  such  countries  as  Denmark,  Norway  and  Swed- 
en. In  the  treaty  of  1629  arranged  with  Denmark,  the  latter 
was  promised  pure  salt  from  France  instead  of  the  impure 
product  the  Dutch  sold  to  them.  France  would  have  also  a 
better  market  for  the  purchase  of  such  things  as  hemp,  masts 
for  boats,  etc.,  which  she  needed.58  A  treaty  also  was  arranged 
which  permitted  French  merchandise  to  go  through  the  Straits 
(the  Sund)  with  a  tax  of  1  per  cent  instead  of  the  5  per  cent 
hitherto  levied.  This  arrangement  was  limited  to  eight  years.59 
A  commercial  treaty  was  also  negotiated  with  Sweden;  In 
it  an  alliance  was  agreed  upon  which  was  to  last  six  years,  and 
in  compliance  with  it  they  agreed  to  defend  oppressed  friends, 
to  assure  freedom  of  commerce  from  the  north  to  the  .Baltic, 
etc.60 

France  during  this  period  was  interested  in  the  Baltic  not 
only  for  diplomatic  reasons  or  on  account  of  the  fear  of  the 
growing  Hapsburg  dynasty,  but  she  also  desired  to  assume 
more  friendly  and  important  commercial  relations  with  the 
northern  countries.  It  is  possible  that  the  alliances  were  fostered 
partly  to  bind  the  nations  more  closely  together  against  a  com- 
mon foe.  They  were  likewise  probably  brought  about  in  order  to 

5«  This  is  especially  interesting  when  one  remembers  that  the  Spanish 
Hapsburgs  by  means  of  their  control  of  the  Portuguese  were  developing  the 
route  around  Africa. 

57  See  Chapter  X. 

58  Caillet,   328-332.      (Les   Voyages  de   Monsieur   des  Hayes,   baron   de 
Courmesmin  en  Denmark,  1669,  p.  99  et  seq.) 

69  With  reference  to  the  Danich  treaty,  Richelieu  has  this  to  say,  ' '  It  was 
a  great  advantage  to  the  commerce  and  navigation  of  France."  See  his 
Memoires,  XXV,  342-343. 

eo  Martin,  II,  316. 


138  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [680 

obtain  an  advantage  over  the  competition  of  at  least  Holland  in 
this  particular  part  of  the  world,  and  to  establish  a  new  commer- 
cial route  to  the  East.  Whatever  were  the  motives,  Richelieu  was 
the  instigator  of  this  policy  and  thus  deserves  the  credit  for 
what  he  accomplished  along  the.se  lines.  It  will  be  shown  later 
that  his  accomplishments  here  had  important  consequences  in 
the  progress  and  outcome  of  the  Thirty  Years'  War.61 

But  it  is  in  Richelieu 's  Testament  Politique,  that  one  finds  his 
final  ideas  with  regard  to  commerce  in  general.  He  repeats 
(and  seems  fond  of  doing  so)  the  story  of  the  commercial  rise 
of  Holland.  "It  is  proof,"  he  says,  "of  the  utility  of  trade. 
Though  that  nation  produces  nothing  but  butter  and  cheese, 
yet  they  furnish  all  the  nations  of  Europe  with  the  greatest 
part  of  what  is  necessary  to  them."62  He  then  proceeded  to 
tell  how  they  had  ousted  the  Portuguese  from  the  East  Indies 
and  were  preparing  to  do  the  same  in  the  West  Indies.  One 
can  not  fail  to  see  the  yearning  in  the  heart  of  the  great  states- 
man for  a  similar  growth  on  the  part  of  France.  He  realized 
that  if  this  could  only  take  place,  France  with  its  geographical 
and  economic  advantages  could  become  the  leader  of  Europe. 
After  all  the  economic  side  of  a  nation  constituted  the 
foundation  of  its  strength  and  all  his  attempts  at  political 
centralization  were  for  the  purpose  of  bringing  about  a  success- 
ful culmination  of  his  "ideal  state."  France  is  so  fertile  in 
corn,  so  abounding  in  wine,  flax,  hemp  to  make  cloth  and  rig- 
gings, so  necessary  for  navigation,  that  Spain,  England,  and  all 
the  neighboring  states  must  have  recourse  thither,"  he  says, 
"and  provided  we  know  how  to  improve  the  advantages  which 
nature  has  given  us  we  will  get  the  money  of  those  who  have 
occasions  for  our  goods,  without  troubling  ourselves  much  with 
their  commodities  which  are  of  little  use  to  us. " 63  He  knew 
that  his  country  was  being  exploited  by  the  commercial  pro- 
gress of  other  nations,  and  that  if  she  found  herself,  she  could 
not  only  develop  her  commerce  and  fisheries,  necessary  at  that 
time,  but  she  also  would  be  able  to  keep  her  sailors  at  home, 
who  up  until  then  had  sought  employment  ^n  Spain. 

The  development  of   French   industries,    French   commerce, 

ei  See  Chapter  X. 

«2  Richelieu,  Testament  Politique,  II,  65. 

es  Hid.,  II,  66-67. 


681]  THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  FOREIGN  COMMERCE  139 

and  French  wealth  was  the  underlying  foundation  of  his 
philosophy.  "Instead  of  importing  cloth  from  Spain,  England 
and  Holland,  let  us  make  it  ourselves,"  was  his  earnest  demand.64 
"France  is  industrious  enough,  if  she  desires,  to  dispense  with 
some  of  the  best  manufactures  of  her  neighbors. ' ' 65  He  then 
goes  on  to  praise  the  plush  made  at  Tours,  as  ahead  of  that  made 
in  Italy  and  Spain.  France  could  make  as  good  silk  as  any 
nation,  was  his  boast.  It  would  seem  as  if  he  indulged  a  typical 
"made  in  France"  argument,  such  as  is  not  out  of  fashion  at 
the  present  time.  Efficiency  was  his  motto.  He  could  see  in  the 
revival  of  commerce  and  industry,  a  chance  whereby  everybody 
could  have  an  opportunity  to  work,  so  that  sloth,  laziness,  and 
an  extreme  desire  for  luxuries  would  be  overcome.  A  man  who 
advocated  the  use  of  the  entire  material  and  human  resources 
of  the  country  in  order  to  create  a  wealthy  and  strong  state  is 
certainly  not  to  be  classed  as  mediocre  either  in  the  political  or 
the  economic  sense  of  the  term. 

No  one  can  doubt  that  he  possessed  keen  business  ability. 
"There  are  many  advantages  in  navigation,"  he  says:  "The 
fur  trade  of  Canada  is  very  useful,  as  you  can  carry  on  an  ex- 
change of  goods  for  goods. ' '  M  He  points  out  the  advantages 
of  commerce  in  the  East  Indies  and  in  North  Africa.  "The 
merchants  of  Rouen,"  he  says,  "at  one  time  established  a  silk 
and  cloth  trade  in  Morocco  by  means  of  which  they  obtain 
a  great  quantity  of  gold."  He  bemoans  the  lack  of  a  great 
merchant  marine  which  could  carry  all  the  traffic  of  the  north 
which  the  Flemish  and  the  Dutch  had  taken  over  because  the 
north  had  an  absolute  need  of  wine,  vinegar,  spirits,  etc., 
all  commodities  in  which  France  abounds  and  which  she  can- 
not consume  herself.  (The  idea  of  a  surplus  of  products  is 
clearly  brought  out  here.)  "It  is  easy/'  he  says,  "to  carry 
on  a  commerce  with  them,  and  better  in  that  the  French 
vessels  can  bring  back  woods,  copper,  etc.,  things  not  only 
useful  to  us  but  necessary  for  our  neighbors,  who  must  get 
them  direct  from  us,  if  they  do  not  wish  to  lose  the  freight  of 
their  vessels  going  for  the  commodities. "  6T  It  would  seem  as  if 
Richelieu  intended  not  only  to  carry  on  French  trade  with  the 

64  Eichelieu,  Testament  Politique,  II,  67. 
65/fcuJ.,  II,  68-69. 
ee /&«*.,  II,  68-69. 
6T  Ibid.,  II,  69-70. 


140  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [682 

north  in  French  vessels,  but  desired  to  have  the  French  merchant 
marine  have  a  monopoly  of  the  trade  of  all  nations  with  the  north. 
It  was  a  large  scheme,  but  it  fits  in  exactly  with  his  general  eco- 
nomic and  political  idea  of  the  great  state,  and  the  destruction  of 
all  forces  which  would  hinder  that  conception.  A  great  state 
would  certainly  mean  a  nation  which  was  the  predominant  com- 
mercial center  of  the  world.  The  first  step  in  order  to  bring  this 
about  and  assume  control  of  commerce  in  the  West  Indies,  etc., 
was  to  overpower  Spain  by  means  of  military  strength.68  This  was 
the  underlying  economic  element  in  their  relations  in  the  Thirty 
Years'  War,  as  will  be  shown. 

Thus,  commerce  and  the  methods  to  obtain  a  development  of 
it  in  France,  dominated  his  thoughts  towards  the  end  of  his 
administration,  and  no  better  indication  of  its  importance,  and 
of  the  keen  intellect  which  solved  its  difficulties  is  found  than 
in  his  change  from  a  supporter  of  a  high  export  and  internal 
tax  on  goods  to  the  support  of  a  lower  tax,  in  order  to  increase 
trade  thereby.69 


es  Richelieu,  Testament  Politique,  II,  71. 
6»  Ibid.,  II,  88,  et  seq. 


CHAPTER  X 

THE  ECONOMIC  ELEMENTS  IN  THE  DIPLOMACY  OF 

RICHELIEU 

Richelieu's  entire  administration  was  taken  up  with  the  ful- 
filment of  two  objects:  in  the  first  place,  to  develop  the  ex- 
ternal commerce,  marine,  and  colonization  of  France,  and  make 
her  one  of  the  strongest  nations  from  an  economic  point  of 
view ;  in  the  second  place,  to  create  in  France  one  of  the  strong- 
est political  states  in  Europe,  and,  as  a  consequence,  place  her  in 
the  center  of  the  nations  united  or  opposed  to  each  other,  in 
order  to  preserve  the  balance  of  power.  He  wanted  to  create, 
as  one  writer  says,  a  combined  continental  and  colonial  nation.1 

His  accomplishments  with  regard  to  the  marine,  colonies,  and 
internal  and  external  commerce,  would  indicate  that  during  his 
administration  he  at  least  tried  to  lay  the  foundations  of  his 
first  great  object.  But  it  has  been  shown  that  he  could  go  only 
so  far  in  his  effort  along  those  lines  because  of  the  fact  that 
his  second  object,  the  continental  supremacy  of  France,  was  a 
necessary  preliminary  to  the  first.  Thus  it  was  his  purpose  to 
bring  about  the  pacification  of  Europe  as  the  essential  basis  of 
all  future  progress.2  The  method  of  attaining  that  end  was 
a  war  against  the  Hapsburgs.  It  now  remains  to  consider  the 
economic  motive  involved  in  his  efforts  to  carry  to  a  successful 
completion  the  second  phase  of  his  administration. 

Few  people  at  that  time  comprehended  this  ultimate  pur- 
pose, as  is  shown  by  the  fact,  which  Richelieu  admitted,  that 
few  people  could  see  the  necessity  of  war,  which  he  believed 
was  really  needed  in  order  to  preserve  the  dignity  and  credit 
of  the  King  and  state,  over  against  other  European  powers. 
"Merchants  and  people  in  general,  do  not  see  this  point,"  he 
says,  "they  complain  about  the  burdens  of  war  but  do  not  see 

1  Vignon,   L.,  L  'Expansion  de   la  France,   Paris,   1891,    28-34. 

2  Richelieu,  Testament  Politique,  I,  285-286. 

141 


142  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [684 

the  value  of  it  for  the  state  as  a  whole."3  The  Cardinal  had 
the  security  of  the  nation  in  view,  as  a  prerequisite  for  future 
prosperity.  But  the  people  could  not  look  so  far  ahead.  They 
could  see  the  benefits  of  the  suppression  of  the  nobles,  but  the 
Thirty  Years'  War  was  above  their  political  or  economic  com- 
prehension. The  need  of  a  strong  frontier,  the  maintenance 
of  the  balance  of  power,  and  the  question  of  the  control  of  the 
sea  as  a  part  of  a  strong  economic  and  political  nationalism 
were  beyond  them.  Richelieu  realized  this  and  was  compelled 
to  hold  back  many  of  his  advanced  policies  until  the  coming 
peace  would  enable  him  to  undertake  them  with  a  better  hope 
of  success. 

In  his  diplomacy  the  theoretical  rule  guiding  his  relations  was 
of  course  to  assure  the  welfare  of  France  by  means  of  favor- 
able negotiations  with  other  countries.  He  was  in  particular 
guided  by  a  spirit  of  political  and  economic  reciprocity.4  The 
diplomatic  relations  between  France  and  Spain  during  the 
period  may  first  serve  as  a  good  illustration  of  this  policy. 

Spain,  when  Richelieu  came  into  power,  was  beginning  to 
decline,  but  nevertheless  could  be  a  very  powerful  and  active 
foe.  The  Cardinal  feared  her  and  sincerely  believed  from  the 
first,  that  the  welfare  of  the  world  would  be  aided  by  the  de- 
struction of  her  power  as  well  as  that  of  the  Empire.5 
This  nation  was  not  only  a  danger  to  the  existence  of  France 
on  the  seas  and  along  her  boundaries,  but  also  threatened  her 
internal  status.  The  French  Court,  which  was  led  by  Anne  of 
Austria  and  others  suspected  of  treason,  was  half  Spanish  ;6 
and  furthermore,  according  to  Richelieu,  the  Spaniards  were 
more  or  less  interested  in  the  attempts  of  the  Huguenots  to 
obtain  independence.7  "Why?  Of  course,  in  part  for  political 
reasons.  Spain  desired  to  weaken  France,  in  order  to  be  per- 
mitted to  unite  with  Austria  across  Italy,  and  on  other  accounts. 
But  it  should  not  be  forgotten  that  La  Rochelle  was  important 
as  a  center  for  the  distribution  of  salt.  England  realized  this 

a  Richelieu,  Memoires,  XXVI,  87-91. 

*Lavisse,  E.,  and  Rambaud,  A.,  Histoire,  Generale,  12  vols.,  Paris,  1896, 
V,  368. 

5  Richelieu,  Lettres,  II,  150. 

e  Bridges,  113. 

7  Richelieu,  Testament  Politique,  I,  19-22. 


685]         ECONOMIC   ELEMENTS  IN  DIPLOMACY  OP  RICHELIEU  143 

and  Spain  no  doubt  did  so,  for  she  herself  carried  on  a  trade 
in  that  commodity.  In  fact,  Richelieu  complained  in  1627  (the 
time  of  the  Huguenot  affair)  of  the  attempts  of  the  Spanish  to 
hinder  French  commerce  in  salt  with  the  Flemish  people. 
There  was  evidently  a  commercial  rivalry  existing  between 
France  and  Spain  with  regard  to  that  trade.8  When  the  most 
important  salt  producing  center  of  France  revolted,  it  was  nat- 
urally aided  by  Spain.  The  latter  country  would  clearly  have 
welcomed  an  independent  La  Rochelle  from  the  economic  as 
well  as  the  political  point  of  view. 

The  Cardinal,  it  would  seem,  was  well  aware  of  the  com- 
mercial plans  of  Spain.  He  knew  that  she  wanted  to  monopolize 
commerce  in  Flanders  and  indeed  in  all  of  her  possessions.9 
Furthermore,  he  knew  of  her  attempt  to  deprive  the  Dutch 
of  their  trade  in  the  Mediterranean  and  the  Indies.  Spain,  he 
claimed,  desired  even  at  that  time  to  become  dominant  in  com- 
merce in  the  Levant  and  in  Russia,  and  to  prevent  the  trade 
of  Holland  with  France  and  England.10  The  good  relationship 
with  Holland  on  the  part  of  France  is  partly  accounted  for  by 
this  statement.  Richelieu  believed  from  the  beginning  of  his 
administration  that  the  Spanish  nation  was  the  one  power  which 
intended  to  spread  its  commercial  monopoly  over  all  the  world, 
and  that  therefore  its  plans  should  be  blocked.  Immediate 
efforts  were  made  to  oppose  her  ambitions.  Commercial 
relations  were  broken  off,  and  at  the  same  time,  about 
1626,  the  French  began  to  form  large  companies  to  reestablish 
commerce,  colonies,  etc.11  Steps  were  taken  also  to  build  canals 
through  France,  and  thus  cause  all  goods  from  the  Mediterra- 
nean and  the  Levant  to  be  sent  north  through  France,  instead 
of  going  by  way  of  Spain,  with  the  purpose  of  making  France 
the  common  deposit  of  all  the  trade  of  the  earth. ' ' 12  Even 
the  superiority  of  geographical  location  which  France  possessed 
over  Spain  was  considered  from  the  economic  point  of  view. 
The  Mercure  Frangois  quotes  the  statement  made  by  the  King's 

s  Bassompferre,  Memoires,  (Soci4t4  de  1'Histoire  de  France),  4  vols., 
Paris,  1870-1877,  III,  432. 

»  Mercure  Francois,  XXIII,  334-335. 

™lbid.,  XII,  4-8;  30-35. 

n  Mercure  Francois,  XII,  3-6. 

12  Ibid,,  XII,  359. 


144  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [686 

Garde  de  Sceaux,  that  Spain  in  order  to  trade  with  Italy  or 
any  part  of  the  Mediterranean,  had  to  pass  by  France  at  night 
or  under  the  culverins  of  the  islands  of  Provence.  Further- 
more, in  order  to  trade  with  Flanders,  Holland,  England, 
Denmark,  and  other  northern  lands,  it  was  necessary  for 
Spanish  vessels  to  pass  le  Ros  Sainct  Make,  at  the  mercy 
of  the  French  cannon,  which  could  control  the  English  chan- 
nel with  little  difficulty.13  Thus  France  would  find  it  easy, 
because  of  her  fortunate  geographical  position,  to  defeat  Spain 
in  her  commercial  ambitions. 

The  favorable  position  of  France  on  the  Mediterranean  Sea 
was  brought  forth  a  little  later  in  the  same  way.  The  good 
coast  and  harbors  of  Provence  could  easily  hinder  the  com- 
merce of  Spain  and  the  latter 's  communication  by  water  with 
Italy,  so  necessary  in  peace  and  war.  At  this  point  appears  the 
definite  object  of  keeping  Italy  independent  of  Spain,  in  order 
to  separate  not  only  their  political  but  also  their  economic  re- 
lations.14 The  attempt  to  form  a  political  and  economic  zollver- 
ein  between  the  Empire  and  Spain  through  Italy  was  to  be 
broken,  because  it  endangered  the  very  existence  of  France, 
politically  and  economically.15 

On  the  other  hand  Eichelieu  knew  that  he  could  not  oppose 
Spain  upon  the  sea  as  he  did  not  have  the  ships.  So  he  was 
willing  to  compromise.  In  spite  of  the  desires  of  French  mer- 
chants to  retaliate  against  the  Spanish  and  Portuguese,  who 
committed  depredations  upon  their  vessels  on  their  way  to  and 
from  the  Indies  or  America,  he  tried  to  preserve  peace,  and 
asked  the  merchants  not  to  commit  hostile  acts  when  they  were 
in  neutral  waters.16  He  professed  belief  in  the  principles  of 
what  is  now  called  international  law;  although  prudence  very 
likely  told  him  that  this  was  for  the  best  interest  of  France. 

In  1634  Richelieu,  in  order  to  prevent  trouble  with  the  Span- 
ish and  Portuguese,  agreed  that  they  should  have  full  rights 
within  certain  waters  leading  from  the  Indies  and  America. 
However,  he  asked  that  the  French  be  permitted  to  sail  into 
the  ports  and  harbors  of  Spain  and  Portugual,  as  long  as  they 

^Mercure  Francois,  XII,   359-60. 

«  Ibid.,  XIII,  248-253. 

is  Richelieu,  Lettres,  II,  81;  Memoires,  XXVII,  222-223. 

IB  Eichelieu,  Memoires,  XXVIII,  204-205. 


687]         ECONOMIC  ELEMENTS  IN  DIPLOMACY  OP  RICHELIEU  145 

did  not  impose  on  the  limits  of  the  ports  of  the  ocean  reserved 
for  them.17  Thus  he  was  willing  to  concede  certain  rights  to 
his  colonial  rivals  in  return  for  privileges  for  Prance. 

At  the  very  time  when  Richelieu  was  trying  to  make  comprom- 
ises, he  was  also  attempting  to  overthrow  the  power  of 
Spain  in  Italy,  was  advocating  a  large  navy  in  order  to  sweep 
her  off  the  ocean,  and  was  allowing  the  situation  north  of 
France  to  be  taken  care  of  by  the  Dutch.  The  latter  prevented 
any  attempts  on  the  part  of  the  Spanish  to  strengthen  their 
possessions  in  the  Netherlands,  by  means  of  canals,  etc.,  and 
thus  build  up  their  economic  interests  in  those  lands.18  The 
Mercure  Francois,  in  1627,  mentions  the  attempts  of  the  Span- 
ish to  obtain  a  closer  union  with  their  colonies  and  other  lands, 
for  the  purpose  of  defence  against  enemies.19  Of  course  this 
policy  would  be  dangerous  economically  and  politically  for  France 
and  should  be  prevented.  The  people  of  Flanders  were  conse- 
quently influenced  to  oppose  these  efforts  of  Spain.20  Richelieu 
saw  the  economic  struggle  going  on  between  Holland  and  Spain 
for  control  of  the  Indies  and  the  sea.  "The  rise  of  either,"  he 
said,  "would  bring  about  the  ruin  of  the  other."21  As  a 
consequence,  he  evidently  played  one  against  the  other  in  the 
interests  of  France. 

This  was  the  general  diplomatic  position  taken  by  France 
toward  these  two  nations  throughout  Richelieu's  administration. 
Finally,  in  1635  the  Cardinal  declared  that  war  with  Spain  was 
the  only  solution  for  the  peace  of  Europe  and  the  safety,  the 
repose,  and  the  commercial  rights  of  the  French  people.22  At 
this  time,  in  spite  of  the  economic  rivalry  existing  between 
Holland  and  France,  an  offensive  and  defensive  league  was 
made  between  them  against  the  Empire  of  Spain.23 

In  1639,  Richelieu  was  still  pegging  away  at  the  Spanish  in 
Italy  besides  trying  to  get  the  English  into  an  alliance  against 
Spain.2*  The  three  of  them  were  to  drive  Spain  off  the  seas. 

"Isambert,  XVI,  409-411;  Mercure  Francois,  XX,  711-712. 
is  Mercure  Francois,  XIII,  566-571. 
iBZ&wL,  XIII,  590.595. 

20  Ibid.,  XIII,  598-600. 

21  Richelieu,   Mfmoircs,  XXVII,   362-365. 

22  Richelieu,  Lettres,  V,  151-153;  Mercure  Francois,  XX,  959. 

383. 
550-555. 


146  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [688 

Indeed,  he  gave  orders  at  this  time  for  the  fleet  to  attack  the 
Spanish  towns,  and  (which  is  more  important  by  far)  her  col- 
onies.25 Now  apparently,  the  Cardinal  had  imperialistic  ideas 
of  the  most  advanced  sort.  Control  of  the  seas  meant  colonies 
to  him  as  it  did  to  many  other  statesmen  after  him.26  His 
Testament  shows  that  this  was  his  final  intention  and  was  his 
advice  for  those  who  were  to  follow  him.  He  says  that  "there 
is  little  left  for  France  in  western  commerce.  The  only  chance 
is  to  obtain  control  of  places  occupied  now  by  the  King  of 
Spain  by  means  of  a  powerful  war."27  In  another  place  he 
maintains  that  a  navy  will  overcome,  Spain  and  protect  France. 
It  has  been  the  only  instrument  which  has  enabled  Spain  to  retain 
her  colonies.28  Furthermore,  Richelieu  advised  a  strong  marine 
in  order  to  keep  Spain  from  Italy.29  He  believed  that  the 
only  solution  for  the  economic  and  political  development  of 
France  lay  in  the  defeat  of  Spain  on  land  and  sea:30  on  land 
so  that  she  would  not  threaten  the  boundaries  of  France;  on 
the  sea,  so  that  she  could  not  hinder  French  commerce,  and  so 
that  France  might  obtain  some  of  the  rich  colonial  rewards 
which  she  so  much  desired.  Richelieu's  part  in  the  Portuguese 
revolt  was  probably  taken  because  of  his  desire  to  break  up  the 
colonial  empire  of  Spain.31 

In  one  respect  Richelieu  looked  upon  Spain  from  a  more  or 
less  friendly  point  of  view.  The  latter  purchased  wheat,  silks, 
etc.,  from  France  in  considerable  quantities.  The  Cardinal 
permitted  this  trade  to  be  carried  on,  because  it  added  to  the 
wealth  of  France.  "Richelieu  in  1639,"  says  one  writer,  "han- 
dled this  difficult  proposition  very  well.  He  allowed  the  traders 
by  an  edict  the  right  to  export  goods  at  their  risk.  It  was  a 
sort  of  authorized  contraband  by  which  both  countries  profit- 
ed. ' ' 32  This  edict  illustrates  the  principle  back  of  the  Cardinal 's 
administration.  The  political  and  external  economic  power  of 

25  Eichelieu,  Lettres,  658. 

26  Sourdis,  I,  Introduction,  III-VII ;  Eichelieu,  Memoires,  XXIII,  257- 
258. 

27  Eichelieu,   Testament  Politique,   II,   71. 
28/&i<Z.,  II,  52-53. 

29JZ>td.,  II,  54-64. 

soMercure  Francois,  XXIII,   125;   Eichelieu,  Lettres,  III,  81. 

si  Wakeman,  H.  O.,  European  History  (1598-1715),  :iSTew  York,  1916,  116. 

32  Pigeonneau,  II,  423. 


689]          ECONOMIC  ELEMENTS  IN  DIPLOMACY  OP   RICHELIEU  147 

Spain  was  a  danger  to  the  development  of  France;  therefore,  it 
should  be  destroyed.  However,  enmity  to  Spain  should  not  pre- 
vent France  from  taking  advantage  of  any  opportunity  to  better 
herself,  even  though  it  should  lead  to  trade  with  a  nation  with 
which  they  were  at  war.  French  merchants  actually  became 
the  overland  carriers  of  goods  between  Spain,  the  Netherlands, 
and  Germany.83 

Richelieu  was  guided  by  the  same  nationalistic  ideal  in  his 
diplomatic  relations  with  England.  The  latter  country,  he 
claimed,  had  failed  to  observe  the  various  clauses  of  the  com- 
mercial treaty  of  1623.  They  placed  various  restrictions  upon 
the  importation  of  French  goods,  such  as  cloth  for  example. 
Now  the  French  desired  their  government  to  retaliate  and  con- 
sequently there  arose  in  France  the  demand  that  the  English 
should  be  treated  in  France  as  the  French  were  treated  in 
England.34  Therefore  when  Richelieu  came  into  office  he  had 
the  problem  confronting  him  of  arranging  commercial  relations 
which  would  be  satisfactory  to  both  countries. 

One  of  the  first  steps  in  that  direction  was  the  marriage  of 
Henrietta  of  France  to  the  English  Prince  of  "Wales.  The 
Cardinal  hoped  that  this  alliance  would  result  not  only  in  the 
establishment  of  good  relations  between  the  two  countries,  but 
that  it  would  serve  as  a  counterweight  to  the  grandeur  of 
Spain,35  and  also  would  prevent  a  powerful  commercial  and  col- 
onial alliance  between  England  and  Holland.36 

The  effect  of  this  alliance  was  temporary,  although  both  Eng- 
land and  Holland  lent  boats  to  France  in  1625,  to  be  used 
against  La  Rochelle  at  a  time  when  France  was  at  war  with 
Spain.  The  explanation  for  the  change  is  simple  when  one 
considers  not  only  the  religious  side  of  the  marriage  alliance 
but  the  commercial  difficulties  in  the  way  of  a  happy  consum- 
mation of  its  aims.  France  and  England  were  beginning  the 

as  Calendars  of  State  Papers  and  Manuscripts,  (Venetian  Series), 
London,  1912-1916.  XX,  162. 

s^Levasseur,  I,  273. 

35  Eichelieu,  Memoires,   XXIII,   78. 

se  Ibid.,  XXII,  293. 

Richelieu  must  have  had  in  mind  the  failure  of  Buckingham  to  bring 
about  a  marriage  alliance  between  the  two  royal  houses  of  Spain  and  Eng- 
'land.  See  Montague,  F.  C.,  Political  History  of  England,  New  York,  1911, 
VII,  110-117. 


148  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [690 

intense  commercial  rivalry  on  the  sea  which,  was  to  be  the  key- 
note of  their  diplomatic  relations  for  the  next  two  hundred 
years.  Indeed,  Eichelieu  in  a  letter  said  that  the  three  roots 
of  trouble  between  France  and  England  were  first,  the  relig- 
ious difficulties  concerning  the  right  of  Henrietta  in  that  re- 
spect;37 secondly,  the  commercial  side  as  seen  not  only  in  the 
retention  of  French  vessels  and  their  goods  by  the  English,  but 
in  the  retaliation  in  a  similar  manner  by  the  French;38  in  the 
third  place,  the  aid  of  La  Rochelle  by  the  English.39  However, 
the  first  cause  of  trouble  could  have  been  settled  easily  if  the 
latter  points  in  dispute  had  not  prevented  any  lasting  solu- 
tion during  the  entire  period.  In  fact,  one  might  say  that  the 
first  four  or  five  years  of  Richelieu's  administration  were  taken 
up  with  a  sharp  commercial  controversy  with  England,  with  the 
military  base  of  operations  at  La  Rochelle.  After  that,  this 
rivalry  was  extended  over  the  seas  toward  various  colonies, 
where  the  actual  rivalry  of  the  two  nations  is  seen  to  the  fullest 
extent.  The  Thirty  Years'  War  complicated  to  a  certain  ex- 
tent their  diplomatic  relations  so  far  as  Europe  was  concerned, 
because  England  was  a  much  sought-for  ally,  in  that  particular 
struggle.40 

Taking  up  the  commercial  phase  of  the  trouble,  one  discovers 
a  sharp  rivalry  on  the  sea,  which  resulted  in  depredations  on 
French  commerce,  which  in  turn  led  towards  the  preparation 
of  a  war  marine  to  protect  French  merchants.41  Richelieu  stated 

37  Even  the  marriage  of  Henrietta  had  its  economic  side  because  the 
French  in  spite  of  the  demands  of  the  English  had  failed  to  pay  the  dowry 
which  had  been  promised.  In  fact  the  Venetian  ambassador  summarized 
the  causea  of  the  trouble  between  the  two  countries  as  follows:  (1)  the  La 
Rochelle  affair,  (2)  navigation  troubles,  and  (3)  the  question  of  the  dowry. 
See  Calendars,  (Venetian),  XX,  66. 

as  Ibid.,  XIX,  592.  ' '  Seizure  of  vessels  on  both  sides  makes  both 
nervous.  Starting  as  a  friendly  dispute  between  Denmark,  England, 
and  France  in  1626  over  the  question  of  navigation,  it  now  began  to 
assume  serious  proportions."  See  Calendars,  (Venetian),  XIX,  482-483. 

39  Eichelieu,  Lettres,  II,  243. 

40  So  far  as  affairs  in  Europe  were  concerned,  the  relation  of  France  and 
England  in  the  Thirty  Years'  War  was  influenced  largely  by  territorial 
desires.     The  question  of  the  Palatinate  and  Lorraine  was  at  issue.     Eng- 
land was  interested  in  the  former  and  France  the  latter.     Neither  country 
was  enthusiastic  over  the  demands  of  the  other.     See  Revue  des\  Questions 
Historique,  1889,  XLV,  489-501. 

41  Richelieu,  Lettres,  II,  279-281 ;  305.     Sourdis,  I.  Introduction,  II-III. 


691]         ECONOMIC  ELEMENTS  IN  DIPLOMACY  OF  RICHELIEU  149 

openly  in  1627  that  he  was  going  to  protect  French  trade  on 
the  sea.42  Furthermore,  in  following  out  this  policy  of  pro- 
tection for  French  commerce,  he  used  the  same  mercantilistic 
policy  toward  England  as  toward  Spain.  He  would  not  permit 
the  importation  of  English  cloth,  but  wanted  England  to  send 
over  her  raw  materials,  such  as  iron,  hides,  etc.43  He  desired 
to  build  up  the  manufactures  of  France,  as  being  one  of  the 
requirements  of  a  strong  state.  It  is  no  wonder  that  England 
was  afraid  of  the  results  that  would  follow  if  Richelieu  carried 
out  his  policy.4* 

Colonial  interests  began  to  occupy  a  place  in  the  English- 
French  relations  as  early  as  1626.  "For,"  says  Richelieu,  "the 
establishment  of  the  company  of  Morbihan  in  1627  alarmed 
the  English  and  the  Dtutch  who  fear  our  control  of  the  sea  as 
an  ultimate  goal. ' ' 45  This  fear  on  the  part  of  the  English  is 
substantiated  by  the  reports  of  the  Venetian  ambassador  to 
England  in  1627.  He  says,  "the  dispute  over  the  Queen's 
household  and  the  shipping  are  merely  pretexts  and  not  diffi- 
cult to  adjust 46  but  after  that  they  would  never  permit 

the  French  to  strengthen  themselves  at  sea,  because  they  are 
so  close.  More  than  one  person  told  me  frankly  that  not  to 
oppose  this  would  amount  to  giving  the  French  the  keys  to  his 
majesty's  dominions."47  He  goes  on  to  point  out  the  fact  that 
the  French  look  upon  Richelieu's  attempt  to  build  up  a  marine 
as  a  means  whereby  he  could  make  himself  supreme,  not  only 
over  England  and  her  India  trade,  but  in  France  itself.  This 
and  other  quotations  indicate  that  the  English  feared  the  col- 
onial aspirations  of  the  French  and  realized  that  the  control 
of  the  sea  was  the  means  by  which  France  might  not  only  break 

42  Richelieu,    Lettres,  II,  389-390. 

«  Pigeonneau,  II,  423. 

4*  In  his  report  concerning  the  relations  existing  between  France  and 
England  in  1626,  the  Venetian  Ambassador  to  England  says,  "Richelieu's 
care  for  naval  affairs,  either  by  means  of  a  company  or  otherwise;  the  pas- 
sage of  the  Galleons  from  the  Mediterranean  to  the  ocean  and  other  man- 
oeuvres of  France  all  furnish  pretexts  for  comments,  suspicions,  etc."  See 
Calendars,  (Venetian),  XIX,  592. 

«  Richelieu,  Memoires,  XXIII,  127. 

46  France  had  failed  to  pay  the  rent  for  the  ships  loaned  by  the  English 
for  use  against  the  Huguenots  in  1626,  much  to  the  disgust  of  the  English. 
See  Calendars,  (Venetian),  XX,  122-123. 

"Ibid.,  XX,  98-99. 


150  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [692 

up  their  beginnings  of  an  empire,  but  even  attack  England 
itself.48  "The  secretary  Conway,"  writes  the  Venetian  ambas- 
sador in  1626,  "whom  I  visited  spoke  to  me  and  read  a  letter 
addressed  to  the  King  announcing  the  great  attention  paid  by 
Richelieu  to  maritime  affairs,  the  ships  expected  from  Holland, 
and  others  off  La  Rochelle  and  in  the  ports  of  Brittany  and 
Normandy,  the  arrangement  made  by  the  merchants  for  a  com- 
pany to  trade  off  the  East  Indies etc.  This  is  contrary 

to  the  common  weal  and  is  not  generally  understood,  etc. ' ' 49 

Both  England  and  Prance  seemed  to  realize  that  they  were 
to  be  mortal  enemies  for  control  of  the  sea  and  all  that  goes 
with  it.  As  one  writer  says,  ' '  Richelieu  constantly  believed  that 
Spain,  England,  and  Holland  derived  their  greatness  and  power 
from  the  marine.  Like  a  genius,  he  plunged  into  the  future. 
He  knew  that  Spain  would  not  control  her  colonies  much  longer, 
that  Holland,  whether  she  maintained  herself  or  not,  would  never 
be  the  great  danger  to  France.  But  as  for  England,  he  feared 
her  and  the  more  she  increased  in  power,  the  stronger  he  wished 
to  make  France. ' ' 50 

The  capture  of  merchant  ships  by  both  sides  served  as  the 
basis  of  their  opposition  to  each  other.  "This  has  to  be  stop- 
ped, ' '  says  Richelieu,  ' '  or  war  will  result. ' ' 51  Consequently 
the  great  economic  struggle  between  these  two  important  na- 
tions found  a  first  significant  expression  in  1626  over  this 
question  of  navigation.52  Richelieu  even  went  so  far  as  to  call 
the  English  pirates,  accusing  them  of  committing  all  sorts  of 
outrages  against  the  French  merchant  ships.  "No  heed  was 
taken  of  any  agreement  made  with  France."53  In  fact,  they 

*s  Calendars,  (Venetian),  XX,  242.  The  Venetian  ambassador  in  France 
writes  in  1627,  ' '  They  are  making  forty  pieces  of  artillery  in  the  foundries 
here  for  the  fleet,  according  to  the  invention  of  Targoni  I  wrote  of.  .  . 
The  terrible  results  they  produce  are  shown  by  experiments  .  .  .  be- 
fore the  Cardinal,  etc.  He  called  upon  me  yesterday  and  said  he  was  going 
in  a  fortnight  to  Brittany,  not  only  to  reduce  La  Rochelle  but  he  boasts  that 
he  will  enter  the  ports  of  England  itself,  etc." 

*»  Ibid.,  XX,  31. 

BO  Gouraud,  I,  191. 

"Richelieu,  Memoires,  XXIII,  236-237. 

62  Calendars,  (Venetian),  XIX,  222-223,  286;  XX,  267. 

53  Richelieu,  Memoires,  XXIII,  271-272,  277. 

Henry  IV,  notwithstanding  his  dire  need  of  the  English  Alliance,  frequent- 


693]          ECONOMIC  ELEMENTS  IN  DIPLOMACY  OP   RICHELIEU  151 

even  took  advantage  of  the  faith  the  French  placed  in  peace 
agreements  between  the  two  nations.54  Of  course  he  failed  to 
consider  the  English  side  of  the  case.  At  any  rate  it  is  clear 
that  at  the  start,  the  Cardinal  decided  that  if  France  was  to  be 
powerful  and  wealthy,  the  English  must  be  overcome.55 

Matters  were  brought  to  a  head  by  the  establishment  of  a 
marine,  as  has  been  discussed  before.56  Efforts  were  made  to 
arrange  a  satisfactory  solution  of  the  affair  by  means  of  negotia- 
tions. However,  the  piracies  committed  upon  the  merchant 
ships  of  both  nations  brought  in  another  element  which  made 
a  peaceful  settlement  difficult.  In  1627  the  King  of  England 
forbade  all  commerce  with  France,  and  confiscated  French  ves- 
sels and  goods  found  in  England.  Louis  XIII  in  retaliation  for- 
bade his  subjects  to  trade  with  England  and  accused  the  latter 
of  breaking  her  agreement.57  Evidently  the  La  Rochelle  affair 
and  the  marriage  question  were  not  the  leading  points  at  issue 
between  these  two  powers. 

Richelieu  now  believed  that  he  had  a  good  cause,  and  it  is 
interesting  to  note  how  he  tried  to  influence  public  opinion  against 
England.  For  example,  the  Mercure  Francois  mentions  the 
accusation  of  the  English,  that  the  French  were  laden  with 
taxes,  etc.  "However,"  it  says,  "if  the  people  of  France  suffer 
because  of  the  war,  the  English  endure  just  as  much,  and  curse 
the  Duke  of  Buckingham  for  having  caused  the  rupture  of  com- 
merce. The  merchants  have  lost  all  their  trade,  and  the  people 
are  overburdened  with  the  military  expenses.  All  for  the  im- 
aginary purpose  of  obtaining  power. ' ' 58  Many  traces  of  the 

ly  protested  against  the  violation  of  the  freedom  of  French  ships.  See 
Cheyney,  E.  P.,  A  History  of  England.  New  York,  1914,  I,  446. 

s*  Richelieu,   Memoires,  XXIII,   314. 

os  Ibid.,  XXIII,  270-271 ;  Sourdis,  Introduction,  II-III,  Lettres,  II,  561. 

se  See  Chapter  VII. 

57  Mercure  Francois,  XIII,  200-206. 

f*Ibid.,  XIII,  832-833.  Richelieu  had  good  reason  to  desire  the 
support  of  his  people,  because  of  the  fact  that  the  war  with  England 
ruined  the  business  of  French  merchants  along  the  coast,  who  constantly 
complained  on  this  account.  The  English  even  expected  the  fall  of  the 
Cardinal  because  the  merchants  of  Bordeaux,  Rouen,  Gascony,  Guienne,  etc., 
depended  on  English  trade.  See  Calendars,  (Venetian),  XX,  122-123,  151, 
257. 


152  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [694 

birth  of  the  intense  rivalry  of  these  nations  may  be  seen  at  this 
time.  Both  suffered,  but  were  willing  to  endure,  because  of  the 
bright  rewards  of  the  future  and  the  thoughts  of  the  weakness 
and  sufferings  of  the  other  side.  Public  opinion  was  influenced 
then  as  now  in  the  direction  of  material  gains.  The  resem- 
blance of  the  past  to  the  present  appears  when  Richelieu  in  the 
Mercure  Francois,  accuses  the  English  of  double-dealing  and 
lining  up  his  allies  against  him.59  In  a  certain  sense  it  would 
seem  that  the  edict  prohibiting  all  commerce  with  England,  ex- 
cept by  the  permission  of  Richelieu,  was  the  first  step  in  the 
economic  struggle  between  the  two  nations  which  was  to  come 
to  a  climax  in  the  famous  blockade  phase  of  the  Napoleonic 
War. 

But  the  match  which  really  started  the  struggle  in  1627  was 
found  in  the  aid  given  the  Huguenots  by  the  English.  Not 
satisfied  with  undergoing  the  displeasure  of  the  Cardinal  with 
respect  to  the  marriage  alliance  and  the  question  of  French 
and  English  commerce,  the  English  had  incurred  his  wrath  by 
taking  issue  with  him  in  regard  to  La  Rochelle.  They  had 
captured  the  island  of  Re  and  had,  he  believed,  tried  to  draw 
other  people  to  their  side,  using  as  a  pretext  the  religious  ques- 
tion.60 

At  that  time  salt  was  one  of  the  principal  products  of  the 

59  Mercure  Francois,  XIII,  833-835. 

eo  Trevelyan  says  that  English  interference  in  the  Huguenot  question 
stultified  the  European  policy  of  both  nations.  "The  Duke  of  Bucking- 
ham," he  says,  "couldn't  blind  Parliament  to  the  truth,  even  by  under- 
taking, with  huge  Protestant  bluster,  the  relief  of  those  very  Huguenots 
whom  he  had  been  helping  Richelieu  suppress."  He  then  goes  on  to  say 
that  the  English  were  sent  to  seize  the  island  of  Re  off  La  Rochelle  which 
was  to  serve  as  a  basis  for  English  commerce  and  privateering  at  the  ex- 
pense of  France,  secured  by  the  neighbourhood  alliance  of  the  great  Hugue- 
not party.  See  Trevelyan,  G.  M.,  England  under  the  Stuarts,  New  York, 

1910,  136-138. 

Another  English  writer  says  that  Buckingham  took  command  in  1627 
with  instructions  first  to  offer  the  citizens  of  La  Rochelle  the  help  which 
they  would  need  if  threatened  with  attack  by  their  King,  and  then  to  make 
good  the  English  mastery  of  the  sea  and  destroy  French  and  Spanish  com- 
merce. "This  conquest  of  Re  would  have  given  the  English  a  good  basis 
for  naval  operations  and  political  intrigue. ' '  See  Montague,  F.  C.,  History 
of  England  (1603-1660).  Political  History  of  England,  VII,  New  York, 

1911,  143-144. 


695]         ECONOMIC  ELEMENTS  IN  DIPLOMACY  OF   RICHELIEU  153 

external  commerce  of  the  French.61  Both  political  and  econ- 
omic interests  influenced  her  to  engage  in  it,  and  develop  the 
exportation  of  that  important  commodity.  A  valuable  trade  in 
salt  was  carried  on  in  northern  Italy  and  with  the  Swiss.62 
This  might  account  to  a  certain  extent  for  Richelieu's  interest 
in  that  part  of  Europe.  Furthermore,  the  large  amount  of  salt 
consumed  in  Flanders  has  a  peculiar  significance  when  one  comes 
across  attempts  on  the  part  of  Austria  and  Spain  to  gain  ab- 
solute control  in  that  country,  much  to  the  distress  of  France, 
as  will  be  shown  later. 

La  Roehelle  was  one  of  the  best  salt  ports  on  the  ocean,  in 
spite  of  efforts  of  Richelieu  to  build  up  other  harbors  where 
foreigners  could  obtain  this  commodity.63  However,  the  great 
geographical  discoveries  had  brought  about  the  rising  impor- 
tance of  all  the  Atlantic  ports.64  As  a  result,  La  Rochelle, 
Nantes,  Dieppe,  etc.,  became  very  important  not  only  in  the  eyes 
of  Richelieu,  but  in  the  eyes  of  foreign  nations  as  well.  Further- 
more, they  were  Huguenot  strongholds. 

The  basis  of  the  trouble  was  of  course  England's  interest  in 
the  Huguenots.  The  Cardinal  felt  that  England  did  not  have 
much  personal  sympathy  for  the  latter.  He  was  materialistic 
enough  to  base  the  affair  on  the  principle  of  a  struggle  for  sea 
power.  Indeed,  to  dominate  the  sea  was  the  desire  of  France. 
"None  of  them,"  he  says,  "not  even  the  Huguenots,  saw  the 
advantage  of  the  control  of  La  Rochelle  because  of  its  salt 
mines. ' ' 65  Richelieu  was  probably  mistaken  in  the  latter  part  of 
his  assertion.  For  it  is  not  unlikely  that  the  economic  importance 
of  La  Rochelle,  especially  with  regard  to  the  salt  mines,  was 
the  controlling  factor  in  causing  England,  Spain,  and  Holland 
to  be  friendly  toward  the  Huguenots.  Fundamentally,  the 
struggle  between  England  and  France  was  one  for  sea  power 
even  at  that  time.68  But  the  salt  mines  and  the  control  of  the 

ei  See  Chapter  VII. 

ez  D'Avenel,  Absolue  MonarcJrie,  II,  275. 

es  Ibid.,  Ill,  194-5. 

«*Lavisse,  E.,  Histoire  de  France,  9  vols.,  Paris,  1896,  VI,  277. 

es  Richelieu,  Memoires,  XXIII,  262.  Yet  Eichelieu  entertained  a  fear  of 
the  economic  relations  existing  between  La  Rochelle  and  the  English,  so  that 
he  tried  to  keep  track  of  the  trade  carried  on  between  them.  See  Richelieu, 
Lettres,  II,  499. 

ee  Calendars,   (Venetian),  XX,  77,  191-192,  282. 


154  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [696 

Garonne  and  Loire  rivers,  together  with  the  revenues  to  be 
obtained  from  the  Dutch  and  other  peoples  as  a  consequence 
of  the  possession  of  the  salt  mines,  must  have  been  objects 
of  desire  to  the  English,  especially  since  they  carried 
on  an  important  commerce  in  that  commodity  with  La 
Kochelle.67  The  Venetian  ambassador  at  London  seems  to  have 
had  difficulty  in  swallowing  the  statement  of  the  English  minis- 
try that  they  had  lately  conceived  of  the  war  against  the  French 
as  based  upon  the  sole  preservation  of  the  reformed  church  and 
the  public  weal.68  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  England  had  a 
certain  economic  interest  in  the  welfare  of  her  fellow  Protes- 
tants in  La  Rochelle.69  On  the  other  hand,  Richelieu  at  this 
point  frankly  admits  that  one  of  the  predominating  motives 
back  of  his  desire  to  retain  La  Rochelle  was  commercial,  namely, 
the  control  of  the  salt  mines. 

As  a  first  step  in  opposition  to  the  efforts  of  England  with 
regard  to  La  Rochelle,  Richelieu  proposed  a  union  with  Spain. 
He  did  this  not  only  for  political  but  also  for  economic  reasons, 
and  even  though  this  plan  failed  it  is  of  importance  because 
it  illustrates  his  diplomatic  skill  in  political  as  well  as 
in  economic  affairs.  He  knew  that  Spain  and  France  were  com- 
petitors in  the  salt  trade.  Therefore  he  proposed  a  scheme  where- 
by a  price  was  to  be  set  on  that  commodity  which  was  to  be  raised 
or  lowered  only  by  common  consent.  In  this  agreement  he  brings 
out  the  importance  of  the  salt  trade  with  the  northern  countries, 
and  then  says  that  a  mixture  of  Spanish  and  French  salt  would 

67  Calendars,  (Venetian),  XX,  341.  Calendars  of  State  Papers  and 
Manuscripts,  (Domestic  Series),  (1625-1642),  London,  1858-1887,  X,  534, 
553. 

»s  Calendars,  (Venetian),  XX,  374. 

"After  the  capture  of  B6,  they  (the  English)  mean  to  attempt  Oleron, 
which  is  also  very  important  on  account  of  its  salt  pans,  and  both  islands 
are  very  convenient  as  they  command  the  mouths  both  of  the  Garonne  and 
the  Loire,  the  chief  rivers  of  France,  enabling  their  possessors  to  take 
toll  sufficient  to  pay  the  cost  of  the  garrison  and  the  fleet  with  something 
over,  indeed,  some  say  that  already  certain  Dutch  ships  which  went  to  lade 
salt  evaded  a  duty  claimed  by  the  English,  by  main  force  and  flight." 
From  a  report  of  the  Venetian  ambassador  in  England  in  1672.  See  Cal- 
endars, (Venetian),  XX,  341. 

69  The  French  claimed  that  the  English  did  not  aid  the  Huguenots  for 
religious  but  for  territorial  and  commercial  reasons.  See,  Mercure  Fran 
QOIS,  XIII,  809-811;  XIV,  9-14. 


697]          ECONOMIC   ELEMENTS  IN  DIPLOMACY  OF  RICHELIEU  155 

offer  the  best  market,  due  to  the  fact  that  one  was  too  strong  and 
the  other  was  too  weak.70  He  offered  Spain  a  partnership  in 
a  salt  monopoly  as  an  inducement  towards  an  alliance  against 
England.  The  commerce  in  this  commodity  must  have  been 
very  important  to  have  caused  him  to  use  it  as  a  means  of  bring- 
ing about  such  a  vital  union. 

Even  though  he  did  not  succeed  in  this  plain,  he  went  ahead 
and  took  action  against  the  English,  who  were  constantly  prey- 
ing upon  the  French  commerce.  The  Duke  of  Guise  was  ordered 
to  prepare  a  fleet  and  to  oppose  them.71  The  English  were 
ready  to  meet  them,  for  the  fear  of  a  union  between  France 
and  Spain  had  caused  that  country  to  take  a  definite  stand  in 
her  relations  to  La  Rochelle.72  England  probably  saw  at  a  glance 
that  this  was  a  plan  which  promised  to  put  a  stop  to  French 
commercial  and  political  ambitions. 

An  edict  of  September  20th,  1627,  breaking  off  relations  with 
England,  indicates  that  the  two  nations  were  on  the  point  of 
an  armed  conflict.73  This  marks  definitely  not  only  the  begin- 
ning of  the  struggle  for  control  of  the  sea  but  also  the  contest  for 
the  colonial  empire  of  the  New  World.  Richelieu  had  taken 
the  first  step  toward  this  great  event,  when  he  began  to  build 
up  the  marine.  He  took  a  second  step  when  he  attempted  to 
increase  the  political  and  economic  importance  of  Brittany  and 
Normandy  and  make  the  harbor  of  Brest  the  commercial  em- 
porium of  the  world,  together  with  other  ports  near  it.74  Eng- 
land likely  realized  the  danger  which  threatened  her  and  even 
considered  the  capture  of  Brest  as  a  means  of  thwarting  the 
design  of  the  Cardinal,  who  would  have  liked  to  make  this  port 
the  center  of  trade  and  navigation.75  She  was  afraid  of  the 
growth  of  France,  and  even  the  commercial  alliance  proposed 
between  the  Hansa  cities  and  France  possibly  caused  her  to 

™  Richelieu,  Memoires,  XXIII,  288-289. 

71  Mercure  Frangois,  XIV,  38 

72  Calendars,  (Venetian),  XX,  77. 

"Isambert,  XVI,   215;    Richelieu,  Memoires,  XXIII,    277-278. 

74  Calendars,   (Venetian),  XX,  191. 

islbld.,  XX,  281. 

' '  Something  has  also  been  said, ' '  says  the  Venetian  ambassador,  ' '  about 
the  Port  of  Brest,  which  is  considered  of  great  advantage  for  thwarting 
the  designs  of  the  Cardinal,  who  would  fain  make  it  the  center  of  trade 
and  navigation,  but  when  on  the  spot  they  will  make  their  choice. ' ' 


156  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [698 

fear  the  Cardinal  as  an  opponent  of  England's  claims  to  su- 
premacy on  the  sea.76 

On  account  of  this  distrust  of  the  ambitions  of  Richelieu, 
Great  Brittain  began  to  look  for  an  ally.  It  was  natural  enough 
that  La  Eochelle  with  its  economic  importance  and  its  relative 
political  and  religious  independence  should  attract  her.  Here 
was  one  great  opportunity  to  destroy  the  growing  naval  power 
of  France  before  it  could  threaten  either  England  or  her  col- 
onies. Both  countries  began  negotiations  to  break  the  neutral- 
ity of  La  Rochelle.  The  French  tried  to  influence  the  Huguenots 
by  fear  of  their  land  forces,  near  at  hand ;  the  English  by  setting 
forth  the  interests  of  the  place  and  by  blandishments  towards 
the  inhabitants,  having  issued  a  decree  that  all  may  trade  and 
bring  food  into  the  town  and  islands,  as,  according  to  ancient 
claims,  they  belong  to  the  English  crown,  etc.77  The  French 
proposed  force,  and  the  English,  an  economic  alliance  and  old 
political  claims. 

Both  the  English  and  the  French  seemed  to  be  well  aware  of 
the  economic  importance  of  these  lands  of  the  Huguenots,  as 
each  nation  was  afraid  of  the  control  of  the  latter  by  the  other. 
But  this  fear  on  the  part  of  the  English  was  likely  increased 
when  they  saw  in  the  possession  of  La  Rochelle  by  the  French,  to- 
gether with  an  alliance  with  Spain,  a  loss  of  maritime  and  col- 
onial power.  On  the  other  hand,  the  French  could  see  in  English 
control  an  invasion  of  their  country,  and  a  loss  of  valuable  eco- 
nomic territory,  as  well  as  the  chance  for  future  naval  expansion. 
It  is  not  surprising  that  Richelieu  said  that  he  would  not  talk 
peace  with  the  English  as  long  as  their  flag  waved  above  French 
soil,78  nor  that  in  his  efforts  to  convert  France  from  a  conti- 
nental into  a  naval  power,  he  threatened  England  with  dire  mis- 
fortunes, when  he  should  have  a  fleet  large  enough  to  defeat. 
her.79  The  English  knew  when  he  became  superintendent, 
grand  master,  etc.,  that  they  would  have  to  look  out  for  his 

76  Calendars,  (Venetian),  XX,  56. 

"I  believe  that  Richelieu  would  gladly  listen  to  this  (the  proposal  of 
the  Hansa  towns)  for  the  sake  of  his  marine,  and  it  will  generate  ill  will 
here  by  reason  of  their  claims  to  supremacy  at  sea,"  says  the  Venetian  am- 
bassador to  England. 

77  Ibid.,  XX,  341. 
7*  Ibid.,  XX,  371. 

7» /&«?.,  XX,  179,  199. 


699]         ECONOMIC  ELEMENTS  IN  DIPLOMACY  OF   RICHELIEU  157 

increase  of  naval  strength  and  his  political  alliances,  especially 
with  La  Rochelle.80  It  would  seem  that  these  two  countries 
began  their  colonial  struggle  at  this  time,  and  it  is  to  the 
credit  of  Eichelieu  that  France  won  the  first  engagement  by 
the  capture  of  La  Rochelle. 

For  a  while  it  looked  as  though  both  nations  must  fight 
to  the  finish.  The  sole  basis  on  which  the  French  would  make 
peace  with  the  English  in  1629  was  that  England  should 
give  up  all  thoughts  of  La  Rochelle  and  the  Huguenots  forever.81 
Richelieu  realized  that  if  France  was  to  attain  national  politi- 
cal and  economic  unity,  and  was  to  enter  upon  an  expansive 
policy,  both  Spain  and  England  would  have  to  be  guarded 
against.  France  must  have  her  place  in  the  sun,  and  her  in- 
terests must  not  be  endangered  by  either  nation.82 

In  1629,  the  rivalry  between  the  two  nations  had  extended 
into  the  distant  colonies.  Port  Royal  in  Canada  and  the  island 
of  Saint-Kitts  had  been  taken  from  the  French  by  the  English. 
As  a  result,  Richelieu  sent  a  fleet  "to  show  the  English  that 
they  were  not  kings  of  the  sea  any  more. " 83  In  1629,  under 
the  leadership  of  Cahusac,  they  recaptured  the  island  of 
Saint-Kitts.8*  Richelieu  accused  the  English  of  entertaining 
the  desire  even  at  this  time  to  cast  the  French  out  of  Canada, 
a  remarkable  forecast  of  later  events. 

Then  came  a  change  in  Richelieu's  policy.  In  1629  he  sent 
Chateauneuf  to  England  as  his  representative  to  try  to  arrange 
a  settlement  of  disputes  and  a  commercial  treaty  which  would 
enable  both  countries  to  live  in  a  happy  union.85  Under  these 
general  directions  the  ambassador  had  specific  instructions  which 
he  was  to  try  to  carry  out.  For  example,  he  was  to  attempt  to 
settle  the  dispute  with  regard  to  the  commercial  relations  of 
France  and  England  with  Spain,  for  both  nations  were 
trying  to  prevent  each  other  from  trading  with  the  latter.  He 
was  also  to  take  up  the  affair  of  the  flags,  in  regard  to  salutes 
on  the  high  seas. 

But  what  was  the  cause  of  this  change?    The  Thirty  Years' 

so  Calendars,  (Venetian),  XX,  155. 
*ilbid.,  XXI,   7. 

82  Biehelieu,  Memoires,  XXIII,  281. 
«s  Eichelieu,  Lettres,  III,  446-447. 
**Ibid.,  Ill,  447-448  ;477-478;   518-519. 
ss  Ibid.,  Ill,  447-448;  518-519;  477-478. 


158  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OP  RICHELIEU  [700 

"War  had  reached  a  stage  wherein  the  defeat  of  the  Hapsburgs 
in  Austria  and  Spain  seemed  a  necessity.  Richelieu  wished 
England  to  join  with  him  in  aiding  Sweden.86  Therefore,  he 
had  to  give  up  his  active  struggle  with  England  for  control  of 
the  sea,  in  order  to  obtain  her  aid  in  the  Thirty  Years'  "War. 
"Whether  or  not  he  would  have  continued  the  conflict  after  the 
war  if  he  had  lived  is  a  mere  matter  of  conjecture.  The  probabil- 
ities are  that  when  peace  had  been  declared  and  his  long  de- 
layed marine  had  been  created  he  would  have  taken  up  again 
an  economic  and  political  opposition  to  England.87 

Richelieu  at  this  time  showed  his  diplomatic  genius  by  hav- 
ing his  ambassador  demand  a  new  treaty  from  the  English, 
which  would  bring  about  secure  and  free  mutual  commerce. 
All  agreements  in  past  treaties  were  to  be  renewed.88  Further- 
more, the  problem  concerning  the  restitution  of  vessels  captured 
by  the  English  was  to  be  taken  up,89  and  at  least  a  compromise 
was  to  be  agreed  upon.  England  was  no  longer  to  place  her 
neutrality  in  question  by  selling  ammunition  to  the  "infidels," 
which,  according  to  Richelieu,  caused  even  the  English  people 
to  murmur.90 

The  colonial  question  arose  at  this  time,  but  the  French 
ambassador  wisely  placed  the  emphasis  upon  the  other  commer- 
cial problems.  It  is  significant,  however,  that  in  his  Memoirs 
Richelieu  reports  that  the  King  of  England  told  Chateauneuf , 
that  the  King  of  France  would  produce  a  better  indication  of 
his  desire  of  living  in  peace  and  good  friendship  with  him,  by 
departing  from  his  desire  to  become  master  of  the  sea.91  Riche- 
lieu himself  points  out  that  even  the  English  centered  the  en- 
tire struggle  on  the  control  of  the  sea.  "Jealousy  of  French 
power  on  the  ocean  caused  English  opposition  in  1629,"  says 
the  Cardinal,  "even  the  merchants  of  England  were  envious  of 
those  of  France."92 

se  Richelieu,  Lettres,  III,  447-448.     Pigeonneau  II,  414-415. 

"  See  Calendars,   (Venetian),  XX,  179. 

ss  Richelieu,  Memoires,  XXV,  198-199;  Levasseur,  I,  264. 

89  A  peace  agreement  had  been  made  April  24,  1629,  which*  established 
free  commerce,  etc.  But  this  agreement  had  been  broken  by  England.  See 
Eichelieu,  Memoires,  XXV,  199,  also  Dumont,  V,  pt.  2,  580-581. 

so  Richelieu,  Memoires,  XXV,  199-201. 

ei/bid.,  XXV,  201-205. 

»2  Ibid.,  XXV,  211.  The  Dutch  ambassador  in  France  wrote  in  1628 
"that  the  Cardinal  clings  to  his  old  idea  about  establishing  com- 


701]         ECONOMIC  ELEMENTS  IN  DIPLOMACY  OF   RICHELIEU  159 

The  recapture  of  Saint-Kitts  strengthened  the  fears  of  the 
English.  But  Chateauneuf ,  in  a  kindly  way,  assured  them  that 
the  French  desired  only  to  enforce  the  peace  terms,  and  that 
they  should  have  no  fear  of  the  growing  sea  power  of  the 
French.93  The  English  King  replied  that  just  as  Queen  Eliza- 
beth had  warned  Henry  IV  to  leave  the  sea  alone,  he,  Charles  I, 
would  do  the  same. 

Richelieu,  in  order  to  settle  the  trouble  concerning  the  sea, 
then  sent  Count  de  Nitschdil  as  a  general  representative  to  call  on 
the  King  of  England.  But  the  latter  was  not  willing  to  con- 
cede that  equality  on  the  sea  which  Eichelieu  demanded.  ^  He 
said  that  the  French  were  causing  trouble  by  persisting  in 
increasing  their  marine  power.  The  French  representatives 
laughed  at  the  idea  of  another  person's  telling  a  great  ruler 
what  he  should  do  in  his  state.9*  Richelieu  in  reply  asserted 
that  the  arms  of  France  were  always  for  defence  and  assis- 
tance against  enemies  and  never  for  purposes  of  oppression.95 

In  1630  De  Fontenay-Mareuil  took  Chateauneuf 's  place  in 
England.  Richelieu  instructed  him  to  try  to  obtain  the  resti- 
tution of  Canada,  and  the  restoration  of  the  merchandise  and 
vessels  captured  since  the  peace  agreement  of  1629,  and  to  at- 
tempt to  arrange  a  good  peace  between  the  two  crowns,  and  settle 
all  commercial  difficulties.  He  even  mentioned  the  so-called 
"Laws  of  the  Sea,"  as  giving  the  final  decision  with  regard  to  the 
restitution  of  the  ships.  "Reason  and  justice  are  to  decide  af- 
fairs," he  said.96  The  new  ambassador  was  to  try  to  settle  the 
commercial  relations  between  France  and  England,  and  further- 
more to  determine  England's  attitude  in  the  Thirty  Years'  War, 
especially  with  respect  to  the  Palatinate.97 

94  Richelieu,  Memoires,  XXV,  205-6. 

panics  as  in  Holland,  and  extending  navigation.  The  English  will  never 
permit  this,  so  as  not  to  put  arms  in  the  hands  of  thousands  of  hostile 
neighbors  against  an  open  Kingdom  like  this,  and  state  policy  does  not 
allow  it."  Calendars,  (Venetian),  XXI,  446. 

»3  Richelieu,  Memoires,  XXV,  201-5.  A  good  example  of  the  fears  of 
some  of  the  English  people  is  found  in  a  letter  of  an  English  captain  in 
1630,  who  was  afraid  of  the  intention  of  France  to  dominate  Canada  and 
New  England  to  the  detriment  of  the  English.  Calendars,  (Colonial,  1574- 
1660),  London,  1860,  I,  106. 

95/bi<Z.,  XXV,  205. 

90  Richelieu,  Lettres,  III,  518-519. 

97  Hid,  III,  671-672. 


160  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [702 

Finally,  on  March  29,  1632,  after  many  negotiations,  the  treaty 
of  Saint-Germain  was  signed.  In  this  treaty  justice  was  to 
guide  the  nations  in  the  matter  of  prizes  of  the  sea,  depreda- 
tions, and  reprisals.  Commerce  and  navigation  were  to  con- 
form to  the  liberal  principles  of  the  past  treaties  of  1606  and 
1610,  which,  according  to  the  French,  had  been  ignored  by  the 
English.  Lastly,  the  colonial  possessions  taken  by  England 
were  to  be  returned  to  France.98  It  seems  that  the  importance 
of  this  treaty  has  been  overlooked.  The  argument  shows  clearly 
the  competency  of  Eichelieu,  in  settling  not  only  political  dis- 
putes but  economic  problems  as  well.  Furthermore,  it  was  a 
clever  solution  of  the  difficulties  between  England  and  France. 
Theoretically,  Richelieu  obtained  what  he  desired  and  strength- 
ened the  commerical  and  colonial  power  of  France  thereby. 

After  this,  the  Cardinal  was  busy  with  the  great  continental 
struggle  and  could  not  concentrate  so  much  upon  the  foreign 
economic  and  political  situation.  However,  in  1635  he  was  forced 
to  send  a  combined  French  and  Dutch  fleet  to  guard  the  channel. 
But  the  Dutch  did  not  remain  long  with  the  French.  They  were 
afraid  of  the  English  claim  of  being  ''Lord  of  the  sea."  To 
avoid  taking  sides  in  a  sea  dispute  between  the  two  nations, 
the  Dutch  sailed  away  and  left  the  French  alone."  Now  the 
issue  was  a  question  of  control  of  the  British  channel. 

"The  King  of  England,"  says  Richelieu,  "in  a  notice  placed 
in  the  Bourse,  affirmed  the  English  control  of  the  channel. 
Commerce  should  be  free  but  under  English  supervision." 
But  the  Cardinal  having  all  he  could  do  to  handle  the  Thirty 
Years'  War,  was  forced  to  give  in  to  the  English  on  this  as 
well  as  the  general  question  of  the  sea  in  spite  of  an  almost 
national  hatred  engendered  over  the  problem.100  He  tried  to 
keep  up  friendly  relations  with  the  British  and  retain  them  in 
an  alliance  with  Holland  and  France  instead  of  with  Spain.101 

o*Mercure  Francois,  XVIII,  39-52;  Calendars,  (Venetian),  XXI,  311- 
315;  Levasseur,  I,  264;  Dumont,  VI,  pt.  I,  31-32. 

99Eiehelieu,  Memoires,  XXVIII,  359-360. 

K>O  The  English,  in  1636,  were  constantly  threatened  by  French  ships. 
The  French  sailors  called  the  English,  "English  dogs."  Eichelieu  accord- 
ing to  reports  had  promised  a  sum  of  money  to  those  men  of  war  who  could 
interrupt  the  King  of  England's  packet.  English  vessels  coming  from 
La  Rochelle,  were  forced  to  avoid  the  French  fleets  for  fear  of  capture. 
See  Calendars,  (Domestic,  1635-1636),  IX,  561-562. 

101  Eichelieu,  Lettres,  IV,  559-567. 


703]         ECONOMIC  ELEMENTS  IN  DIPLOMACY  OP  RICHELIEU  161 

He  even  attempted  to  settle  the  question  as  to  who  should  salute 
when  English  and  French  ships  met  on  the  high  seas.  He 
favored  their  relative  location  as  determining  this  matter;  that 
is,  if  they  should  meet  near  the  French  coast,  the  English  would 
salute  the  French,  and  if  they  should  meet  near  the  English 
coast  it  would  be  vice  versa.102  Nothing  was  accomplished  with 
regard  to  this  point. 

In  1637,  he  again  tried  to  get  the  English  to  break  their 
neutrality  and  come  in  against  Austria  and  Spain.  "  However, 
the  gain, ' '  he  said, ' '  in  selling  contraband  goods  as  a  neutral  with 
warring  nations,  made  England  a  neutral. ' ' 103  It  is  plain  that 
Eichelieu  could  see  the  economic  forces  underneath  the  diplomacy 
of  the  nations  at  that  time,  especially  when  they  concerned  his  en- 
emies. In  his  Memoirs  in  1637,  he  says,  "Is  this  neutrality  of 
England  due  to  an  honest  love  of  repose,  or  is  it  due  to  the  gain 
to  be  derived  thereby,  during  such  a  neutrality,  by  conveying 
contraband  goods  to  warring  nations  as  well  as  carrying  on 
during  the  wars  the  entire  commerce  of  France  and  Spain.  Is 
that  why  England  kept  from  a  direct  alliance  with  France  ? ' ' 104 
At  another  place  he  complains  that  England  constantly  aided 
Spain  to  the  detriment  of  France.105  England  still  feared  the 
French  on  the  sea,  and  Richelieu  realized  this  as  is  shown  by 
the  fact  that  he  instructed  his  ambassador  there  to  avoid  a  dis- 
cussion of  England's  imaginary  empire  of  the  sea.106  He  knew 
that  England  was  torn  between  two  policies,  the  materialistic 
neutrality,  or  the  aid  of  the  Elector  Palatine  by  participation 
in  the  war.  It  was  the  aim  of  France  to  get  her  to  follow  the 
latter  policy.107 

When  the  Cardinal  died,  his  plans,  of  course,  were  left  in- 
complete. What  he  would  have  done  after  the  Thirty  Years' 
War  is  not  mere  conjecture  however,  for  in  his  Testament  Pol- 
itique  he  has  strongly  advised  the  necessity  of  a  powerful  mar- 
ine to  oppose  the  claims  of  the  English  to  being  Lord  of  the 
Seas."108 

102  Eichelieu,  Lettres,  V,  66-70. 

103  ibid.,  v,  854-856. 

104  Richelieu,  Memoires,  XXX,  523. 

105  Ibid.,  XXX,  529. 

loe  Richelieu,  Lettres,  VI,  10-12. 
107  Richelieu,  Testament  Politique,  II,  49-50. 
.,  II,  50-52. 


162  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [704 

Richelieu  looked  at  England  in  a  large  degree  from  the  eco- 
nomic point  of  view.  He  saw  in  both  England  and  Holland,  two 
of  his  great  rivals  in  the  East  Indies  and  Persia.109  In  fact 
one  must  conclude  that  the  former  was  a  definite  colonial  and  com- 
mercial opponent  of  France  at  that  time.  Spain  was  on  the  de- 
cline and  he  knew  it.  England  was  the  enemy  of  the  future  and 
he  wanted  to  prepare  against  her.  If  he  had  lived  long  enough 
to  carry  out  his  economic  policy  it  is  a  question  whether  or  not 
our  land  would  have  contained  one  English-speaking  nation  as 
today.  At  any  rate  the  Thirty  Years'  War  put  off  the  com- 
mercial and  colonial  struggle  for  a  hundred  years  —  for  better 
or  for  worse  —  but  Richelieu  seems  to  have  been  aware  that  it 
had  to  come  in  the  end. 

Turning  to  Holland,  one  discovers  that  Richelieu's  attitude 
in  regard  to  that  country  was  different  from  that  toward  England 
and  Spain.  As  has  been  shown  before,  he  admired  the  Dutch 
industrial  and  commercial  genius,  built  up  in  spite  of  numerous 
obstacles.  Indeed,  he  described  it  as  a  model  for  the  future 
growth  of  France.110  He  was  at  no  time  actually  willing  to 
undertake  a  hostile  attitude  toward  this  nation,  although  he 
threatened  her  with  dire  punishment  when  she  refused  to  lend 
him  boats  to  be  used  against  England.111 

Just  as  with  England,  the  economic  rivalry  between  France 
and  Holland,  even  though  it  existed,  was  not  permitted  to  dom- 
inate on  account  of  the  Thirty  Years'  War.112  In  fact  it  seems 
that  the  alliance  of  1627  with  the  Dutch,  for  mutual  protection 
and  satisfactory  commercial  relations,  was  an  effort  on  the  part 
of  Richelieu  to  enlist  the  aid  of  this  country  not  only  to  put 
down  the  Huguenots,  but  also  to  aid  in  the  prosecution  of  the 
Thirty  Years'  War.113  He  was  constantly  afraid  of  an  alliance 
between  Spain  and  Holland,114  even  though  he  did  not  like  to 
see  the  Dutch  carrying  most  of  the  French  commerce  on  their 
vessels. 

The  treaty  of  1627  was  arranged  with  the  purpose  of  removing 

109  Richelieu,  Testament  Politique,  II,  73-74. 
«<>See  Chapter  IX,  138. 
in  Calendars,  (Venetian),  XX,  192. 
112  Levasseur,  I,  266. 
us  Mercure  Francois,  XIV,  14. 

11* Richelieu,  A.  J.  Cardinal,  due  de,  Maximes  d'£tat,  et  Fragments 
Politique  du  Cardinal  de  Bichelieu,  Ed.,  G.  Hanotaux,  Paris,  1880,  730-731. 


705]         ECONOMIC  ELEMENTS  IN  DIPLOMACY  OP  RICHELIEU  163 

these  difficulties,  and  of  engaging  the  Dutch  to  act  as  the  pro- 
tectors of  the  French  marine  which  was  being  built  at  that  time. 
Improved  commercial  relations  were  the  result  of  this  treaty.115 
Yet  the  Dutch  were  not  so  friendly  as  they  might  have  been, 
as  is  shown  by  the  incident  in  which  they  looked  on  in  glee  while 
the  English  captured  certain  French  vessels  near  their  coast.116 
The  fear  of  the  English  by  the  Dutch,  was  one  of  the  most  bitter 
complaints  made  by  Richelieu  during  the  Huguenot  affair.  He 
says  that  Spain  proved  to  be  a  false  ally,  and  Holland  an  un- 
neutral  neutral,  in  that  she  persisted  in  sending  ammunition  to 
the  English.  She  was  afraid  of  the  latter  country  and  really 
favored  her.117  Richelieu  did  not  like  this,  as  is  shown  by  his 
letters.  He  thought  it  right  for  France  to  trade  with  Spain,  as 
their  commerce  was  important;  but  for  the  Dutch  to  do  so  was 
wrong.118  International  rights  were  thus  considered  from  nar- 
row national  points  of  view. 

Both  Holland  and  France  were  looking  after  their  own  inter- 
ests on  the  sea.  The  former  country  had  before  this  supplanted 
French  navigation  upon  the  east  coast  of  Africa,  and  was 
very  strong  in  the  East  Indies.119  She,  like  England,  took  plea- 
sure in  carrying  on  depredations  upon  French  commerce,  even 
forming  an  alliance  with  the  Barbary  pirates  to  do  so.  Riche- 
lieu tried  to  force  the  Dutch  to  accept  terms  by  which  rules  of 
reciprocity  should  guide  their  commercial  relations.  "He  did 
not  want  to  undertake  a  tariff  war,"  says  one  writer,  "which 
would  have  alienated  the  valuable  Dutch  commerce  and  influ- 
ence. He  tried  to  make  the  Dutch  his  associates  in  enterprises 
in  the  East  and  in  the  Americas.  The  treaties  of  1627  and  1629 
stipulated  that  they  aid  the  French  merchant  boats,  and  allow 
their  men  to  associate  with  the  French  in  the  navigation  to  both 
of  the  Indies. ' '  12°  In  fact,  Richelieu  desired  to  settle  their 

us  Levasseur,  1,  266;  Dumont,  V,  pt.  2,  523. 

uoMercure  Francois,  XIV,  159. 

i"  Richelieu,  Lettres,  III,  66,  78. 

11*  Ibid.,  Ill,  471.  Holland  as  a  matter  of  fact  was  rather  in  sympathy 
with  the  Huguenots  and  the  English  as  against  Bichelieu.  She  not  only 
refused  to  take  action  as  an  ally  of  France,  but  would  only  lend  boats 
to  the  French  to  be  used  against  Austria  and  Spain.  See  Calendars, 
(Venetian),  XX,  115,  192,  310,  353. 

us  Levasseur,  I,  273. 

120  Pigeonneau,  II,  424-425.  This  treaty  illustrates  the  fact  that  Holland 
also  desired  to  stay  by  her  agreements  with  England.  Probably  she  was 


164  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [706 

commercial  relations  by  means  of  a  compromise  and  thus  open 
north  Europe,  the  Levant,  Africa,  Canada,  the  Indies,  Persia, 
etc.,  to  trade. 

The  Cardinal  knew  that  even  though  Holland  was  a  danger- 
ous economic  and  political  rival,  yet  she  was  the  natural  enemy 
of  Spain  and  as  such  should  be  used  as  one  of  the  elements  which 
was  to  contribute  to  the  defeat  of  the  Hapsburgs.  In  1630 
he  took  this  stand  definitely  when  he  arranged  a  treaty  with 
Holland  which  completed  those  of  the  past.121  After  this  she 
was  one  of  the  allies,  and  her  commercial  power  was  forgotten 
for  the  time  being  by  the  French.  But,  the  Cardinal  did  not 
forget  the  economic  side,  as  shown  by  the  fact  that  in  his  Testa- 
ment Politique  he  left  plans  for  obtaining  the  commerce  in  the 
north  which  the  Dutch  and  the  Flemish  had  controlled.122  This 
intention  has  an  added  significance  when  studied  in  connection 
with  the  Thirty  Years'  War. 

Richelieu 's  relations  with  Italy  were  of  course  interwoven  with 
his  purpose  of  keeping  the  Spanish  and  Austrians  from  uniting 
through  that  country,  which  would  have  been  the  death  blow 
to  any  plans  he  had  with  regard  to  the  development  of  France. 
Her  boundaries  had  to  be  secure,  not  only  at  that  time,  but  also 
for  the  future.123  He  did  not  desire  territory  in  Italy.  In  fact 
he  proposed  the  formation  of  a  confederation  in  that  country,124 
which  would  keep  Austria  and  Spain  separated,123  for  the  Cardi- 
nal frankly  admitted  in  1637  that  the  French  did  not  desire  new 
lands  in  Italy,  or  on  the  Rhine  border.126  All  he  wanted  was  an 
opportunity  to  develop  France  without  fear  of  foreign  invasion,  a 
prerequisite  to  a  strong  economic  state.  Until  a  lasting  peace 
was  assured  for  France  so  far  as  concerned  foreign  affairs, 
Richelieu  was  willing  to  fight.127  Indeed  the  Cardinal  goes  so 

afraid  of  the  France  of  the  future.  Furthermore,  this  treaty  broke  up  the 
Franco-Spanish  alliance,  much  to  the  disgust  of  the  latter.  See  Calendar*, 
(Venetian),  XX,  353.  See  Dumont,  etc.,  V,  pt.,  2,  462-464,  523,  605-606, 
VI,  pt.  I,  69-70,  124-135,  127,  242-243. 

121  Isambert,  XVI,  356,  Dumont,  V,  pt.  2,  605-606. 

122  Richelieu,  Testament  Politique,  II,  69-70. 

123 Richelieu,  Maximes,  d'ttat,  815,  etc.;   Lcttres,  I,  260-267,   294-296. 

124  Richelieu,  Lettres,  III,  239. 

125/fttd.,  VII,  695. 

"6  ibid.,  V,  595-597.     Bridges  137. 

127  Richelieu,  Memoires,  XXVI,   42. 


707]         ECONOMIC  ELEMENTS  IN  DIPLOMACY  OF  RICHELIEU  165 

far  as  to  claim  that  peace  as  he  sees  it  would  be  a  true  peace 
for  all  Christianity.128  However,  his  altruism  was  not  such  that 
this  can  be  entirely  accepted.  Itaty  might  have  been  on  the 
territorial  waiting  list. 

Richelieu's  relations  with  the  East  have  been  considered.129 
Again,  it  is  the  story  of  commercial  rivalries  between  England, 
Spain,  Holland  and  France.  Also,  the  Levant  had  a  certain  con- 
nection with  the  Thirty  Years'  War,  in  that  the  Cardinal  at 
one  time  was  afraid  of  a  possible  alliance  between  Turkey  and 
Austria.  He  even  went  so  far  as  to  advise  his  ambassador  to 
prevent  Turkey  from  undertaking  any  negotiations  with  the 
enemy.130  The  alliance  was  not  formed.  However,  the  Cardinal 
had  to  neglect  his  commercial  interests  in  the  Orient  and  permit 
the  Dutch  to  obtain  a  good  foothold  by  means  of  a  maritime 
route  around  the  cape.131 

The  Cardinal's  interest  in  Sweden  and  the  North  in  general 
was  closely  bound  up  in  the  Thirty  Years'  War  and  the  question 
as  to  the  control  of  the  Baltic  sea.  Of  course  the  aid  given  by 
Richelieu  to  the  Swedish  King  in  his  attempt  to  overcome  the 
Hapsburgs  has  been  mentioned  by  most  writers.  But  the  mo- 
tives which  caused  Richelieu  to  do  so  have  been  brought  forth 
in  rather  an  unsatisfactory  way.  The  Cardinal  did  consider 
that  he  used  this  Scandinavian  country  as  a  tool  to  defeat  the 
Emperor.  But  why?  In  his  Memoirs  he  says  that  Sweden  en- 
tered the  war  on  account  of  the  fear  of  the  increasing  size  of 
the  Emperor's  dominions,  which  threatened  her  boundaries; 
and  also,  to  aid  the  poor  northern  German  states,  and  preserve 
freedom  of  commerce  in  the  Baltic.132  Richelieu  therefore  sent" 
Charnace  to  Sweden  as  his  representative,  who  was  to  tell  the 
King  that  France  was  in  sympathy  with  the  misery  of  Germany, 
and  was  afraid  of  the  extension  of  the  frontiers  of  the  Empire, 
whose  ambitions  had  no  limits.  He  desired  to  furnish  troops  and 
money  to  aid  the  Swedes,  which  should  be  used  to  maintain  the 
liberty  of  the  Princes,  communities,  and  cities  of  Germany,  and 
to  conserve  the  security  of  the  two  seas,  the  Baltic,  the  ocean, 

128  Richelieu,  Lettres,  IV,  29. 

129  See  Chapter  IX. 

130  Richelieu,  Lettres,  VI,  323. 
isi  Levasseur,  I,  270. 

132  Richelieu,  Memoires,  XXVI,  397. 


166  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [708 

and  their  ports.  To  do  this,  the  forces  of  the  Emperor 
should  be  driven  out  of  Germany  and  their  fortresses  demol- 
ished. Now  to  assist  in  this  undertaking,  France  was  to  furnish 
money  yearly,  as  long  as  necessary,  and  the  English,  Dutch  and 
Danes  were  also  to  aid  the  Swedes.133  In  other  words,  Richelieu 
feared  the  growing  universal  power  of  the  Empire.  The  Danes 
had  failed  to  stem  the  tide.  Now  the  control  of  the  Baltic  was  in 
danger.  Richelieu  and  his  allies,  in  order  to  stop  this  threatened 
economic  and  political  conquest  of  the  entire  north  by  the  empire, 
urged  Sweden  to  sacrifice  herself.  She  was  to  restore  the  free- 
dom of  commerce  on  the  Baltic  and  the  ocean,  which  Richelieu 
desired  so  much.  In  order  to  do  so,  the  German  princes  must  be 
given  control  of  the  coast,  and  the  imperial  forces  had  to  be 
pushed  back  from  their  advanced  position. 

It  may  be  that  his  relations  with  the  northern  states  were 
largely  economic.  He  saw  the  value  of  trade  in  the  north  and 
in  the  Baltic.  In  1640  mention  is  made  of  the  fact  that  France 
did  not  carry  on  much  commerce  with  Poland,  for  it  was  mostly 
in  the  hands  of  the  Austrians.134  Indeed  it  is  likely  that  the 
control  of  the  Baltic  was  one  of  the  great  factors  in  the  Thirty 
Years'  War.  At  any  rate,  Richelieu  desired  the  Baltic  and  its 
commerce  to  be  free.  This  desire  together  with  the  fall  of  the 
Empire  was  bound  to  have  great  economic  and  political  conse- 
quences. Richelieu,  as  shown  by  his  efforts  to  develop  foreign 
commerce,  would  have  been  only  too  glad  to  increase  the  French 
trade  in  the  north.135  He  could  have  accomplished  this  aim  if 
the  Baltic  had  become  controlled  only  by  the  Baltic  countries 
wJth  whom  he  was  on  friendly  terms. 

The  question  which  now  naturally  arises  is  just  what  con- 
nection did  the  Thirty  Years'  War  have  with  Richelieu's  poli- 
cies? Judging  by  the  Cardinal's  ambitions  in  the  north  which 
even  extended  to  the  east  by  way  of  Russia,  one  can  well  infer 
that  his  extra  European  policies  both  commercial  and  colonial 
had  a  close  connection  with  his  continental  program.  Both  parts 
of  his  administration  were  intermingled  and  he  realized  that 
success  in  each  was  a  necessary  preliminary  if  he  wanted 
to  develop  and  increase  the  political  and  economic  grandeur 


Francois,  XVII,  469-470. 
is*  Eichelieu,  Lettres,  VII,  891-892. 
IBS  gee  Chapter  IX. 


709]          ECONOMIC  ELEMENTS  IN  DIPLOMACY  OP   RICHELIEU  167 

of  France;  or  looking  at  it  from  another  point  of  view, 
just  as  the  Seven  Years'  "War  was  closely  bound  up  with  the 
colonial  struggle  of  France  and  England,  the  Thirty  Years' 
War  decided  whether  or  not  the  Hapsburgs  were  to  be  the  con- 
tinental and  colonial  powers  of  the  world  as  against  the  claims 
of  France,  England,  and  their  allies.  "The  possession  and  ex- 
ploitation of  the  colonies  had  become  an  international  political 
question  at  that  time."136 

Richelieu  continually  claimed  that  France  desired  no  terri- 
tory as  a  result  of  the  Thirty  Years'  War,  beyond  her  natural 
boundaries.137  What  then  was  his  purpose  in  entering  the  war 
and  playing  the  part  he  did  if  one  grants  him  the  truth  of  that 
statement  ? 

In  his  Memoirs,  he  maintains  that  he  sought  a  permanent  peace. 
He  wanted  to  prevent  the  ambition  of  Austria  causing  her 
to  overcome  the  weaker  German  States.  Each  nation  should 
get  what  belonged  to  it.13*  According  to  the  Cardinal,  his  pol- 
icy was  to  protect  the  rights  of  small  nations  against  the  growing 
power  of  the  Empire.  He  claims  that  he  had  no  material  in- 
terest in  doing  so,  but  only  desired  a  peace  which  would  be  for 
the  benefit  of  all  the  allies.139  In  a  letter  to  the  Swiss  Cantons, 
he  assured  them  that  he  was  working  only  for  a  permanent 
peace,  and  while  fighting  for  it  he  would  not  infringe  upon 
their  territory.140  It  might  be  that  Richelieu  really  believed  that 
a  victory  over  Spain  and  the  Empire  would  benefit  the  world. 
We  do  know  that  he  constantly  considered  the  welfare  of  France, 
even  before  that  of  any  other  nation  or  group  of  nations,  mak- 
ing this  the  guiding  force  of  his  entire  administration. 

Now  carrying  this  idea  of  "state  interest"  to  its  logical  con- 
clusion, it  seems  quite  in  harmony  with  the  rest  of  Richelieu's 
administration  to  say  that  his  opposition  to  the  Hapsburgs 
naturally  involved  an  alliance  to  overpower  them  on  the  Baltic 
as  well  as  on  the  Mediterranean.  Deschamps  has  mentioned 
an  anonymous  Memoir  of  1626,  which  affected  Richelieu  to  a 
marked  extent  and  indicates  the  patriotic  policy  behind  the 

las  Deschamps,  80-88. 

i3r  Eichelieu,   Memoires,   XVII,  403-406. 

IBS  ibid.,   XXVII,  517-521;    Lettres,  VI,  243. 

139 /bid.,  XXVII,  499-500. 

no  Ibid.,  XXX,  340. 


168  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [710 

Cardinal's  administration  at  that  time.  The  end  was  a  com- 
mercial and  maritime  league  to  weaken  Spain  on  the  Mediterra- 
nean, and  the  first  step  was  to  establish  a  navy  and  increased 
commerce  in  that  field.141  Richelieu  in  his  creation  of  a 
marine  accomplished  this  first  step.  His  attempts  to  draw 
England,  Holland,  Denmark,  and  Sweden  into  the  war  against 
the  Hapsburgs  marks  the  second  step  taken  by  Richelieu  toward 
the  completion  of  that  plan.142 

In  1632,  Richelieu  received  from  a  Hollander  by  the  name 
of  Wilhelm  Usselinx,  a  written  plan  which  proposed  an  associa- 
tion (commercial  and  colonial)  with  Sweden  and  the  German 
princes.  The  purpose  of  it  was  to  drive  Spain  from  the  control 
of  seas.  The  writer  gives  as  his  reason  for  this  proposition,  that 
the  Hapsburgs  of  Austria  have  been  the  cause  of  all  the  trouble 
for  more  than  a  hundred  years,  and  the  King  of  Spain  was  the 
chief  supporter  of  that  ambitious  house.  Since  the  ruler  of  Spain 
was  powerful  only  through  the  money  from  the  American  col- 
onies, France  should  form  a  company  which  would  destroy 
Spain  commercially  and  colonially.143  Richelieu's  efforts  to 
obtain  allies  against  the  Hapsburgs  indicate  that  he  probably 
heeded  this  advice. 

But  it  is  evident  that  Richelieu  must  have  realized  the  eco- 
nomic importance  of  an  alliance  against  these  powers,  for  the 
Mercure  Francois,  in  1628,  published  the  various  efforts  of  Spain 
and  Austria  to  form  a  commercial  and  political  alliance  against 
France,  England,  and  Holland.  In  1628,  one  can  read  an 
account  of  the  attempts  of  the  Hapsburgs  and  Poland  to  control 
the  Baltic  by  means  of  a  mutual  alliance,  together  with  the 
aid  of  the  Hanseatic  cities,  especially  Lubeck,  Danzig,  and  Ham- 
burg, which  cities  were  all  offered  great  privileges,  in  return 
for  which  they  should  leave  the  commercial  alliance  with  Hol- 
land and  England.  The  Hapsburgs  even  tried  to  get  Sweden 
by  offering  Prussia  to  that  country  in  order  to  separate  her 
from  Denmark  (which  they  desired  to  overrun).  They  said 
openly  that  their  purpose  was  to  control  the  trade  and  commerce 

I"  Deschamps,  93-94. 

142 '  <  His  treaties  with  England,  Holland  and  Germany  and  his  defiance 
of  Spain  were  all  economic  policies,"  says  M.  d'Avenel,  "He  extended  the 
boundary  of  France  in  order  for  her  to  be  secure. ' '  See  Richelieu,  Lettres, 
I,  LXXX. 

us  Deschamps,  96-99. 


711  j         ECONOMIC  ELEMENTS  IN  DIPLOMACY  OP  RICHELIEU  169 

of  the  Baltic  and  to  ruin  the  Dutch  thereby.  To  do  this  they 
planned  a  strong  fleet  on  the  Baltic.144  It  is  not  strange  that 
Richelieu  was  so  anxious  to  bring  Sweden  and  the  North  German 
states  into  an  alliance  with  France.  He  must  have  realized 
that  France  and  her  allies  were  threatened  by  a  combination 
founded  by  the  Hapsburgs,  which  might  cause  their  political 
and  economic  ruin  if  allowed  to  continue. 

It  is  no  wonder  that  Richelieu  tried  to  settle  the  commercial 
troubles  with  England  and  Holland  by  means  of  a  compromise, 
in  order  to  meet  this  great  rival.  One  sees  why  he  neglected 
the  finances  as  well  as  commerce  more  or  less.  " Spain,"  says 
the  Mercure  Francois,  "frankly  admitted  that  in  alliance  with 
the  Empire,  she  intended  to  gain  control  of  the  principal  com- 
merce of  Europe,  by  means  of  control  of  the  Baltic,  together 
with  the  aid  of  Lubeck,  Danzig,  etc. ' ' 145  In  1624  a  council  of 
commerce  and  an  admiralty  had  been  established  in  Spain  and 
in  the  Netherlands  and  the  navy  was  increased.  Agents  were 
then  sent  to  the  German  cities  offering  a  commercial  treaty 
with  Spain  together  with  the  promise  of  removing  all  traces  of 
past  devastation  in  those  regions.  But  this  plan  failed,  as  the 
cities  refused  to  unite  against  England  and  Denmark,  etc.  Also, 
the  Empire  was  not  able  to  seize  the  control  of  the  straits  from 
Denmark,  as  Holland,  Denmark,  and  Sweden  all  opposed  that 
move.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  result  of  all  these 
negotiations  only  served  to  unite  the  German  cities  more  closely 
to  Sweden,  Denmark,  and  Holland. 

Richelieu  seems  to  have  appreciated  the  danger  of  a  sort 
of  zollverein  comprising  the  Imperial  lands,  Spain,  and  the  Ger- 
man states,  against  Sweden,  England,  Holland  and  France. 
This  economic  union  would  have  resulted  in  a  commercial  war 
which  would  have  been  extended  to  all  parts  of  the  world,  and 
so  he  took  steps  to  prevent  its  success,  by  promoting  the  entrance 
of  Sweden. 

Unfortunately  for  Sweden,  and  happily  for  Richelieu,  Gus- 
tavus  Adolphus  was  killed  in  the  battle  of  Lutzen  in  1632.  For 
in  1633  appeared  in  the  Mercure  Francois  a  very  significant  ac- 
count of  the  proposed  political  and  economic  alliance  between 
Sweden  and  the  northern  German  states,  in  order  to  complete 
the  war  against  the  Hapsburgs,  and  to  begin  a  commercial  and 

144  Mercure  Francois,  XIV,  354,  etc. 
«Z.,  XIV,  355-373. 


170  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OP  RICHELIEU  [712 

colonial  policy  which  extended  even  into  the  Americas  and  the 
East  Indies.  Gustavus  Adolphus  planned  this  in  1626,  and 
Oxenstierna  tried  to  carry  it  out  in  1633.146  The  Swedish  leaders 
were  too  ambitious,  and,  as  a  result,  Richelieu  became  rather  cool 
towards  Sweden  when  he  learned  about  this  plan,  and  the  mili- 
tary successes  of  her  great  King  and  leader  made  it  probable  that 
she  might  be  able  to  succeed.147  The  Cardinal  was  not  guided 
purely  by  political  ambitions,  when  he  threw  France  into  the  war 
in  1635  and  assumed  the  leadership  in  the  war  by  this  act.  It  is 
possible  that  something  besides  political  considerations  caused  a 
protest  on  the  part  of  France  as  to  the  intentions  of  Austria  to 
control  Liege  in  1637,  with  which  France  maintained  important 
commercial  relations.148  Speaking  in  general  terms,  Richelieu 
definitely  desired  France  to  develop  not  only  on  the  continent  but 
in  colonial  possessions  as  well.  Austria  and  Spain  both  stood 
in  the  way  of  the  first  step  to  be  taken  toward  the  achievement 
of  that  policy.  As  a  result  of  the  Thirty  Years'  War,  Germany 
became  open  to  the  European  powers,  and  the  influence  of  the 
Empire  a  thing  of  the  past.  France  was  thus  afforded  a  chance 
to  expand  toward  her  natural  frontiers.  Spain  fell  further  in 
national  power.  The  Portuguese  revolution  in  which  Richelieu 
was  especially  interested  left  her  Empire  in  a  very  weak  and 
helpless  condition.  What  a  chance  for  political  and  economic 
expansion  of  France !  How  unfortunate  it  was  for  that  country, 
that  her  minister  was  unable  to  live  long  enough  to  complete 
the  economic,  as  well  as  the  political,  side  of  his  administration, 
which  he  had  so  well  begun ! 

Thus  it  was  the  result  of  the  Thirty  Years '  War  which  decided 
the  first  question  as  to  who  should  control  the  commerce  and 
the  colonial  projects  of  the  world.  Richelieu  helped  to  frustrate 
the  claims  of  Spain  and  the  Empire  along  these  lines.  Who 

i*«Mercure  Francois,  XIX,  468-485.  In  1630,  Gustavus  Adolphus  ar- 
ranged a  treaty  of  commerce  between  Danzig  and  Sweden.  See  Dumont, 
etc.,  V,  pt.  2,  598-599. 

!«  Wakeman,  94.  In  1626,  Gustavus  Adolphus  persuaded  by  Usselinx, 
an  Amsterdam  merchant,  decided  to  form  the  Swedish  West  India  Company 
and  establish  settlements  in  so-called  "New  Sveden."  Oxenstierna  con- 
tinued the  policy  and  in  1638  established  a  settlement  in  the  state  of 
Delaware.  See  Tyler,  L.  G.,  England  in  America  (American  Nation 
Series),  N.  Y.  1904,  295-296. 

"8  Mercure  Francois,  XXII,  55 


713]         ECONOMIC  ELEMENTS  IN  DIPLOMACY  OP  RICHELIEU  171 

among  the  allies  would  be  the  leader  in  the  economic  and  pol- 
itical affairs  of  the  time,  was  a  question  of  the  future.  As 
was  said  before,  Richelieu  knew  that  England  was  the  great 
power  that  France  would  have  to  contend  with  for  control  of 
the  sea,  after  the  ambitions  of  Spain  in  that  direction  had 
been  settled.  His  external  policy  was  his  method  of  preparing 
for  this  coming  emergency. 

In  the  last  place,  it  does  not  seem  that  due  credit  has  been 
given  Richelieu  in  his  conduct  of  the  Thirty  Years'  War.  The 
very  fact  that  he  was  able  to  throw  other  countries  against  the 
enemy  by  furnishing  them  with  money,  certainly  indicates  his 
genius.  For  while  he  was  doing  this,  he  tried  to  settle  internal 
affairs  and  develop  his  external  policy,  so  that  after  the  war 
France  would  be  able  to  assume  the  leading  part  in  European 
affairs,  because  of  her  own  great  economic  and  political  strength 
and  grandeur.  "All  this  was  a  matter  of  prudence,"  he  says, 
"for  by  keeping  your  enemies  occupied  with  your  allies,  you 
have  time  not  only  to  furnish  them  money,  but  to  save  some 
for  yourself.  However,  when  your  allies  really  need  you,  then 
it  is  an  act  of  wisdom  and  courage  to  come  to  their  aid. ' ' 149 

It  certainly  would  seem  that  Richelieu  followed  out  to  the 
highest  degree  his  principle  of  placing  the  interest  of  the  state 
first,  in  his  conduct  of  the  Thirty  Years'  War.  After  all,  what 
he  desired  was  the  political  and  economic  supremacy  of  France 
in  Europe.  In  order  to  achieve  this  purpose  he  forgot  commer- 
cial rivalries,  made  allies,  and  then  pushed  them  into  the  war, 
and  finally  at  the  opportune  time  entered  it  himself.  When  he 
died,  international  relations  were  shaping  themselves  in  such  a 
way  that  he  could  have  turned  his  undivided  attention  to  the 
economic  development  of  his  nation,  and  to  the  questions  which 
would  have  arisen  out  of  his  attempts  to  develop  such  phases  of 
his  government  as  colonization.  Of  course  England  was  a  prob- 
lem for  the  future.  But  what  would  the  future  have  brought  if 
the  Cardinal  had  lived?  At  any  rate  the  English  and  French 
colonial  struggle  seems  to  have  been  the  natural  outcome  of 
Richelieu's  administration.  Imperialism  had  begun. 


Eichelieu,  Memoires,  XI,  307;   Testament  Politique,  I,  45. 


CHAPTER  XI 
CONCLUSION 

The  early  death  of  Richelieu  was  certainly  an  unfortunate 
event  for  the  development  of  France,  for  his  career  ended  at 
a  time  when  he  was  planning  to  carry  to  final  completion  the 
magnificent  political  and  economic  program  which  he  had  begun. 
It  was  doubly  unfortunate  because  of  the  fact  that  his  successor, 
while  he  was  able  to  carry  out  the  external  political  phase  of 
Richelieu's  administration,  nevertheless  failed  to  aid  in  any 
way  the  general  economic  and  internal  political  ideas  promulga- 
ted by  the  Cardinal.  As  a  result,  whatever  Richelieu  accom- 
plished in  an  economic  way  was  neglected  until  Colbert  came 
along,  and  by  that  time  France  had  lost  to  a  certain  extent  her 
great  opportunity.  One  writer  suggests  that  if  a  man  strong  in 
both  political  and  economic  affairs  had  succeeded  Richelieu,  no 
doubt  the  final  disappearance  of  feudalism  in  the  18th  century 
would  not  have  been  delayed.  The  French  Revolution  would 
probably  have  come;  but  the  horrors  of  the  French  Revolution 
would  have  been  spared.  Aristocracy  and  hereditary  monarchy 
would  have  been  swept  away  none  the  less,  and  the  republicanism 
of  modern  France  would  have  arisen,  as  it  has  arisen  in  their 
place,  but  the  substitution  would  have  taken  place  without  con- 
vulsions and  without  bitterness.  ' '  The  question  after  his  death  is 
whether  the  monarchy  will  stay  with  the  Third  Estate  or  will 
turn  on  them  and  be  conservative.  In  the  first  case,  there  will  be 
the  peaceful  establishment  of  the  modern  era,  and  in  the  second, 
a  reign  of  terror  and  war. ' ' x  The  second  choice  was  made,  and 
it  is  indeed  unfortunate  that  the  death  of  this  great  man  be- 
came one  of  the  forces  leading  to  the  great  catastrophe  of  French 
history. 

Colbert,  who  succeeded  Mazarin,  was  able  to  build  upon  the 
foundation  laid  by  Richelieu.  "One  must  admire,"  says  Gour- 
aud,  "the  security  of  principles,  when  after  twenty  years  of 

i  Bridges,  40-41 

172 


715]  CONCLUSION  173 

civil  trouble  and  debasement  of  nearly  all  commerce  the  founda- 
tion laid  by  the  latter  great  man  was  found  nearly  intact,  and 
it  was  upon  this  that  his  economic  successor  built  the  great  com- 
mercial grandeur  of  France. ' ' 2  One  can  easily  confirm  the  truth 
of  this  statement  by  consulting  the  achievements  of  Colbert. 
Indeed  to  Colbert  alone  has  been  given  the  glory  of  having  made 
France  for  a  brief  period  the  greatest  colonial  power  of  modern 
times.  "In  this,"  says  one  writer,  "he  showed  himself  to  be 
the  docile  son  of  Richelieu.  He  borrowed  from  him  the  method 
of  forming  companies  with  privileges  and  monopolies.  The 
contracts  of  1664  were  formulated  in  the  same  manner  as  those 
of  the  time  of  the  revolution.  Indeed  the  patents  of  the  com- 
pany of  the  'one  hundred  associates'  and  the  company  of  the 
'"West  Indies,'  seemed  to  have  been  written  by  the  same  hand."  8 
Colbert  completed  the  colonial  conceptions  of  Richelieu.  The 
latter  had  placed  conquest  and  settlement  of  the  new  lands  in 
the  first  place.  He  considered  the  honor  and  welfare  of  the 
Kingdom,  and  its  influence  in  Europe.  Colbert,  minister  of 
finances,  took  upon  himself  the  task  of  increasing  the  richness 
of  the  country,  accomplished  by  means  of  colonization,  which  was 
an  economic  effort.  He  put  in  the  first  place  the  commercial  in- 
terests, which  had  remained  in  the  second  place  according  to 
the  Cardinal's  conception.4  One  might  go  on  and  show  just  in 
what  way  Colbert  built  upon  the  economic  foundations  laid  by 
Richelieu  with  regard  to  finances,  the  marine,  industry,  etc., 
but  it  suffices  to  say  that  the  accomplishments  of  Richelieu 
served  as  a  worthy  basis  for  the  brilliant  protective  policy  of  Col- 
bert. It  is  indeed  unfortunate  that  the  continental  policy  of 
Louis  XIV  should  have  prevented  the  carrying  out  of  the  peace- 
ful economic  ideas  set  forth  in  the  Testament  Politique,  which 
Richelieu  left  to  posterity. 

The  keynote  of  Richelieu's  administration  from  the  economic 
point  of  view  is  mercantilism.  This  study  has  tried  to  point 
out  the  fact  that  the  great  Cardinal  was  fundamentally  a  man 
of  that  school  of  thought.  Whether  he  obtained  his  ideas  from 
Sully,  Henry  IV,  or  the  first  French  economist  Montchretien, 
is  not  certain,  but  it  is  evident  that  the  motive  behind 

2  Gouraud,  I,  198. 
s  Deschamps,  144-146. 
*  Ibid.,  146. 


174  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [716 

his  administration  was  mercantilistic  as  illustrated  by  his  policy 
of  political  and  economic  centralization.  Practically  all  of  his 
actions  can  be  traced  back  to  that  belief.  For  example,  in  his 
efforts  to  create  the  state,  he  looked  at  all  classes  from  the 
viewpoint  of  the  welfare  of  the  nation.  In  this  respect  his 
conflict  with  the  Huguenots  over  the  salt  beds  around  La  Rochelle 
is  a  splendid  example  of  his  efforts  to  centralize  even  the 
economic  side  of  the  government.  His  financial  program  sA- 
though  weak  was  guided  by  ideal  state  building.  This  was  smo 
true  of  his  foreign  and  domestic  commercial  policies  as  well  as  his 
colonization  schemes  and  his  attempts  to  create  a  marine.  The 
welfare  of  the  nation  was  behind  all  of  them.  As  to  his  contin- 
ental policy,  Richelieu  desired  to  overthrow  the  Hapsburgs,  not 
only  for  political  but  for  economic  reasons  as  well.  That  is,  to  the 
Cardinal,  the  downfall  of  the  Hapsburgs  was  the  first  step  in  the 
colonial  and  commercial  as  well  as  the  political  aggrandizement 
of  France.  His  relationship  with  all  nations  was  centered 
around  this  idea  and  consequently  the  struggle  with  England 
over  control  of  the  Huguenots,  and  the  salt  region,  is  only  in- 
teresting in  that  it  shows  that  the  Cardinal  was  aware  of  the 
potential  economic  forces  working  within  his  own  land,  and  his 
future  rival,  England.  It  is  granted  that  Richelieu  might  have 
been  actuated  by  other  motives  in  his  administration,  but  one 
must  concede  that  the  policy  of  a  great  mercantilistic  state 
around  which  all  his  economic  policies  center  is  one  of  the  fun- 
damentals of  his  administration.  For  after  all,  a  strong  state 
politically,  a  good  economic  foundation,  and  an  era  of  peace  in 
which  work  could  be  accomplished,  was  the  ideal  of  Richelieu, 
and  no  correct  conception  of  his  career  can  be  obtained,  unless 
this  program  is  taken  into  account. 

That  he  fully  intended  to  develop  his  country  in  the  time  of 
future  peace  is  clearly  brought  out  in  his  Testament  Politique, 
which  was  written  toward  the  last  of  his  career  when  he  knew 
that  death  was  going  to  prevent  the  carrying  out  of  his  plans. 
"Just  as  his  Memoirs  were  the  accomplishments  of  the  past,  so 
his  Testament  Politique,"  he  says,  "would  be  the  guide  for  the 
future. ' ' 5  Then  in  concluding  the  first  part  of  his  great  work, 

5  Richelieu,  Memoires,  XI,  269-271.  (Includes  introduction  to  the  Testa- 
ment Politique,  and  part  one.)  Testament  Politique,  Introduction,  I,  1-5. 


717]  CONCLUSION  175 

he  sums  up  the  keynote  of  his  entire  administration  when  he 
says;  "Up  to  the  present  the  deeds  of  your  Majesty  have  been 
related.  I  certainly  believe  that  they  will  end  happily  if  they 
are  followed  by  a  repose,  which  will  give  the  means  by  which 
the  state  may  be  heaped  up  with  all  kinds  of  advantages,  gains, 
etc."6  "Your  Majestjr  being  naturally  of  a  tender  constitution, 
not  very  healthy,  of  restless  impatient  humor,  especially  when 
you  are  with  the  army,  of  which  you  take  the  leadership,  I  should 
think  myself  guilty  of  a  crime,  if  I  did  not  make  it  my  humble 
request  for  you  to  avoid  war  for  the  future,  as  much  as  possible ; 
which  I  do  upon  this  basis,  that  the  levity  and  inconsistency 
of  the  French,  can  only  be  vanquished  by  the  presence  of  their 
master,  and  that  your  Majesty  cannot,  without  exposing  your- 
self to  ruin,  fix  upon  so  lasting  a  design,  nor  consequently  ex- 
pect a  good  success  from  it.  You  have  shown  your  valor  and 
military  power  sufficiently  to  think  of  nothing  like  that  for  the 
future,  but  to  enjoy  that  peace  and  tranquillity  which  you  have 
acquired  for  the  Kingdom  by  your  labor,  being  in  a  position 
to  defend  youself  against  all  those  who,  contrary  to  public 
faith,  would  offend  you  anew. ' ' 7  Peace  was  the  final  goal  to- 
ward which  the  Cardinal  had  worked.  And  even  though  he 
admitted  the  heavy  cost  in  treasures  and  suffering,  yet  he  be- 
lieved that  the  ideal  was  worth  the  efforts  and  the  privations. 

Like  many  great  men,  Richelieu  made  countless  enemies  in 
his  attempts  to  carry  out  his  policies.  "But,"  says  Bonnefon, 
"in  contact  with  the  logical  and  firm  policies  of  the  Cardinal, 
the  French  people  began  to  take  notice  of  the  true  interests  of 
the  country  and  the  public,  and  if  it  had  at  first  been  distrustful 
of  the  minister  because  of  the  brutality  of  his  plans  —  perceived 
now  the  farsightedness  and  the  justice  of  the  policies  which  he 
conceived  and  was  carrying  out. "  8  In  this  regard  the  beautiful 
letter  of  his  contemporary  Voiture  is  significant.  The  latter 
praises  the  farsightedness  of  the  Cardinal's  costly  military  policy, 
as  being  a  necessary  prerequisite  for  the  future  wealth  and  growth 
of  the  country.  "One  must  admit,"  he  says,  "that  instead  of 
ruining  France,  he  has  saved  her  millions  by  simply  taking  La 
Rochelle,  which  has  been  in  a  state  of  constant  revolt  and  thus 

6  Richelieu,  Memoires,  XI,  394-350;  Testament  Politique,  I,  60. 
T  Richelieu,  Testament  Politique,  I,  196-197. 
s  Sotiete  Franeaise  due  XVIII  *  Stfcle,  32. 


176  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OP  RICHELIEU  [718 

a  constant  expense. "  9  He  then  goes  on  to  justify  the  part  taken 
by  Richelieu  in  the  Thirty  Years'  War.  "If  the  war  ends,  as 
it  appears  to  indicate,  in  a  victory,  Kichelieu  will  then  find  the 
means  of  winning  the  admiration  of  all.  Being  as  wise  as  he 
is,  he  has  realized  after  so  many  experiences,  what  is  best; 
and  will  turn  his  attention  toward  creating  in  that  state  the  most 
flourishing  of  all,  after  having  made  it  the  most  formable.  He 
will  make  evident  an  ambition  which  is  the  most  beautiful  of 
anything  which  can  fall  into  the  views  of  mankind,  namely,  of 
creating  in  France  the  best  and  most  loved  of  Kingdoms  and  not 
the  most  feared.  He  knows  that  the  most  true  and  noble  con- 
quests are  those  of  the  heart  and  the  affection;  and  just  as  a 
plant  is  barren  which  gives  shade  and  no  fruit,  so  will  he  enjoy 
the  fruits  with  which  peace  is  crowned.  There  is  not  so  much 
glory  in  extending  the  limits  of  the  land  as  in  diminishing  the 
taitte.  Richelieu  realizes  this  fact.  He  also  knows  that  there  is 
less  glory  in  overcoming  a  hundred  thousand  men,  than  in  put- 
ting twenty  millions  at  their  ease  and  security.  Also,  this  great 
spirit  who  has  only  been  occupied  with  the  means  of  furnishing 
money  for  the  war  and  of  raising  men,  taking  villages  and  win- 
ning wars,  will  occupy  himself  henceforth,  only  in  establishing 
repose,  riches,  and  abundance.  Instead  of  being  a  leader  in  war, 
he  will  lead  in  the  advancement  of  the  arts.  He  will  make  new 
edicts  to  regulate  luxury  and  establish  commerce.  Large  vessels 
accustomed  to  carry  arms  will  bear  merchandise,  and  hold  the 
seas  free  from  pirates,  etc.  Then  the  people  will  admire  him  and 
the  middle  classes  will  sing  his  praises.  .  . "  This  is  a  rather  en- 
thusiastic eulogy  of  the  Cardinal,  but  it  is  interesting  as  indicat- 
ing the  growth  in  sentiment  in  his  favor  among  the  intellectual 
French  people.  They  began  to  see  the  ultimate  purpose  of  Riche- 
lieu's administration;  that  war  was  a  necessary  evil,  accepted 
only  for  the  sake  of  better  conditions  under  future  peace. 

A  study  of  Richelieu's  life  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  he  was 
an  economic  statesman  and  that  he  was  one  of  the  unconscious 
economic  and  political  founders  of  the  French  mercantilistic 
state.  Yet  he  was  not  an  extreme  advocate  of  the  doctrine  of 
mercantilism,  for  one  finds  that  he  differed  radically  from  other 
influential  men  of  his  age.  The  extreme  mercantilistic  view  held 
for  its  fundamental  belief  that  money  is  wealth.  It  follows  that 

»Voiture,  Oeuvres,  2  vols.,  Ed.,  M.  M.  TJbicini,  Paris,  1855,  I,  271-279. 


719]  CONCLUSION  177 

a  nation  should  have  a  favorable  balance  of  trade  in  order  to 
keep  gold  and  silver  within  its  boundaries,  and  should  never  let 
them  go  out  of  the  land,  because  it  is  the  possession  of  specie 
that  makes  the  state  strong.  When  the  Cardinal  took  up  the 
work  of  his  administration,  he  believed  more  or  less  in  this 
doctrine,  which  was  commonly  followed  and  obeyed  at  that  time. 
But  as  he  began  to  study  the  economic  side  of  the  question;  as 
he  was  confronted  with  commercial  conditions  in  which  the  fal- 
lacies involved  in  the  idea  were  brought  to  light  in  various  ways, 
he  gradually  came  to  the  conclusion  that  this  theory  was  wrong, 
and  admitted  it.  In  referring  to  this  change  of  economic  doctrine, 
M.  Masson  says  that  the  other  French  officials  still  believed  in 
the  theory,  but  Richelieu  changed  completely  to  the  other  side. 
This  change  is  a  very  important  event  in  the  economic  history  of 
that  time,  because  it  tends  to  locate  in  the  age  of  Richelieu  the 
transitional  stage  of  development  from  the  mercantilistic  doctrine 
to  the  belief  in  free  trade.  Just  what  was  the  influence  of  the 
Cardinal's  ideas  upon  those  who  came  after  him,  presents  a  dif- 
ferent historical  and  economic  problem.  That  Richelieu  was 
not  strictly  a  follower  of  either  the  old  or  new  school  is  evident 
from  a  study  of  his  life,  although  the  main  outlines  of  his  govern- 
mental policy  are  based  largely  upon  the  mercantilistic  concep- 
tion of  the  strong  state.  He  may  be  regarded  as  an  unconscious 
medium  whereby  the  old  mercantilistic  views  finally  became 
merged  into  the  ideas  which  finally  led  to  the  doctrine  of  free 
trade.  For  example,  one  of  his  letters  illustrates  very  well  the 
modern  view  he  possessed  in  regard  to  duties  on  imports.  "If 
one  must  endure,"  he  says,  "the  heavy  import  duties  which 
foreign  lands  put  upon  our  goods  which  enter  their  lands,  and 
upon  those  which  come  to  us,  let  us  charge  such  duties  on  their 
goods  and  raise  them  in  proportion  as  the  foreigners  raise  their 
duties  on  us."  "  Thus  he  believed  in  the  system  of  retaliation, 
which  is  more  or  less  modern.  As  a  result,  it  may  be  asserted 
that  Richelieu  deserves  more  consideration  upon  the  economic 
side  than  has  hitherto  been  given  him.  The  Cardinal  may  indeed 

10  Histoire  du  Commerce  Frangaise  dans  le  Levant,  149. 

11  Richelieu,  Lettres,  II,  332.     Richelieu  desired  to  make  France  a  strong 
commercial  nation  and  "in  the  spirit  of  reciprocity  he  gave  to  foreign  mer- 
chandise the  same  rights  as  they  gave  to  French  goods."     See  Lavisse  et 
Rambaud,  Histoire  Generate  V,  368. 


178  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [720 

be  regarded  as  a  forerunner  of  the  exponents  of  the  modern 
school  of  political  economy. 

"The  deeds  of  great  men  live  after  them."  A  man  is  truly 
great  if  he  has  accomplished  something  which  has  a  living  force 
in  times  after  his  own.  All  accounts  of  Richelieu's  life  have 
brought  out  clearly  the  importance  of  his  political  work,  but 
have  failed  to  give  similar  attention  to  the  economic  phase  of 
his  career.  This  treatise  has  endeavored  to  take  up  the  internal 
and  external  commercial  policies  of  the  Cardinal,  and  has  thus 
limited  itself  to  an  interpretation  of  his  economic  accomplish- 
ments. It  has  tried  to  establish  that  Richelieu,  as  measured  by 
his  activities  in  this  particular  field  of  his  career,  comes  up  to 
the  requirement  as  to  what  constitutes  a  great  man.  Two  gen- 
eral contributions  to  economic  thought  and  practice  entitle  him 
to  this  position.  In  the  first  place,  he  made  an  addition  to  the 
theoretical  side  of  economics  by  taking  a  stand  in  favor  of  in- 
creased freedom  of  trade  and  opposing  the  extreme  mercantil- 
istic  doctrine.  This  unconscious  contribution  made  by  the 
Cardinal  may  have  influenced  the  development  of  the  modern 
doctrine  of  free  trade.  In  the  second  place,  his  ideas  as  to 
"state  building,"  by  means  of  a  marine,  colonization,  and  com- 
merce in  general,  have  formed  the  basis,  as  has  been  said  before, 
of  most  activities  in  this  particular  field  ever  since. 

In  the  last  place,  Richelieu's  political  achievements,  largely 
accomplished  with  the  intention  of  obtaining  a  peace  which  would 
afford  an  opportunity  for  France  to  expand  in  an  economic 
way,  are  essentially  modern.  Traces  of  his  ideas  can  be 
found  after  nearly  three  centuries  in  the  economic  pol- 
icies of  modern  France,  and  of  other  nations.  His  greatness 
cannot  be  limited  to  the  political  sphere,  but  clearly  extends  with 
approximately  equal  credit  into  the  field  of  practical  economics. 

Us  chantent  quel  fut  ton  merite 
Quand  au  gre  de  vos  matelots 

Tu  vainquis  les  vents  et  les  flots.12 

1 2  This  poem  was  written  by  Jean  de  Chapelain  (1595-1624),  and  ap- 
peared under  the  title :  Ode  a  Monseigneur  le  Cardinal  Due  de  Richelieu. 
(Paris,  Jean  Camusat,  1633).  See  De  Brienne  H.  A.,  Memoires,  Paris, 
1916,  I,  241-243. 

Chapelain  ranks  among  the  intellectual  men  of  that  age  and  was  a  mem- 
ber of  the  French  Academy.  The  above  poem  is  considered  his  best. 


721]  CONCLUSION  179 

Et  domptas  1'orgueil  d 'Amphitrite. 
Quand  votre  commerce  affoibli, 

Par  toi,  puissamment  retabli. 
Dans  nos  havres  deserts  ramena  1'abondance 
Et  que  surcent  vaisseaux  maitrisant  les  dangers 
Ton  nom  seul  aux  Frangais  redonna  1'asseurance 
Et  fit  naitre  la  craints  au  coeur  des  etrangers  .  .  . 

Us  chantent  tes  conseils  utiles 

Par  qui  malgre  Tart  des  mediants 

La  paix  refleurit  dans  nos  champs 
Et  la  justice  dans  nos  villes 
Us  disent  que  les  immortels 
De  leur  culte  et  de  leur  autels 
Ne  doivent  qu'a  tes  soins  la  pompe  renaissante, 
Et  que  ta  prevoyance  et  ton  autorite 

Sont  les  deux  forts  appuis  dont 

1'Europe  tremblante 
Soutient  et  raffermit  sa  foible  liberte. 


APPENDIX  A. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 

The  following  works  are  the  primary  and  secondary  sources 
consulted  in  the  preparation  of  this  study.  In  each  group  they 
are  placed  in  the  order  of  their  importance. 

GROUP  I 
Bibliographies 

1.  Molinier,    Augusta    fimile,    and    others,    Les    Sources    de 

I'Histoire  de  France  depuis  les  Origines  Jusqu'en  1815, 
12  vols.,  See  Vols.,  XI,  XII.    Paris,  1913. 

2.  Monod,    Gabriel   Jacques,    Bibliographic    de    I'Histoire    de 

France,  Paris,  1888. 

3.  Franklin,  Alfred,  Les  Sources  de  I'Histoire  de  France,  Paris 

1877. 

4.  Belong,  Jacques,  Bibliotheque  Historique,  5  vols.,  Paris,  1768- 

1778. 

5.  Langlois,    Charles   Victor,   et   Stein,   H.,   Les  Archives   de 

I'Histoire  de  France,  3  vols.,  Paris,  1891  [1893]. 

Of  the  five  bibliographies,  the  first  one  has  been  found 
most  valuable  in  the  preparation  of  this  study.  It  covers 
the  field  with  respect  to  geographies,  general  histories, 
memoirs,  and  letters.  Monod 's  work  is  a  single  volume 
in  which  is  found  a  fairly  good  limited  catalogue  of  sources 
and  works  relating  to  the  history  of  France  from  its 
origin  down  to  1789.  It  is  arranged  chronologically  and 
by  classification.  The  next  two  bibliographies  are  older 
works  and  thus  not  so  important  as  the  ones  just  mentioned. 

Good  brief  bibliographies  concerning  this  subject  may 
be  obtained  by  consulting  (a)  Lavisse,  E.,  Histoire  de 
France,  Vol.,  VI,  2  partie,  Ch.  XI.,  (b)  Lavisse  et  Ram-, 
baud,  Histoire  Generale,  Vol.,  V,  Ch.  VII.,  (c)  Cambridge 
Modern  History,  Vol.,  IV,  Ch.  IV. 

180 


723]  APPENDIX   A  181 

GROUP  II 
Original  Sources 

1.  Richelieu,  A.  J.  du  Plessis,   Cardinal,  due  de,   Testament 

Politique,  2  partie,  Londres,  La  Haye,  La  Februre,  1770. 
See  Appendix  B. 

2.  Richelieu,  A.  J.  du  Plessis,  Cardinal,  due  de,  The  Political 

Will  and  Testament  of  that  Great  Minister  of  State, 
Cardinal  Duke  de  Richelieu,  London,  1695. 

This  interesting  old  English  translation  is  found  in  the 
Harvard  College  Library,  made  by  some  unknown  men  of 
the  age  of  Louis  XIV. 

3.  Richelieu,  A.  J.  du  Plessis,  Cardinal,  due  de,  Memoires  du 

Cardinal  de  Richelieu  (M.  Petitot,  editor),  Vols.  X-XXX, 
Foucault,  Libraire  Rue  des  Noyers,  No.  37,  Paris,  1821- 
1829. 

These  memoirs  of  Richelieu  include  the  years  1610-1638. 
They  are  the  source  of  valuable  information  with  respect 
to  his  economic  ideas.  Indeed,  in  one  sense  of  the  word, 
they  are  not  memoirs,  but  are  a  collection  of  notes  sent  to 
him  by  his  agents,  advice  from  his  councillors  and,  finally, 
his  own  ideas  either  jotted  down  by  himself  or  by  his 
secretaries,  and  have  been  used  with  this  in  mind.  The 
authenticity  of  the  memoirs  is  generally  accepted,  although 
before  the  Academie  des  Sciences  Moral  et  Politiques,  on 
January  7,  1921,  M.  Louis  Batiffol  maintained  that  the 
Memoirs  of  Cardinal  Richelieu  were  not  authentic,  being 
the  work  of  two  compilers,  who  used  Richelieu's  papers 
shortly  after  his  death.  Therefore  this  work  must  be  used 
with  that  idea  in  mind.  [See  L.Batiffol,  "Les  Faux  Mem- 
oires du  Cardinal  de  Richelieu"  (Revue  des  Deux  Mondes, 
April  15,  1921)]. 

4.  Richelieu,  A.  J.  Plessis,  Cardinal,  due  de,  Lettres,  Instruc- 

tions. Diplomatiques,  et  Papiers  d'fitat,  Ed.,  Georges, 
Comte  d'Avenel  (Documents  inedits  sur  1'histoire  de 
France),  8  vols.,  Paris,  1853-1877. 

A  valuable  collection,  including  practically  all  of 
Richelieu's  correspondence.  Unfortunately  the  letters  left 
out  seem  to  be  the  ones  pertaining  to  commerce. 
The  editor  remedies  matters  to  a  certain  extent  by  listing 
these  letters  and  summing  up  their  main  themes.  Volume 


182  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [724 

one  of  this  series  contains  a  splendid  introduction  by  the 
author. 

5.  Eichelieu,  A.  J.  du  Plessis,  Cardinal,  due  de,  Maximes  d'Etat 

et  Fragments  Politique  du  Cardinal  de  Richelieu,  Ed., 
Gabriel  Hanotaux,  (Collection  des  documents  inedits  sur 
Thistoire  de  France,  vol.,  LI),  Paris,  1880.  See  Appendix 
B. 

6.  Mercure  Francois,  le,  25  vols.,  (1605-1644),  Paris,  J.  Richer 

[etc] . 

This  work  is  not  a  journal  but  is  an  annual  history  of 
which  the  first  volume  embraces  an  account  of  the  events 
which  took  place  in  Europe  from  1605-1611.  The  collec- 
tion of  twenty-five  volumes  is  one  of  the  best  sources  for 
the  study  of  the  history  of  that  period.  Being  controlled 
by  the  government,  it  sets  forth  the  views  of  the  admin- 
istration. There  is  a  strong  probability  that  Richelieu 
acted  as  editor  in  some  degree  and  contributed  a  number  of 
articles  to  it. 

7.  Isambert,  Frangois  Andre  and  others,  Recueil  General  des 

Anciennes  Lois  Francoises  depuis  I' an  420,  jusqu'a  la 
Revolution  de  1789,  29  vols.,  See  vol.  XVI,  Paris,  1829. 

8.  Sourdis,  Henry  de,  Archbishop  of  Bordeaux,  Correspondence, 

Ed.,  Eugene  Sue.  (Collection  des  Documents  inedits.  .  . 
LVII)  3  vols.,  Paris,  1839. 

This  is  the  best  source  for  information  concerning  Riche- 
lieu's  marine  activities.  M.  Sue  has  written  an  excellent 
introduction,  dealing  with  the  state  of  the  marine  under 
the  Cardinal. 

9.  Montchretien,  Antoyne  de,  L' economic  Politique  Patronale 

Traicte  de  I'Oeconomie  Politique  .  .  .  Ed.,  Th.  Funck- 
Brentano,  Paris,  1889. 

This  economic  work  is  especially  important,  because  of 
the  fact  that  this  is  the  first  French  work  of  that  nature, 
and  also  because  it  sets  forth  the  basis  of  many  of  Riche- 
lieu's economic  ideas,  whether  he  was  acquainted  with  it 
or  not.  Written  in  1615,  it  is  our  first  real  evidence  as 
to  the  rise  of  economic  ideas  in  France. 

10.  Calendar  of  State  Papers  and  Manuscripts,  (Domestic  ser- 

ies), (1625-1642),  19  vols.,  London,  1858-1887.  Colonial, 
(1574-1660),  vol.,  I.  London,  1860. 


725]  APPENDIX   A  183 

11.  Calendar  of  State  Papers  and  Manuscripts,  (Venetian  ser- 

ies), Vols.  XVIII-XXI,  London,  1912-1916. 

An  important  source  for  a  study  of  the  relations  be- 
tween England  and  France  during  the  administration  of 
Richelieu,  both  from  the  English  and  the  Venetian,  or 
neutral,  point  of  view. 

12.  Voiture,  Vincent  de,  Oeuvres,  2  vols.     Ed.,  M.  M.  Ubicini, 

Paris,  1855. 

This  work  contains  a  very  interesting  eulogy  of  the 
Cardinal  by  a  contemporary,  with  much  information  in 
regard  to  economic  matters. 

13.  Richelieu,  A.  J.  du  Plessis,  Cardinal,  due  de,  Journal  de 

Monsieur    Cardinal    Richelieu,    (1630-1631),    Amsterdam, 
1864. 

Not  very  valuable  so  far  as  this  study  is  concerned. 

14.  Mole,  Mathieu,  Memoires.  (Societe  de  1'Histoire  de  France), 

4  vols.,  See  vols.  I-II.    Paris,  1855-1857. 

Mathieu  Mole  was  a  member  and  later  president  of  the 
Parlement  of  Paris.  These  memoirs  are  therefore  im- 
portant in  that  they  give  one  an  insight  into  the  ideas  of 
Richelieu's  opponents.  They  are  also  valuable  in  an  eco- 
nomic study  of  the  period. 

15.  Beaurepaire,  Charles  Marie  de,  Cahiers  des  fitats  de  Nor- 

mandie  (1610-1666),  (Societe  de  1'Histoire  de  France),  3 
vols.,  See  vols.  II-III,  Rouen,  1876-1879. 

A  good  source  for  the  economic  study  of  the  period. 

16.  Talon,  Omer,  Memoires,  Petitot,  2e  serie,  Vols.  LX-LXIII, 

See  vol.  LX,  Paris,  1819-1829. 

Omer  Talon  was  an  avocat  in  Parlement  who  in  1641 
became  avocat  general.  He  was  a  constant  opponent  of 
Richelieu,  and  therefore  his  writings  are  valuable  as  re- 
gards disputes  which  arose  between  the  Parlements  and 
the  Cardinal.  His  work  is  not  so  much  a  memoir  as  a 
compilation  of  speeches,  extracts  from  the  registers  of 
Parlement,  etc.  There  is  much  material  on  the  economic 
side. 

17.  Brienne,  Henri  Auguste,  Comte  de,  Memoires  de  Comte  de 

Brienne.     (Societe  de  1'Histoire  de  France),  Vol.  I,  Paris, 
1916. 

18.  Bassompierre,     Francois,     Marechal     de,     Memoires,     (So- 


184  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [726 

ciete  de  1'Histoire  de  Prance),  4  vols.     See  vols.  III-IV, 
Paris,  1870-1877. 

19.  Goulas,    Nicholas,    Memoires,    (Societe    de    1'Histoire    de 

France),  2  vols.    See  vol.  I,  Paris,  1879. 

20.  Tillieries,  Leveneur,  Comte  de,  Memoires,  Paris,  1863. 

Tillieries  was  ambassador  to  England  in  1619  and  his 
memoirs  furnish  a  good  source  for  a  study  of  Anglo- 
French  relations. 

21.  Dumont,  Jean,   Corps   Universelle  Diplomatique  du  Droit 

des  Gens,   (800-1731),  8  vols.     Supplement  5  vols.     See 
vol.  V,  pt.  2,  vol.  VI,  pt.  1.    Amst,  et  La  Haye,  1726-1739. 
This  work  contains  treaties  of  alliance,  peace,  commerce, 
etc.,  from  800  to  1731.    It  is  a  valuable  source. 
The  following  sources,  while  not  of  much  value  to  this  study, 
yet  are  important  in  obtaining  an  all  around  conception  of  the 
accomplishments  of  the  great  Cardinal. 

22.  La  Force,  Jacques  Nompar,  Memoires  de  La  Force,  4  vols., 

Paris,  1843. 

A  faithful  "marechal"  of  Louis  XIII. 

23.  Kohan,  Henri,  Prince  de  Leon,  Memoires,  Petitot,  2e  serie, 

Vols.  XVIII-XIX,  1819-1829. 

Herein  one  finds  the  Huguenot  side  of  the  conflict  with 
Richelieu. 

24.  Orleans,     Gaston,    due    de,    Memoires,    Petitot,    2e    serie, 

Vol.  XXXI,  1819-1829. 

25.  Fontenay-Mareul,  Frangois,  Marquis  de,  Memoires,  Petitot, 

le  serie,  Vols.  LI-LII,  1819-1829. 

26.  Souvigny,  Jean,  Gangnieres,  Comte  de,  Memoires,  3  vols., 

See  vols.,  I-II,  Paris,  1906-1909. 

An  excellent  account  of  the  political  accomplishments 
of  Richelieu  and  Mazarin. 

GROUP  III 
Secondary  Works 

A.     LIVES    OF    RICHELIEU 

1.  Perkins,  James  Breck,  Richelieu  and  the  Growth  of  French 

Power,  (Heroes  of  the  Nation  Series),  New  York,  1900. 
A  good  general  account  of  his  life. 

2.  Lodge,  Richard,  Richelieu,  London,  1896. 


727]  APPENDIX   A  185 

This  book  is  of  especial  interest  because  the  author  did 
not  consider  the  Testament  Politique  of  Richelieu  as  authen- 
tic and  thus  did  not  use  it  in  the  preparation  of  his  work. 
See  his  appendix  C. 

3.  Zeller,  Berthold,  Richelieu,  London,  1884. 

4.  Fagniez,  Gustave  Charles,  Le  Pere  Joseph  et  Richelieu,  2 

vols.,  Paris,  1894. 

5.  Price,  Eleanor  C.,  Cardinal  de  Richelieu,  New  York,  1912. 

Remarkable  for  its  neglect  of  the  economic  side  of  Riche- 
lieu's  administration. 

B.    GENERAL  HISTORIES  WHICH  COVER  THE  PERIOD 

1.  Martin,  Henry,  Histoire  de  France,  6  vols.,  Paris,  1861. 

2.  Dareste,  Antoine,  Histmre  de  France,  9  vols.,  Paris,  1884- 

1885. 

3.  Bazin,  Anais  de,  Histvire  de  France  sous  Louis  XIII  et  sous 

le  Ministere  de  Mazarin,  ed.  2,  4  vols.,  Paris,  1846. 

4.  Ranke,  Leopold,  von,  Franzosiche  Geschichte,  Vols.  II,  III. 

Samtliche  Werke,  IX,  X,  Leipzig,  1876-1877. 

5.  Lavisse,  Ernest,  Histoire  de  France,  9  vols.     See  vol.  VI, 

Paris,  1896. 

The  best  French  account  of  this  period. 

6.  Anquetil,  Louis  Pierre,  Histoire  de  France,  14  vols.     See 

vols.  X,  XI,  Paris,  1805. 

7.  Kitchin,  George  William,  History  of  France,  3  vols.,  Oxford, 

1892-1896. 

8.  Michelet,  Jules,  Histoire  de  France,  16  vols.     See  vol.  II, 

Paris,  1869. 

9.  Macdonald,  John  Ronald,  A  History  of  France,  3  vols.    See 

vol.  II,  New  York,  1915. 

C.    HISTORIES  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY  WHICH  DEAL  WITH  THE  PERIOD 

1.  Blanqui,   [Jerome  Adolphe],  History  of  Political  Economy, 

New  York,  1880. 

2.  Ingram,  John  Kells,  History  of  Political  Economy,  London, 

1904. 

3.  Schmoller,  Gustave,  The  Mercantile  System,  New  York,  1902. 

4.  Seeley,  John  Robert,  The  Expansion  of  England,  London, 

1891. 

The  main  criticism  of  these  works  would  seem  to  be  that 


186  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OP  RICHELIEU  [728 

they  reveal  a  universal  neglect  of  the  economic  side  of 
the  administrative  career  of  Kichelieu. 

D.     HISTORIES   OF  FRENCH   COMMERCE 

1.  Bonnassieux,  Louis  Jean  Pierre,  Les  Grandes  Compagnies  de 

Commerce,  Paris,  1892. 

An  excellent  account  of  the  French  colonial  and  com- 
mercial projects  during  the  age  of  Eichelieu. 

2.  Deschamps,    Leon,    Histoire    de    la    Question   Coloniale    en 

France,  Paris,  1891. 

A  unique  work  covering  the  colonial  efforts  made  by 
France  in  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries. 

3.  Gouraud,  Charles,  Histoire  de  la  Politique  Commerciale  de  la 

France  et  son  Influence  sur  le  Progres  de  la  Richesse  Pub- 
lique,  Paris,  1854. 

This  work  is  distinguished  not  only  for  the  abundance 
of  facts,  but  for  the  novelty  and  profundity  of  its  re- 
views and  ideas. 

4.  Levasseur,  Emile,  Histoire  du  Commerce  de  la  France,  2 

vols.,  Paris,  1911-1912. 

An  excellent  work.  M.  Levasseur  has  the  ability  to 
pick  out  the  essentials  from  the  non-essentials. 

5.  Pigeonneau,  H[enri],  Histoire  du  Commerce  de  la  France,  2 

vols.    Paris,  1889. 

One  of  the  best  works  covering  this  phase  of  French 
history.  The  author  sees  clearly  the  economic  importance 
of  the  seventeenth  century. 

6.  Guenin,  Eugene,  Histoire  de  la  Colonisation*  Franc.aise  dans  la 

Nouvelle  France,  Paris,  1896. 

7.  Masson,  Paul,  Histoire  du  Commerce  Francois  dans  le  Levant 

en  XVII*  Siecle,  Paris,  1896. 

8.  Masson,  Paul,  Histoire  des  Etablissemewts  et  du  Commerce 

Frangaise  dans  I'Africque  Barbaresque  (1560-1793),  Paris, 
1903. 

10.  Norman,  Charles  Boswell,  Colonial  France,  London,  1886. 

This  work  is  not  very  reliable  as  the  author  makes  a 
number  of  mistakes  with  regard  to  important  French 
dates  in  French  colonial  history. 

11.  Weber,  Henry,  La  Campagne  Fran$aise  des  Indes,   (1604- 

1870),  Paris,  1904. 


729]  APPENDIX   A  187 

E.    FINANCIAL  HISTORIES  OF  FRANCE 

1.  Bailly,  Antoine,  Histoire  Financiers  de  la  France,  2  vols., 

Paris,  1830. 

2.  Bresson,  Jacques,  Histoire  Finmiciere  de  la,  France,  2  vols., 

Paris,  1843. 

Both  works  contain  a  fair  estimate  of  the  financial  ad- 
ministration during  the  period  of  Richelieu. 

3.  Forbonnais,  Francois,  F.  de,  Recherche*  et  Considerations  sur 

les  Finances  de  France,  2  vols.,  Basel,  1758. 

F.     GENERAL    WORKS    ON    THE    PERIOD 

1.  Wakeman,   Henry   Offley,   European  History    (1598-1715), 

New  York,  1916. 

A  standard  brief  general  work  in  English  for  this  period. 

2.  Caillet,  Jules,  Lf Administration  en  France  sous  le  Ministere 

du  Cardinal  de  Richelieu,  Paris,  1857. 

A  very  conscientious  and  complete  work,  but  a  little 
confused  and  apt  to  neglect  the  economic  phase  of  the 
subject. 

3.  Avenel,  Georges,  Comte  de,  Richelieu  et  la  Monarchic  Abso- 

lue,  4  vols.,  Paris,  1859. 

The  best  work  concerning  the  Cardinal  from  an  economic 
point  of  view. 

4.  Bridges,  John  Henry,  France  under  Richelieu  and  Colbert, 

Edinburgh,  1866. 

A  combined  economic  and  philosophical  survey  of 
France  under  Richelieu  and  Colbert.  An  extremely  val- 
uable book. 

5.  Cambridge  Modern  History,  13  vols.,  and  atlas.     Cambridge, 

1902-1912.    See  vol.  IV,  Ch.  IV,  "Richelieu." 

6.  Lavisse,  Ernest,  et  Rambaud,  Alfred,  Histoire  Generale,  12 

vols.,  Vol.  V,  Paris,  1893-1901. 

7.  Lavallee,  Theophile  Sebastien,  Histoire  des  Fran$ais,  6  vols., 

Paris,  1861. 

8.  (a)    Lavisse,   Ernest,   et  Rambaud,  Alfred,  Histoire  de  la 

Civilisation  Franqaise,  2  vols.,  Paris,  1897-1898. 
(b)    Rambaud,  Alfred,  Histoire  de  la  Civilisation  Franqaise, 
2  vols.,  Paris,  1898. 

9.  Bonnefon,  Paul,  Societe  Franqaise  due  XVII*  Siecle,  Paris, 

1903. 


188  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OP  RICHELIEU  [730 

10.  Gasquet,  Amedee  Louis,  Precis  des  Institutions  Politiques  et 

Sociales  de  I'Ancienne  France,  2  vols.,  Paris,  1885. 

11.  Avenel,  Georges,  Comte  de,  La  Noblesse  Frangaise  sous  Riche- 

lieu, Paris  1901. 

12.  Avenel,  Georges,  Comte  de,  Pretres,  Soldats,  et  Juges  sous 

Richelieu,  Paris,  1907. 

13.  Normand,    Charles,    La    Bourgeoisie    Fran$aise    au    XVII 

Siecle,  1604-1661,  Paris,  1908. 

14.  Mims,   Stewart  Leas,   Colbert's  West  India  Policy.     New 

Haven,  1912.     See  Chapter  I. 

15.  Parkman,  Francis,  The  Jesuits  of  North  America,  Boston, 

1905. 

16.  Hanotaux,  Gabriel,  Origine  de  I' Institution,  des  Intendants 

des  Provinces,  Paris,  1884. 

17.  Michaud,  Joseph  Francois  and  Louis  Gabriel,  Biographic 

Universelle,  45  vols.,  Paris,  1842-1865.     See  Vol.  XXXV. 

18.  Montague,  Francis  Charles,  History  of  England  (1603-1660), 

in  Political  History  of  England,  VII,  New  York,  1911. 

19.  Trevelyan,   George  Macaulay,  England  under  the  Stuarts, 

New  York,  1910. 

20.  Cheyney,  Edward  Potts,  A  History  of  England,  New  York, 

1914. 

21.  Bracq,  Jean  Charlemagne,  France  under  the  Republic,  New 

York,  1910. 

22.  Griffet,  Henri,  Histoire  du  Regne  de  Louis  XIII,  3  vols., 

Paris,  1758. 


APPENDIX  B 

THE  AUTHENTICITY  OF  THE  TESTAMENT 
POLITIQUE 

Because  of  the  fact  that  this  study  is  based  largely  upon 
the  writings  of  Cardinal  Richelieu  and  especially  upon  his 
Testament  Politique,  it  seems  best  to  discuss  the  problem  of  the 
authenticity  of  the  latter  work,  which  has  been  a  perennial 
question  ever  since  it  was  first  published.  That  it  belongs 
among  the  most  interesting  memorials  of  French  history  in  the 
17th  century,  is  shown  by  the  great  warmth  with  which  schol- 
ars have  fought  over  it.  "But,"  says  Boehm,  "such  was  the 
fate  of  this  work  that  its  authenticity,  and  therewith  its  value 
or  worth  must  be  placed  in  doubt  because  of  a  succession  of 
circumstances,  not  yet  cleared  up.  Thus  it  has  been  under 
suspicion  until  now.  An  important  individual  has  opposed  the 
treatise  and  since  then  various  teachers  have  exerted  their  ability 
to  defend  or  approve  it.  Indeed*  few  works  of  the  world's  lit- 
erature have  been  subject  to  such  a  searching  criticism. ' ' x 

The  Testament  Politique  was  written  sometime  between  the 
years  1638  and  1642.  D'Avenel  says  that  Richelieu  continued 
his  memoirs  as  far  as  1638,  and  seeing  that  he  could  not  finish 
them,  wrote  the  former  work.2  It  is  divided  into  two  parts,  the 
first  of  which  gives  a  short  account  of  the  reign  of  Louis  XIII 
up  to  that  time,  according  to  Richelieu's  interpretation.  The 
second  part  is  concerned  mostly  with  matters  of  administration, 
such  as  colonial  development,  the  marine,  finances,  etc.  Indeed 
its  contents  demonstrate  that  in  writing  his  Testament  Politique, 
Richelieu  desired  to  leave  it  as  a  guide  for  the  King  after  his 
own  death,  when  the  coming  peace  would  afford  him  a  chance 
to  build  up  his  state.  Also,  it  was  to  serve  as  a  vindication 
of  the  Cardinal's  administration,  which  had  been  grossly  at- 
tacked by  many  enemies. 

1  Boehm,  Introduction,  1. 
zEichelieu,  Lettres,  VIII,  383. 

189 


190  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OP  RICHELIEU  [732 

The  personal  nature  of  the  work  accounts  for  the  fact  that 
it  was  not  published,  or  known  at  first  by  the  public  at  large. 
Indeed,  only  a  few  people  were  aware  of  its  existence.  Yet 
the  fact  that  mention  was  made  of  it  in  a  funeral  oration  upon 
the  Cardinal,  which  has  been  found  in  the  British  Museum, 
certainly  would  indicate  that  some  were  acquainted  with  the 
treatise  and  its  important  contribution.3  Furthermore,  the  writer 
of  the  oration  bemoaned  the  fact  that  the  King  had  not  pub- 
lished his  copy  of  the  Testament  Politique.  This  showed  that 
the  King  had  a  copy  which  he  was  keeping  secret,  and  explains 
the  late  public  appearance  of  the  work.  However,  since  neither 
the  King  nor  Richelieu  left  direct  evidence  that  a  copy  was  pre- 
sented to  the  former  and  was  to  be  kept  secret,  one  cannot  be 
certain  as  to  the  precise  reason  for  the  late  appearance  of  the 
work.  "The  probabilities  are,"  says  one  writer,  "that  it  was 
considered  so  important  that  it  was  reserved  for  the  King  alone 
and  thus  its  publication  was  delayed. ' '  * 

There  are  a  number  of  copies  of  the  Testament  Politique. 
Among  these  are  four  important  manuscripts,  the  first  of  which 
is  found  in  the  French  department  of  foreign  affairs.  It  was 
probably  brought  over  in  1705  with  the  papers  of  Eichelieu 
as  a  whole,  which  were  sent  there  by  permission  of  Louis  XIV.5 
The  second  manuscript  was  found  in  the  Sorbonne,  which  insti- 
tution obtained  it  from  a  former  secretary  of  the  Cardinal.  The 
third  was  found  in  the  possession  of  M.  Frudaine,  councillor  of 
state  and  of  the  royal  council.  The  fourth  belonged  originally 
to  M.  de  Saint-Palaye.  The  last  two  were  manuscripts  found 
in  the  hands  of  private  individuals  and  are  thought  to  be  copies 
of  the  manuscript  discovered  in  the  department  of  foreign  affairs. 
Thus  the  first  two  can  be  regarded  as  original,  since  one  was 
found  among  the  papers  of  the  Cardinal,  and  the  other  given 
by  his  secretary  who  recognized  its  authenticity. 

In  spite  of  the  existence  of  these  copies  of  the  interesting 
work,  the  historian  Aubery,  who  took  upon  himself  the  task  of 
writing  the  life  of  the  Cardinal,  failed  to  find  it  among  the 
papers  of  Richelieu,  which  were  in  the  possession  of  his  niece 
the  Duchess  of  Aiguillon.  He  went  ahead  and  published  in 

sBoehm,  15. 

*  Ibid.,   16-17. 

5  Eichelieu,  Memoires,  XI,  267-268. 


733]  APPENDIX  B  191 

1678  a  work  entitled  le  Traite  de  la  Regale.  But  when  the 
Testament  appeared  about  ten  years  later,  the  latter  work 
proved  that  his  conception  of  Richelieu's  ideas  with  regard 
to  the  royal  prerogative  was  wrong.  Indeed  he  found  his  rep- 
utation as  an  authority  on  the  life  of  the  Cardinal  to  be  injured, 
and  as  a  result'  it  was  a  question  of  either  his  downfall  or  that 
of  the  Testament  Politiqiie,  and  of  course  he  favored  the  fall 
of  the  latter. 

Thus  the  fight  started.  "Aubery  in  his  history  of  the  Cardi- 
nal Mazarin,"  says  Boehm,  "took  a  determined  stand  against 
the  authenticity  of  the  work,  but  his  criticism  was  purely  per- 
sonal and  not  scientific. ' ' 6  However,  his  failure  to  find  the 
manuscript  gives  evidence  of  the  effort  made  to  keep  the  work 
secret  as  a  personal  possession  of  the  King.  No  apparent  effort 
was  made  between  1642  and  1687,  to  make  the  public  aware 
of  it.  Nevertheless,  once  it  got  into  print,  its  intrinsic  impor- 
tance made  it  an  object  of  eager  debate,  and  the  question  of  its 
authenticity  became  a  live  one.7 

Next  comes  the  great  debate  of  1749  between  the  historians 
Voltaire  and  Foncemagne  with  regard  to  the  last  writing  of  the 
Cardinal.  Voltaire  hated  Richelieu  from  the  very  first  and 
saw  a  chance  to  pay  his  respects  to  the  departed  churchman. 

At  this  point  one  must  take  into  account  the  attitude  of 
certain  groups  toward  Richelieu  as  largely  influencing  the 
secrecy  of  the  Testament  and  accounting  for  the  violent  oppo- 
sition to  it.  Sympathy  could  not  be  expected  for  the  Cardinal 
or  for  his  work  from  such  opponents  as  the  nobles  and  the 
Parlement  of  Paris.  Indeed,  it  is  surprising  that  they  permitted 
the  work  to  appear  at  all.  It  certainly  did  not  suit  their  polit- 
ical ambitions,  and  therein  lies  the  political  explanation  for 
the  suppression  of  and  the  opposition  to  the  great  book. 

On  the  other  hand,  Richelieu  left  some  strong  friends  espec- 
ially among  the  intellectual  class.  Gabriel  Hanotaux,  for  ex- 
ample, may  be  cited  as  the  greatest  living  exponent  of  the  true 
greatness  of  the  Bishop  of  Luzon.  It  is  due  to  such  men  that 
a  reliable  account  of  the  life  of  Richelieu  can  be  obtained  at 
present. 

Voltaire  made  an  unauthentic,  prejudiced  attack  which  was 

e  Boehm,  18. 
19. 


192  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OP  RICHELIEU  [734 

answered  by  Foncemagne  in  a  clear,  fair,  and  concise  manner. 
"In  fact,"  says  Boehm,  "he  knew  how  to  return  every  thrust 
with  absolute  certainty  and  effect. ' ' 8  However,  as  the  dispute 
was  a  personal  one,  it  is  not  worth  considering  except  in  so  far 
as  the  motives  behind  it  aid  in  an  explanation  of  the  results 
obtained.  The  opposition  to  Richelieu,  in  a  political  and  personal 
sense,  found  a  welcome  outlet  in  numerous  attacks  on  his  last 
work.  For  example,  Voltaire's  second  assault  upon  the  Testa- 
ment was  brought  about  more  from  personal  enmity  against 
certain  Amsterdam  publishers  than  from  a  desire  to  oppose  the 
Testament  Politique.  He  was  determined  to  "show  up"  these 
publishers  as  being  frauds,  and  picked  upon  the  last  contribu- 
tion of  the  Cardinal  as  a  means  by  which  this  was  to  be  done. 
The  result  was  a  torrent  of  sarcastic  abusive  personal  remarks 
which  really  meant  nothing  against  the  book  itself. 

Opposition  developed  to  the  attacks  of  Voltaire,  and  the  Tes- 
tament Politique  had  many  defenders.  Foncemagne  in  a  letter, 
made  a  reply  which  put  the  former  on  the  defensive.  But 
nothing  positive  came  out  of  this  conflict.  The  authenticity  of 
the  work  was  not  proved  as  yet,  and  the  question  as  to  whether 
Richelieu  had  written  the  notes  and  not  the  text  or  vice  versa 
was  unsettled.  In  fact,  the  crux  of  the  argument  now  centered 
around  a  study  of  the  original  manuscripts,  which  contained  the 
text  and  some  notes  written  on  their  borders.  Of  course,  the 
Cardinal  is  accused  of  obtaining  his  ideas  in  finances  from  Sully, 
but  this  proves  nothing,  as  Boehm  points  out,  for  any  writer  at 
that  time  used  the  intellectual  ideas  of  the  age  as  common 
property.  This  custom  is  also  illustrated  in  Richelieu's  Mem- 
oirs, but  they  must  be  considered  likewise  a  part  of  his  own 
ideas.9 

Both  Foncemagne  and  Ranke  recognized  the  spirit  of  Riche- 
lieu in  this  work,  but  when  they  found  anything  in  the  book 
which  reminded  them  of  other  authors  they  put  down  a  question 
mark  as  to  that  particular  section.  The  best  example  is  perhaps 
the  chapter  devoted  to  the  finances,  which  was  considered  to 
have  been  written  by  Sully  or  someone  else  who  had  read  Sully 's 
works.  However,  Foncemagne  admitted  finally  that  the  chap- 

s  Boehm,  23-24. 

9  Ibid.,  28.  Also,  that  the  Cardinal  might  have  obtained  his  ideas 
from  Montchretien,  but  what  does  this  prove! 


735]  APPENDIX  B  193 

ters  concerning  the  finances  and  the  marine,  if  not  written  by 
the  Cardinal,  were  set  down  by  his  secretaries  under  his  super- 
vision. Boehm  does  not  doubt  that  they  were  the  ideas  of 
Richelieu  and  of  no  one  else.10 

The  final  stage  of  the  controversy  was  reached  when  Hano- 
taux  brought  out  his  Fragments  et  Maximes  de  Richelieu,  which 
were  written  by  Richelieu  without  doubt,  since  his  handwriting 
has  been  recognized. 

Now  these  fragments  are  a  part  of  his  Testament  Politique. 
That  is,  all  the  passages  having  a  certain  mark  are  found  in 
the  latter  work.  Furthermore,  along  the  margin  of  certain 
passages  is  found  the  word  Testament,  which  would  tend  to 
prove  that  particular  sections  were  to  be  inserted  in  his  last 
great  work. 

"  However,  Hanotaux's  discovery  does  not  absolutely  prove 
the  authenticity  of  the  Politique,"  says  Boehm.12  It  merely 
supports  the  funeral  oration  mentioned  above  in  the  proof  that 
the  Cardinal  actually  intended  to  write  a  work  of  that  kind. 
One  must  further  conclude  that  the  real  Testament  Politique 
arose  uniformly  and  grew  as  an  organic  unit,  that  it  was  writ- 
ten during  the  latter  part  of  his  life,  and  that  it  was  completed 
and  was  not  a  mere  "torso."  The  Fragments  to  Boehm  are 
just  a  part  of  the  work.  The  marginal  notes  on  the  text  are 
changes  to  be  made  in  the  revision  of  the  work.  He  has  no 
doubt  that  the  fragments,  the  text,  and  the  marginal  notes  com- 
prise what  Richelieu  planned  should  be  a  part  of  a  final  copy 
which  he  would  not  be  able  to  finish.13  Does  this  explanation  not 
help  to  explain  the  late  publication  of  the  work  and  the  silence 
concerning  it  ?  In  other  words,  the  Testament  Politique  we  now 
have  is  a  combination  of  the  text,  the  marginal  notes,  and  the 
fragments.  That  the  process  of  copying  might  bring  about 
slight  mistakes  is  to  be  expected,  but  this  fact  does  not  prove 
the  falsity  of  the  work. 

Finally,  when  one  considers  again  the  purposes  which  Riche- 
lieu had  in  writing  this  book :  (1)  to  influence  the  King  to  wait 

10  Boehm,  29-30. 

11  Eiehelieu,  Maximes  d'titat,  707-728. 

12  Boehm,  30-31. 

tU,  30-31. 


194  THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU  [736 

until  the  coming  peace  to  take  up  the  great  reorganization  of  the 
state,  (2)  to  leave  a  defense  of  his  life-work  against  future 
attacks  that  might  be  made  against  him;  one  cannot  doubt  its 
importance  and  truth:  "out  of  these  purposes  grew  the  great 
interest  which  Richelieu  put  into  his  work  and  the  value  he 
attributed  to  it. " 14  That  he  tried  to  adopt  and  follow  out  a 
system  based  on  what  is  in  his  Testament  Politique  is  evident 
to  students  of  his  administration.  Indeed,  the  tenseness  and 
unity  of  it  all,  the  firmness  with  which  the  portions  were  skill- 
fully^ inserted  in  the  building  up  of  the  whole  work,  and  above 
all  the  high  personal  purpose  of  it  all,  makes  Richelieu  responsi- 
ble for  every  line  of  it.  When  one  studies  his  life  and  finds  out 
how  he  constantly  considered  the  future  of  France;  when  one 
compares  this  work  with  his  Memoirs  and  letters,  and  sees  the 
conformity  in  style,  judgment,  and  opinions,  it  seems  incon- 
ceivable that  this  is  the  work  of  any  other  man  than  the  Cardi- 
nal. Was  there  another  individual  in  France  capable  of  writing 
a  book  as  great  as  the  Testament  Politique  ?  Bonnefon  says, 
"It  is  a  work  which  shows  the  man  more  than  the  writer, ' ' 15 
and  this  makes  it  of  supreme  value;  for  in  reading  it,  one  can 
conceive  of  no  other  personality  than  that  of  Richelieu  behind 
it  all.  Pigeonneau  sums  the  whole  matter  up  when  he  says  that 
it  is  his  work  in  thought  as  in  style.16  The  authenticity  of  the 
Testament  Politique  is  today  generally  admitted.17 


i*  Boehm,  32. 

is  Bonnefon,  415-416. 

is  Pigeonneau,  II,  376-377. 

"Molinier,  XI,  35. 


BIBLIOGBAPHY  TO  APPENDIX  B 

The  above  appendix  has  been  based  to  a  large  extent  upon 
material  found  in  the  following  works. 

I.    Boehm,    Ernest,    Studium    zum    Politischen    Testamente 
Richelieus,  Leipzig,  1902. 

Dr.  Boehm,  in  preparation  for  the  doctoral  degree, 
investigated  the  problem  with  special  reference  to  the 
fight  over  the  authenticity  of  the  Testament  Politique. 
The  dissertation  seems  to  be  sound  and  has  been  relied 
upon  for  much  of  the  material  in  the  above  appendix. 
II.  Richelieu,  A.  J.  du  Plessis,  Cardinal,  due  de,  Maximes 
d'fitat  et  Fragments  Politiques  du  Cardinal  de  Richelieu. 
Ed.  Gabriel  Hanotaux  (Collection  des  Documents  Inedits 
sur  L'Histoire  de  France.)  Vol.  LI. 

M.  Hanotaux 's  remarks  in  the  introduction;  throw  new 
light  upon  the  question  at  issue,  and  constitute  a  decisive 
stage  in  the  controversy. 

III.  Richelieu,  A.  J.  du  Plessis,  Cardinal,  due  de,  Memoires  (M. 

Petitot,  Editor).    Vols.  X  and  XI,  Paris  1819-1829. 

M.  Petitot  brings  out  clearly  in  these  volumes  his  idea 
of  the  strong  relationship  existing  between  the  Testament 
Politique  and  the  Memoires. 

IV.  Molinier,  Augusta  E.,  Les  Sources  de  I'Histoire  de  France, 

etc.     Vol.  XII.     See  appendix  A,   I-I.    • 


195 


INDEX 


Admiralty,  seven  bureaus  of,  102. 
Africa,   colonies   in,    108,   110,    119, 

120;      commerce     in,     163,     164; 

pirates    of,    95,    101;    Eiehelieu's 

accomplishments  in,  135. 
Agriculture,   83-85. 
Aides,  113. 

Aiguillon,  duchess  of,  190. 
Algiers,  commerce  with,  135. 
Aleppo,   132,   133. 
Alexandria,  131,  132. 
America,  135;  colonies  in,  108,  110, 

116,  118,  144. 
American    colonies,    diplomacy   with 

regard,  168. 
Americas,  111,  170. 
Amsterdam,  192. 
Anne  of  Austria,  142. 
Antilles,  company  of  the,  118. 
Arctic,  region  of,  117. 
Army,  38,  60,  67,  68,  72,  83. 
Asia,  colonies  in,  108,  110,  111,  119 ; 

commerce  in,  131. 
Assembly    of   notables,    65,    66,    95, 

125;  cahiers  of,  27. 
Atlantic,  piracy  on,  101. 
Aubery,  190,  191. 

Austria,  13,  20;  diplomacy  with  re- 
gard, 136,  137,  158,  161,  164,  165, 

168,  170. 

Bagdad,  131. 

Baltic,  and  commerce,  131;  and  dip- 
lomacy, 137,  165-166,  167,  169. 

Barbary  Pirates,  96,  144,  163. 

Barbary  States,  92,  135. 

Bassompierre,  Grand  Mar6chal  de, 
82. 

Baugy,  M.  A.  M.  de,  127. 

Beer  industry,  85. 

Bonds,  71,  79,  80. 


Bordeaux,  archbishop  of,  53. 

Bourse,  the,  160. 

Bouthilier,  superintendent  of  finan- 
ces, 66,  67. 

Braire,  canal,  26,  87. 

Brest,  119,  155. 

Bridges,  88. 

British  Museum,  190. 

Brittany,  72,  94,  115^  150,  155. 

Brouage  d'  Orleans,  103. 

Buckingham,  duke  of,  151. 

Bullion,  superintendent  of  finances, 
66,  68. 

Cadiz,  44. 

Cahiers,  of  the  third  estate,  85. 

Cahusac,   French  admiral,   157. 

Canada,  colonies  in,  113,  116;  com- 
merce in,  164;  control  of,  159; 
fur  trade  in,  139;  Huguenots  and, 
54. 

Canals,  development  of,  86-88. 

Cape   of   Good  Hope,   121. 

Cape  Verde,  120. 

Capitian,   days  of,  49. 

Capitulations,  with  Turkey,  132. 

Cartier,  Jacques,  116. 

Caspian  Sea,   136. 

Centralization,  economic  aspects  of, 
46-62. 

Chamber  of  justice,  64. 

Champigny,  superintendent  of  fin- 
ances, 64. 

Champlain,  21,  108,  109,  114,  117, 
118;  in  America,  116. 

Charlemagne,  95. 

Charles   I,  of  England,   159. 

Charles  VI,  of  France,  95. 

Charles  IX,  of  France,  88. 

Charnace,   165. 

Chartres,    87. 

Chateauneuf,  35,  157,  158,  159. 


197 


198 


THE   ECONOMIC   POLICIES   OF   RICHELIEU 


[740 


Chief  councillor,  46-47. 

China,  133;  Jesuits  in,  119. 

Clarente,   55. 

Clergy,  and  colonization,   111;    and 

finances,     69;     member     of,     63; 

Bichelieu's    attitude    toward,    36- 

38. 

Code  Michaud,  100,  125. 
Colbert,   20;    age  of,  105;    and  the 

marine,  106;  and  his  policies,  172, 

173;    and    taxation,    71;    colonies 

and,  108,  110,  111;  importance  ol, 

64. 

Coligny,  109. 
Colonization,  Bichelieu's  ideas  with 

regard,  108-125. 
Commerce,    foreign,    125-140. 
Commonwealth  of  Plato,   81. 
Comptons,    79. 

Connetable,  office  of,  47,   93. 
Conseil,    95. 

Constantinople,  131,  132,  133. 
Conway,    150. 
Corvees,    84,    88. 
Cromwell,  125. 

Danzig,  168,   169. 

d'Armacon,  87. 

d'^ffiat,  marquis,  superintendent  of 

finances,  64,  65,  72,  75. 
d  'Etampes,    87. 
De  Fontenay-Mareuil,   159. 
d'Infreville,  Leroux,  101. 
Denmark,    commerce    of,    136,    137, 

144;   diplomacy  with  regard,  168- 

169;   the  marine  of,   95. 
d'Ouehe,  87. 
Dieppe,  153;  and  colonies,  119,  120; 

company  of,   116. 
Distillers,  85. 
Dominique,   119. 
Doniol,  Henri,  83. 
Duel,  edict  against,  50. 
Dutch  East  India  Company,  25. 

East  Indies,   colonies  in,   111,    119, 
120;    commerce    with,    139,    150, 


163;  company  of,  116;  rivalry 
over,  138,  162. 

Elector  Palatine,  161. 

Elizabeth,  Queen,   159. 

England,  23,  24,  25,  27,  54,  55;  and 
French  commerce,  138,  139;  and 
Holland,  143;  and  Huguenots, 
174;  and  marine,  92,  95,  97,  98, 
99;  and  Polish  trade,  136;  and 
salt  trade,  57,  142;  and  Seven 
Years'  War,  167;  colonies  of, 
108,  109,  110,  122,  126,  128,  129, 
130;  commerce  of,  163;  piracies 
of,  96;  Richelieu's  attitude  to- 
ward, 147-162,  168,  169,  171. 

Entail,  84. 

Estates  General,  21,  27,  52,  63,  85. 

Europe,  50,  122,  141,  164. 

Father  Joseph,  46,   119,  131. 

Finances,  Bichelieu's  administration 
of,  62-82. 

Flanders,  89 ;  commerce  in,  143,  144 ; 
diplomacy  of,  145. 

Florida,   117. 

Foncemagne,  191,  192. 

Foreign  commerce,  Bichelieu's  ideas 
with  regard,  125-141. 

Fort  Bichelieu,   118. 

Fournier,  L.  P.,  105. 

France,  viewed  by  Voiture,  176;  ac- 
cording to  Bichelieu,  178;  colonies 
of,  99,  108-124;  commerce  of,  71, 
125-140;  economic  importance  of, 
19,  20,  21,  24,  25;  economic  ten- 
dency in,  28,  31,  35;  finances  and, 
65,  66,  67,  73,  74,  76,  77;  industry 
in,  86 ;  local  privileges  in,  70 ;  La 
Bochelle  and,  56;  Bichelieu  and, 
59,  141-171,  172,  173,  174,  175; 
Seven  Years'  War  and,  167;  taxes 
in,  90. 

Francis  I,   of  France,   94,   95. 
Frankfort,  44. 

French  Bevolution,  35,  50,  172. 
Frudaine,    M.    councillor    of    state, 
190. 


741] 


INDEX 


199 


Gabelle,    71,    74,    79,   80. 

Garde  de  Sceaux,  144. 

Garonne,   55,   154. 

Gaston  d'   Orleans,   51,  57,   72,  99. 

Generalities,  14. 

Genoa,  133. 

Germany,  23,  89,  133,  165,  166; 
commerce  with,  147;  Hanseatic 
cities  of,  99;  Thirty  Years'  War 
and,  170. 

German  salt,   136. 

German  states,  165,  167. 

Grand  master,  chief,  and  general 
superintendent  of  the  navigation 
and  commerce  of  France,  office  of, 
47-49,  57,  82,  92,  113,  119,  125; 
duties  of,  93;  Eichelieu's  ideas  as 
to  office  of,  93-94,  102. 

Grand  Ordonnance,  see  Michaud. 

Grand  Seigneur,  132,  133. 

Grotius,  118. 

Guadeloupe,    119. 

Guiana,  119. 

Guise,  duke  of,  155. 

Gustavus  Adolphus,  colonial  policy 
of,  170;  death  of,  169. 

Guyon,  87. 

Hamburg,  168. 

Hanotaux,  Gabriel,  191,  192. 

Hansa  cities,  155. 

Hanseatic  cities,  94;  diplomacy 
with  regard,  168. 

Hanseatic-League,   decay  of,   108. 

Hapsburgs,  110,  111,  129;  diplo- 
macy with  regard,  137,  141,  158, 
164,  166,  167,  168,  169,  174. 

Henry   II,   of   France,    94. 

Henry  IV,  of  France,  19;  colonies 
in  regime  of,  108,  119,  120,  159; 
economic  achievements  of,  20, 
173;  end  of,  21,  22;  failures  of, 
21,  27,  28;  finances  and,  64,  65; 
internal  administration  of,  83, 
85,  87 ;  the  marine  of,  94,  95,  101, 
103;  the  people  and,  38. 

Henrietta  of  France,   147,  148. 

Holland,   23,    24,    27,    74;    coloniza- 


tion of,  108,  109,  116,  121;  com- 
merce of,  126,  128,  129,  130, 
138,  139,  143,  144;  diplomacy 
with  regard,  145,  147,  150,  153, 
160,  162,  168,  169  j  Eichelieu's 
attitude  toward,  97,  162-164. 

Huguenots,  15,  32,  38,  46,  49,  100, 
129,  142,  143;  and  commerce,  53, 
54,  56,  57;  Eichelieu  and  the,  61, 
62,  77,  80,  153-157,  163,  174; 
ships  and  the,  96,  97,  103. 

' '  Hundred  Associates, ' '  companies 
of,  115,  116,  173. 

Indies,  98,  112;  colonies  in  the, 
115;  commerce  in  the,  164. 

Industry,  in  France,  85-86. 

Intendant  Generate,  88. 

Intendants,  52;  creation  of,  70,  71; 
duties  of,  88. 

internal    commerce,    86-92. 

Iron  industry,   85,   90. 

Italy,  89,  98;  and  Spain,  145;  com- 
merce in,  136;  commerce  of,  144, 
153;  diplomacy  with  regard,  146, 
164-165;  expeditions  in,  108; 
manufactures  in,  122,  139. 

Japan,    Jesuits   in,    119. 
Jerusalem,   131. 
Jesuits,  119. 

King,  colonies  and,  111,  116,  117; 
centralization  and,  46;  finances 
and,  68,  71,  78,  88;  Huguenots 
and,  53,  54;  marine  and,  99; 
people  and,  52;  Eichelieu's  at- 
titude toward,  30-31;  war  and, 
141. 

King  of  England,  and  French  com- 
merce, 151. 

Laffemas,  Isaac  de,  95. 

La  Nacelle  de  Saint  Pierre  Fleur- 

delissS,  company  of,  112. 
La  Roehelle,  53;    and  salt,   57,  71, 

142,  143 ;  and  the  government,  55 ; 

commerce  of,  116;  diplomacy  with 


200 


THE   ECONOMIC   POLICIES   OF   RICHELIEU 


[742 


regard,    147,    148,    150,   151,   152- 

157;  fall  of,  136;  Eichelieu  and, 

174;  siege  of,  104. 
Lauson,  M.  de,  127. 
"Laws   of  the   sea,"   159. 
Le  Eos  Sainct  Make,   144. 
Le  Traite  de  la  Eegale,  191. 
Lea  messieurs  de  Saint-Molo,  51. 
Lettres,  patent,  60,  72. 
Levant,  25,  95,  105;  and  Spain,  143; 

colonies  in,   119;    commerce  with, 

115,    126,    130,     132,    136,    164; 

diplomacy  with  regard,  165. 
"libelles,"   in   Germany,    15. 
Li4ge,  170. 
Loire,   154. 
London,    44,    129. 
Louis  XI,  of  France,  19,  49. 
Louis  XIII,  of  France,  28,  47,  105, 

110,  120,  151,  189. 
Louis  XIV,  of  France,   173,  190. 
Louis  d'or,  91. 
Liibeck,   168,   169. 
Luc.on,  bishopric  of,   36,  40,  191. 
Liitzen,  169. 

Madagascar,  island  of,  119,  120, 
121. 

Mare  Liberum,  118. 

Marie  de  Medicis,  French  queen,  21. 

Marillac,  superintendent  of  finances, 
64. 

Marine,  Eichelieu 's  ideas  with  re- 
gard to  the,  92-108. 

Marseilles,    132,    134. 

Martinique,  island  of,  119. 

Mazarin,   Cardinal,   97,    172,    191. 

Medicinal  plants,   61. 

Mediterranean,  86,  96,  101,  103, 
113;  a  French  lake,  135;  and  the 
Dutch,  143;  and  Spain,  144;  com- 
merce in  the,  111;  control  of,  167, 
168;  rivalry  on,  131. 

Mercantilism,  age  of,  17-29. 

Merchants,  and  colonization,  111. 

Mercure  Francois,  44,  56,  145;  col- 
onies and,  124;  commerce  and,  90, 


92,  95,  144;  diplomacy  and,  151, 
152,  168. 

Meurier,  Jean  du,  112. 

Michaud,  code  de,  84. 

Mole,  Mathieu,  111,  112. 

Montchretien,  19,  21;  and  salt  in- 
dustry, 54;  economic  ideas  of,  22, 
23,  24,  25,  26,  27,  28,  173;  marine 
and,  95. 

Montmorency,  47,   94,  120. 

Monts,  Sieur  de,  116. 

Morbihan,  company  of,  115,  122, 
147. 

Morocco,  commerce  with,  135. 

Musselmans,    Emperor   of,    131. 

Nantes,  153. 

Naples,  133. 

Napoleonic  War,  151. 

Navy,  38,  48,  67,  68,  72. 

Netherlands,  145,  147,  169. 

Newspaper,  aid  to  commerce,  90. 

New  France,  colonies  in,  113;  com- 
pany of,  73,  116,  117. 

New  World,  discovery  of,  91;  strug- 
gle for,  155. 

Nitschdil,  count  de,  159. 

Nobles,  colonies  and,  111;  commerce 
and,  126;  finances  and,  69,  70; 
intendants  and,  71;  marine  and, 
95,  101;  newspapers  and,  90; 
privileges  of,  73,  83;  Eichelieu 's 
attitude  toward,  32-36,  49,  50,  52, 
61,  62,  64;  suppression  of,  142. 

Norman   mariners,    19. 

Normandy,    150,   155. 

North  Africa,  commerce  in,  135, 
139. 

North  America,  108,  118;  fur  trade 
in,  114. 

North  German  States,  169. 

Norway,  commerce  and,  113,  136, 
137. 

Ordonnateur  generale,  82. 
Orient,   111;   colonies  in,  119;   com- 
merce with,  131,  165. 
Orleans,  55. 


743J 


INDEX 


201 


Oleron,    island    of,   57;    importance 

of,  55. 

Ottoman  Empire,  131. 
Oxenstierna,   170. 

Palatinate,  159. 

Paris,  21;  Parlement  of,  47;  paving 

of   streets   in,    86;    postal    service 

from,  89;  province  of,  87;  Royal 

Garden    at,    61. 
Parlement,   47;    conflict   in   a,   115; 

Richelieu's    attitude    toward,    52, 

55,  70. 

Parlements,  local,  72. 
Pensions  and  Richelieu,  79. 
Persia,  131,  132,  133,  136,  162,  164; 

Jesuits  in,  119. 
Pieardy,   85. 
Pierre  du  Pont,  85. 
Plato,  commonwealth  of,  81. 
Poland,    and    commerce,    136,    166; 

and  control  of  Baltic,  168. 
Port  Royal,  157. 
Portugal,    144;    and    colonies,    108, 

111;  and  commerce,  128. 
Portuguese,    navigators,    19;    revolt 

of,  146;  revolution  in,  170. 
Postal  system,  88. 
Protestants,  13,  14,  117. 
Provence,    96,    134,    144. 
Prussia,   168. 

Quebec,  117,  118. 

Ranke,  192. 

Razilly,   Isaac  de,   110,   115,  120. 

Re",  island  of,  55,  56,  103,  152. 

Eeglement  pour  la  mer,  97. 

Rhine,  border  of,  164. 

"River  Rulers,"  101. 

Roads,  development  of,  88. 

Robeval,   116. 

Rome,   36,   133. 

Rouen,  city  of,  and  Morocco;  col- 
onies and,  120,  121;  commerce 
and,  116;  governor  of,  51;  piracy 
and,  127;  Morocco  and,  139. 

Rug  industry,  85. 


Russia,  25;  and  commerce,  113,  131; 
and  Spain,  143;  diplomacy  with 
regard,  166;  French  commerce 
with,  136. 

Saint-Germain,  treaty  of,  160. 

Saint-Kitts,  island  of,  118,  157,  159. 

Saint  Lawrence,  river  of,  117. 

Saint-Malo,  Les  Messieurs  de,  126. 

Saint-Palaye,  M.  de,  190. 

Sanson,  the  geographer,  121. 

Sanson  Napolon,  135. 

Savoy,  129. 

Schools,  for  liberal  arts,  83;  for 
pilots,  103;  technical,  86;  trade, 
82. 

S6guiran,  Henri  de,  101. 

Sendre,  river,  55. 

Senegal,  colonies  of,  119. 

Seven  Years'  War,  167. 

Sicily,  133. 

Silk  industry,  85. 

Smyrna,    133. 

Sorbonne,  190. 

Sou  per  livre,  tax,  74,  75,  79. 

South  America,  colonies  in,  118. 

Spain,  20,  23,  24,  25,  38,  49,  52; 
and  finances,  65;  and  marine,  92, 
97,  98,  104,  105;  and  postal  ser- 
vice, 89;  colonies  of,  108,  110,  115, 
118,  122;  commerce  and,  126,  128, 
129,  130,  136,  138,  139;  diplomacy 
and,  140,  149,  150,  153,  154-155, 
156,  157,  158,  160,  161,  162,  164, 
167,  168,  169,  170;  pirates  of,  96, 
101;  Richelieu's  relations  with, 
142-147. 

Spanish  navigators,  19. 

Speculations,  in  food,  89,  90. 

State  Socialism,  58. 

Sublet  des  Noyers,  secretary  of  state, 
82. 

Sue,    M.,    105,    106. 

Sully,  economic  achievements  of,  20, 
21,  22,  28;  financial  policy  of,  75; 
ideas  of,  173;  importance  of,  64, 
65 ;  Richelieu 's  letter  to,  41 ;  naval 
marine  and,  94. 


202 


THE   ECONOMIC   POLICIES   OF   RICHELIEU 


[744 


Sulton,  131. 

Sweden,    and    commerce,    113,    136, 

137;   diplomacy  with  regard,  158, 

165,  166;  Richelieu  and,  168,  169, 

170;  the  sea  and,  95. 
Swiss,    cantons    of,    167;    commerce 

with,  135,  153;  soldiers  of,  136. 
Switzerland,  89. 

Tattle,  tax,  64,  65,  71,  73,  78,  79, 
80,  83,  84,  113. 

Tarragona,  53. 

Testament  Politique,  15,  23,  26,  27, 
29,  31,  34,  38,  41,  42,  45,  62,  63, 
161,  164,  173,  174,  175;  and  col- 
onization, 115,  122,  146;  and  com- 
merce, 134,  138-139,  164;  and  fin- 
ances, 75-81;  and  the  marine,  92, 
97-98;  authenticity  of,  189-194. 

Third  eetate,  finances  and,  63; 
Richelieu's  attitude  toward,  38- 
44. 

Thirty  Years'  War,  13,  46,  66,  128, 
129,  130,  138,  140,  142;  and  col- 
onization, 119;  and  diplomacy, 
147,  157,  158,  159,  160,  161,  162, 
164-170,  176. 

Toulon,   103. 


Tours,  139. 

Transportation,    in    France,    88,    89, 

90,   107. 
Tunis,  135. 
Turkey,    commerce    and,    130,    131; 

diplomacy  with  regard,  165. 

Ultramontanism,  36. 
Universities,  61,  88. 
Usselinx,  Wilhelm,  168. 

Venetian     ambassador,     report     of, 

149,  154. 
Venice,  79. 
Vettes,  river,  87. 
Voiture,  letter  of,  175-176. 
Volga,  river,  136. 
Voltaire,   191,    192. 

West  Indies,  colonies  in,  114,  115, 
118,  120,  121;  commerce  in,  140; 
company  of,  173;  Portuguese  and, 
138. 

Wine  growers,  85. 

Witte,  Nicholas,  112. 

Zollverein,  144,  169. 


UNIVERSITY  OF  ILLINOIS  STUDIES 

IN  THE 

SOCIAL  SCIENCES 

::B,  1920  No.  4 


THE  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  OF  RICHELIEU 


BY 
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ioJern  European  History 
in  the  University  of  California 


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